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Introduction
maTT Bower
Beloit College
membower@gmail.com 
emanUele caminada
universität zu Köln
emanuele.caminada@uni-koeln.de
IntRodUCtIon
The present volume of Phenomenology and mind is dedicated to the topic of 
habit, especially in its personal and social aspects. The phenomenological 
tradition has produced a number of interesting and fruitful reflections on 
habits, importantly challenging the often too sharply drawn distinction 
between nature and culture.  The notion of habit is crucial in understanding 
husserl’s phenomenology. The ante-predicative framing of types in 
perception and the felt movement of the lived-body, the framing of position-
takings in logically, evaluatively, and practically formed judgments, the 
rational stances one can adopt, e.g., in interpersonal discourse, or the 
attitudes shaping one’s conceptual grasp of the world – in all these instances 
conscious life decisively involves elements of habit (types, positions, stances, 
attitudes, etc.).
The notion of habit, of course, does not first emerge within the intellectual 
milieu of the phenomenological movement.  indeed, the discourse on 
habit in phenomenology’s precursors may prove quite helpful in making 
sense of certain currents in (especially Francophone) phenomenology.  it 
has been a significant subject of discussion and controversy throughout 
philosophy’s history, ranging from aristotle’s treatment of hexis and its 
reception as habitus in Thomas aquinas’ psychology, to hume’s critical 
analysis of ‘powers’, and further on to the French vitalists and Bergson, who 
had an important role also in merleu-Ponty’s transformation of husserl’s 
phenomenology of the lived-body.  in the 20th, century the concept was 
imbued with great social relevance. gehlen’s philosophical anthropology, 
for instance, gave a foundational role to ‘habits’ in the stabilizing of social 
institutions.  Schütz and some of his followers, like Berger and luckmann, 
analyzed habits in relation to the life-world.  But it was perhaps Bourdieu’s 
sociology that really made the concept of ‘habitus’ prominent within the 
social sciences and the humanities.
we think that phenomenology has far from exhausted its potential to 
clarify the concept of habit and advance the discussion further.  To that 
end, the current volume, on “mind, habits and Social reality,” brings 
together a number of contributions in an attempt to put on display both 
the profound depth, systematic import, and the thematic breadth that a 
phenomenological treatment of the notion of habit can possess.
Session i introduces genetic phenomenology with an overview of husserl’s 
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broad and differentiated understanding of the habitual self (Moran) 
and offers a specific focus on the phenomenology of types, with an eye 
to hume’s account of induction (Lohmar), as husserl’s most original 
account of habits, as well as on the quasi-existential application of genetic 
phenomenology to situational intentionality (Ferencz-Flatz) and also to the 
social structure of the life-world (Da Costa).  in Session ii, habit is elucidated 
ontogenetically (Sheets-Johnstone) and its peculiar teleological sensitivity 
to circumstances (Zhok) is brought to the fore.  The history of the concept 
of habit is also mobilized to engage the problem of the naturalization of the 
mind (Efal), while marleau-Ponty’s and ricoeur’s phenomenology are shown 
to assuage certain problematic assumptions about habit (McGuirk), and, 
lastly, habit is argued to be pertinent to the current debate on extended 
mind.  Session iii is dedicated to the social and normative character of habit, 
critically taking stock of Bourdieu’s seminal sociological theory of habit 
(Crossley) and enhancing it phenomenologically to make room for social 
creativity (Kokoszka). on the other hand, from a non-Bourdieuian point 
of view, a reciprocal habitual influence of individual and society on values 
is posited (Scalambrino), and, turning toward the individual, we are given 
an analysis of the intertwining of passive and active habits in personal 
position taking (Arango).  Finally, in Session iV we offer two further 
resources for understanding habits: the english version of Rochus Sowa’s 
article on episodic and non-episodic intentionality (“episodische und nicht-
episodische intentionalität Zur konstitutiven Funktion der epistemischen 
habitualitäten des wissens und glaubens bei edmund husserl”, published in 
fenomenologia, Vol. 12, 2014) and an annotated bibliography on habits edited 
by Marco Cavallaro.
returning now in a little more detail to the present volume’s contents, 
Session I introduce genetic phenomenology, focusing on its most 
characteristic contribution to our understanding of the realm of habits: its 
theory of habituality and types.
Dermot Moran’s contribution “‘The ego as Substrate of habitualities: 
edmund husserl’s Phenomenology of the habitual Self” analyzes and 
contextualizes many different terms husserl uses to theorize about the 
domain of habit.  although husserl rarely gives an explicit methodological 
reflection on its operative value, habit appears to be the key concept of 
genetic phenomenology.  Moran collects therefore the main occurrences 
of terms related to habit in the husserliana volumes and elucidates their 
systematic relevance, showing how phenomenology reveals habit as present 
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at all levels of human behavior, from the lower drives, bodily intentionality 
right up to rationality in theoretical, practical and emotional life. The 
transcendental clarification of epistemic attitudes relates methodologically 
to the role of scientific habits and their sedimentation. Convictions, 
decisions and sentiments are all habits “layered over on each other in very 
complex intertwined ways” that constitute selves as stable and abiding 
egos, giving them their “weight” in individual and social life.  disclosing the 
operative concept of habit in husserl’s disparate phenomenological analyses 
and juxtaposing the latter with (among others) heidegger’s, gadamer’s and 
Bourdieu’s own developments, Moran’s article clears the ground for further 
in-depth studies on the phenomenology of habits.
in his article “Types and habits. habits and their cognitive Background 
in hume and husserl”, Dieter Lohmar explores husserl’s most original 
development of genetic phenomenology.  The concept of type refers to 
pre-predicative forms of knowledge.  Lohmar defines ‘type’ as a form of 
pre-knowledge of singular objects or events (individual types) or of a class 
of objects or events (general types).  Types are contrasted with empirical 
concepts of everyday life, respectively as a similarity group bound to a 
finite number of experiences and as the result of idealizations that grasp 
what is common to an infinite manifold of possible objects.  Types show a 
unique aspect of mental life characterized by preservation of knowledge and 
gradual adaption to changing circumstances.  despite this conservatism, 
types, as leading and guiding operations in perception and action, are 
quite flexible frameworks of sense, being powerful and effective tools of 
pre-knowledge.  lohmar underlines their role in various pre-predicative 
realms of cognition, which, as he claims, the human mind shares with other 
animals, too.  Finally, he sketches some systematic comparisons between 
husserl’s genetic phenomenology and hume’s understanding of habits.
against the background of husserl’s theory of types, Christian Ferencz-
Flatz gives a phenomenological account of the notion of ‘situation’ in his 
paper “A Phenomenology of Automatism: Habit and Situational Typification 
in husserl”. moving from the existential tension between situational 
facticity and the demand of free decisions, the author discusses the 
details of husserl’s genetic-phenomenological understanding of situation 
as a peculiar form of total-configuration (Gesamtkonfiguration).  The 
apperceptive unity of situational typification is treated both in its noetic 
as in its noematic character, stressing the dynamic role of expectations 
and embodied potentialities.  Thus, situation is defined as the “intentional 
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living unity of horizonal context and subjective potentiality”.  Ferencz-
Flatz focuses his attention on three main aspects of the phenomenology 
of situation: the role of interests in the shaping of experience, periodicity, 
and the emergence of a secondary normativity. Situations are organized 
through complex processes of time patterns contingent on subjective and 
environmental constraints and rhythms. They are structured by habitual 
interests which commit the subject to forms of ‘secondary normativity’, 
i.e. the “secondary passivity of practical preference in an intersubjective, 
generative context.”
intersubjective types or ‘stocks of knowledge at hand’ are the core topic of 
Tomas Da Costa’s “Between Relevance Systems and Typification Structures: 
alfred Schutz on habitual Possessions”. da costa contextualizes the concept 
of type in the work of the founder of Phenomenological Sociology, alfred 
Schutz.  Schutz’s notion of type lies in between weber’s sociological tool 
of ideal-type and husserl’s genetic account of typical appresentation. 
Because of this twofold source, Schutz’s understanding of types is related 
both to forms of idealizations (typifications) and to an empirical concept 
of generality (typicality).  Typicalities and ideal-types are at the generative 
core of Schutz’s description of the structures of the life-world and are 
conceived in his account as essential social features of both mind and 
environment:  even more, they are the instruments through which the 
social world becomes real.  in this regard, the pragmatic turn of Schutz’s 
phenomenology slightly modifies the terms of Husserl’s understanding of 
types, stressing more the role of higher-order idealizations, such as the 
interchangeability of standpoints and the congruency of the system of 
relevancies, rather than focusing on the basic genetic operations that lead 
from previous pre-predicative levels of cognition to the disparate realm of 
idealizations.
The suite of papers comprising Session II of this volume takes on the 
general themes of how habits figure in our mental constitution and mode 
of access to the world.  Fittingly, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, in her article 
“on the origin, nature, and genesis of habit,” opens up the section by 
tackling the question of the mind’s beginnings.  her concern is the relation 
of genesis to ontogenesis.  More specifically, the aim is to gain clarity about 
the phenomenon of habit by taking into account precisely the relation of 
habit to ontogenetic development.  The investigation is inspired by her 
observation that in the analysis of conscious life nothing may be taken for 
granted, or, positively, that every minute detail has its origin and history 
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in past experience.  This is precisely what the notion of habit suggests – 
no habit is given, all habits are acquired.  in her analysis, which focuses 
on habits as patterns of movement, Sheets-Johnstone highlights the 
individuality of habit-acquisition by describing the phenomenon’s relation 
the related phenomenon of style.  The specifically ontogenetic dimension 
of habit is then related to instinctive behaviour, where Sheets-Johnstone 
stresses, following husserl, the character of persons both as free agents and 
natural beings comes to light.
in light of that analysis, Sheets-Johnstone takes issue with recent 
phenomenological work on embodiment and the sense of self, arguing that it 
misconstrues its phenomena of interest by unwittingly assuming an adultist 
stance.  if one instead recognizes the primacy of felt bodily movement – 
something easily overlooked by phenomenologist who, as a matter of fact, 
occupy the standpoint of adults while carrying out their investigations, but 
filling the awareness of the infant at every moment – one can avoid such 
pitfalls.  lastly, Sheets-Johnstone indicates how her ontogenetic approach to 
habit might connect with the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and social 
understanding, inasmuch as we understand others so often by recognizing 
their habitual style.
while the importance of habit for our mental constitution is widely 
recognized, there is a current within philosophy that nevertheless sees 
habit in a somewhat negative light.  This is even apparent in the word’s 
semantic often negative associations with words like “rote,” “mechanical,” 
“blind,” etc.  Andrea Zhok devotes his article, “habit and mind,” to tackling 
this issue and defending habit’s dignity in our mental economy.  indeed, 
since habits are necessary for learning, and we can follow no rule, i.e., 
master no concept or meaning, without learning, a great deal is at stake 
with habit.  in his mission to put on display habit’s merits, Zhok marshals 
the philosophical resources of Peirce and husserl to show how an urge to 
repeat makes habit possible in the first place.
Though it is thanks to Peirce’s notion of abduction that we can recognize 
the need for such an impulse, it is husserl who presents in more detail the 
shape it might actually take.  Zhok locates this impulse in husserl’s account 
of time-consciousness and the process of “temporalization.”  consciously 
retained past experience is transformed and projected in protention, which 
seeks out the same in the further course of experience.  what emerges in 
this analysis, Zhok claims, is the purposive and intelligent character of 
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habit.  indeed, habit has its own logic, being both sensitive to circumstances 
(and so not mechanical) and purposive (and so not blind).  having redeemed 
the notion of habit, he notes that the conception of habit he develops resists 
any thoroughgoingly reductive naturalization because of its teleological 
elements.  nevertheless, in stressing its embodied and embedded character, 
Zhok admits that his view is amenable to a more liberal take on the project 
of naturalizing the mind.
habit is also pertinent to the discourse on naturalization in a more 
historical register, as Adi Efal’s work, titled “naturalization: habits, 
bodies, and their subjects,” shows.  efal charts the conceptual geography 
and philosophical lineage of the notion of habit prior to and leading 
up to its appropriation in the phenomenological tradition.  indeed, 
the work undertaken by efal is essential genealogical work providing 
important background information for understanding how Francophone 
phenomenologists have conceived of habit.  her task is to relate, in 
particular, how the aristotelian-Thomistic conception of habit that keeps 
the material body at a relative distance is overturned in the 19th century 
discourse on habit among such figures as Biran, Ravaisson, and Bergson.  
despite their nuanced differences, the latter, she explains, conceive of habit 
as essential to life precisely as its material presupposition.  She contends 
that this idea opens up the possibility to think of habit in a unified way 
as both material and moral, rather than prising these aspects apart as 
in the aristotelian-Thomistic strategy, an idea that is in need of further 
exploration.
James McGuirk, picking up near where efal’s article leaves off, represents 
the post-husserlian phenomenologies of merleau-Ponty and ricoeur in his 
article “Phenomenological considerations of habit: reason, knowing, and 
self-presence in habitual action,” in which he maintains along with Zhok 
that any conception of habit as merely blind, automatic, and mechanical 
is mistaken.  indeed, to put it positively, habit can be a genuine form 
of knowledge.  mcguirk conceives it as containing both the potential 
for authentic self-expression and a sensitivity to circumstances, pace 
the negative allegations advanced by ryle and heidegger against habit.  
merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology makes prominent the deft, even creative, 
manner in which habit allows one to navigate through the world, while 
ricoeur, especially when he views the phenomenon in hermeneutic terms, 
explains for us how habit can be both opaque (i.e., at least in part beyond 
our conscious grasp) and authentic at the same time.
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The specifically Merleau-Pontian view of habit may also be relevant to 
current debates over the extent of cognition and the so-called extended 
mind hypothesis (emh), namely, the proposal that some cognitive processes 
may by partially constituted by what lies beyond a cognizer’s boundaries 
as an individual organism.  Richard Strong connects the dots between 
merleau-Pontian habit and emh in his article “habit and the extended 
mind: Fleshing out the extended mind Theory with merleau-Pontian 
Phenomenology.”  his goal is not to alter or expand upon the thesis in 
any way, or even to suggest that habit itself extends the mind in any way.  
rather, he argues that the classic presentation of emh in clark and chalmers 
(1998) and its subsequent elaboration in clark (2011) overlooks an important 
way in which embodied habits might figure in the kinds of examples used to 
support emh.  one need not address this problem beginning ex nihilo, Strong 
shows, because merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology already illustrates the way 
embodied habit, in the form of the “body schema,” facilitates the acquisition 
and employment of extended cognitive accessories.  This does not end the 
discussion, Strong suggests, but rather brings into view the variety of real 
strategies subjects may make use of in co-opting their environment to 
better pursue their cognitive ends.
Session III offers phenomenologically driven insights into the 
methodological debate of the social sciences about the tensions between 
individual agency and the social structures. 
Nick Crossley approaches the concept of habit from a sociologist’s point of 
view. after having given a historical introduction on the relevance of the 
concept of habits in sociology and in related phenomenological accounts, 
he aims to clarify the proper validity and the conceptual limitations of 
the term as the main explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns 
of social interaction. in this regard, the concept of habits is in crossley’s 
account both crucial and limited. he explores the methodological strength 
and the conceptual limits of the term contrasting it with concepts which 
have been often presented as alternative accounts: rules and conventions.  
in the context of ‘theory of practice’ habit is coined by Bourdieu’s 
understanding of it as ‘structuring structures’ that gives the enculturated 
subject a ‘feel for the game’.  with this understanding of habit, one nowadays 
quite familiar in social sciences and humanities, crossley compares winch’s 
theory of social rules and lewis’ conception of convention.
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according to crossley, in contrast to rules and conventions, habit cannot 
grasp the relational nature of social structures, provided it is understood as 
the sedimentation of individual instantiations of social actions in dispositions 
of discrete individuals.  Therefore, social structures, if conceived only through 
habits, are methodological fragmented and individualized in the collection of 
individual dispositions for social tasks and skills.  on the other hand, winch’s 
account can elucidate the fact that rules refer to rational normativity, since 
social practices governed by rules can (and ought to) be viewed in terms of 
their rightness or wrongness.  Thus, this peculiar aspect of social rationality 
can be captured by rules, not by habits, which tends to reduce it to matters of 
fact.  The same goes for Lewis’ definition of convention as coordination and 
agreement for social action.  Both winch and lewis underline aspects of social 
reality that are intrinsically relational and cannot be reduced to individual 
dispositions.
crossley shows, moreover, how habits can lend stability to both rules 
and conventions and durability by anchoring them within the embodied 
subject, beneath the level of reflective decision.  Habits both enable the 
naturalisation of behaviour and put them outside of the realm of discourse, 
as embodied knowledge of something taken-for-granted. Finally, he 
concludes his conceptual clarification showing how habits, rules and 
conventions need to be considered not as key concepts of alternative 
accounts, but as related conceptual tools within an all-compassing frame for 
a future theoretical sociology.
While Crossley gives a sociological clarification of the concept of habit as 
an explanatory tool for regular and enduring patterns of social interaction, 
i.e. for social structures, Valérie Kokoszka enhances Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus phenomenologically by elucidating how social creativity 
(therefore agency in a strong sense) is linked to, but not exhausted by 
habitual dispositions.  She refers to Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus 
as a “generative scheme of practices adapted to objective circumstances” 
as a means to give an account both of social regularities without reducing 
them to inanimate mechanism and of creativity in social interactions 
without taking recourse to a powerful, rational subjectivity capable of 
decoupling itself from social structures.  She calls Bourdieu’s rejection of 
structuralism and subjectivism into question. on one hand, his concept of 
habitual dispositions seems to be linked to a strong “noetisation” of habit, 
i.e. internalisation of all its performativity as a form of Kantian schematism, 
and, on the other hand, the objectivity of the social environment is 
presupposed as a static field and never analysed in its structural relation to 
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the dynamic life of the bearer of habits.  Kokoszka’s suggested enhancement 
moves from her original interpretation of husserl’s genetic phenomenology.
Kokoszka suggests a terminological distinction between habits as 
noetic dispositions and types as noematic schemes.  in her original 
account, she distinguishes genetic phenomenology distinguishes from 
static phenomenology by decidedly sublating the static tendency “to 
noeticize” the intentional field, drawing it into the immanence of the 
transcendental ego.  She then applies this phenomenological innovation 
to Bourdieu’s account where the concept of habits replaces the role of 
transcendental consciousness.  Since the systematic correlation of habits 
as subjective dispositions and of types as objective dispositions of the life-
world stresses the intertwining of embodied subject and environment, 
the social environment can no longer be presupposed as a given field of 
social objectivities and norms that are stabilized by internalized habitual 
dispositions, but as an enactively framed habitat. inhabiting the life-
world, the bearer of habits is not only intertwined with its environment, 
but also called to reply to its affordances and to cultivate it by creating 
material correlates that make it habitable.  Thus, she subtly describes the 
intertwining of passive and active habits, showing how in taking a stance 
in relation to its own cultural environment the hiatus between disposition 
and disposed subject provides the latter the leeway of a relative framework 
of spontaneity and personal cultivation, something absent in Bourdieu’s 
account.  Finally, she addresses Sartre’s description of social institutions as 
material devices for incorporation and embodiment of goals, as well as their 
tendency to degenerate in goal-blind devices for self-conservation.
as crossley’s and Kokoszka’s contribution already suggest, there is a rich 
field of phenomenological research having to do with the sociality of habits.  
Frank Scalambrino, in his article “From a phenomenology of the reciprocal 
nature of habits and values to an intersubjective ground of normative social 
reality,” approaches the same matter from a non-Bourdieuian perspective, 
taking as his primary philosophical resource a phenomenological 
appropriation of aristotle.  There is, Scalambrino shows, a challenging 
problem concerning the place of the individual and the place of the social 
with respect to normativity, namely, about whether the validity of values 
(in their basic experiential, proto-rational form) has its source in the former 
or the latter.  he negotiates this dilemma by pursuing a phenomenological 
analysis that ultimately doesn’t force one to take sides (i.e., in favour of the 
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individual or the social).  one can, instead, strike a balance by conceiving 
of a reciprocal interrelation of the individual and the social insofar as these 
co-contribute to the validity of values.  This is made possible by locating 
the ground of values in habit, which is at the same time an individual and 
a social affair.  only in interpersonal intercourse, Scalambrino argues, 
can we come to an adequate evaluation of the value of a given situation, 
provided that the habitual background of all the individuals involved 
mutually serve as evaluative constraints.  in that way, Scalambrino presents 
a complex picture of habit as the site where the individual and the social 
come together to engender the norms that bind social subjects together in 
interpersonal encounters.
Shifting focus to theorize more specifically about the place of habit in 
the constitution of an individual subject, Alejandro Arango’s paper, 
titled “husserl’s concept of position-taking and second nature,” contains 
a treatment of the notion of second nature.  he views the latter not as 
comprised of habits per se, but more specifically of those dispositional 
tendencies termed “position-takings” [Stellungnahmen].  Arango first takes 
pains to carefully distinguish between pure passivity, e.g., in the form of 
instincts, acquired habits, and, more narrowly, active position-takings.  he 
argues that only position-takings are suitable elements for comprising a 
second nature based on their peculiar motivational character.  The latter 
gives one a kind of self-consistency that is integral to a person’s unity, 
yet a consistency that is not some kind of natural given but which, rather, 
requires active self-formation.  hence, arango concludes, position-takings, 
as acquired principles of self-unification, are precisely what the notion of a 
second nature is meant to capture.  despite this distinction between second 
nature as comprised of position-takings over against one’s more “natural” 
or passive tendencies, husserl’s phenomenology, arango notes in closing, 
weaves the active and the passive together into a non-dualistic, multi-
stratum whole.
with Session IV, the present volume closes with the inclusion of a 
translation into english of an article by Rochus Sowa, titled “episodic and 
non-episodic intentionality: on the constitutive Function of the epistemic 
habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in edmund husserl.”  The article seeks 
to clear up some problematic aspects of husserl’s phenomenology, to which 
end a renewed reflection on the domain of the habitual figures importantly.  
Sowa begins by explaining the difference between the project of a static and 
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of a genetic phenomenology.  The difference can be cashed out in terms of 
a development in husserl’s theory of intentionality: Static phenomenology 
concerns discrete episodes of particular conscious intentional acts, while 
genetic phenomenology concerns non-conscious habits, i.e., horizons 
consisting of empty intentions in which intentional acts are contextualized.  
in particular, Sowa shows, habit, in the form of knowledge, is not an 
occurrent moment within the complex of lived-experiences that comprise 
one’s conscious life.  it is, rather, a way one is disposed.  one doesn’t 
know, truly, by executing a one-off intentional act, but only inasmuch 
as something holds good, i.e., is accepted as valid.  This is a condition, a 
disposition, exceeding conscious awareness, thanks to which one tends to 
produce appropriate acts (empty intentions in perception, judgments in 
knowledge) in appropriate circumstances.
The threatening consequence emerges, then, that the phenomenologist is 
cut off from these putatively noetic “phenomena,” as they do not properly 
appear, and accordingly cannot be described.  indeed, the threat is, as Sowa 
sees it, to the very idea of intentional correlation.  his solution comes with 
the notion he introduces of “gewusstsein,” for which the best we can do in 
english is “knownness.”  So explains that nothing new is thereby added to 
the contents of conscious awareness.  rather, knownness follows from the 
recognition that our acts have motivational antecedents of which we are 
not aware.  Prior experience, belief, or knowledge may fall into complete 
obscurity for consciousness. yet it remains “present” and even “in view” 
inasmuch as our acts in the present continue to have it for their motivation, 
though without its coming to conscious awareness.  This is how, moreover, 
our belief in the world functions, Sowa argues, as something that holds good 
beyond our awareness.
The last piece in the volume is an extensive, lightly annotated bibliography 
of literature on the topic of habit, generously compiled by Marco Cavallaro.  
For ease of use, the bibliography is divided into four main parts.  The first 
part covers edmund husserl’s engagement with the topic of habit, which, 
in turn, is grouped into three categories: his primary published works; 
the published manuscripts, lectures, and essays; and references to yet 
unpublished manuscripts.  The second part of the bibliography lists primary 
works by other authors working in the phenomenological tradition, and 
the third covers the secondary literature dealing with the notion of habit 
in phenomenological terms.  lastly, the fourth part presents a sampling of 
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work on habit exemplifying perspectives beyond phenomenology, including 
figures in the history of philosophy, more recent philosophy (analytic and 
continental), and some offerings from outside of philosophy altogether (e.g., 
psychology, neuroscience, sociology, aesthetics, literary theory).
in that spirit, we hope this collection of papers will be of service in ongoing 
phenomenological and philosophical research.  its value will lie not in 
settling disputes or definitively answering questions concerning habit, 
but in opening up avenues for further research and discussion.  This is 
possible, in part, due to its systematic import, i.e., in clarifying the major 
fault line within husserlian phenomenology demarcating static and genetic 
phenomenology in a way that makes the notion of habit indispensable.  
The phenomenon of habit is also made to appear in this volume in its 
concreteness, i.e., in the broad range of topics that it can help shed light on, 
whether in the way habit relates to the temporal depths of an individual life 
in its development, or in its constant presence as what enables individuals to 
creatively and authentically navigate their surroundings and negotiate their 
interpersonal relations in ways that have cognitive, practical, and ethical 
significance.  Additionally, in their analyses of habit, several contributions 
in this volume not only offer an expansive take on phenomenology’s domain 
of research, but also draw attention to points of contact, e.g., between 
phenomenology as an approach to philosophy and alternative philosophical 
outlooks (e.g., analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science) and 
theoretical paradigms (e.g., praxeological sociology), sites in which we would 
like to see much more interdisciplinary dialogue on these themes.
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SESSION 1
HABIts And tHe PHenomenology of tyPes
Dermot Moran (University College Dublin) 
The Ego as Substrate of Habitualities: Edmund Husserl’s 
Phenomenology of the Habitual Self
Dieter Lohmar (Universität zu Köln)
Types and Habits. Habits and their Cognitive Background in 
Hume and Husserl
Christian Ferencz-Flatz (Alexandru Dragomir Institute for Philosophy, Bucharest)
A Phenomenology of Automatism. Habit and Situational Typification 
in Husserl
Tomas da Costa (Bergische Universität Wuppertal)
Between Relevance Systems and Typification Structures: Alfred 
Schutz on Habitual possessions
abstract
keywords
husserl, phenomenology, habit, self, sociality, tradition
dermoT moran 
university College dublin 
dermot.moran@ucd.ie
husserl’s phenomenology offers a very complex treratment of the full conscious person 
as constituted out of its capacities and habitualities. human existence develops 
itself habitually through its intentional meaningful practices both individually and 
communally. habit can be found at all levels in the constitution of meaningfulness 
(Sinnhaftigkeit), from the lowest level of passivity, through perceptual experience, to the 
formation of the ego itself, and outwards to the development of intersubjective society 
with its history and tradition, to include finally the whole sense of the harmonious course 
of worldly life. husserl uses a range of terms to express his concept of habit including: 
habitus, habitualität, gewohnheit, das habituelle, habe, Besitz, Sitte, and even Tradition. 
Husserl’s account deeply influenced Ortega Y Gasset, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger, 
and maurice merleau-Ponty, and Pierre Bourdieu, among others. This paper will give an 
overall analysis of husserl’s conception of the habitual self.
tHe ego As sUBstRAte of HABItUAlItIes: 
edmUnd HUsseRl’s PHenomenology of 
tHe HABItUAl self
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each individual has his or her habits. 
(Jedes individuum hat seine gewohnheiten, husserl, hua XiV, p. 230).
The ego as Substrate of habitualities. 
(das ich als Substrat von habitualitäten, Cartesian meditations, husserl, hua i, §32, p. 100/66;) 1
in general, edmund husserl’s phenomenology is an extraordinarily rich 
source of insights and analyses concerning the nature of the self and its 
relation with others approached from the phenomenological point of view, 
that is, from the point of view of intentional sense-making by and between 
conscious subjects. his phenomenological investigations over many years 
explore the rich and multi-layered life of intentional consciousness and 
experience from the lowest levels of what might be described as a kind of 
humean “pre-egoic” passive association, where experiences hang together 
and are clustered in an orderly harmonious way temporally, prior to explicit 
conscious organization, right through the formation of a stable and abiding 
self with its capacities and abilities and then again, on to the highest level 
of cultural cooperation, living together (mitleben) and “being-with-one-
another” (ineinandersein) in what he terms the “life of spirit” (geistesleben). 
in Cartesian meditations § 34 husserl locates this discussion of the habitual 
ego within a new area of phenomenology which he names “genetic 
phenomenology”:
with the doctrine of the ego as pole of his acts and substrate of habitualities, 
we have already touched on the problems of phenomenological genesis and 
done so at a significant point. Thus we have touched the level of genetic 
phenomenology. (hua i, § 34, p. 103/69)
husserl even speaks of the possibility of an overall genetic “phenomenology 
of habitualities” (Phänomenologie der habitualitäten) (hua XV, p. xxxviii)2. 
The mature husserl always thinks of individual conscious selves as 
being in entangled correlations with other selves in what he somewhat 
misleadingly terms “empathy” (einfühlung) and its cognates, miterleben 
(“co-experiencing”), nacherleben (“reliving”), Einempfindung (“sensing-in”), 
and hineinversetzen (“projection” or “introjection”)3. indeed, one could say, 
without exaggeration, that husserl’s mature phenomenology is primarily 
a phenomenology of communal and intersubjective life, a phenomenology 
of spirit that effectively re-invents hegel although with any pretense 
at dialectical progression but with a sense of appearance, negation, 
cancellation and sublation (aufhebung), as we shall see. 
1  hereafter cited as hua i with page numbers from the german text followed by those of the 
english translation.
2  hereafter cited as hua XV.
3  See moran (2004).
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habit is one of husserl’s operative concepts, concepts on which he does not 
offer an explicit methodological reflection. Moreover, Husserl’s analyses 
of habituality do not appear frequently in his published works, but may 
be found scattered through the nachlass, especially in the volumes on 
intersubjectivity (hua Xiii, XiV and XV) as well as in ideas ii (hua iV)4. For 
instance, husserl’s ideas i (hua iii/1) mentions “habitus” only once at § 96 
(hua iii/1 224), where husserl speaks approvingly of the phenomenological 
“habit of inner freedom”. indeed, the term habitus does not appear at all 
in the Crisis of european Sciences5 although habitualität occurs about a dozen 
times. The term gewohnheit has only a few occurrences there. in terms of the 
works published in his own lifetime, husserl’s readers initially encountered 
the concept of “habit” and “habituality” primarily through a few key 
references in the Cartesian meditations (hua i, especially §27, and §32) and 
later in experience and Judgment (husserl 1938). habitus appears only twice in 
the Cartesian meditations although the term habitualität is somewhat more 
frequently found. 
habit is discussed quite frequently in the posthumously published husserliana 
volumes such as ideas ii (hua volume iV, especially §§29 and 56), husserliana 
volumes XiV and XV on intersubjectivity, Phenomenological Psychology6 lectures 
of 1925 (hua iX), and in husserliana volume Xi on passive synthesis7. husserl 
frequently employs the phrase “abilities and dispositions” (Vermögen und 
habitualitäten). This in his Phenomenological Psychology lectures (1925), he speaks of 
the personal ego as having various “abilities and habitualities” (hua iX, p. 136; see 
also §41, p. 206, where he speaks of the ‘ego as a pole of activities and habitualities’, 
[das ich als Pol der aktivitäten und habitualitäten])8. habituality, in this sense, usually 
combined with human personal abilities and activities to form what husserl calls, 
in Cartesian meditations and elsewhere, an “overall personal style” (Stil). 
central to husserl’s analyses of spirit is his understanding of habitual life in the 
familiar world. This is always a life where meanings are encountered or lived 
4 hereafter cited as hua iV with page numbers from the german text followed by those of the 
english translation.
5 hereafter cited as hua Vi with page numbers from the german text followed by those of the 
english translation.
6 hereafter cited as hua iX with page numbers from the german text followed by those of the 
english translation.
7 hereafter cited as hua Xi with page numbers from the german text followed by those of the 
english translation.
8 he speaks positively of the “personal subject of habits” (hua iX, p. 286). Similarly, in Crisis of 
european Sciences Husserl speaks of the specific “activity and habituality of the functioning ego” 
(aktivität und habitualität fungierenden ich) (hua Vi, p. 109); and of the “peculiarities of human life 
and human habitualities” (hua Vi, p. 141n). every ego has to be considered as an ego pole of acts 
and habitualities (als ichpol seiner akte und habitualitäten und Vermögen) (hua Vi, p. 187).
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through as “always already there” (immer schon da) or “pregiven” (vorgegeben). 
The everyday world of experience has a deep degree of stability, commonality, 
normality, familiarity, and even comfort. it is the common context and horizon 
for our collective concerns. it is indeed both constituted out of and forms the 
intentional counterpart to our habitual lives. in this regard, husserl has a 
phenomenology of the self in everyday life, even if, because of the demands of 
his transcendental point of view, he methodically suspends commitment to this 
everyday life through the transcendental epochē. Precisely because everyday life 
has a pregiven, taken-for-granted character, it is invisible in the analyses of the 
positive sciences. The operations of this hidden intentionality need to be made 
visible and husserl gradually realized this required a major suspension of our 
naïve worldly-commitment or Seinsglaube, belief-in-being. 
For husserl, everyday life is natural life, life in the natural attitude. This is a life lived 
in obscurity, the unexamined life, life lived according to everyday habituality, life 
lived “with blinders on” as husserl often says.
husserl’s phenomenology of habitual life discovers habit as present at all levels 
of human behavior from the lower unconscious instincts and drives (that have 
their own peculiar individuality or idiosyncrasy), bodily motility right up to the 
level of autonomous rational life in culture9. Thus he speaks not just of bodily 
habits or traits of character but of peculiar and abiding “habits of thought” 
(denkgewohnheiten) (hua iX, §24, p. 14210; and hua iii/111, p. 5/xix, see also §108). 
These habits of thought include scientific habits of thinking (Hua III/1, §33) that 
are accepted without question and that it is the function of the transcendental 
epochē to disrupt and thereby expose. 
The life of habit, what husserl often simply abbreviates to the latinate term 
habitus, moreover, is not just a matter of intellectual attitude or conviction 
(Überzeugung), it can also be a matter of perceptual tendencies, desires, feelings, 
emotions, even peculiar moods. husserl recognizes the complex character of our 
“feelings” (gefühle), as well as our intertwined emotional and affective “states” 
(Zustände), acts of empathy, sympathy, love, fellow feeling, and so on, as well as acts 
of willing (important for our ethical lives). in this sense, personal love, for husserl 
is described as a “lasting habitus” (dauernder habitus) (hua XiV, p. 172). all of these 
can have a habitual character, a particular style of being lived through, and as a 
result they can be sedimented into layers that encrust the psyche and form the 
“abiding style of the ego” (der bleibende Stil des ich) (hua Xiii, p. 400).
9  For a fuller treatment of the classical treatments of habit (aristotle, hume) as well as for a 
discussion of Husserl’s influence on Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu, and others, see Moran (2011).
10  See also hua iX, §5, p. 55, where husserl speaks of the “habits [gewohnheiten] of natural 
scientific thinking”.
11  hereafter cited as hua iii/1 with page numbers from the german text followed by those of 
the english translation.
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husserl employs a wide range of terms to express his concept of habit and the 
habitual, including: gewohnheit12, habitus13, habitualität, das habituelle (hua XiV, p. 
195). occasionally, he even uses the germanized version of the greek hexis (hua 
Xiii, p. 400; hua XiV xxiv) and he often speaks quite generally of “possession” 
(Besitz), or “having” (habe, hua Xiii, p. 400), of a skill, a routine, or a decision, a 
point of view, anything that can become literally incorporated in one’s body or 
confirmed as an abiding trait in one’s character—even one that perhaps is now 
cancelled out14. most frequently, husserl deploys adjectives (gewohnheitsmässig, 
habituell) that connote the “habitual”. generally speaking, and i am really basing 
this on my own reading of the husserliana volumes, husserl employs the familiar 
german term gewohnheit to refer specifically to habits of thought, ways of 
thinking influenced by science, psychology and so on (see also Hua VI, p. 145). In 
line with his overall discussion of habit and of human capacities, husserl deploys a 
number of words including “dispositions” (dispositionen), and “abilities” (Vermögen). 
habit is thereby intimately connected with powers, capacities, disposition, 
the ability to exercise a skill, execute routines, embody successfully a range of 
activities, such as playing a musical instrument, dancing, driving, reading, and so 
on. habit, for husserl, is also connected with higher activities of the ego involving 
knowledge, moral practical wisdom and the formation of a stable character, as 
well as the overall achievement of a stable intersubjective life with others. in this 
regard, husserl says that the word ‘Sitte’ (custom) summarizes this idea of habitual 
action and behavior in the social sphere (hua XiV, p. 230)15. husserl is deeply aware 
of and attempts at least to sketch in outline, in his research manuscripts, as we 
shall see, some of the collective social practices that contribute to the constitution 
of custom and culture. in this regard, human existence involves not just bodily, 
psychic and personal habits of the individual but more collective habitual states 
such as the use of language, involvement in games and social practices, and the 
overall capacity to belong to a “sociality” (Sozialität), the capacity to recognize, 
appreciate and follow the norms and values of one’s culture—all these are 
outcomes of habituality. it is through habituality that one becomes acculturated 
and can live in attunement with cultural norms. nevertheless habituality is not a 
12  The term “gewohnheit,” for instance, does not occur at all in Cartesian meditations.
13  The latin term habitus is found in ordinary german with the meaning of “manner” in 
the sense of mannerism, e.g. in phrases such as “he has an odd manner” (er hat einen komischen 
habitus). 
14  on husserl’s use of the word habe and its etymological connection with “habitus”, see 
cairns (1976), p. 7.
15  hua XiV, p. 230: “Jedes individuum hat seine gewohnheiten. wie steht individuelle
gewohnheit und bleibende entschiedenheit (bleibende Urteile, werte, entschlüsse für 
das individuum)? Sitte ist ein Titel für sozial gewohnheitsmässige handlungen, ebenso 
hat die Sprache ihre sozial gewohnheitsmässige grammatische Form, und zu allem sozial 
gewohnheitsmässigen gehört ein Sollen, das des ‘Üblichen,’ des norm alen, sich gehörenden. 
aber wissenschaft und Kunst? ist Sitte an sich schon Kultur? Sie kann in Kultur genommen 
werden, möchte man sagen.”
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set of blind or unconscious processes, it is intentional through and through.
especially in his ideas ii, husserl considers the constitution of the human being, 
progressively, from a number of standpoints that he normally divides into the 
physical (the purely natural), the psychical and the spiritual. human beings as 
physically embodied belong to nature and are subject to natural laws, causation, 
and so on. But human beings are also psychophysical, living organisms or what 
husserl calls leibkörper that have animation, motility and so on, as directed by 
psychic states and acts. human beings are also personal subjects who interact on 
the “spiritual” or cultural plane.
according to husserl, habit, along with association, memory, and so on, belongs 
to the very essence of the “real psychic subject” (hua iV, §30), which is treated as 
a subject of properties and not to be construed as identical with the “pure ego” 
(das reine ich). according to husserl, to this psychic subject belong every personal 
properly, the intellectual character of the human individual and the totality of his 
or her intellectual dispositions, his/her affective character, practical character, 
every one of his/her spiritual capacities and aptitudes, mathematical talent, 
logical acumen, magnanimity, amiability, self-abnegation, etc. (hua iV, p. 122/129). 
Following the older tradition of descriptive psychology, husserl is happy to call 
this psychic subject “soul” (Psyche) in so far as it is understood as having a body 
but not being identical with its body. 
The psychic subject is essentially and by its nature in constant flux, it cannot be 
considered – unlike strictly material objects—as a static entity with unchangeable 
properties:
every lived experience leaves behind itself a wake of dispositions and 
creates something new as regards psychic reality [ Jedes erlebnis hinterläßt 
dispositionen und schafft in hinsicht auf die seelische realität neues]. hence 
this reality itself is something constantly changing. (hua iV, §32, p. 
133/140)
husserl always emphasizes the importance of thinking the psychic subject 
as a flow (fluß) (hua iV, p. 133) in its totality and interconnection with other 
subjects. Thus he writes:
moreover, it has to be noted in this connection that what belongs 
to the full psychic unity as manifold [als mannigfaltiges] (in analogy 
with the schema or the material thing) is the current total state of 
consciousness, whereas the singular, abstracted out, lived experiences 
are, in this respect, “states” [Zustände] of the soul in its fullness only 
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insofar as they fit within the total consciousness and are, in their 
total nexus [gesamtzusammenhang], transitional points for particular 
avenues or manifestation. (hua iV, §32, p. 133/141)
human beings are layered and formed by their lived experiences. 
If we begin by considering the individual human being in its flowing life of 
consciousness, there is a corporeal or bodily habitus that invokes a person’s 
overall ‘bearing’, ‘form’, i.e., how they physically present themselves. in 
this regard, husserl speaks of a person’s bodily habitus (see hua Xiii, p. 76, 
for instance, where he criticizes the munich psychologist Theodor lipps’ 
understanding of human bodily expressions and talks about expression 
as a “bodily habitus”)16. memories, skills, practical abilities are literally 
incorporated in the body, in the way we hold ourselves, move our bodies, 
walk, sit, eat, look weary, adopt a defeated air, and so on17. Some people have 
a more or less ‘innate’, ‘natural’ or ‘given’ sense of balance, an ability to feel 
their way through water when swimming, a joy in hearing sounds (husserl 
speaks of this as belonging to sheer facticity, ideas ii §61, in that different 
people simply enjoy different kinds of sounds, colors and so on, i.e. one’s 
favorite color), and so on. Training can build on and amplify these nature 
abilities and capacities. For edith Stein, for instance, who follows husserl 
in this regard, capacities can be strengthened through “habituation”18.  one 
can practice sitting up straight, not slumping one’s shoulders, and so on. 
nevertheless, there is an extremely deep inalienable individuality to human 
experiencing. Each of us has a familiar gait or a specific tone of voice, set of 
facial expressions, even favorite strings of words.
Some babies just are attracted to certain sounds or colors; some prefer one 
kind of movement over another. gradually distinctive tastes and inclinations 
in food, color, smell, taste, emerge, and these last through life. husserl here 
speaks of certain attractive stimulus or allure (reiz) that comes to prominence 
and elicits an individual response. husserl even says: “we may even allow 
originally instinctive, drive related preferences” here (see hua Xi, p. 150/198). 
each individual has his or her own “style” (Stil) (hua iV §61), and indeed the 
natural world also runs along its own “total style” (gesamtstil). To describe 
reality and human beings as running along in a harmonious course is not 
to see it as something automatic or mindless. habit for husserl is connected 
with rational deliberation and intellectual scrutiny but this is not its primary 
characteristic. The key characteristic of habit in husserl’s analysis is its 
16  in this sense, certain gestures, facial expressions, mannerisms of various kinds exemplify 
an individual’s style.
17  See for instance, young (1990) and Sheets-Johnstone (2003).
18  Stein (1917), p. 56/51.
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“lasting” or “continuous” (dauernd) character, the fact that it attaches to the 
ego and modifies it permanently.
There are, of course, intellectual habits as well as corporeal or bodily habits. 
Intellectual habits in particular are initiated by acts of the ego—specific 
position-takings or decisions. habits need to be initiated. They also need to 
be ‘bedded down’ or burned in through practice and repetition. one swallow 
does not make a summer. developing or changing a habit, moreover, may 
require deliberation and alert self-scrutiny. giving up or resisting a habit, 
e.g. smoking, requires the development of new habits, new overriding and 
deflective routines. It also requires a certain second-order stance towards my 
first-order instincts, I experience a strong and unshakeable desire to smoke; at 
the same time, i perhaps desire to stop smoking; i desire to curb my desire to 
smoke. i stand in a judgment of negation in front of my compelling desire and 
hence it is now an altered desire. as husserl writes in ideas ii:
[T]he personal ego constitutes itself not only as a person determined 
by drives […] but also as a higher, autonomous, freely acting ego, in 
particular one guided by rational motives […]. habits are necessarily 
formed, just as much with regard to originally instinctive behavior 
[…] as with regard to free behavior. To yield to a drive establishes the 
drive to yield: habitually. likewise, to let oneself be determined by a 
value-motive and to resist a drive establishes a tendency (a “drive”) to 
let oneself be determined once again by such a value-motive […] and to 
resist these drives. (hua iV, §59, p, 255/267; with translation change)
One can desire to fulfill, negate or enhance another desire. There are higher 
levels of self-awareness here. one can embrace a desire (the desire for 
another person, for instance) and make it not just a project (in the Sartrean 
sense) but as filled with the meaning of being a central characteristic of 
my own existence and character.  desires and stances towards them are all 
caught up in the complexities of meaning-investment or sense-constitution.
The Fourth cartesian meditation contains an important Section (§32) 
entitled ‘The ego as Substrate of habitualities (das ich als Substrat von 
habitualitäten) (hua i, §32, p. 100/66) which treats of the formation of a 
stable ego through its habits. it is this Session that originally attracted 
the attention of Pierre Bourdieu, who went on to make a major theme of 
habit19. here husserl primarily talks about the manner in which a conscious 
decision (a freely performed act of judging, e.g. “i become thus and so 
19  See Bourdieu (1990), pp. 52-65.  See also Bourdieu (1985) and Bourdieu (1977).
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decided”) can become sedimented down into a habitual property attaching 
to one’s character such that the original decision can even be forgotten. But 
nevertheless, it can be re-activated if i return to it again. husserl writes: 
[i]t is to be noted that this centering ego is not an empty pole of 
identity, any more than any object is such. rather, according to a law of 
“transcendental generation”, with every act emanating from him and 
having a new objective sense, he acquires a new abiding property. For 
example: If, in an act of judgment, I decide for the first time in favor of 
a being and a being-thus, the fleeting act passes; but from now on am 
abidingly the ego who is thus and so decided, “i am of this conviction”. 
That, however, does not signify merely that i remember the act or can 
remember it later. This i can do, even if meanwhile i have “given up” 
my conviction. after cancellation [durchstreichung] it is no longer my 
conviction; but it has remained abidingly my conviction up to then. 
as long as it is accepted by me, i can “return” [zurückkommen] to it 
repeatedly, and repeatedly find it as mine, habitually my own opinion 
or, correlatively, find myself as the Ego who is convinced, who, as 
the persisting ego [als verharrendes ich], is determined by this abiding 
habitus [diesen bleibenden habitus] or state. (hua i, §32, pp. 100-101/66-67).
This is not a new thought for husserl. he says something very similar much 
earlier in his ideas ii:
if i acquire anew [neu gewinne] an old conviction, while executing 
the appropriate judgement, then the acquired conviction (a lasting 
acquisition [ein bleibender gewinn]) “remains” [verbleibt] with me as 
long as i can assume it “again”, can bring it again to givenness for 
me in a new execution. i may also abandon the conviction, now 
rejecting the reasons for it, etc. Then again i can turn back to the 
“same” conviction, but in truth the conviction had not been the 
same throughout. instead, i have two convictions, the second of 
which restores [wiederherstellt] the first after it has broken down 
[niedergebrochen war]. (hua iV, p. 114/121)
These very interesting passages indicate how, for husserl, transient 
episodes of belief actually can turn into stable and even unconsciously 
held convictions. husserl is always interested in the way these convictions 
can be re-awoken, re-affirmed, or even cancelled or negated, yet, as he 
says in a way nothing gets lost. Thus, in a similarly most interesting and 
THE EgO AS SUBSTRATE Of HABITUAlITIES
dermoT moran university College dublin
35
important passage in experience and Judgment, § 25, husserl emphasizes that 
no experience is ephemeral but rather every leaves some kind of lasting 
“trace” (Spur). even a conviction repudiated is still a conviction-that-once-
was believed. This “trace” becomes accommodated into a habituality 
which eventually has the character of an “empty” practical possessing. 
These habitualities are precisely not memories; they lie somewhere deeper 
in the ego’s character itself. indeed, they may even have been forgotten 
as convictions; certainly the original foundational moments, urstiftungen 
that gave rise to them and inaugurated them can be forgotten. i may have 
forgotten what led me to my conviction or resentment. i cannot remember 
the incident that motivated me to dislike someone. nevertheless, a new 
sense or meaning has been acquired, an object (substrate) is perceived with 
certain properties (explications). Thus he writes:
no apprehension is merely momentary and ephemeral. To be sure, 
as this lived experience of the apprehension of a substrate and an 
explicate, it has, like every lived experience, its mode of original 
emergence in the now, to which is adjoined its progressive sinking 
[herabsinken] into corresponding non-original modes: retentional 
reverberation and, finally, submersion [Versinken] into the totally 
empty, dead past [leere, unlebendige Vergangenheit]. This lived 
experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may 
become “forgotten”; but for all this, it in no way disappears without 
a trace [spurlos]; it has merely become latent. with regard to what 
has been constituted in it, it is a possession in the form of a habitus [ein 
habitueller Besitz] ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active 
association […]. The object has incorporated into itself the forms of 
sense [Sinnesgestalten] originally constituted in the acts of explication 
by virtue of a knowledge in the form of a habitus [als habituelles Wissen]. 
(husserl 1938, §25)20
in all of these discussions husserl has most interesting things to say about 
the peculiar process that he calls durchstreichung–a term more usually 
associated with heidegger and by derrida. The concept of durchstreichung, 
crossing-out or cancellation, is actually quite common in husserl (see hua 
Xiii, p. 367; hua XiV, pp. 124; 142, 153, etc.). For husserl, moreover, in relation 
to intentional life, what is cancelled and crossed out is still retained as 
that which is crossed out. i can say that i used to have such and such as 
conviction but then i abandoned it. nevertheless, i am now both the person 
20  husserl (1938), §25, p. 137/122.
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who (a) had the conviction (b) cancelled it and now (c) hold a different 
perhaps opposite conviction. one never really leaves anything behind in 
the sphere of the person; everything is taken up and carried on even in a 
cancelled or modified manner. Everything is aufgehoben, to invoke hegel’s 
term that is often translated as “cancelled” or “sublated” but which cairns 
renders as “revoked”. indeed husserl uses this exact term when he writes in 
Cartesian meditations:
if it aims at a terminating deed, it is not “revoked” [aufgehoben] by the 
deed that fulfils it; in the mode characteristic of fulfilled decision 
it continues to be accepted: “i continue to stand by my deed”. [Tat 
gerichtet, so ist er durch diese erfüllung nicht etwa aufgehoben, im modus 
der erfüllung gilt er weiter — ich stehe weiter zu meiner Tat.] (hua i, §32, p. 
101/67)
In this recognition of cancellation, modification, taking-up-again, and 
re-validation, husserl thinks of the formation of the ego almost like an 
onion. it is made up of layers that cover and include lower layers, except 
that the layers interact and modify each other. one could also use the 
analogy of a snowball rolling downhill and taking up new layers of snow 
that it integrates into itself. when the self makes a decision, this decision 
attaches itself to and marks out the self as a whole. The self is permanently 
changed or marked even by the things it abandons and rejects. Through 
these indelible convictions, I have the constituted sense of being a “fixed 
and abiding personal ego [als stehendes und bleibendes personales ich]” (hua i, 
§32, p. 101/67). 
decisions and beliefs form into convictions and these convictions become 
sedimented into dispositions or even marks of character. These convictions 
become possessions or “havings” of an ego. having a conviction is not at 
all the same as remembering that one once decided something. a conviction 
indicates a more permanent psychic state; it is a mark of one’s character. 
Furthermore, what was decided can be returned to and reactivated without 
having to run through the associated judgments of evidence. as husserl puts 
it in his intersubjectivity volume husserliana XiV:
i am not only an actual but i am also a habitual ego, and habituality 
signifies a certain egoic possibility, an “I can” or “I could”, or “I used 
to be able to”, and this being-able-to become actual refers to actual 
ego-experiences, even an actualization of ability. in a word, i am (and 
without this there would be no i, i can not think of myself otherwise), 
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an ego of abilities (hua XiV, p. 378, my translation)21
notice that husserl includes “i used to be able to”. in other words, we retain 
past achievements in sedimented form: I used to be able to run a five-minute 
mile or whatever. even if i can no longer do it, i remain the person who could 
do it at one time.
Like Max Scheler, who discusses the stratification of our emotional life in his 
formalism in ethics (1913), husserl is deeply aware that our whole character 
with its convictions, values and emotional stances are layered over on each 
other in very complex intertwined ways. To offer one example, in ideas ii, 
husserl writes with some subtlety about the attitude involved in nursing a 
grudging or harboring a resentment:
we still need to examine more closely how the persistence [Verbleiben] 
of “the” lived experience is to be understood. i have a lasting 
conviction, or i “nurse a grudge” [ich “hege einen groll”]. at different 
times i do have different lived experiences of the grudge (or of the 
judgment), yet it is only “the” grudge coming again to given ness; it 
is a lasting grudge [ein bleibender groll] (or a lasting conviction). The 
judgment of determinate content as lived experience lasts a while 
(immanent duration) and then is irretrievably gone. a new lived 
experience of the same content can subsequently emerge—but not the 
same lived experience. it may emerge in such a way, however, that it 
is only the former conviction returning again, the former conviction 
that had been carried out earlier and is now again being carried out, 
but it is the one lasting conviction, the one i call mine. (hua iV, p. 
113/120)
There are very complex structures of identity in question here. what 
constitutes the identity of a mental state? how do we know that the grudge 
or resentment is the same one? husserl puts quotation marks around “the” 
lived experience. in one sense, each experience occupies a unique place in 
the temporal flow of conscious processes, but we also have a sense of the 
same experience returning. i constitute the feeling as the same feeling as 
before. husserl is aware that we can constitute a feeling or a conviction 
in different ways. Thus people can re-awaken an old anger and again be 
21  The german reads: “ich bin aber nicht <nur> aktuelles, sondern auch habituelles ich, und 
die habitualität bezeichnet eine gewisse ichliche möglichkeit, ein ‘ich kann,’ ‘ich könnte,’ ‘ich 
hätte können,’ und das Können wieder sich verwirklichend weist hin auf ichaktualitäten, auf 
aktuelle icherlebnisse, eben als Verwirk lichungen des Könnens. mit einem worte, ich bin (und 
ohne das wäre ich kein ich, ich kann mich nicht anders denken) ein ich der Vermögen.”
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angry or one could revisit the anger with a degree of embarrassment or 
discomfort. or i could get trapped in reliving the same old emotion over and 
over again without resolving it, cancelling or sublating it. husserl here is 
developing a phenomenology that could contribute greatly to psychological 
or psychoanalytical discourse. of course, we cannot go into it here, but 
the inner temporality of the emotion is at stake here. Some people know 
when to let go of a grief, grudge, or an anger; others live it in a manner 
which is characterized by what Kierkegaard called repetition. There is no 
growth only going back over and over the same grievance. managing the 
temporality of emotional life could call for a deep phenomenology of the 
inner temporality of habit.
as we have seen, husserl recognizes that convictions, decisions, etc., attach 
to the ego and give it a lasting, permanent character despite the flow. 
habitus has to be understood as an enduring “state” whereby i can be said, 
in husserl’s language, to “abide” by my decision. The decision inhabits or 
informs me. Through these acquired decisions that become convictions i 
constitute myself as a stable and abiding ego, someone with, husserl says, 
“a personal character” (hua i, §32, p. 101/67). overall, as husserl writes in 
his intersubjectivity writings, the ego is stabilized by its fixed habits and 
possessions:
I with my firm habitus, with determinate habits of self-having, acting, 
thinking and speaking, and so on. [ich mit seinem festen habitus, mit 
bestimmten gewohnheiten des Sich-gehabens, Wirkens, des denkens und 
redens, usw.] (hua Xiii, p. 244)
husserl often compares the formation of a stable sense of ego with the 
perceptual formation of a stable sense of the perceived object. in perception, 
we glimpse only profiles and adumbrations (abschattungen) nevertheless we 
constitute the perceived object as having a stable existence independent 
from our perceivings. Similarly in rememberings or in forming of 
resentments or grudges there is the noetic dimension and also the noematic 
dimension (the grudge itself, hua iV, p. 115). in many of his analyses husserl 
is primarily interested in what one might call the noematic dimension of 
the experience–what makes a particular habit or disposition the same one 
as before. But at other times he is interested in the noetic dimension, how 
the grieving or grudging is constituted as such, how it relates to the ego, and 
so on. let us now consider how habit is related to the concept of “attitude” 
(einstellung).
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in an even larger sense, habit is also understood by husserl as the manner 
in which a overall ‘attitude’ or ‘stance’ or ‘collective mindset’ (einstellung) is 
lived through. einstellung is a term that husserl took from the psychological 
tradition but he gave it a unique sense. There are any number of attitudes 
that humans can freely adopt but he usually talks about the natural attitude 
and the personalistic attitude (see hua iV, §62). elsewhere he talks about 
“the subjective attitude” (die subjective einstellung) hua Xiii, p. 91). in the 1935 
Vienna lecture Husserl defines an attitude as a style of life: 
[A] habitually fixed style of willing life comprising directions of the 
will or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the 
ultimate ends, the cultural accomplishments whose total style is 
thereby determined (hua Vi, p. 326/280).
interestingly, “habit” in terms of an overall attitudinal stance is discussed 
by husserl already in his 1910/1911 logos essay “Philosophy as a rigorous 
Science”22. There, husserl’s writes of ‘habitus’ (he uses both terms: habitus 
and gewohnheit) as an overall disposition of, for instance, a natural scientific 
researcher:
in keeping with their respective habits of interpretation [herrschenden 
auffassungsgewohnheiten], the natural scientist is inclined to regard 
everything as nature, whereas the investigator in the human sciences 
is inclined to regard everything as spirit, as a historical construct, and 
thus both thereby misinterpret whatever cannot be so regarded. (PrS, 
p. 253/294/hua XXV, pp. 8-9)
This essay is one of the key texts that introduces the idea of the natural 
attitude – which of course gets its canonical formulation in ideas i §27. in 
“Philosophy as a rigorous Science” he writes
it is not easy for us to overcome the primeval habit [die urwüchsige 
gewohnheit] of living and thinking in the naturalistic attitude and thus 
of naturalistically falsifying the psychical. (PrS, p. 271/314/hua XXV, 
p. 31)
and again:
22  hereafter cited as ‘PrS’ with english pagination followed by pagination of the german 
original and then the pagination of the german edition in the husserliana series.
THE EgO AS SUBSTRATE Of HABITUAlITIES
dermoT moran university College dublin
4. 
Habit as Mind 
Set or Attitude 
(Einstellung)
40
THE EgO AS SUBSTRATE Of HABITUAlITIES
dermoT moran university College dublin
experience as personal habitus is the precipitation of acts of natural, 
experiential position-taking that have occurred in the course of life 
[erfahrung als persönlicher habitus ist der niederschlag der im ablauf des 
lebens vorangegangenen akte natürlicher erfahrender Stellungnahme]. This 
habitus is essentially conditioned by the way in which the personality, 
as this particular individuality, is motivated by acts of its own 
experience and no less by the way in which it takes in foreign and 
transmitted experiences by approving of or rejecting them. (PrS p. 
284/329/ hua XXV, p. 48)
There is, furthermore, a difference between the habit (habitus) of the 
natural human in his or her daily living and that of the phenomenologist. 
The mature husserl has a sense of habitus as forming an essential part of 
the character or attitude of natural life and also of expressing the self-
consciously adopted stance of the phenomenologist. husserl regularly 
speaks of the “theoretical habitus” (hua XXViii, p. 402) of the scientist and 
philosopher and even of the “habitus of the epochē” (hua Xiii, p. 208). in 
a supplement written around 1924 to the Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(husserliana volume Xiii), husserl writes: 
The habitus of the phenomenological epochē is a thematic habitus, for 
the sake of obtaining certain themes, the discoveries of theoretical and 
practical truths, and to obtain a certain purely self-contained system of 
knowledge. This thematic habitus, however, excludes to a certain extent 
the habitus of positivity. only in its being closed off to the latter does it 
lead to the self-contained unity of phenomenology as “first” philosophy, 
the science of transcendental pure subjectivity23.
he contrasts the ‘phenomenological habitus’ of personal self-observation 
to the more usual habitus of anonymous and unquestioned living in the 
natural attitude. in this sense, habitus expresses the manner in which 
stance-taking is informed by a certain discipline or practice of viewing and 
considering. in the phenomenological reduction, the habitual survives but
23  See husserl (2006), p. 123; hua Xiii, p. 208: “der habitus der phänomenologischen epoche 
ist ein thematischer habitus, um gewisse Themen, wahrheitserkenntnisse, theoretische 
und praktische, zu gewinnen und ein gewisses rein in sich geschlossenes erkenntnissystem. 
dieser thematische habitus schliesst zwar in gewisser weise den der Positivität aus : nur in 
seiner abgeschlossenheit gegen den letzteren führt er zur abgeschlossenen einheit einer 
Phänomenologie als der ‘ersten’ Philosophie, als der wissenschaft von der transzendental reinen 
Subjektivität.”
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 in altered form. as husserl puts it in his intersubjectivity volume XiV: 
But through the phenomenological reduction, i put the world out of 
validity, only my world-experiencing, my world-believing, my world-
vouching, my corresponding habituality and so on, remain available 
but now as purely subjective. (hua XiV, p. 399, my translation)24
The key point is that husserl believes that human beings have the capacity 
not just to live within certain overall attitudes but to alter them through 
an act of will. attitudes can be changed (einstellungwechsel) or altered or 
switched (einstellungänderung). as a result of these alterations of attitude, 
new objectivities come to light. This is the key to husserl’s “correlationism”. 
let us now turn from the individual to the social.
as we have been insisting, husserl talks of habituality not just in relation 
to the formation of an individual person and his or her character but 
also in relation to the social and cultural spheres, the sphere of “spirit” 
(geist). husserl often speaks of geist to mean generally culture. he talks 
of gemeingeist (hua Xiii, p. 92) which means literally “common spirit” but 
which in ordinary german has something more of the meaning “common 
sense”. already in 1910, husserl is emphasizing that human beings are not 
just beings in the natural world, but seen from the right attitude also spirits, 
belonging to the “world of spirit” (geisteswelt). he writes:
all lived bodies are not only bearers of sensations, etc., and “organs” 
of the mind, but also are “expressions” of the mind and of the life 
of the mind, and as such they are bearers of significance; they are 
beaers of meaning for all interpretations, which is the condition of the 
possibility of social life, being the life of the community25.
in this regard, in a text from 1921/1922, husserl speaks not only of the 
habituality that belongs to the “single ego” (einzel-ich), but also of “a social 
habituality” (eine gemeinschaftshabitualität), which may also be called 
24  See hua XiV, p. 399: “aber durch phänomenologische reduktion setze ich die welt 
ausser geltung, nur mein welterfahren, mein weltglauben, -ausweisen, meine entsprechende 
habitualität usw. bleibt erhalten, eben als rein Subjektives”..
25  husserl (2006), pp. 168-69; hua Xiii, p. 93. The german reads: “alle leiber sind nicht nur Träger 
von Empfindungen etc. und ‘Organe’ des Geistes, sie sind ‘Ausdrücke’ des Geistes und Geisteslebens 
und als solche sind sie Bedeutungsträger, Bedeutungsträger in jeder eindeutung, die Bedingung der 
möglichkeit des sozialen lebens als eines gemeinschaftslebens ist.” 
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a“tradition” (eine Tradition, hua XiV 230)26. husserl recognizes that both 
individuals and social and ethnic groupings have their own habitus. Thus 
he writes about shared physical similarities: “we count races [rasse] in this 
way in so far as the commonality of outer physical habitus goes hand in 
hand with social characteristics” (hua XiV, p. 183)27. we recognize people 
on the basis of familiar patterns, family resemblances (including physical 
traits), social typicalities, and so on, precisely those schemata, sometimes 
called “stereotypes” (not necessarily in a prejudicial sense) by psychologists 
and “types” (Type) by husserl, weber and Schutz. in ideas ii, husserl writes: 
“Personal life manifests a typicality, and each personal life manifests a 
different one” (hua iV, p. 271/284). i come to understand others initially 
through these types—what kind of typical motivations are at play, and so on.
husserl speaks about the self-constitution of the ego but it is important to 
stress that the ego does not constitute itself solely through active stance-
taking (Stellungnahme) and being a self-reflective cogito. The ego constitutes 
itself in the unity of a history and hence it is understood as living a life. The 
ego arises out of ‘life’:
i am the subject of my life, and the subject develops by living; what it 
primarily experiences is not itself, but instead it constitutes objects 
of nature, goods, instruments, etc. what it primarily forms and 
structures as active is not itself but things for work. The ego does 
not originally arise out of experience—in the sense of an associative 
apperception in which are constituted unities of manifolds of a 
nexus—but out of life (it is what it is not for the ego, but it is itself the 
ego). (hua iV, §58, p. 252/264)28.
husserl is describing a dynamic conception of selfhood lived out through 
26  Hua XIV, p. 230 (1921/1922): “Verflechtung des Einzel-Ich und seiner Positionalität in die 
gemeinschaft : Konstitution einer gemeinschaftshabitualität, der Tradition, die immer schon 
besteht mit dem momente der Stiftung der gemeinschaft, da sie selbst nur ist durch Stiftung 
einer intersubjektiven habitualität oder Tradition. das Parallele natürlich für das einzel-ich, 
es ist nur in fortgesetzter Stiftung von habitualität (seine individuelle Tradition) und [hat] also 
auch seinen wesensmässigen anfang (schöpferischen ansatzpunkt) in einer ersten Stiftung, 
durch sie es sich selbst als habituelles ich stiftet.”
27  See hua XiV, p. 183: “die rasse rechnen wir hierher, sofern die gemeinsamkeit des äusseren 
physischen habitus hand in hand geht mit derartigen gemeinschaftscharakteren.”
28  hua iV, p. 252/58: “ich bin das Subjekt meines lebens, und lebend entwickelt sich das 
Subjekt; es erfäh rt primär nicht sich, sondern es konstituiert naturgegenstände, wertsachen, 
werkzeuge etc. es bildet, gestaltet als aktives primär nicht sich, sondern Sachen zu werken. das 
Ich ist ursprünglich nicht aus Erfahrung — im Sinne von assoziativer Apperzeption, in der sich 
einheiten von, mannigfaltigkeiten des Zusammenhanges konstituieren, sondern aus leben (es 
ist, was es ist, nicht für das ich, sondern selbst das ich).”
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its habitual activities: “The ego exercises itself; it habituates itself, it is 
determined in its later behavior by its earlier behavior, the power of certain 
motives increases, etc. ” (hua iV, §58, p. 253/265), it acquires capacities, sets 
itself goals. it settles into a style of life, surrounds itself with what makes 
it feel at home, comfortable, secure. There is, to paraphrase St. augustine’s 
phrase pondus meum amor meus (Confessions, Book Xiii, ch. 9. Para. 10), a 
certain “weight” to habitual experience, it settles the ego down into a stable 
course of living. habit gives a person gravitas, as it were. as husserl writes:
i am the subject that is used to being pleased b y such and such matters, 
that habitually desires this or that, goes to eat when the time comes, 
etc., i.e. the subject of certain feelings and of certain habits of feeling, 
desire, and will, sometimes passive […] sometimes active. (hua iV, p. 
256/269)
Moreover, personal development is intrinsically influenced by others. 
husserl describes the human being as a socius, a member of a community, 
a citizen. he writes in ideas ii: “others’ thoughts penetrate into my soul” 
(fremde gedanken dringen in meine Seele ein) (hua iV, §60c, p. 268/281). husserl 
says that one acquires the habitus of others, more or less as one takes over 
a habitus in the area of individual experience. There is an instauration 
and then in some form an assimilation. I may first experience the feelings 
of others as a demand on me – but later i can submit to that demand and 
assimilate it so that it becomes in some way my own feeling (hua iV, p. 
269). we live always in a communalized world. Thus members of a family 
may display common habits. People in a certain area develop similar 
accents, and so on. They also experience their communal context as a 
set of determinations and also as a set of norms that govern them. They 
experience this network of customs and social institutions as powers, as 
husserl writes around 1910: 
The human being lets “himself” be influenced not only by particular 
other humans (actual or imagined) but also by social objectivities that 
he feels and apprehends as effective objectivities in their own right, as 
influencing powers. He is afraid of “the government” and carries out 
what it commands. he views such and such individuals, for instance, 
the police officer, etc., as representatives of the government only; he 
fears the person who is an official representative. The customs, the 
church, etc., he feels as powers, too [Er empfindet auch die Sitte, die Kirche 
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etc. als eine macht]. (hua Xiii, p. 95)29
husserl expands his account of communalization and life in tradition to 
the full sense of human cooperation in the formation of a common history. 
husserl frequently speaks of the complex interweavings of human subjects 
in collective social life in its concreteness and historicity. Thus in the 
“origin of geometry” text, husserl writes:
we can now say that history [geschichte] is from the start nothing 
other than the vital movement [die lebendige Bewegung] of the being-
with-one-another [miteinander] and the interweaving [ineinander] 
of original formations [Sinnbildung] and sedimentations of meaning 
[Sinnsedimentierung]. (Hua VI, p. 380/371; trans. modified)
husserl speaks of intentional life as an intersubjectively interwoven 
life lived in history and in tradition. we are subjects, or what he calls 
“intersubjective for-itselves”. husserl writes already in 1910:
[m]inds are present to me as addressed or addressing me, as loved or 
loving me, etc. i do not live in isolation; i live with them a common, 
integrated life, in spite of the separation of subjectivities30.
husserl’s analysis of cultural tradition and the manner it is transmitted, 
preserved, distorted and renewed was later taken both by heidegger (in 
his analyses of the relation between arts and world) and by hans-georg 
gadamer with his concept of the effective working out of history. For 
gadamer, as for heidegger, all understanding (Verstehen) requires an 
initial presumption concerning what is being understood. Understanding 
requires “pre-judgement” (Vorurteil) and our prejudgements are formed 
by what gadamer calls “effective history” or the “history of effect” 
(Wirkungsgeschichte, the historical working out of the effects of actions in 
which we are inevitably involved: “[T]hat in all understanding, whether 
we are expressly aware of it or not, the efficacy of history is at work”)31. 
gadamer writes in Truth and method (1960):
The illumination of this situation—reflection on effective history—can 
29  husserl (2006), p. 172.k
30  husserl (2006), p. 168; hua Xiii, p. 92.
31  gadamer (1960), p. 284/300.  here and in subsequent citations the page numbers of the 
german edition precede those of the english translation.
THE EgO AS SUBSTRATE Of HABITUAlITIES
dermoT moran university College dublin
45
never be completely achieved; yet the fact that it cannot be completed 
is due not to a deficiency in reflection but to the essence of the 
historical being that we are. To be historically means that knowledge 
of oneself can never be complete. all self-knowledge arises from what 
is historically pregiven, what with hegel we call “substance,” because 
it underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and hence both 
prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition 
whatsoever in its historical alterity. This almost defines the aim of 
philosophical hermeneutics: its task is to retrace the path of hegel’s 
phenomenology of mind until we discover in all that is subjective the 
substantiality that determines it. (gadamer (1960), pp. 285-86/301)32
whereas gadamer refers to hegel, he could also have invoked husserl’s 
meditations on historical communal life in tradition. For husserl, human 
beings live subjective and intersubjective lives, in the subjective or personal 
attitude. But husserl differs from gadamer in believing it is possible, 
through the radical application of the transcendental epochē to gain the 
position of the disengaged transcendental spectator which allows the 
intentional workings of this engaged life to be uncovered and understood. 
at least in its essential necessities such a life can be understood and its 
intentional character displayed by transcendental phenomenology. or, at 
least, that was husserl’s dream.
32  Gadamer: “Auch die Erhellung dieser Situation, d. h. die wirkungsgeschichtliche Reflexion, 
ist nicht vollendbar, aber diese Unvollendbarkeit ist nicht ein Mangel an Reflexion, sondern 
liegt im wesen des geschichtlichen Seins, das wir sind. geschichtlichsein heißt, nie im Sichwissen 
aufgehen. alles Sichwissen erhebt sich aus geschichtlicher Vorgegebenheit, die wir mit hegel 
>Substanz< nennen, weil sie alles subjektive meinen und Verhalten trägt und damit auch alle 
möglichkeit, eine Überlieferung in ihrer geschichtlichen andersheit zu verstehen, vorzeichnet 
und begrenzt. die aufgabe der philosophischen hermeneutik laßt sich von hier aus geradezu 
so charakterisieren: sie habe den weg der hegelschen Phänomenologie des geistes insoweit 
zurückzugehen, als man in aller Subjektivität die sie bestimmende Substanzialität aufweist.”
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The paper begins with a brief characterization of the function of types in the process 
of perception before discussing their different possible degrees of generality. Some 
similarities in the function of habits and types are then thematized, similarities based 
on the fact that each is the compact result of some set of prior experiences. following 
these clues, both parallels and important differences between types and concepts 
are discussed. The second part of the paper investigates the function of types in the 
perception of concrete objects, the arousal of types in sensibility and the ongoing 
competition of different types striving for fulfillment. It is shown that the selection, 
collection, interpretation, and synthesis of sensible elements in perception are guided by 
the pre-knowledge that is sedimented in types. in the third part some very basic forms of 
cognition are shown to be based on the use of a type in a new cognitive context. finally, 
a close connection is drawn between hume’s investigation of association and habit and 
husserl’s concept of types.
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we have habits of performing actions, of valuing and perceiving, attending 
and expecting. They can be modified and they are sometimes overgrown 
by other habits. Thus if we are speaking of habits – or, as husserl prefers, 
habitualities - we are dealing with a broad field of very different, lower- and 
higher-order activities that can occur in different realms of experience1. 
There are trivial habits of acting and behaving, and there are also habits 
that make up a certain extent of our knowledge. in this regard, it becomes 
apparent that we have acquired habits of expectation concerning the 
properties of certain things and kinds of things. For example if we see a 
lemon, we expect a fruity smell, etc. These expectations reflect a kind of 
pre-knowledge or familiarity we already have before we are able to perceive 
the respective object in a full sensible way. and it turns out to be a pre-
knowledge that usually does not concern, for instance, this individual lemon 
alone, but rather concerns, as we say, “objects of this kind”, e.g., all lemons. 
Such habits of expectation, entailing and expressing a pre-knowledge about 
the kind of object we have in front of us, arise out of experiences we have 
had either of this individual object or other members of the class of similar 
objects (objects of this kind). 
in his genetic phenomenology, husserl names this pre-knowledge of an 
object or class of objects (or events) its “type” (Typus)2. The function of a type 
is best seen in the process of perception, which in genetic phenomenology is 
often termed a “typifying apperception” (i.e. an apperception with the help 
of a type, typisierende apperzeption). Types are essential for the performance 
of perception, in each instance functioning through the entire process. The 
contents of a type rest extensively on the pre-predicative forms of gaining 
“knowledge” that husserl consistently tried to differentiate from knowledge 
in the strict sense, i.e., formulated in predicative judgments, by calling 
them a kind of acquaintance (Kenntnis, Bekanntheit)3. The formation of types 
1 concerning habits of actions we can even attempt to change our habits, for example, to quit 
smoking, and we can try to acquire new habits. If I tend to be halfhearted in public conflicts, I 
can try to become more courageous. This reveals our ability for self-education and shows that 
we can be responsible for our habits because they depend partly on my own influence. This is 
part of the notion of hexis developed by aristotle. here i will not discuss this aspect of habits, but 
concentrate rather on the cognitive aspects of habits.
2 we must observe the difference between a type for a singular object and a type for a group 
of similar objects. we may speak in the latter case also of a general type. cf. lohmar (2013), 147-
167.
3 cf. husserl (1971), 31-35, 140 f. on the difference between type and concept cf. husserl (1971), 
394-403.
TyPES AND HABITS
dieTer lohmar universität zu Köln 
 1. 
Everyday-
Interpretations 
of Habits and 
their Cognitive 
Aspects
50
takes place across a multiplicity of perceptions of similar things and events. 
The result is sedimented in a person’s types, with the result that types may 
differ slightly from person to person. 
everything affecting us, if we apperceive it as an object, is interpreted by us 
as something-to-be-determined and moreover - already following the pre-
knowledge of a special type - as something which we are acquainted with 
in advance, just as in the case of the lemon we expect that peculiar fruity 
smell, even if we only see it from a distance. husserl tries to express this 
strange form of pre-knowledge in numerous places in the following terms: 
we apperceive the unknown in terms of the already known4. The function 
of a type, e.g., the type for a dog, is the form of an intentional anticipation 
revealing for us something not yet directly given of the object, but in a 
vague mode. (one “knows” ahead of time what a dog’s features are like, e.g., 
its fangs; and the same is true of its behaviour, e.g., its sniffing, barking etc.). 
The content of these concrete expectations is quite precisely determined 
but remains flexible and always contains a degree of vagueness, so that 
the expectations can adjust to an actual sensible perception, for example, 
by a perspective redrawing of our expectations. hence, our expectations 
are revisable, they may be refigured in the course of experience. If I see a 
student sitting at a desk i expect his legs to be under the table, if he hides 
behind a bush i expect his legs to be bent, etc. 
The degree in the generality of a type varies. There are very general types, 
like “object” or “living being”, which have a very broad extension and a lot 
of sub-types. The usual case of a perception with the help of a type begins 
with a very general type, for instance, an extended and real object, and 
end up with a quite narrow type, like an apple or a rubber band. Starting 
with the type “living being”, i may realize that it is a dog and moreover it 
is a shepherd’s dog, perhaps it is even a dog i know well individually. even 
typifying perception of a single object is possible. Types for singular objects 
differ from general types for objects in many important aspects, and beside 
this the reference of single objects to other specific and also individual 
objects nearby and in a close relation to the first object is characteristic 
of them. But even types of singular objects still allow one to apperceive a 
particular object in different modes of givenness. moreover, such types also 
entail the series of a singular object’s states and some part of its historical 
development in a sedimented form. 
But in typifying apperception things may also unfold in the opposite 
4 we always apperceive the known in the mode of the known. cf.  husserl (1971), 34; husserl 
(1976), 126 ff. This general rule is often criticized with the argument that it implies that there 
could simply be nothing “completely new” in our experience. i do not think so. See  lohmar 
(2011), 120-134.
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direction. That is, starting with the type of a concrete, singular object 
we may then realize that it is not the individual object i supposed it to 
be “at first glance”: It is not Peter but someone else! Thus I moved on to a 
more general type that allows for a successful apperception in this case:  
“someone”. The most general type, “something”, designates objects insofar 
as they are substrates of determinations5. yet even this high degree of 
generality does not give such types the generality of a concept, because 
a type corresponds to the features shared by a certain group of things 
with which i have some prior experience. The most general types, like 
“something”, divide themselves into less general types (with narrower 
extensions) and, ultimately, to types for singular objects, and all of them 
belong to a “typical totality” (Totalitäts typik)66 entailing the whole horizon of 
our world. 
habits in a very trivial sense and types for singular objects are closely 
connected. This will be more obvious based on the following reflection. 
Singular objects’ types do not exclusively concern things’ cognitive aspects. 
They govern, moreover, a significant part of our everyday life and make it 
much more economic. Because the activities of persons usually are guided 
by certain ideas, it makes sense that the basis of the organization of life is 
experience - experience that is incorporated into habits and - as we will 
see in a moment - into types of singular objects. habits sometimes appear 
to be quite conservative and inflexible because they adjust only very slow 
to changing circumstances. at the same time, exactly this conservative 
tendency sheds light on an important cognitive aspect of habits guiding 
our low-level everyday activities, i.e. activities performed without special 
attention. This often leads to specific uncertainties: Did I turn off the oven 
just now? did i lock the door? Sometimes this might be annoying, but it 
proves that in most cases we are able to perform everyday activities without 
making their aims explicit in our consciousness, and we usually proceed 
successful without further control or troubling uncertainty. in this way 
habits facilitate our everyday practice7. 
yet the conservatism of habits is only one side of the coin. our types also 
change slowly in the further course of experience. consider an example of 
this gradual modification of a type’s contents that takes place in everyday 
circumstances. i have the habit of using a certain burner on my stove while 
making myself coffee, using an old-fashioned italian style coffee maker in 
the morning. it happens one day, let’s suppose, that the preferred burner 
5 cf. also for the following husserl (1971), 34 f.
6 cf. husserl (1971), 33.
7 There are also habits that can counterbalance the weak side of other habits. For instance, we 
might start with the habit to control the lock of the door when we leave our home.
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stops working, and i, naturally, make up my mind to call for a service man. 
The next morning, i behave as usual, i.e. i follow my habitual routine and put 
the coffee maker on the customary, but now broken, burner. after some 
minutes, i realize that it will not start, and in recognizing that the burner 
is defective yesterday’s experience, which i had forgotten, is called to mind 
again. I may even reprimand myself: You should have known better! It was 
only yesterday that you discovered the defect!  Each of us has experienced 
similar situations. The important point is that only after a series of 
similar disappointments do i change my habits and avoid the use of the 
defective burner. This shows that a singular object’s type not only includes 
information about the usual way the object will appear, but also contains 
intentions concerning its value and about its functional qualities, e.g., the plate 
is helpful for heating the coffee machine. now suddenly the latter quality 
changes and it becomes apparent (upon a little reflection) that my usual 
orientation in the world is based on a non-linguistic way of preserving my 
expe riences in types of singular objects. This way of preserving experience 
is quite conservative, but it changes gradually as habits do, in a series of 
similar experiences. This preservation of “knowledge” in our types gives it 
a kind of life of its own, since, although in principle my expectations may 
change, this change is sluggish and conservative.
But let us now come back to the more general characteristics of types and 
discuss what we know about the emergence and function of types. what 
we expect while we perceive with the help of a type is always anticipated 
in a vague generality (unbestimmt all ge mein) so that we have always a kind 
of “room of possibilities” (Spielraum von möglichkeiten) where different 
intuitive fulfilments of, e.g., sensory experience can fulfil the same typical 
expectation8. Different colours can fulfil an expectation about a coloured 
surface, and different shades of a particular colour, e.g., red, can fulfil the 
same expectation. This vague indeterminacy of types corresponds the 
“extension” or the range of objects that can be perceived successfully with 
this type9. with the help of one and the same general type we can apperceive 
different individual objects. 
Besides that, the vagueness or “generality” of a type enables one to 
expect different modes of presentation of the same object (or objects of 
this kind), such as the different postures a living being might assume 
or distortions in the spatial appearance of objects due to perspective. 
Therefore even an individual object’s type has this vagueness and generality 
8 cf. husserl (1971), 32.
9 husserl speaks about an „‘Um fang’ der unbe stimm ten allgemeinheit der antizipation“, cf. 
husserl (1971), 32.
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in its expectations, leaving room for their transformation (preserving 
similarity)10. Because of this, no type has an exhaustively determined sense 
or content. Its flexibility offers a kind of “empty” frame of sense (leerer 
Sinnes rahmen)11. 
every perception of a previously unknown object (helicopter, bumble bee 
etc.) starts with a quite general type, and in the explication of the sensible 
given object the type used becomes more and more determinate, resulting 
in the constitution of a new special type12. Thus the constitution of new 
types is an everyday experience not only for children, but for adults as well. 
For example, we get to know new people all the time. with a new type of 
this sort we are able to apperceive a person in different ways of his sensible 
givenness13. in the constitution of a new type corresponding to something’s 
general character there is also entailed a new ability to act: i can perceive 
other objects of the same similarity group as something like the one i have 
come to know before. 
now we have already considered that types and language’s informal 
concepts have a lot in common, but it is also important to know where the 
differences lie. On the first view, types may look like empirical concepts, 
since they have a specific content related to the essential properties of the 
object (or the set of objects) they are types of, and they have an extension, i.e. 
a set of objects that can be constituted in perception with the help of this 
type. in that respect, there is some similarity to concepts. yet there are also 
differences. The type is related to a relatively narrow group of objects that 
up to now i was able to constitute in perception with the help of precisely 
this type. So the relation of sense based on my experience is quite small 
and it is a group of similar objects, a similarity group. But this similarity 
group is bound to my own experience and it is limited. That means: we 
do not conceive of it as “fitting” infinitely many possible objects in the 
future course of experience, like we do with the sort of concept employed 
in ordinary language. and the extension of the type is not comparable 
to the extension of a concept, which is, in principal, unlimited. The type 
constitutes its object as a member of a finite group of similar objects. 
nevertheless there is a path stemming from the type to the full-blown empirical 
concept, though it demands an overcoming of the type’s limitation due to the 
limited expe rience of its possessor. in short, it requires an act of idealization.  
10 cf. husserl (1971), 33 and 141.
11 cf. husserl (1971), 141.
12 husserl writes: „mit jedem neuartigen, (genetisch gesprochen) erstmalig konstituierten 
gegenstand ist ein neuer gegenstandstypus bleibend vorgezeichnet, nach dem von vornherein 
andere ihm ähnliche gegenstände aufgefasst werden“ (husserl (1971), 35)
13 cf. husserl (1971), 35, 140.
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In types we may already find a kind of predelineation of further, yet unknown 
objects that might turn out to be similar. Thus we may be able to use a type as 
the experiential basis for building a truly general concept out of it. But to take 
this step we have to change our attitude toward the object completely, i.e. we 
have to generalize all partial intentions bearing on the perceived object; now 
they are thought of as being all general con cepts. The transition from a type to 
a concept is not trivial, because the concept is an idea of something common to 
infinite many objects14.
now let’s consider the function of types in everyday perception. a general 
type contains or has sedimented in it (as husserl would prefer) what we 
know about this kind of object, e.g., about the way an object of a peculiar 
type will typically present itself in sensory experience. This is how the 
type “car” helps us in perception, for instance, when we see a car to our left 
speeding up, but we see it through a closed window, while at the same time 
we hear the noise of the motor from an open window to our right. even if 
we hear the noise coming from a different direction we know that it must 
belong to the object we see speeding up in front of us. 
we already know that the most important performance of a type is to guide 
and enable perception. The type provides the answer to one of the most 
central questions that arises in the entire process of perception: which 
sensory elements can fulfil our intention, which sensory element can 
represent successfully the object i expect to perceive? The type therefore 
guides the activity of collecting the elements of given sensibility useful for 
representing the object. But, moreover, it also helps to decide the sense in 
which these intuitive elements of sensation are to be interpreted. we have 
realized this function already in the case of the noise from the window at 
our right, where we interpret it not as something that is located at the right 
but as the noise from the car in front of us. This interpretation changes 
the “sensory sense” (or sensory meaning) of this sound. we will have to 
return below to the matter of the full range of a type’s possible functions 
in perception. in the discussion of the functions of types, i will not be able 
to treat the questions of the origin of types and the nature of their possible 
modifications in subsequent experience15. i take for granted here that we 
already have a type, e.g., corresponding to Peter (a singular person) and 
another corresponding to a banana, and we are able to use such types in 
perception. Types contain in sedimented form the experience of several 
perceptions of Peter and of different bananas. This “knowledge” in the form 
14 cf. husserl (1971), 401.
15 i have treated this in another place, cf. lohmar (2008), chap. 7-8.
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of a type is readily activated and i can make use of it in a variety of situations. 
For example, i am able to perceive different bananas, and with the help of the 
type for Peter, i am able to perceive Peter in many poses, postures, etc.  
The very first stage of the process of perception starts with stimulus given 
in sensation that may only be, e.g., a colour, a smell, a strong contrast in 
the different sensory fields, or perhaps already a small fraction of some 
perceptual gestalt. on this basis, the intuitive sensory givens provokes the 
arousal (Weckung) of a type corresponding to an object of a certain kind, so 
that this type will be put to work, i.e., guiding the collection of elements 
useful for a representation of such an object. 
The arousal of a particular type is motivated by sensibility, though there 
are usually - due to the very multitude of motivating factors of arousal - 
different types aroused at the same time that step into a kind of competition 
to become fulfilled in the further course of perception. The process of 
perception is in this manner constantly accompanied by the arousal of 
alternative types. Some of them are very nearby the type that is now 
guiding the perception, i.e. they are only slight variants of some broader, 
overarching successfully guiding type, whereas some are directed to quite 
different things16. The success of a type in competition with others depends 
on its greater usefulness in making the present elements of sensibility into 
a representation of what the type intends. in the functioning (respectively 
working) of the successful leading or “dominant” type we find different 
activities, for example collection, combination, and interpretation of 
sensible elements. The type functions in the latter activities insofar as they 
are all guided by the contents of the type. 
The dominant type guides all parts of the complex process of apperception. 
let’s begin considering the different functions of a type with the selection of 
elements out of sensory givens. The type “lemon” entails a fruity smell, which 
becomes manifest when we are nearby the object and which - if it is present - is 
useful for the full intuitive representation of this lemon there. a faint smell 
of gasoline or coffee, our slight toothaches, a gently played melody in the 
background - all of this is also intuitively given in sensibility, but because of 
our knowledge about how a lemon might present itself to us we do not integrate 
these elements in the function of representation of the object. The type “car” entails 
in certain circumstances the idea of the engine’s sound, and so sounds like this 
can be interpreted as part of this object’s presentation in sensibility. The pre-
knowledge contained in types concerning the way objects of this kind will show 
16 There are different forms of motivation that lead to the arousal of a special type. what matters in this 
regard is not only the relevance of the object to be perceived but also a kind of topology of objects that are 
most probably in this part of my every-day world. Beside this, there are different forms of association and 
also factors more related to an individual person’s history. cf. on this topic lohmar (2008), chap. 8.
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up guides the choice and collection of representing sensory elements, and might 
also motivate a search for particular sensible elements not yet present, such as a 
certain sound, smell or shape. 
additionally, the interpretation of sensory elements is influenced and motivated 
by types. when hearing the sound of a car speeding up coming from my right 
through an open window, i interpret it as the sound of the car i see in front of me 
slowly speeding up. even if the acoustic sound has another sense of direction it is 
reframed with a new sense of direction so that it fits what I can see. – Although 
this interpretation may turn out to be mistaken, it is nevertheless a way of 
enriching the representation of the car beyond simply relying on our visual 
sense. what also becomes apparent here is that the interpretation of what we 
really have in sensory experience is a very strong tool for our world-constitution, 
and it may therefore also be misleading is some cases.
The fulfilment of a perceptual intention is based on the fulfilment of all or 
at least the most central partial intentions that are aroused by the type. 
accordingly, in a successful act of perception there is a coincidence of 
the (at first emptily) expected intentions with corresponding parts and 
properties of the object that are covered or fulfilled by intuitive intentions 
in sensation. For example, i may expect the lemon’s fruity smell while in fact 
only viewing it from a distance, and then, upon approaching it, this partial 
intention may be fulfilled and coincide with my prior expectation. 
Types are very powerful and effective tools of our pre-knowledge, as can be 
seen by reflecting on the different phases of the process of apperception. 
Beside the guiding operation of perception, there is another striking 
form in which the contents of types appear. Sometimes we experience 
the contents of our expectations in vivid “phantasmata” - and this is even 
possible before we are able to have those contents fulfilled by intuitive 
sensory givens. consider again the case of the lemon seen at just enough of 
a distance to elude our sense of smell. Sometimes the fruity smell appears 
to my conscious awareness as a briefly occurring phantasma, a phantasma 
that is nearly as vivid as the sensory intuition. in this peculiar way, our pre-
knowledge about the object is manifested to me “as though it was already 
sensibly given”. and these properties that we expect of the object appear in 
situations where the object is lacking this property in fact, e.g., because it is 
a plastic lemon or because the object is still too far away to really smell it17.
17 Such effects of the empty intentions in the form of vivid phantasmata of experienced sensory data 
have already been studied in empirical psychology. If you show an animated film of a bouncing steel spring 
and ask the experimental subjects afterwards whether they heard the characteristic “boing boing” sound 
of the bouncing spring, around 30% of all subjects will answer in the affirmative (which in fact was not 
there). Empty intentions present themselves in our sensory fields in the form of phantasmata. Cf. Biocca, 
Frank / Kim, Jin / choi, yung (2001), 247-265 and lohmar (2008), chap. 3.
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These are clues pointing in another important direction, namely, to the fact 
that having a vivid intention about a particular property of an object does 
not require the use of concepts. empty intentions can be realized instead 
by means of a phantasma directed to the pertinent intuitive sensory givens 
we expect on the basis of the operative type. Therefore we are allowed to 
suppose that many animals can make use of types in the same way as we do 
and that they can emptily intend the properties of the object of perception 
with the help of such anticipative phantasmata, which are, as it were, the 
empty intentions. If it happens that sensory givens can fulfil the empty 
intentions, then the vivid sensory givenness overwrites and pushes out the 
empty intentions presented by phantasmata. Phantasmata seem to be useful 
provided there is no sensory co-occurrence; but if there is sensory co-
occurrence, the phantasmata show themselves to be weak by comparison.
of course, there is also a deliberate use of fantasy, and this fantasy goes beyond 
the weak phantasmata that arise in the framework of a typifying perception. 
if i imagine my friend Peter, then i experience a kind of pictorial memory 
presenting his face, his characteristic body posture, his size, perhaps also acoustic 
phantasmata of his voice, etc. This ability is also based on our type for Peter, 
because the type is an instrument that enables us to imagine and to perceive all 
possible postures and different ways of appearance of an object. we need this 
ability of imaginative free variation of the way a particular object may be appear 
in order to be able to perceive it. i must be able to “redraw” in imagination the 
familiar postures and appearances of the object (as i have come to know it up to 
now), even into the unknown ways in which it may possibly appear. This does not 
imply that i really have to be able to redraw the object like an artist with the use 
of pencil and paper. what i am speaking of is more basic. it is my expectations that 
have to be modified, thereby adjusting themselves to the particular situation in 
which the object appears.
But even this performance is not yet the complete realm of possibilities we can realize 
with the help of types. They enable us also to imagine in our fantasy lively scenes of 
Peter and other persons, even if we have in fact never seen these imaginary scenes. we 
can imagine them in a natural speed, with all the details, with the appropriate mimics 
and the usual rhythm of his movements as we know from other situations18.
Up to now our examples are limited to what we are able to do with types of 
singular things in perception and imagination. now it will turn out that we 
can do much of this holds also for more general types. But first let’s consider 
some details of the use of a very peculiar type, one based only on the 
18 we might ask why we are able to act like this and what good sense there is in this ability. The ease in 
performance of such a complex activity hints to the fact that we need these imaginative scenes sometimes. 
This might be related to a prominent non-linguistic system of thinking in our consciousness, cf. lohmar 
(2012), 377-398.
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experiences of a singular thing, e.g., a certain tree in the woods that serves 
as a landmark for our orientation19. going through the woods we might 
believe that we have found this characteristic tree or site, yet with some 
central property or part fails to appear in perception. That is, the landmark 
tree is nearly as we had it in mind, but there is missing something. in 
situations like this our belief weakens, we become uncertain because the up-
to-now reliable interplay of concrete expectations and following fulfilments 
in the constitution of objects based on sensibility is disturbed. our usual 
practice is disrupted, we stop and try to orient ourselves again, taking a 
more precise look at the tree in question with a newly aroused interest: we 
want to discern whether it is really the that singular tree that we know will 
guide our way.  
it appears that we have just passed a threshold. The concerns just raised 
occur already within the framework of cognition. The newly raised interest 
calls for a new form of synthesis and a new active, conscious performance. 
The previously undisturbed practice itself becomes a theme and a problem. 
Up to now there was fairly narrowly bounded change within a certain 
range in degrees of certainty. Anything in that range would be sufficient 
to allow us to carry on as usual, but now we have to make sure that what we 
are perceiving is really the landmark we sought. To reinforce our certainty 
we have to go back to the same place and actively restage the perception of 
the object, but with the novel emergence of an interest to “make sure”. it is 
obvious that this newly initiated perception is no longer a simple perception, 
but rather a cognitive process of gaining knowledge of whether this object is 
really the sought-after landmark. now the partial intentions concerning the 
object as expected are performed with a higher degree of attention, and the 
activity of checking whether or not these intentions can be fulfilled is much 
more critical than in the usual circumstances of perception. 
i do not arbitrarily choose the example of a landmark in the form of a 
particular tree. we know from empirical studies in comparative cognitive 
psychology that there are many animals that orient themselves with very 
simple methods, such as those used in seal colonies that make use of seal 
pups’ scent or cry to locate them. even seemingly much more complex 
performances of orientation, like those carried out by migratory species 
of birds, are sometimes based on sensory feelings, e.g., a sense for the 
magnetic field of the earth. But there are also many animals that use 
visually discernible markers in difficult and complex sites. These “markers” 
include not only things like colour and shape, but include as well fully 
individualized objects like a particular tree. most mammals and many 
19 as in most other situations of perception and cognition, there is no absolute certainty.
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birds with (relatively) highly complex brains use the second method just 
mentioned. They are able to recognize individual objects and use them as 
landmarks. 
we know from our own experience what happens when we become certain 
about the landmark. it is not merely an individual object surrounded by 
other individuals, but is also a guide for our further practice. when all 
is well, we know how we have to proceed. But if perception is uncertain, 
then we have only one strategy to overcome the difficulty. We have to 
deliberately engage in an explicit re-enactment of the perception by 
performing each step in a conscious exercise of will. we try to answer the 
question, “Can I find here exactly what I was waiting for, is it precisely the 
constellation that i bore in mind, is it exactly the same as what i expected?
Usually perceptual type is amenable to certain possible differences in the 
way an object can appears to us. as long as i am able to interpret a particular 
object as the same object, that singular thing’s type is successfully deployed 
in relation to its object. if the type in question is one for a general class 
of objects, any variation within that type that may emerge serves to 
individualize particular objects, and i can nevertheless see the latter as 
objects of the same kind. not all trees look alike, of course. yet they are alike 
at least in being trees, members of a class that admits degrees of similarity 
among its members. But there is a great difference between precisely this 
case and that of the type for a particular object. what can we do if there is 
persistent divergence of experience from our expectations? 
will we perhaps have to go a further step and look for some accidental or 
causal influence that can make the discrepancies comprehensible? Could it 
be that a characteristic branch of the tree has broken off due to wind? But 
then it would be laying here on the ground. could it be that the leaves have 
all fallen from it because it is fall or winter? These sorts of questions framed 
in terms of causal influences often relieve us from our uncertainty. 
nevertheless, we should be more patient. if we skip to the level of causality 
we are treating problems of perception on the level of cognition, and this 
level is considerably higher than that of perception. it is nevertheless true 
that in everyday affairs we sometimes solve such problems of identification 
on the higher level of cognition. But before we begin to treat problems 
of perceptions with the means of cognition, there is a vivid process 
within the level of perception that is best described as a kind of struggle 
and competition on the level of typifying perception. a tree in autumn 
surrounded by fallen leaves is a quite typical situation for deciduous trees as 
well as the thick leaves in summer. Thus, to solve the difficulty of uncertain 
3. 
From Perception 
to Cognition 
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perception we might also use a tool that is on the level of perception. in 
short, we can switch between a given type’s alternative variants. all types 
have such variants due to circumstances. This has nothing to do with 
causality. it is rather our knowledge about the usual appearance of objects 
as it is incorporated into our types. and this is true not only for types for 
singular objects, but it is also true of more general types of objects, i.e., for 
groups of similar objects well known to us. There are “laws” for the familiar 
ways in which appearances change that hold for both kinds of types. now we 
see how to solve the difficulties concerning appearances that deviate from 
expectation by the using the technique of switching out competing variants of 
a given type, e.g., the type for a tree in summer or a tree in winter. 
importantly, this change of type in perception does not yet call for a 
deliberate striving for knowledge or an overcoming of uncertainties by the 
use of the idea of causality. even if we ordinarily solve such uncertainties 
by shifting to cognition, the change of types is a more basic strategy that 
remains within the realm of perception. we have already learned that on the 
level of perception with the help of types there is a vivid competition between 
types that are aroused in the usual course of ordinary perception, and each of 
them strives for fulfillment- all the time. The quick change between variants 
of the same type is therefore by no means an exceptional case. 
nevertheless there are some disappointments in perception that are not to be 
resolved with such a change in type. what shall we do if a characteristic trait 
of a particular object is missing, e.g., the branch of a tree is broken and has 
vanished? in cases like this, we realize that the task at hand exceeds the play 
of variants in the realm of typifying perception and instead ask for a causal 
explanation that exceeds perception and ventures into the realm of cognition. 
At this point we take a first step up to the level of cognition, which is closely 
related and motivated by problems of perception20. even the deliberate 
reenacting of the partial acts of perception, which are taken up into the 
process of cognition, are guided by the singular object’s type, i.e. of all 
details we “know” about this special thing in advance. with the type “causal 
change” bearing on certain things, we know about the more or less probable 
changes this object may undergo. and if we are able to recognize this 
particular object with the help of causal change we perform a cognition that 
will henceforth guide our practice, we now know how to carry on.
It is a wide-spread opinion that cognition can be identified with 
propositions, with judgments that can be true or false. This claim must 
be weakened if we take into consideration the result of the preceding 
analysis about the role of types in the process of overcoming uncertainties 
20 cf. the further discussion in lohmar (2013), 147-167.
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in perception. it has to be realized that cognition is already underway 
when we - in a moment of uncertainty and doubt - overcome this 
uncertainty by using a singular thing’s type in a deliberate reenactment 
of this perception with a new cognitive interest. in this context, cognition 
is characterized by the mode of activity and interest in the performance 
of a complex reenactment guided by our pre-knowledge. Such cognition 
is further characterized emotionally and pragmatically by the release of 
our uncertainties and by the enabling of further practice, respectively. in 
relation to this, the form of a judgment is a subsequent development. 
we began our investigation with everyday varieties of habit and became 
attentive to the sort of habits that incorporate certain pre-forms of 
cognition, i.e., pre-knowledge by means of types. Types entail “knowledge” 
about objects, like trees, that takes shape in expectations about the concrete 
ways in which an object of that type can be given to us. with the help of this 
pre-knowledge, the type guides the constitution of objects in perception and 
- as we learned - also in recognizing these objects at the level of cognition. 
Thus, types turn out to be basic for our practical relation to the world, and 
they also enable us to grasp and manage the many changing properties 
of everyday things without using higher-level cognitive performances. 
we might therefore say about types what hume once mentioned about 
associations: They are to us the “cement of the universe”.
This last point sets us up for a first look at a possible connection with the 
philosophy of david hume. hume is not only well known as a skeptic, 
but also as an empiricist who offers brilliant analyses of the process of 
cognition. and in their systematic concern, his analyses are very near to 
husserl’s genetic-phenomenological concept of cognition. hume highly 
esteems habit and contributes in particular the idea of there being different 
forms of habit in cognition. 
he calls habit the great guide of life, a claim that is related to the idea of 
our belief in the uniformity and constancy of the course of causal events in 
nature. This uniformity in the course of nature is one key presupposition 
for all of our judgments resting on experience: Similar causes will always 
have similar effects. The problem with this central conviction is that we 
cannot prove its truth. it is obviously not what hume calls a relation of ideas, 
such that we would run into a contradiction if we were to deny it. we can 
think without contradiction, e.g., that the sun will not rise tomorrow. on 
the other hand, we cannot prove the truth of the uniformity thesis with the 
help of experience either, because in every judgment of experience we must 
already make use of this presuppo sition. So an attempt to prove uniformity 
4. 
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on experiential grounds would be circular. nevertheless hume was realistic 
enough to concede that, although it is not demonstrable, we are compelled to 
accept this presupposition if we want to survive at all. as hume is unwilling to 
declare it to be a part of our ratio - like the rationalist of his time - he interprets 
it as a kind of instinct, an immutable habit or custom, and a natural operation of the 
mind. 
The concept of habit he uses in this characterization is obviously not the 
everyday concept, because these everyday habits (of action, of expectation, 
of evaluation, etc.) are alterable in further experience. in view of the very 
foundational function of the idea of a uniform causality for the constitution 
of reality, and in the light of hume’s interpretation of this presupposition as a 
natural operation of the mind, we might better speak of this presupposition as a 
“grand-scale” habit. 
But hume also recognizes “small-scale” habits, namely the sort of habits that 
arise and are modified in a single person’s experience, i.e., what he calls the 
“associations of ideas”. associations, too, have an exceptionally important 
function in obtaining cognitive acquisitions. it is by means of the association 
of ideas that our experiences with certain objects and events is retained 
(sedimented). This is a first apparent parallel of Hume’s associations to Husserl’s 
types. concerning their relation to experience, two forms of association become 
more prominent: associations of contiguity and causality. with a view to the 
problem of how to go from a stream of atomized impressions to the experience 
of unified things and connected events in our everyday world, associations are 
an empiricist’s critical resource for gaining access to the nature of cognition. 
associations are a means of recovering the missing connections among sensory 
givens. Therefore, associations can be regarded for us, in agreement with hume, 
as the cement of the universe. They make possible the accretion of unordered and 
unconnected impressions, presenting unified objects and reliable connections 
of events that make sense for us. as the latin verb for “growing together” 
(concrescere) indicates, and as we can also see in the relation of our own words 
“cement” and “concrete” associations serve as that which enables the elements of 
our universe of sensibility, perception and knowledge grow together.
hume’s analysis of cognition draws out attention to four elements or phases in 
the process of cognition. we begin with an intuitively given object like smoke. 
Then we realize that we have a habit of connecting this idea with another idea, 
say fire. Using the natural operation of the mind incorporated in the presupposition 
of a uniformity of nature, we then arrive at a belief in the existence of fire at 
this place. what we realize in the overview of the process is that such mutable 
associations of ideas are already a preform of cognition. This is yet another 
point of contact with husserl’s types. 
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in several of his early Freiburg lectures, martin heidegger analysed the 
concept of “situation” as a basic structure of factical life, claiming that: “The 
problem of situation was until now never actually posed in philosophical 
literature without being objectified.”1 his critique, primarily aimed at 
Karl Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschaungen, also touched upon his own 
treatment of the issue in one of his very first lectures, as it ran the risk – in 
heidegger’s own opinion – of regarding situations merely as a “spatio-
temporal order” to be charted in light of a “typology of situations” (Typik 
der Situationen). Obviously influenced by Heidegger’s early lectures, Günther 
anders defended his dissertation in 1923 with husserl under the title: 
die rolle der Situationskategorie bei den “logischen Sätzen”. The dissertation 
was, as anders recalls, driven by the intention to criticize husserl from 
a heideggerian perspective, by focusing on a concept that was ostensibly 
lacking in husserlian phenomenology, namely, “situation”. The following 
paper tries to give a detailed account of husserl’s attempts to catch up 
with this phenomenon in his later work of the 1930s. The reference to 
heidegger and anders proves relevant not so much because husserl might 
have been directly inspired by them in his treatment of the subject matter, 
but especially because his analyses focus exactly on the question of 
“typification”. I will start by offering a general presentation of “typification” 
in its relation to expectation and habit (1.), then i will try to work out a more 
comprehensive concept of “situation” based on several of husserl’s writings 
(2.), after which i will follow husserl’s exposition of various aspects of 
situational typification (3.).  
“a cognitive function bearing on individual objects of experience is never 
carried out as if these objects were pregiven for the very first time, as some 
completely undetermined substrates.”2 according to this abrupt statement 
in husserl’s experience and Judgment, nothing we encounter in our experience 
actually presents itself as completely novel, given in an absolute first 
impression. on the contrary, even if the object is entirely unfamiliar as 
such, it is always still perceived as something, as an individual object, e.g., as 
a living being or as a strange piece of machinery. it is always experienced 
in the light of some pre-cognition, while it is precisely this aspect that 
1  heidegger (1993), p. 258 (my translation).
2  husserl (1999), p. 26 (english translation: p. 31).
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Husserl most often addresses with his concept of “typification”. In Husserl’s 
view, “typification” thus designates the epistemic process by which the 
acquisitions from prior experience determine our ongoing encounter 
with things: “With each new kind of object constituted for the first time 
(genetically speaking), a new type of object is permanently prescribed, in 
terms of which other objects similar to it will be apprehended in advance.”3 
On several occasions, “types” are defined by Husserl as empirical 
generalities4. also termed as „morphological essences“, such generalities are 
– already in the ideas i – contrasted to the “ideal essences” of mathematics, 
stemming from a quite different process of ideation5. according to husserl’s 
genetic phenomenology, these empirical generalities are fully constituted 
– as general conceptual cores – only by means of an active performance 
of judgment6, and it is of course only at this superior level of conceptual 
expression that we actually recognize, for example, a dog as a “dog”, a phone 
as a “phone,” and a toy as a “toy”. however, this intellectual performance 
is itself, as husserl shows, primarily grounded in a layer of passive, 
experiential pre-constitution. To be more precise, types as empirical concepts 
require as their foundation individual objects encountered in perceptive 
experience with typical characters of acquaintance or familiarity7, while in 
husserl’s notations these characters are themselves also often referred to as 
“types”. Thus, we can generally distinguish between a predicative and a pre-
predicative acceptation of “types”, while our following reflections will focus 
mostly on the latter.  
when considered in this primary, experiential acceptation, types are above 
all a phenomenon of expectation. To be typically acquainted with an object 
thus actually means to anticipate it according to an earlier experience. 
Therefore, it is precisely in the course of a genetic theory of expectation that 
husserl comes to elaborate on the problem of types in his famous lectures 
on “passive synthesis”8. certainly, in husserl’s view expectations are not 
related to future events alone, as they can also refer to aspects of present 
objects not yet fully given in experience or even to aspects of the past9. For 
instance, when we approach an unknown crossroad, we only see a part of 
our path ahead, while we do not yet know in detail how the rest will be. 
however, this unseen part of our path is, as husserl stresses, anticipated 
3  husserl (1999), p. 35 (english translation: p. 38). For husserl’s concept of type, see also lohmar (2003).
4  See husserl (1999), § 81.
5  husserl (1976)2, p. 155 (english translation: p. 166). 
6  husserl (1999), p. 382 (english translation: p. 386).
7  husserl (1999), p. 382 (english translation: p. 386).
8  husserl (1966), pp. 184-191 (english translation: pp. 235-242).
9  husserl (1966), p. 185 (english translation: p. 235).
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in a “typical” fashion: we generally expect there to be houses, roads, cars, 
people, etc. This “generality” – that motivates husserl to regard such 
expectational characteristics of typical acquaintance as “preliminary forms 
of concepts” – is itself by no means yet of a conceptual nature, as it merely 
indicates the vagueness of such expectations, i.e., the fact that they can be 
intuitively individualized with equal justification in manifold variants10. it is 
precisely this aspect that Husserl indicates when defining experiential types 
as open “ranges of manifold possibilities”11. concepts are in husserl’s view 
essentially rooted in the vagueness of our expectations.
on several occasions, husserl formulates the a priori law governing the 
formation of expectations as follows: “Something similar recalls something 
else that is similar, but it also allows something similar to be expected 
in coexistence as in succession.”12 due to this “apperceptive transfer,”13 
every object of our present experience simultaneously 1) recalls similar 
past experiences and 2) is itself anticipated in analogy with them. This 
double movement of evocation and anticipation, characterizing our 
typified experience of objects, is determined by Husserl as an “assimilating 
apperception”14 (assimilierende apperzeption). and it is indeed a process of 
typical assimilation that accounts for the fact that, as husserl expresses 
it, “the future always leads us back to the past”15, since all expectations 
necessarily echo implicit horizons of recollection. often enough, 
husserl considers this process of passive assimilation to be the most 
original, experiential form of “induction”16, while it is precisely at this 
point in the lectures on passive synthesis that he also establishes an 
essential connection between typification and habit. For, if the concept 
of “typification” primarily refers to the inductive anticipations that 
continuously arise within our ongoing experience determining our 
recognition of all encountered objects and persons, than these expectations 
can themselves obviously become gradually stronger or weaker depending 
on how often they are confirmed or disconfirmed by experience: “the force 
of this apperceptive expectation increases with the number of ‘instances’ 
– or with habit [gewohnheit], which amounts to the same thing.”17 Thus, the 
problem of typification is generally to be regarded as an integral part of 
10  husserl (1999), pp. 31-32 (english translation: pp. 35-36).
11  husserl (1966), p. 41 (english translation: p. 79).
12  husserl (1966), p. 185 (english translation: p. 235).
13  See for instance husserl (2008), p. 431.
14  husserl (2008), p. 436.
15  husserl (2006), p. 285, (my translation).
16  husserl (1999), p. 28 (english translation: p. 33).
17  husserl (1966), p. 190 (english translation: p. 240). For a more detailed and contextual 
reading of husserl’s conception of habit, see also moran (2011).
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husserl’s theory of habituality: types are the correlates of epistemic habits.
Surely, according to Husserl’s use of the term “typification”, these 
observations should apply not only to individual substrates of experience, 
but also to “situations”. But what exactly is a “situation”? in a notation from 
1931 – first published under the title “die Welt der lebendigen gegenwart und 
die Konstitution der ausserleiblichen umwelt” – husserl discusses situations 
beforehand as configurations. The latter are, in short, examples of complex 
intentional pluralities. Such pluralities were already touched upon in the 
ideas i as products of an active “articulated” or “polythetic” synthesis, which 
– as Husserl discovered – was not specific to the sphere of judgement alone, 
but could also be found in the lower spheres of perceptive, emotional or 
practical experience18. moreover, as husserl shows in his later genetic work, 
synthetic articulations already occur in the sphere of passivity, for instance 
in the primary constitution of the sensuous fields out of which individual 
objects later on emerge19. Defined as “configurations of sensual data”, these 
fields are initially produced by means of an “associative genesis” following 
the similarities (homogeneities) and dissimilarities (heterogeneities) of 
sensuous affectation. However, in Husserl’s view, configurations are not 
constituted passively on the ground of affective pairing and contrast 
alone. on the contrary, in the lectures courses on “passive synthesis”, their 
constitution is also linked to the question of assimilative apperceptions 
and expectations. Thus, the nexus that binds together the terms of a 
configuration, Husserl here claims, “is not merely a nexus with respect 
to content […] but rather apart from affective motivation, which governs 
selectively in the configuration. (Various figures could have been formed 
out of the chaos, and could still be formed, but the path of awakening that 
was privileged favored the path of special unifications of a lower and higher 
level up to the entire configuration in question.)”20 in husserl’s view, every 
configuration that was once constituted in our earlier experience motivates 
us in our ongoing experience to appercieve similar configurations:
if a plurality of data emerge in the same present as it continues to 
develop, data that can go together with the configuration in question, 
then the entire configurations in question will be awakened by the 
awakening that reaches back and that issues from the particularities. 
And these configurations radiating ahead in a protentional-
18  husserl (1976)2, § 118.
19  husserl (1999), §16.
20  husserl (1966), p. 191 (english translation: p. 241).
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expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model 
of this configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this 
the coalescence of the configuration will simultaneously be favored 
once more as fulfillment. In this way, the anticipation is at work 
‘apperceptively,’ it is co-productive in the configuration of the 
coexisting objects.21 
These observations could also be applied to situations which husserl often 
addresses as typically repeatable configurative phenomena. However, 
it is important to notice here that, when generally speaking about the 
apperceptive recognition of configurations in his analyses concerning 
passive syntheses, husserl is referring solely to individual “self-contained 
configurations given to consciousness”22 – that is: to mere particular 
sets of objects or data grouped within a wider frame of consciousness – 
whereas the situation is not an individual configuration among others but a 
“Gesamtkonfiguration”23, a totality-configuration encompassing the ensemble 
of a subject’s lived circumstances in a given moment. This totality is often 
also termed by husserl as “the living present”. “each present is a situation”, 
he claims in his aforementioned notation from 1931, adding just a few lines 
further down: “all that is experienced together as coexisting in the unity of 
a living present has as its unity the situation”24. certainly, such a unity is, 
as several thinkers have pointed out25, not really “self-contained” (except 
perhaps in hindsight, when the formerly lived situation is narrated to others 
as an anecdote), but necessarily elusive and open. moreover, by generally 
defining the situation as a “configuration”, Husserl also seems to neglect an 
important aspect of situations that he himself stumbles upon in a marginal 
note to his lectures on passive synthesis, i.e., our own freedom of action. in 
his brief note, husserl draws attention to the fact that, when analysing the 
constitution of the “living present”, one should not forget the correlation 
between a subject’s momentary field of consciousness and his kinesthetic 
possibilities of movement26. This idea is expanded upon in a brief addendum 
to the lecture, introducing a significant conceptual distinction between 
proper “expectations” (here defined as the line of prefigurations that follows 
the trajectory of the subject’s actual kinesthetic movements) and mere 
“potential expectations” (conceived as simple associative intentions that would 
21  husserl (1966), p. 190 (english translation: pp. 240-241).
22  husserl (1966), p. 187 (english translation: pp. 237-238).
23  husserl (1946), p. 336.
24  husserl (1946), p. 334, (my translation).
25  See, for instance, Jaspers (1932), pp. 202-203.
26  husserl (1966), p. 185, n. 1 (english translation: p. 236, n. 1).
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become proper expectations if the subject would assume the corresponding 
kinesthetic trajectory).27 Thus, if one really wants to discuss situations 
as apperceptive unities of typification, it is by no means sufficient to regard 
them merely as configurative totalities of circumstances, but – by focusing on the 
essential connection between apperceptive expectations and subjective 
potentialities – one has to correlatively address them as totalities of potentiality. 
on several occasions, husserl touches upon these intuitions in his various 
writings on kinaesthesia, starting from the lecture course of the summer 
semester 1907, Thing and Space. most often here, he uses the concept of 
“kinesthetic situation” to designate the totality of a subject’s momentary 
possibilities of bodily movement. in this sense, the term “situation” is 
employed mostly – as becomes apparent in one of the supplements to 
his 1907 lectures – to designate the practically charged noetic correlate 
to the noematic “orientation” of objects.28 in the Crisis-work, however, 
husserl uses the term “situation”, while discussing the phenomenon of 
kinaesthesia, alternatively, to designate both the noetic system of our 
kinesthetic possibilities (that is: the “kinaesthetic situation”29) and their 
corresponding noematic configurations of circumstances (the “situation 
of appearances” [erscheinungssituation]30, as he terms it). This ambivalence 
is telling. For, if we consider that, 1) already in his earliest notations on 
kinaesthesia, husserl repeatedly draws attention to the “apperceptive 
unity” (auffassungseinheit) binding together our possibilities of movement, 
on the one hand, and the corresponding configurations of phenomenal 
circumstances, on the other31, and 2) if we also consider that – while 
situations are indeed, as “totality-configurations”, products of apperceptive 
expectations – expectations themselves are, as husserl shows, functions of 
our free posibilities of movement and action, then 3) we can  legitimately 
identify precisely in this “apperceptive unity” the key to a more accurate 
and complete phenomenological concept of “situation”. a situation would be in 
this sense the intentional living unity of horizonal context and subjective potentiality. 
Significantly, this acceptation of the term would not only correspond 
perfectly to the classical concept of “situation”, as developed later on in 
“existentialist” and hermeneutic philosophy (by Jaspers, heidegger, or 
Sartre), where it is regarded as a unity of subjective and objective elements, 
but it could actually help give this (often quite vague) concept a more 
27  husserl (1966), pp. 428-429 (english translation: pp. 534-536). Thus, we have actual 
expectations concerning the content of our mailbox when we reach out to open it, while we have 
mere potential expectations when we pass it with no intention of looking inside.
28  husserl (1973)1, p. 299. 
29  husserl (1976)1, p. 108.
30  husserl (1976)1, p. 109.
31  cf. husserl (1973)1, p. 187 et. al. 
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precise interpretation. “The situation,” Sartre writes in a famous passage 
of Being and nothingness, “is the common product of the contingency of the 
in-itself and of freedom”32. husserl himself reaches a similar concept of 
situation in several of his notations of the 1930s, by explicitly conceiving it 
as the concrete lived “horizon of the practical agent”33, wherein meaningful 
circumstances and momentary possibilities of action are concatenated. 
now, certainly, there is nothing bewildering in saying that, in our normal 
practical experience, we encounter typically similar constellations of 
circumstances, such as the supermarket, the elevator, the postal office, the 
airport, the hospital, etc. However, if one defines “situations” as functional 
concatenations of noematic circumstances and noetic potentialities, the idea 
of a “typification of situations” might appear somewhat more problematic. To 
this extent, it is crucial to point out that, indeed, in husserl’s view, the process 
of typification does not refer solely to objects and configurations, but in a 
similar fashion also to practical interests, actions and possibilities. 
in fact, the very genesis of “practical possibilities” – a term husserl uses to 
designate the subjective phenomena of the “i can” – is grounded in such 
a process34. For – as husserl shows with regard to kinaesthesia, the most 
elementary potentiality of bodily movement – such possibilities are from 
the onset formed as acquisitions from prior experience. every infant has to 
“learn” not only how to walk, but also how to move his head, hands and eyes, 
movements that gradually become his “practical possibilities”. in several 
notations of the 1930s, husserl discusses the formation of such possibilities 
by showing how they emerge from a prior stage of merely instinctive, 
uncoordinated movement. in this context, concepts like “instinct” and 
“drive” designate a yearning “that still lacks the representation of its 
target“35, while it is precisely through their crystallisation as practical 
possibilities that such movements become controllable as actual targets 
of the subject’s will. husserl describes this process in more detail by 
referring to the example of a baby learning to nurse: while the scent of his 
mother’s breast elicits an “originally adapted kinaesthesis”36, his instinctive 
movements gradually come to acquire – once they are periodically 
repeated – “the unity of an oriented intention”37. husserl offers similar 
32  Sartre (1992), p. 488.
33  husserl (2008), p. 543.
34  with regard to husserl’s concept of “practical posibilities” see also: mohanty (1984), aguirre 
(1991) and Ferencz-Flatz (2012).
35  husserl (2006), p. 326, (my translation).
36  husserl (2006), p. 326, (my translation).
37  husserl (2006), p. 327, (my translation).
A PHENOMENOlOgy Of AUTOMATISM
chriSTian FerencZ-FlaTZ alexandru dragomir institute for Philosophy, Bucharest
3. 
The 
Typifications of 
Praxis and 
Situational 
Typification
72
reflections in relation to feet-kicking (Strampel-Kinästhesen)38. in husserl’s 
writings, this entire development is often regarded in perfect analogy to 
the apperceptive typification of objects. For, if epistemic apperceptions are 
generally conditioned by the repeated encounter of similar objects, practical 
posibilities are themselves similarly conditioned by the repeated execution 
of actions and movements. husserl terms the latter “exercise” (Übung), 
explicitly considering it to be a practical equivalent of association39. of 
couse, similar processes of practical association also lead to the formation 
of more complex practical posibilities, while husserl himself often stresses 
their contribution to the articulation of kinaesthetic systems: “here, one 
thinks of the remarkable associations, due to which kinaestheses are 
‘associated’ not as mere immanent data, but as practical potentialities (‘i can 
turn this or that way’), building a practical system.”40 
Processes of typification, on the other hand, do not affect a subject’s 
practical experience only by shaping the possibilities of his free activity 
out of the “primary passivity” of his instinctive drive responses. on the 
contrary, they also determine the manner in which this free activity itself 
constantly lapses back into a corresponding “secondary passivity”41. The 
repeated performance of an action, which husserl calls  “exercise”, proves 
central in this respect as well, since, by being repeated as such, an action 
becomes more than a possible target of free will – it also and necessarily 
becomes an object of habit, allowing for its merely automatic execution: 
“generally, the transformations which occur in the case of repeated 
actions in relation to repeated goals are the work of exercise and habit. 
Traditionalising is after all nothing other than a transforming of the 
originally explicit orientation towards a goal into an implicit one, and of the 
implicit one into a forgetfulness of the goal.”42 as is well known, the problem 
of “habit” was already in aristotle’s view considered  indispensable for the 
understanding of human action. in his nicomachean ethics, aristotle claimed 
that the manner in which a subject acts simultaneously determines his habit 
to act in that precise manner43, while this habitual side of action was also 
supposed to account for his ethical behavior in dreams44. Similarly, in the 
second book of his ideas, husserl claims – while generally designating free 
acts as “position takings” – that “with each position-taking, there develop 
38  husserl (2006), p. 327.
39  See husserl (1952), p. 330 (english translation: p. 342); husserl (2006), p. 328; husserl (2008), p. 
358.
40  husserl (2008), p. 12.
41  See for this distinction husserl (1999), § 67 b.
42  husserl (2008), p. 890, note to p. 527, (my translation).   
43  aristotle (2009), 1103a-1104b.
44  aristotle (2009), 1102b.
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‘tendencies’ to take up the same position under similar circumstances”.45 
This statement does not refer, as one might think, exclusively to the sphere 
of judgments, assessing given objects in the light of earlier experiences, but 
also to practical and emotional acts, as husserl explicitly speaks of “habits of 
feeling, desire and will”, especially insisting on the phenomenon of habitual 
behavior46. in husserl’s view, habitual action is not merely, as according 
to aristotle, an action that conforms to the habitual dispositions of the 
practical agent, but primarily an action that tends to become unfree and 
“mechanical” by no longer requiring his conscious attention47. To designate 
this specific type of action, Husserl was later on to coin the idea of an “action 
prior to attention” (Tun vor der Zuwendung)48, that responds to impulses 
automatically, in reflex without paying any attention to them. Without yet 
using this term, husserl already describes the very same phenomenon on 
several accounts in his ideas ii – in explicit reference to the reflex gesture 
of lighting a cigarette – by speaking of an “associative” or “reproductive” 
tendency of action49. 
now, while husserl’s earlier considerations thus regard the habitual 
typifications of praxis exclusively with regard to the noetic posisbilities 
and tendencies of the practical agent, a long series of notations from the 
1930s attempts to engage similar reflections by approaching the subject 
matter from the onset in the broader correlative perspective of a typification 
of practical situations. in the following, i will simply try to map out these 
considerations by following three key issues which seem to structure these 
efforts: a.) the habituality of interest; b.) normality and c.) periodicity.  
If Husserl generally defines “interest” as the practical noetic engagement 
of the i50, his later notations most often tend to approach this phenomenon 
by regarding practical interests in their correlation to the world as they 
noematically apprehend it. This correlation is from the onset considered 
in the perspective of a typical repetition of situations: “Situations repeat 
themselves as similar, while to the habituality of interests there corresponds 
the world passively appercieved as structured in significance.”51 To this 
extent, husserl often distinguishes between the particular, momentary 
45  husserl (1952), p. 280 (english translation: p. 293). 
46  See husserl (1952), p. 256 and 277 (english translation: p. 269 and 289).
47  as an excellent illustration of how habitual action is generally performed one can think 
of the manner in which we normally run through a well-familiar path without paying any 
conscious attention to our surroundings. 
48  husserl (1999), p. 91 (english translation: p. 85).
49  husserl (1952), p. 338 (english translation: p. 350).
50  husserl (2008), p. 589.
51  husserl (1973)2, p. 55, (my translation).
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interests of the subject and his universal, habitual interest horizons, 
illustrating this distinction on the example of professional interest:
during the actual work-life of the businessman (‘in the company’), his 
particular business-interest is momentarily actual, while throughout 
his momentary interests we constantly find the unity of his 
“professional interest”. The momentarily actual interest designates, 
in its relation to the grounding world of praxis, the situation; this 
applies for every waking man understood in his own situation, for the 
clerk in his office, for the member of Parliament in his parliamentary 
business, for the housewife in her business as a housewife, say on the 
market in a market-situation.52
according to husserl, the subject’s momentary, particular constellation of 
interests is constantly determined by his enduring life-interests, be they 
directed, as in the earlier examples, towards one’s profession, or on the 
contrary, towards one’s family, nation and so on. in husserl’s view, interests 
of this sort are necessarily manifold, thus constituting the different layers 
of the subject’s personality, while to each one of his habitual sphere of 
interest there corresponds a variety of goals (i.e. explicitly shaped out 
and willfully pursued “practical possibilities”), “more or less completely 
organised in the unity of one goal”53. certainly, this latter thesis might 
be somewhat problematic, but in the view of the present paper it is less 
important to see whether or not the subject’s goals are indeed organized in 
a coherent fashion, as it is to notice that, according to husserl’s conception, 
goals are as such generally conditioned by a situation that guarantees 
their motivational basis: “goals are goals only with respect to a motivating 
situation in which they have their apodictic validity.”54
 moreover, in husserl’s view, goals and interests always have 
corresponding noematic apperceptions of the world as their necessary 
correlate object. To this extent, husserl often distinguishes between the 
scientific ascertainment of an object “once and for all” and its practical 
ascertainment, “serving only the purpose of transitory practical goals, in 
the perspective of a certain situation or a multiplicity of typically similar 
situations”55. husserl illustrates this by discussing the utility of a tool – 
apprehended as useful in anticipation of a recurring situation in which it 
comes handy – but the same also applies for any value-determination in 
52  husserl (1973)2, p. 415, (my translation).
53  husserl (1973)2, p. 415, (my translation).
54  husserl (2008), p. 774, (my translation).
55  husserl (1999), p. 65. 
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general: “every ascertainment of values and practical characters of things 
is relative to the situation in which they are valuable and of practical use.”56 
ascertainments of this sort – say, of a joke being funny – are for sure not 
universally valid like theoretical determinations, but they still transcend 
the sheer individual moment by referring to a typically repeatable situation 
of their possible verification. A similar observation is made with respect 
to significance (Bedeutsamkeit): “Characters of significance are habitual 
apperceptive characters pertaining to objects; they are apperceived 
enduringly as characters ascertained solely in a certain known context of 
interest and in corresponding situations, when they manifest this precise 
practical configuration”.57 as the practical agent is thus engaged in his 
particular practical situation, his surrounding world is noematically 
apprehended by him, according to Husserl, as a typically prefigured and 
articulated ensemble of significance, with its different layers of situational 
circumstances corresponding to his manifold spheres of goals, interests and 
possibilities. From this perspective, the concrete structure of a practical 
situation is, in husserl’s view, essentially determined by “relevance”: “when 
we speak about the changing circumstances of action and the ‘interests’  
functioning within them (in the situations of the practical agent), we think 
of the agent in his experientially […] given surrounding world, in which 
what is practically relevant for his intention is distinctly emphasized.”58 
This distinction – between what is relevant and what is irrelevant in a 
certain practical situation – represents an indispensable condition for any 
conscious human action and reaction within it, while it is precisely because, 
according to husserl, such a distinction is essentially grounded on the 
typical recognition of the respective situation as, e.g., a “market-situation”, 
an “office situation” and so on, that the question of situational typifications 
proves central for a phenomenology of action as such. Practical possibilities 
and typically recognizable situations are co-constitutive phenomena.
as is well known, the concept of “normality” is initially used by husserl 
in relation to what he terms as “psycho-physical conditionalities”59: the 
conditional correlation between the physiological state of the subject’s 
body and the constitution of his perceived objects. in this context, husserl 
contrasts the case of “orthoaesthetic” (normal) perception, wherein 
the subject’s sense organs function concordantly, with the case of an 
56  husserl (1999), p. 65. 
57  husserl (1973)2, p. 55, n. 2, (my translation);
58  husserl (2008), p. 201, (my translation).
59  husserl (1952), p. 62 (english translation: p. 67). For a more detailed account of husserl’s 
concept of normality, see also gyllenhammer (2009) and Taipale (2012).
A PHENOMENOlOgy Of AUTOMATISM
chriSTian FerencZ-FlaTZ alexandru dragomir institute for Philosophy, Bucharest
3.b.
Normality
76
abnormally functioning organ. later on, this model of synaesthetic 
collaboration also serves husserl as a paradigm for understanding the 
more complex processes of intersubjective experiential cooperation, 
leading to a wider use of the term “normality”. Following this implicit 
analogy between the synaesthetic and the intersubjective concordance 
and discordance of experience60, husserl often illustrates the question of 
normality and anomaly by addressing the intersubjective status of sheer 
sensory dysfunctions like colourblindness. Thus, he claims that “normality” 
primarily refers to an “optimal” standard of intersubjective experience and 
not to the mere contingencies of a statistical majority61. however, several of 
his later writings come to challenge this clear cut conception of “normality”, 
sketching out a more historically relative interpretation. Thus, in a 
notations from 1931, Husserl explicitly defines normality as “averageness” 
(durchschnittlichkeit)62, while in another text he regards it as a voluntarily 
assumed “norm”: “man in his normal existence doesn’t merely behave 
typically similar under typically similar conditions, like a mere thing 
apprehended in its empirical, inductive facticity; man lives under a norm, 
by becoming conscious of that norm. The normal lifestyle as a style of social 
life is not merely a fact for him, but something that ought to be”63. This 
normative character of a “normal lifestyle” is, for sure, not grounded in an 
actual, rationally motivated choice or preference. husserl himself explicitly 
refers it, in another note, to tradition and habituality64, regarding normality 
in this sense as a correlative concept that comprises both the noetic customs 
regulating the personal life of the subject as well as the noematic customary 
determinations of his lived world.65 moreover, by interpreting tradition in 
general as a “socialized practical habit”66, husserl actually comes to claim 
that all habits hold as such a “secondary normativity”67, since they are not 
experienced by the subject as plain facts, but on the contrary as actual 
commitments of the will, even if they are assumed by him only in a passive 
and unconscious manner. habits are mandatory, and the “secondary
60  husserl explicitly adresses this analogy in a notation from 1921, published as Beilage li, 
under the title „Solitäre und intersubjektive normalität“ in husserl (2008), p. 649. The same 
analogy is also central for merleau-Ponty’s theory of “intercorporeality”; see for instance 
merleau-Ponty (1960), pp. 258-275.
61  husserl (2008), p. 658.
62  husserl (1973)2, p. 231.
63  husserl (1973)2, pp. 143-144, (my translation).
64  husserl (1973)2, p. 143.
65  husserl (1973)2, p. 144. 
66  husserl (2008), p. 527. 
67  “To every habit there pertains a secondary form of normativity [Sekundärform des Sollens], so 
that deviations from it are experienced from the onset as something that ‘ought not be’”. husserl 
(2008), p. 527.
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 normativity” of normality is precisely the secondary passivity of a practical 
preference in an intersubjective, generative context.  
it is precisely this latter acceptation of “normality” that also reoccurs 
in several of husserl’s later manuscripts that attempt to address the 
“typification of situations” in the perspective of intersubjectivity. For 
indeed, according to husserl, individual concrete situations are from the 
onset linked intersubjectively: “all situations stand in an intersubjective 
nexus, that implies an intersubjective simultaneity and succession, a 
concrete intersubjective time, understood as a form comprising everything 
as it is intersubjectively interlaced or better even: interfused.”68 already 
in his ideas ii, husserl regarded the understanding of others basically as 
an understanding of their situation69, conceiving the latter primarily as 
the horizon of their determinant motivations. later notations, from the 
1920s and 30s, shift the main point of interest from the empathic givenness 
of the other’s motivations to the typical similarities between one’s own 
and the other’s situation. in husserl’s view, it is precisely this mutual 
correspondence between our individual situations that generally allows us 
to access the situation of others and to be grasped in our own by them, thus 
grounding a specific sense of social normality. in his formal and Transcendental 
logic, he explicitly considers that “the single subject’s and the community’s 
entire daily life” is related “to a typical specific likeness among situations 
[...], such that any normal human being who enters a particular situation 
has, by the very fact of being normal, the situational horizons belonging 
to it and common to all.”70 Therefore, by being apprehended according 
to a shared typology, all normal individual situations are from the onset 
open to mutual understanding, even if this understanding can become 
factically problematic. although husserl terminologically distinguishes 
between “private” situations, pertaining to the individual alone, and 
“common”, social situations, in which  “the situations of the participants are 
synthetically unified”71, he also illustrates their necessary linkage by again 
evoking the example of clerks in a company. For, indeed, the individual 
situations of such employees are, in their own perspective, enclosed in 
the broader situation of the company itself, while all individual situations 
finally share as their overarching common horizon the world regarded as 
the ultimate reference of their intersubjective connection: “The enduring 
style in which this world exists and its very being itself are actual only in 
the form of a temporality, in which socialized human subjects live alongside 
68  husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).
69  husserl (1952), p. 275.
70  husserl (1974), p. 207 (english translation: p. 199).
71  husserl (2008), p. 196, (my translation).
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one another and with one another in situations, each in his own momentary 
situation as well as in the universal horizon of his life situation” – that 
is: the world.72 Following such assumptions, husserl sees it as a chief task 
of phenomenology to explicate “the universal structure of this lifeworld 
as an invariant form for all”, “as an enduring unity that comprises all 
situations”73, while the lifeworld is conceived in this context as “the world 
of normal citizens” [bürgerliche normalwelt]. within its scope, every other 
citizen is as such typically predetermined for me:
if i as a citizen [als bürgerliches ich] analyse this situation of mine, it 
proves to be that of a citizen placed in the unity of a surrounding civil 
world. Thus the world has this sense as a horizon for me as it does for 
anyone else pertaining to it as a co-citizen, be it that he is given to me 
horizontally as someone familiar (my friend, my buisness partner, my 
faculty colleague etc.), if i know him individually, or else merely as 
part of the vast and open horizon of unknown co-citizens. The latter 
have their own predelineated personal sense of being, belonging just 
as well, in their own way, to this civil world of mine.74
Such normality surely also implies a corresponding typical anomaly, and it 
is perhaps at this point that Husserl’s reflections become most problematic:
in my normal civil life there is emphasis on a certain style of 
normal civil life, belonging especially to my class, my profession, 
as this stands out among other professions of civil life, sharing, in 
the manner of a different horizon, the same common lifeworld, as 
one and the same world that is only given in a different mode. This 
again leads to different types of situations. at their outskirts there 
is the abnormal, the vagabonds, the rascals and so on, understood as 
personal types that place themselves outside the normal world.75
    
In several of his notes from the 1930s, Husserl relates the specific time flow 
of situational life to the manner in which our dominant practical interests 
succeed each other and interfere with one another76. most frequently, such 
considerations are illustrated by following the alternation between the 
72  husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).
73  husserl (2008), p. 196, (my translation). 
74  husserl (2008), p. 197, (my translation).
75  husserl (2008), p. 198, (my translation).
76  husserl (1973)2, p. 174.
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professional interest that dominates our “work hours” and other interests 
– of play, leisure, or spontaneous curiosity – that interrupt and complete 
it77. This alternation is from the onset characterized by a certain typical 
periodicity, a concept that becomes central in several of husserl’s later, 
genetic considerations. According to these reflections, the periodicity of 
practical interests is, on the one hand, linked to the natural periodicities of 
the surrounding world (the alternation of night and day, of seasons in a year) 
as it is, on the other hand, primarily rooted in the biological periodicities of 
instinct. in the periodical succession of sleep and waking, for instance, both 
aspects – drive and a natural cycle – are obviously intertwined. however, 
in husserl’s view, an instinctive drive like hunger doesn’t simply reoccur 
periodically, but it is also consciously apprehended by the subject in its 
periodical, typical repetition. By this, the drive itself is modified, remaining 
horizonally open for further reoccurrences with each of its momentary 
fulfillments and thus it helps constitute a broader practical horizon of 
the will: a “synthetic unity of need”78. in husserl’s view, this elementary 
periodicity of instincts actually represents “the necessary starting point for 
understanding all goal-orientation of human life”79, and it is in such primary 
horizons of periodical repeatability that the very possibility of “foresight” – 
that is: of deliberate action and conscious planning – is generally rooted80. 
This very conception of periodicity also becomes central in husserl’s 
reflections on the typification of situations. For situations are indeed, above 
all, finite temporal sequences, subjected to complex processes of time-
organisation. This aspect is explicitly sketched out in a manuscript from 
1932, addressing situations from the onset in terms of their “normal” typical 
repeatability. Situations are, as husserl claims, essentially apprehended 
as parts of normal, typically repeatable successions of situations, that is, 
of predictable sequential arrangements. he illustrates this in a striking 
description of daily routine: “i have just woken up, and the day, my day, is 
already present in front of me, without me having to represent it intuitively 
as such; the succession of its normal, usual, particular situations already 
occurs to me in the flow of their being actualized as such: bathing, getting 
clothed, breakfast, morning work in the office or in the shop, lunch break, 
afternoon work, evening leasure.”81 Thus, any normal concrete situation 
is as such horizonally integrated in a vaster temporal sequence that 
77  See husserl (2008), p. 307.
78  husserl (2008), p. 581, (my translation).
79  husserl (2008), p. 583, (my translation).
80  husserl (2008), p. 585.
81  husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).
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predetermines it from the start: “instead, the particular situation, for 
instance the situation of a particular morning of the week, already implies, 
with its mere apprehension as a morning situation, its precise sense as 
an introduction for the following:  the work in the office with its familiar 
and articulated style, as well as the entire following flow of situations that 
normally constitute a day of the week.”82 moreover, this entire sequence 
of situations is itself anticipated as belonging to an even wider timeframe, 
namely, the overall periodicity of world-time: “But moreover, according to 
its horizonal sense, the day of the week belongs to the overall order of the 
days of the week. Therefore, each week already implies, with its end of the 
week, the following Sunday, as well as the entire periodicity of weeks in a 
year, etc.”83 Thus, according to husserl, overarching periodical rhythms of 
succession constantly define and anticipate our ongoing normal situation 
in its concrete deployment as such. in this perspective, our practical future 
proves to be from the onset mapped out not only by our active planning 
and scheduling, but before all by passive processes of routine formation that 
automatically chart out all our practical intentions. and it is precisely these 
habit driven situational routines – as specific phenomena of a “typification 
of situations” – that offer, in husserl’s view, the necessary experiential 
background for free, deliberate action and foresight. 
For sure, the concept “situation” is most commonly associated with so-called 
“existentialist” philosophy, i.e. with the writings of Jaspers, heidegger or Sartre, 
who emphatically relate it to the question of freedom. according to Sartre, for 
instance, the situation is “the contingency of freedom in the plenum of being of 
the world inasmuch as this datum, which is there only in order not to constrain 
freedom, is revealed to this freedom only as already illuminated by the end 
which freedom chooses.”84 Similarly, heidegger emphasizes, in Being and Time, 
the fact that a “situation” only persists as such for a subject that is capable of 
assuming the autonomous state of “resoluteness”85. in this context, both Sartre 
and heidegger tend to regard the situation as a primary limitation for freedom, in 
relation to which freedom is always bound to assert itself. as such, it delivers the 
very material out of which freedom can concretely shape its choices. Thus, Sartre 
claims: “empirically we can be free only in relation to a state of things and in spite 
of this state of things. i will be said to be free in relation to this state of things 
when it does not constrain me. Thus the empirical and practical concept of 
82  husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).
83  husserl (2008), p. 195, (my translation).
84  Sartre (1992), p. 487.
85  heidegger (1967), p. 300 (english translation: p. 276).
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freedom is wholly negative; it issues from the consideration of a situation and 
establishes that this situation leaves me free to pursue this or that end. one 
might say even that this situation conditions my freedom in this sense, that 
the situation is there in order not to constrain me.”86 Similarly, by conceiving 
the dasein as a “thrown projection”, heidegger explicitly regards the situation 
as an element of determinant facticity, that freedom has to take on: “when 
da-sein, anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself, as free for death 
it understands itself in its own higher power, the power of its finite freedom, 
and takes over the powerlessness of being abandoned to itself in that freedom, 
which always only is in having chosen the choice, and becomes clear about the 
chance elements in the situation disclosed.”87 
husserl’s own considerations tend to focus on a quite different aspect of 
the phenomenon, namely: the inherent unfreedom of freedom itself, as it 
becomes manifest in the flow of practical situations. No doubt, the specifics 
of this perspective are already visible in the conception of freedom put forth 
in his ideas ii. For, in spite of husserl’s recurrent attempts here to establish a 
clear cut distinction between the free acts of the subject, on the one hand, 
also termed “cogitationes”88, and his unfree dimensions of sheer “nature”, 
as husserl calls them, on the other hand, among which he also ranks habit, 
he nevertheless repeatedly arrives at relativising this differentiation, by 
speaking of the habitual, inertial tendencies that also govern the sphere of 
free acts. “[e]ach free act has it’s comet’s tail of nature,”89 husserl claims, and 
it is precisely in view of this comet’s tail of automatism – their “repetition 
compulsion” – that his later notes also seem to regard the phenomenon of 
practical situations by insisting on their typicalrepeatability. Thus, situations 
appear not only in view of a “primary passivity” that first challenges 
freedom, as in heidegger or Sartre, but also in view of a “secondary passivity”, 
that affects the very interaction between freedom and its determinant 
circumstances.
86  Sartre (1992), p. 486.
87  heidegger (1967), p. 384 (english translation, p. 351f.).
88  husserl explicitly addresses acts of “striking” or “dancing” as cogitationes; see husserl (1952), 
p. 218 (english translation: p. 230).
89  husserl (1952), p. 338 (english translation: p. 350).
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alfred Schutz’s characterization of the interrelationship between relevances and 
typifications includes an analysis of the phenomenon of habit that, in his theory of 
knowledge, clarifies some essential aspects of common-sense interpretations in the reality 
of daily life. in form of “habitual possessions”, habit becomes in Schutz an element of 
knowledge, is characterized as a potential set of typical expectations to be actualized 
under typical circumstances. in this article, the constitution process of habitual 
possessions are analyzed considering its place in the interplay between relevance systems 
and typification structures in common-sense thinking – by pointing out that, for Schutz, 
habitual possessions must always be understood as habitual possessions of knowledge.
Between ReleVAnCe systems And 
tyPIfICAtIon stRUCtURes: 
AlfRed sCHUtz on HABItUAl PossessIons
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in his theory of the social distribution of knowledge, alfred Schutz develops 
a concept of habit in order to clarify a specific aspect of the structuration 
of interpretative meaning in the reality of daily life. within the framework 
of the action theory – specially in the weberian tradition –, the term 
“habitual” is commonly used in contrast to the category of rationality. But, 
in Schutz, understood as “habitual possessions”, the phenomenon of habit 
becomes a central moment of the distribution of knowledge that functions 
as a binding notion between “familiarity”, “routine” and “interpretative 
meaning structures” or “systems of knowledge”. Schutz conceptualizes 
habit through an investigation of the interplay between emergence 
processes of systems of common-sense relevance and of structures of 
typification in the life-world. In the present study, the main interest is 
to show that habitual possessions must always be understood, from a 
Schutzian perspective, as habitual possessions of knowledge. In the first 
part, dedicated to a characterization of central functions of the habitual in 
Schutz’s phenomenology, the object of analysis is the way in which objects 
and behavior are typically interpreted. Then, the attention will turn to the 
results of processes of sedimentation, structuration and transmission of 
relevance systems involved in the social distribution of knowledge. after these 
two steps it will become clear in which sense, according to Schutz, habitual 
possessions make possible for interacting individuals to learn to recognize 
a specific typicality, as well as the sedimentation of familiarity and the 
structuration of relevance systems.
in his analysis of how knowledge and experiences are applied and 
sedimented in everyday life, one of Schutz’s interest is the constitution of 
general types characteristic of the common-sense thinking – in contrast 
to the “nonessential” types of the social sciences. Following edmund 
Husserl’s description of typification processes, Schutz considers the world 
of everyday life as constituted from the outset through typified experiences 
and expectations of the individual. According to Husserl, even in the first 
experience of a given object, we have a pre-knowledge of some of its aspects 
and a scope of anticipated possibilities that guide, at some level, the process 
of experiencing. in experience and Judgment husserl writes: “The factual 
world of experience is experienced as a typified world. (…) What is given 
in experience as a new individual is first known in terms of what has been 
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genuinely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the similar). But what is 
apprehended according to type also has a horizon of possible experience (…) 
and has, therefore, types of attributes not yet experienced but expected. (…) 
To begin with, what is experienced about a perceived object in the progress 
of experience is straightway assigned ‘apperceptively’ to every perceived 
object with similar components of genuine perception” (husserl 1976: 331). 
These anticipations are, in Schutz’s words, “typically determinate by their 
typical pre-familiarity, as typically belonging, that is, to the total horizon of 
the same and identifiable objectivity, the actually apperceived properties 
of which show the same general type. Thus, it is the horizontal anticipations 
which predelineate the typical preacquaintedness and familiarity of the 
objectivity given to our apperception” (Schutz 1970: 94). Thus, to understand 
how these typifications are constituted and how they function, implies 
an understanding of the constitution of the unquestioned. in his article 
“Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action“, published 
for the first time in 1953, Schutz speaks of how types must be formed in 
order to determinate what individuals consider natural, and indicates an 
important aspect of typification processes. As he points out: “in the natural 
attitude of daily life we are concerned merely with certain objects standing 
out over against the unquestioned field of pre-experienced other objects, 
and the result of the selecting activity of our mind is to determine which 
particular characteristics of such an object are individual and which typical 
ones (…). The construction consists, figuratively speaking, in the suppression 
of the primes as being irrelevant, and this, incidentally, is characteristic 
of typifications of all kinds” (Schutz 1962: 9; 21). Grasping the meaning of 
objects implicates, in other words, ignoring some particularizing traits, 
aspects or features of it that are not important for the specific context or 
purpose in which the object becomes thematic, in which is manipulated or 
arises for consciousness. Here lies the essence of typification: “Typifying 
consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable” 
(Schutz 1964: 234). In any typification process, qualities of the object are 
perceived in reference to a pre-conceived type of bundle aspects; a recollection 
of similar objectivities constitutes a ground of typicality for the experiencing 
as of an object of same type. now, this selectivity or suppression shows that 
perception implicates choice, but, in this process, at the level of passivity, 
presupposing, as described by Schutz in “Types and eidos in husserl’s late 
Philosophy” of 1959, an apperceptive “automatism” which seems, for us, 
to underlie every process of habitualization: “no apperception is merely 
instantaneous and transient; any apperception becomes a part of habitual 
knowledge as a permanent result” (Schutz 1970: 96). 
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indeed, as lester embree indicates, it is possible to identify different 
usages of the term “type” in Schutz’s phenomenology. in his theory of 
typification, Schutz speaks, following Max Weber, of “ideal types” as 
concepts or constructs of common-sense as well as of scientific thinking, 
since his interest, in many of his writings, is also of methodological 
nature. As Embree points out, Schutz uses “typification” and “typicality” 
in “broad significations that include both concepts of type, but with the 
former tending both as a noun and with reference to interpretation to 
express the narrower signification of ‘ideal type’ and the latter tending to 
express the narrower signification of Husserl’s ‘empirical type’” (Embree 
2012: 126). Yet, as mentioned previously, Schutz’s concept of typification 
structures has also an origin in edmund husserl’s theory of types, where 
the habitual can already be found as related to the notion of typicality. For 
instance, in husserl’s experience and Judgement, as shown above, typicality 
is described as genetically pre-constituted in past experiences, forming, 
following Schutz’s interpretation, habits or “latent habitual possessions, 
and are called forth or awakened by a passive synthesis of congruence if 
we apperceive actually a similar object. at the same time, by apperceptive 
transference a set of anticipations is created which attach themselves 
to the givenness of a newly encountered objectivity of the same type” 
(Schutz 1970: 110). in Krisis, Husserl, according to Schutz, modifies and 
complements some aspects of his theory of typicality and stresses the 
typical regularity in the changeability of qualities and of the position of 
objects in space and time, it is to say that under typical circumstances 
some objects behave similarly (husserl 1976: 22), or, as Schutz puts it, that 
they have habits: “The notion of typicality as used in the Krisis is the form 
in which the objects within our intuitive environment – the lebenswelt – 
together with their properties and their changes are given to our natural 
attitude. This form is that of a vacillating approximation. all regularities, 
even the causal ones, belong to the typical ‘habit’ in which things behave, 
as it were, under typical similar circumstances“ (Schutz 1970: 111). 
This problem of the different usages of the term “type” is also addressed 
by Ronald Cox, who suggests:  “The automatic intending of typifications 
in perceptual experience founds the grasping of eidetic concepts (…). it 
is, then, genuinely the founding level of the actional processes. The usage 
of the term ‘typification’ should accordingly be restricted to the level of 
automaticity” (Cox 1978: 172). In any case, we always find “typification” 
referred, at first, to everyday understandings and to the constitution of 
familiarities; in this sense, also related to the dimension of automaticity 
and, therefore, to habitualities in a broader sense, that is, as habits of the 
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object and as habitual possessions of individuals – as elements of the stock 
of knowledge at hand of the subject which constitute a potential set of 
typical expectations.
Schutz’s theory of typification can be considered an effort to describe the 
structure of mundane experience by pointing out, following husserl, that 
the phenomena constituting everyday life are given according to typicalities. 
As described above, we are given, in our everyday life, typified patterns 
of knowing and acting – our experience of objects in the world is defined 
through pre-acquaintedness. in other words: any object of interpretation 
is, from the outset, taken not only within a context of significance, but of 
a horizon of familiarity. States of affairs are grasped in reference to similar 
ones and to typical ways to deal with them. experiences constituting 
this context are, in this sense – considering the familiarity involved –, 
unquestioned taken. This does not mean that the concrete, experienced 
object cannot show individual characteristics, only that these qualities 
will also assume, for the interpretation, the form of typically apperceived 
individual aspects. even when objects are experienced as unique, this 
uniqueness is, thus, a typical character, the phenomena are of a determined 
kind, recognizable. 
in an analysis of Schutz’s application of eidetic methodology, michael 
Barber shows that Schutz’s critical attitude towards some aspects of the 
phenomenological reduction had consequences also for his theory of 
meaning formation in the everyday life: “Schutz’s study of the meaning-
structures of ordinary social life relies upon a form of eidetic analysis 
which aims at uncovering the invariant, unique, a priori meaning-
structures necessary to any concrete social world. Thus (…), Schutz engages 
in a constitutive phenomenology of the entire natural attitude itself 
(…).The invariant structures which Schutz unearths – the structure of 
consciousness, the corresponding forms of interpersonal understanding, 
and spatio-temporal stratification of relationships – these invariant 
structures emerge out of concrete social worlds and carry their sociality 
as one of their essential characteristics” (Barber 1987: 111; 117). according 
to his “antireductionist turn”, typifications, as instruments of the habitual, 
become a feature not only of our experience of things, but also of our 
experience of the social.
as mentioned previously, Schutz uses the weberian term “ideal type” to 
characterize instruments not only of scientific analysis, but, at first, of 
interpretations in real life. These typified schemes or models of experienced 
motivations and purposes make possible the apprehension of the meaning 
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someone else’s action. ideal types can, in this sense, be understood as 
instruments through which the world becomes intersubjectively real. They 
are “ideal” since are constituted through abstraction. This abstraction 
makes possible his use in different situations. This is the reason why, 
for Schutz, typifications and typification structures are responsible for 
the sedimentation of the social and social in nature – their social aspect is 
invariant and essential. Typification and its structures are always shared, 
always transmitted and reinforced within intersubjective processes. in 
his book on Schutz’s sociology of knowledge, Barber emphasizes that 
“there cannot be typifications that do not reflect the social milieu from 
which they originate and in which they are used. The social is not just 
accidentally affixed to necessary structures of typifications whenever they 
are concretely instantiated, but it is intrinsically necessary to every life-world 
typifications pattern” (Barber 1989: 79). That’s why, for Barber, Schutz’s account 
of the social distribution of knowledge results from his effort to combine a 
concept of sociality – considered as a strand sedimented in the typification 
structure of daily life – with husserl’s theory of the intentional structures of 
consciousness. 
in society, the distribution of knowledge refers not only to the differences 
between the content of what individuals know (considering their particular 
perspectives and biographical circumstances), but also to the different ways they 
know or have access to the same fact. with his contemporaries “consociates”, 
the individual shares not only knowledge, but, in Schutz’s terms, a community 
of space and time (of chronological and also of inner time) where the “vis-à-vis” 
relationship prevails. But the individual is never fully involved in this kind of 
interaction. in processes of everyday interpretation that concerns contemporary 
individuals, they also move away from the face-to-face interaction. Through a 
specific form of typification, the individual is able to grasp1 his fellow-men beyond 
the vis-à-vis interaction or we-relationship “by forming a construct of a typical 
way of behavior, a typical pattern of underlying motives, of typical attitudes of 
a personality type” (Schutz 1962: 17). From this perspective, types configure a 
turning point between the intersubjective validity of the social world and the 
subjective access to this reality, between intersubjectivity and perspectivity. 
Typicality carries out the intersubjective validity of meaning in the everyday 
world, it maintains everyday knowledge in its geltung. in daily life, individuals 
1  in the common-sense thinking related to the social, ways of grasping this meaning is through 
(subjective) personal types – ideal types of personalities – and (objective) course-of-action types – ideal 
types of behaviors and course-of-action types. while the course-of-action type is based upon experience 
of acts of the same type, a personal type, as Barber points out, refers to “a point of reference where all 
his personal characteristics as they existed when he departed intersect. in this case (…) naturally, such a 
type abstracts from the fullness of the individuality of the other” (Barber 1989: 47). in the interpretative 
context, the Other becomes an ideal object, an ideal construct through typification constellations. 
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expect that what is been once verified as valid, will remain valid, in an idealization2 
that constitutes an essential aspect of the phenomena of the habitual in the social sphere: 
the familiarity. in his book Reflections on the Problem of Relevances, Schutz writes: 
“familiarity itself, and even knowledge in general (considered as one’s habitual and 
dormant possession of previous experiences), presupposes the idealizations of the ‘and 
so forth and so on’ and the ‘i can do it again’. (…) familiarity thus indicates the likelihood of 
referring new experiences, in respect of their types, to the habitual stock of already acquired 
knowledge of a passive synthesis of recognition“ (Schutz 2011: 126). Familiarity has, 
therefore, a dual character. in an objective sense, familiarity means the aspect 
of the already experienced.  in a subjective sense, it refers to individual habits in 
recognizing and choosing actual experiences considering the types at hand in 
his stock of knowledge. moreover, Schutz shows that this habitual selection is also 
related to the interest and to the relevance implicated in the concrete situation. 
Schutz calls this situational background “system of relevances”; it is responsible 
to determinate the characteristics that are selected as typical and must, therefore, 
be considered in a necessary relation with typicality3. Thus, habits are not only 
results of sedimentations of social experiences, but also assume a constitutive 
function in their situational setting, supporting relevance structures. 
in Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, Schutz defines habitual possessions 
as follows: “it is the main characteristic of habitual possessions, that is 
of the knowledge we take for granted as beyond question (whether it be 
familiarity of thinking or of practice which is involved), that they carry 
along with themselves expectations (…) that the same or the typically 
2  The common-sense thinking exists despite the differences in the biographical situations and of 
“here-and-theres” between individuals in the social world. and this due to two kinds of idealization: 
the idealization of the interchangeability of the standpoints and of the congruency of the system of 
relevances. The presuppose in this idealizations – that actually configure a knowledge – is that the 
specificity of each biographical circumstances and of the different standpoints doesn’t interfere or 
are irrelevant for the interpretation. They constitute therefore what Schutz calls the general thesis of 
reciprocal perspectives and consist in typifying constructs “of objects of thought which supersede the 
thought objects of my and my fellow-man’s private experience” (Schutz 1962: 12).
3  For Schutz, relevances can be of three, interrelated types: topical, interpretational and motivational. 
Due to the topical relevance, things can, from the grounding field of familiarity, become problematic. The 
topical relevance is directly related to the object of attention. everything else “is in the margin, the horizon, 
and especially all the habitual possessions we have called the stock of knowledge at hand” (Schutz 2011: 
131). Interpretational relevance refers to the typifications that are decisive to the interpretation of an 
object or of a state of affairs. motivational relevances, in the form of in-order-to and because-motives, are, 
on the other hand, always referring to future action, constituting the interest, here understood as “the set 
of motivational relevances which guide the selective activity of my mind” (Schutz 2011: 129). relevances 
can, moreover, be intrinsic of imposed. referring to the topical relevances, Schutz characterizes this contrast 
as follows: “Whereas in the latter [imposed] system the articulation of the field into theme and horizon 
is imposed by the emergence of some unfamiliar experience, by a shift of the accent of reality from one 
province to another, and so on, it is characteristic of the system of intrinsic topical relevances that we may 
or may not direct our attention to the indications implicit in the paramount theme – indications which have 
the form of inner or outer horizontal structurizations or forms of topical relevances – that is, we may or may 
not transform these horizontal surroundings into thematic data” (Schutz 2011: 111).
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similar experiences will recur” (Schutz 2011: 132). in this sense, when an 
experience becomes part of our habitual possession, it becomes familiar. 
as soon as we acquire a habitual possession, we learn, in other words, to 
recognize a specific typicality. Moreover, we don’t know the exactly moment 
and why we possess a specific habit, in the sense that, in daily life, it doesn’t 
become topically relevant. For instance, considering fear as habitual 
possession, all we know is that it has its history and refers to a biographical 
situation. we learn typical ways to avoid what we fear and also to identify 
the characteristics of the object we fear, to identify its type: “The habitual 
possession of familiarity thus acquired is called our knowledge of this object 
of experience in respect of its type. The type is therefore the demarcation line 
between the explored and unexplored horizons of the topic at hand and the outcome 
of formerly valid systems of interpretational relevances“ (Schutz 2011: 129). 
in Schutz’s social theory of knowledge, these “systems of relevance” are 
only another term for frameworks of alternative actions. in dealing with 
a specific situational arrangement in the world, the consciousness will 
always seek for interpretative solutions in sedimented experiences that 
shows a thematic relation with or are relevant to the problem at hand, to the 
setting it is confronted with. as shown, it is the typicality involved in this 
process that makes possible, according to Schutz, the habit, the emergence of 
common-sense recipes for action, since there is an increment in knowledge 
– which must be understood not only as  knowledge of or about something, 
but also as knowledge of how to perform an action, to handle under typical 
circumstances – with every new experience. “To sum up”, writes Schutz, 
“we have found that what we call our stock of knowledge at hand is the 
sedimentation of various previous activities of our mind, and these are 
guided by systems of prevailing actually operative relevances of different 
kinds. These activities lead to the acquisition of habitual knowledge which is 
dormant, neutralized, but ready at any time to be reactivated“ (Schutz 2011: 
130). as ronald cox points out, systems of relevances are items of stocks 
of knowledge at hand “along with the sedimentations of previous mental 
activities, all being habitual possessions (…)”. hence, habitual possessions 
“also includes what Schutz has (…) called the ‘recipes’ of everyday action and 
knowledge in the world” (cox 1978: 91). 
For Schutz, our daily activities are performed through recipes reduced 
to “automatic habits”, through a knowledge referred to the regularity 
of events. in habits and in the routine in daily life,  recipes of action are 
followed in an application of typification constructs. Typification and 
system of relevances determinate, together, according to Schutz, the 
emergence of constructs in common-sense thinking. habits, on the other 
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hand, have their origin in the necessary typicality of daily life, they are 
only possible because the world cannot be experienced in totality, but through 
the selection of relevances, through typifications. Thus, by defining habit within 
the framework of a theory of distribution of knowledge, that is, as habitual 
possessions of knowledge, Schutz clarifies his concept of knowledge in an 
essential, constitutive feature. in his words: “it has to be kept in mind that 
our stock of knowledge at hand not only contains habitual possessions 
originating in our theoretical activities, but also it contains our habitual 
ways of practical thinking and acting (e.g., ways for solving practical 
problems), habitual ways and patterns of behaving, acting, working, and so 
on. The stock of knowledge at hand includes, therefore, the set of practical 
recipes for attaining typical ends by typical means (…)“ (Schutz 2011: 134). 
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This article details fundamental aspects of habits, beginning with the fact that habits are 
dynamic patterns that are learned, and that in coincidence with this learning, habits of 
mind are formed, as in the formation of expectations, thus of certain if/then relationships. 
it points out that, in quite the opposite manner of the practice of phenomenology, 
the strange is made familiar in the formation of habits. it shows how clear-sighted 
recognition of the seminal significance of movement and phenomenologically-grounded 
understandings of movement are essential to understandings of habits and the habits 
of mind that go with them. The article differentiates non-developmentally achieved 
habits from developmentally achieved habits, but elucidates too the relationship 
between instincts and habits. it elucidates the relationship in part by showing how, 
contra merleau-Ponty, “in man” there is a “natural sign”—or rather, natural signs. 
By relinquishing an adultist stance and delving into our common infancy and early 
childhood, we recognize the need for what husserl terms a “regressive inquiry” and 
thereby recover ‘natural signs’ such as smiling, laughing, and crying. at the same 
time, we honor husserl’s insight that “habit and free motivation intertwine.” as the 
article shows, resolution of the relationship between habit and free motivation requires 
recognition of nonlinguistic corporeal concepts that develop in concert with synergies 
of meaningful movement, concepts and synergies achieved not by embodied minds but 
mindful bodies. 
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Brushing one’s teeth, tying a shoelace or knot, hammering a nail and not 
one’s thumb, writing one’s name, walking down stairs—each is a distinctive 
qualitative dynamic, a sequence of movements that has a distinctive 
beginning, a distinctive contour with distinctive intensity changes, for 
example, and a distinctive end. each is a dynamic pattern of movement. we 
are born with none of these dynamic patterns, which is to say that they are 
not ready-made or innate in any sense. each is learned.
There is a lesson to be learned from this existential truth, namely, that 
whatever habits we develop in what we do and the way we do things, they 
exist because we learn the dynamics that constitute them, whether by trial 
and error, by assiduous practice, by resting and taking up the challenge 
again at a later time, or whatever. The mode of one’s learning may vary, 
but the formation of a habit in each instance is basically an enlargement 
of one’s kinetic repertoire, which is to say that one can form a habit only 
by learning a new dynamic pattern of movement. in the beginning, the 
formation is ordinarily a spontaneous developmental given, i.e., infants 
are not told how to do such and such nor are they told  they must learn to 
do such and such in the first place—they would not understand anyway if 
they were told, for infants are precisely “without speech.” infants indeed 
initiate their own learning by first of all learning their bodies and learning 
to move themselves (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011). They 
do so without an owner’s manual as well as without instructions from 
others, a manual that would state, for example, ‘lift and move your right foot 
forward, then gradually take weight on it as you peel off your left foot-- the 
foot that is now behind you--from heel to toe,’ and so on, and so on. infants 
learn quite by themselves to reach effectively, to grasp objects effectively, 
to walk, to feed themselves, and ultimately, to talk and thereby exceed their 
classification as infants. Habits of mind proceed in concert with these habit-
formed and -informed accomplishments, most basically in expectations, i.e., 
in if/then relationships, of which more presently. 
The formation of habits proceeds in just the opposite manner of the 
practice of phenomenology. in doing phenomenology, that is, in following 
its methodology, we not only make the familiar strange, but do so in part 
by disenfranchising our habits, i.e., by bracketing, by “renounc[ing] all 
erudition, in a lower or higher sense” (husserl 1989, p. 96).  across the 
spectrum of human cultures, that is, in the most basic ontological sense 
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that includes every human, habits are indeed a matter of having made the 
strange familiar. That familiarity becomes ingrained in what husserl terms 
the psychophysical unity of animate organisms and their ways of living in 
the world. in more precise terms, habits develop by bringing what was out 
of reach and/or beyond understanding effectively and efficiently into the 
realm of the familiar and into what are basically synergies of meaningful 
movement that run off by themselves. habits are indeed grounded from 
the beginning in movement, that is, in the primal animation of animate 
organisms that gives rise to sensings and sense-makings that evolve into 
synergies of meaningful movement and habits of mind. it is hardly any 
wonder, then, that foundational understandings of habit, its origin, nature, 
and genesis, are rooted in a “regressive inquiry” (husserl 1970, p. 354) into 
ontogenetic life, or what Fink terms a “constructive phenomenology” (Fink 
1995, p. 63). 
in the course of their learning their bodies and learning to move themselves 
effectively and efficiently, infants form certain ways of “doing” that 
generate an ever-expanding repertoire of “i cans” (Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/
expanded 2nd ed. 2011, chapter 5). we might recall in this context husserl’s 
and landgrebe’s emphasis on the fact that “i move” precedes “i do” and 
“i can” (husserl 1989, p. 273; landgrebe 1977, pp. 107-108). certain ways of 
“doing” are indeed constituted in and by certain qualitatively inflected 
movement dynamics that inform an infant’s “i cans,” dynamics that create 
particular spatio-temporal-energic patterns. Just as infants nurse in 
distinctive ways and kick their legs in distinctive ways, so they ultimately 
learn to walk in distinctive ways, which is to say that the qualitative 
dynamics of one infant’s movements are different from that of another. 
Ways of moving are indeed individualized. Moreover qualitatively inflected 
movement dynamics feed into a certain style, of which more later. what is of 
immediate moment here is that self-generated dynamics are the foundation 
of developmentally achieved habits.
developmentally achieved habits are to be distinguished from non-
developmentally achieved habits, that is, habits that are not cultivated from 
the beginning through learnings of one kind and another. The distinction 
between walking and smiling or laughing is one such distinction. one 
does not learn to smile or laugh: smiling and laughter, like crying, are 
spontaneous movement patterns that arise on their own. Such spontaneous 
human movement patterns are in fact quite remarkable. as darwin 
succinctly observed, “Seeing a Baby (like hensleigh’s) smile & frown, 
who can doubt these are instinctive—child does not sneer” (Darwin 1987, 
notebook m, no. 96, p. 542). darwin’s observation is in fact of moment: the 
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relationship between instincts—what is “instinctive”--and habits warrants 
attention.
Instincts, like habits, are distinctive qualitatively inflected dynamic 
patterns. Those patterns, however, arise on different grounds. As specified 
and discussed in detail elsewhere with respect to infants and animate 
forms of life more generally (Sheets-Johnstone 2008, pp. 349-367), what 
merleau-Ponty terms “natural signs,” including “the realm of instinct,” 
are part of the heritage of humans, merleau-Ponty’s dismissal of them to 
the contrary. as noted in that discussion, “when merleau-Ponty writes 
that ‘in man there is no natural sign’, and that ‘[i]t would be legitimate to 
speak of “natural signs” only if the anatomical organization of our body 
produced a correspondence between specific gestures and given “states 
of mind”’ (merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 188-189), he is surprisingly oblivious of 
the dynamic congruity that binds movement and emotions, the kinetic and 
the affective (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/2009). a nervous laugh might simply 
burst forth, for example, when one feels less than full assurance about what 
one is doing or how one is to answer to a question, just as a free lower leg 
might begin swinging or jiggling when one is seated and feeling bored or 
eager to get up and leave a lecture or meeting of some kind. while such 
bodily happenings might not be countenanced as instincts, they are without 
doubt natural signs, instances of spontaneous, involuntarily produced 
movements--“specific gestures”--tied to affective feelings--“given ‘states of 
mind’.” adult instances aside, with respect to infant life, smiling, laughing, 
and crying are clearly the spontaneous expression of human nature: they 
are natural signs. They are, as darwin indicates, instinctive beginning forms 
of sociality that are spontaneously generated; they are neither self-taught 
nor other-taught. They may certainly be honed, however, and in habitual 
intentional ways, as when an infant cries because it has learned all by itself 
that crying brings its mother or caretaker to it, or, when as a child in later 
years, it learns to feign a smile when greeting a certain adult person it 
does not like, or, when as an adult in still later years, it learns to restrain 
a laugh at a child’s continuing awkwardness in order not to dissuade him 
or her from trying to do something. as is evident by such cries, feignings, 
and restrainings, humans can and do develop certain habits by choice 
on the basis of what was originally instinctive. instincts may thus be the 
generating ground of habits, precisely as in crying to bring someone to 
you, in feigning a smile at someone you actually dislike, or in restraining a 
laugh in deference to embarrassing another. moreover somatic responses 
(Johnstone 2012, 2013) such as shivering from cold are natural signs that 
may generate a habitual running to get a sweater or slippers, or to close 
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a window or turn up the thermostat, or in other words, to do something 
rather than nothing in fear that one might be catching a cold. in short, what 
is basically instinctive and thus involuntary becomes open to modulations 
in later years, that is, to voluntary implementations that may and often do 
become habitual in certain circumstances.
wholly voluntary learnings have no such roots in instincts or instinctive 
dispositions. indeed, when children and adults voluntarily take up a new 
skill and in the process form new qualitatively inflected dynamic patterns 
that become habitual —when they learn to write, to type, to jump rope, 
to play the clarinet, to drive, to make a surgical incision, and so on— their 
learnings have no underlying ‘natural signs’. in actual practice, however, 
their learned patterns are also modulated according to circumstance; they 
are open to variation depending on the particular situation of the moment 
and altered accordingly, as in making an abdominal incision or a spinal 
incision, or as in writing one’s name with a piece of chalk on a blackboard or 
signing one’s name with a pen on a house purchase contract.
There is a basic dimension of instincts, however, that warrants attention. 
in their pristine mode, i.e., before being possibly transformed by learnings 
of one kind and another, instincts are properly analyzed as self-organizing 
dynamics that flow forth experientially in spontaneous movement 
dispositions, thus basically, not just the spontaneous movement disposition 
of a fetus to move its thumb toward its mouth and not toward its ear or 
navel, for example, but the spontaneous disposition to move in and of itself in 
the first place, including movement of the neuromuscular system itself as 
it forms in utero. Such movement is not “action” nor is it “behavior.” it 
is the phenomenon of movement pure and simple—a phenomenon that in 
truth is not so simple when analyzed phenomenologically in descriptive 
experiential terms, that is, as a phenomenon in its own right. indeed, this 
pure and simple phenomenon is incredibly complex, far more complex 
than the terms ‘action’ or ‘behavior’ suggest when they are implicitly and 
largely unwittingly used in its place, as in talk and writings of “action 
in perception” (nöe 2004). along similar lines, neither does “embodied 
movement” come close to a recognition of the phenomenological complexity 
of movement, even as in an attempt to abbreviate husserl’s consistent 
specification of the two-fold articulation of perception and movement 
(husserl 1989) by stating, “our embodied movement participates in seeing, 
touching, hearing, etc., thereby informing our perceptual grasp on the 
world” (gallagher and Zahavi 2012, p. 109).
husserl did not plumb the dynamic depths and complexities of movement, 
understandably so, however. his central though certainly not exclusive 
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concern was cognition and the build-up of our knowledge of the world. he 
certainly did realize the complexity of what he consistently termed “affect 
and action” and the fact that he did not explicate them fully, terming 
them at one point simply “the root soil,” “the background that is prior to all 
comportment” (husserl 1989, p. 292, p. 291, respectively).  moreover however 
briefly, he certainly did grasp the centrality of body movement to soul, 
to performance, to production, and to style. with respect to the integral 
connection of body movement and soul, he writes, “each movement of the 
Body is full of soul, the coming and going, the standing and sitting, the 
walking and dancing, etc. likewise, so is every human performance, every 
human production.”  in a Supplement to this section of ideas ii, he observes 
that “products and works” such as wielding a stick or writing a book “take 
on the spirituality of the Body,” that products and works are “psycho-
physical unities; they have their physical and their spiritual aspects, 
they are physical things that are ‘animated.” (husserl 1989, pp. 252, 333, 
respectively). Psychophysical unity and animation indeed go hand in hand 
(Sheets-Johnstone forthcoming 2014).
Precisely in his emphasis on animation and in his not just consistent but 
pivotal concern with animate organisms throughout his writings, husserl’s 
observations are clearly a beginning entry into the complex phenomenology 
of movement and its relation to instinct and habit, and this both in 
recognition of, and in going beyond the fact that “i move” precedes “i 
do” and “i can.” in particular, husserl notes that, “in original genesis, the 
personal ego is constituted not only as a person determined by drives, from 
the very outset and incessantly driven by original ‘instincts’ and passively 
submitting to them, but also as a higher, autonomous, freely acting ego, in 
particular one guided by rational motives, and not one that is merely 
dragged along and unfree. habits are necessarily formed, just as much with 
regard to originally instinctive behavior (in such a way that the power of 
the force of habit is connected with the instinctive drives) as with regard to 
free behavior” (husserl 1989, p. 267).  in short, to yield to a drive establishes 
a habit just as “to let oneself be determined by a value-motive and to resist 
a drive establishes a tendency . . . to let oneself be determined once again 
by such a value-motive (and perhaps by value-motives in general) and to 
resist these drives” (ibid.). he points out explicitly that “here habit and free 
motivation intertwine. now, if i act freely, then i am indeed obeying habit too” 
(ibid., pp. 267-68).  in effect, what i freely choose to do and do again that 
leaves a natural disposition or instinct behind is itself a habit: my freely-
formed movement itself in virtue of its repeated patterning is in a basic 
sense habitual.
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This existential reality is of moment for it indicates a substantively 
significant cognitive dimension in the formation of habits and in habits 
themselves. in more explicit terms, the intertwining of habit and free 
motivation and movement implicitly suggests habitual patterns of mind--
habitual ways of valuing and of thinking.  given the fact that “consciousness 
of the world . . . is in constant motion” (husserl 1970, p. 109), these 
habitual ways can hardly be ignored. habits of mind are surely spurred by 
expectations, for example, most basically by what husserl terms ‘if-then’ 
relationships (husserl, e.g., 1989, p. 63), and correlatively by what infant 
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist daniel Stern terms “consequential 
relationships” (Stern 1985, pp. 80-81) and what child psychologist lois 
Bloom terms “relational concepts” (Bloom 1993, pp. 50-52). insofar as these 
relationships are foundational-- “if i close my eyes, it is dark”; “if i move 
my lips and tongue in certain ways, i make and hear certain sounds”--it is 
not surprising that the relationships are foundational to everyday human 
habits, such as closing one’s eyes to go to sleep or when a light is too bright, 
and saying the words “no” and “yes.” Just such kinesthetically felt and 
cognized experiences ground the faculty that Husserl identifies as the “i-can 
of the subject” (husserl 1989, p. 13), a faculty that engenders a repertoire 
of abilities and possibilities that are indeed in many everyday instances 
habitual. More finely put in phenomenological terms, tactile-kinesthetic 
awarenesses and their invariants are realized in basic if/then relationships 
that we spontaneously discover in infancy in learning our bodies and 
learning to move ourselves. Tactile-kinesthetic awarenesses are thus a 
central aspect of animation, a tactile-kinesthetic built-in of life, a vital 
dimension in the formation of habits. 
That expectations are indeed basic to animate forms of life can hardly 
be doubted, not only in such ordinary realities that if i turn my head and 
twist my torso, then a different profile of the object at which I am looking 
comes into view, and not only in such commonly passed over realities that 
‘if i close my eyes, it is dark’, but in hearing a strange rustling in the midst 
of silence or in smelling smoke. in other words, habits of mind are also 
spurred by happenings and by particular valuings and thoughts that follow 
in response to those happenings that become standard. Though they are 
open to possible variations according to circumstance, they retain their 
basic dynamic: the bodily-felt dynamic of apprehension, for example, or 
of suspicion, and so on. in this regard they might evolve in the form of 
‘wondering if ’, for example, or ‘thinking that’, precisely as when one hears 
a strange rustling in the midst of silence and straightaway ‘wonders if ...’ or 
smells smoke and straightaway ‘thinks that...’ moreover habits of mind may 
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be defensive as well as expectant. ernest Becker, a cultural anthropologist 
who elaborated on otto rank’s conception of truth-seeking as an 
immortality ideology—Rank was a one-time disciple of Freud-- captured 
this defensive habit of mind in a striking way when he wrote about “the life-
and-death viciousness of all ideological disputes”: “each person nourishes 
his immortality in the ideology of self-perpetuation to which he gives his 
allegiance; this gives his life the only abiding significance it can have. No 
wonder men go into a rage over the fine points of belief: if your adversary 
wins the argument about truth, you die. your immortality system has been 
shown to be fallible, your life becomes fallible” (Becker 1975, p. 64). it is of 
interest to note that husserl at one point gives voice to how what Becker 
terms an “allegiance” can be an obstacle to one’s vision and understanding. 
he does so with respect to a “zoologist and naturalistic psychologist,” each 
of whom is so wedded to the “scientific attitude” or to “‘objective’ reality” 
that “[h]e wears the blinders of habit” (husserl 1989, p. 193; italics and quote 
marks in original). The blinders of habit are clearly not limited to scientists, 
but include those whose “allegiance” deters them from considering findings, 
perspectives, or ideas different from, or inimical to their own.
as the above examples suggest, through investigations of habits of mind 
with full phenomenological rigor, one might come to a description of 
mental tendencies and dispositions in valuing and thinking. yet such an 
investigation might be met with skepticism since it is possible that, even 
with the practice of free variation, mental tendencies and dispositions exist 
beyond one’s individual phenomenological capacities. in essence, one might 
thus skeptically claim that there is no valuing and thinking ‘morphology’ of 
humans akin to the real-life flesh and bone morphology of humans.1insofar 
as phenomenological inquiries are open to verification, however, 
elaborations, amendments, corrections, and so on, are certainly possible and 
in fact to be cultivated if phenomenology is to prosper. Furthermore habits 
of mind fruitfully investigated phenomenologically might be authenticated 
and possibly even refined through Buddhist Theravada meditation practice. 
Such practice has basic methodological and experiential similarities with 
phenomenology (Sheets-Johnstone 2011a).  It might thus be affirmed that 
whatever an individual’s limitations might be with respect to encompassing 
a full-scale phenomenological description of habits of mind, that 
investigation is open both to verification by other phenomenologists and to 
habits of mind discovered through a different method of inquiry and study 
that has the possibility of complementing a phenomenological investigation 
1 For perhaps similar reasons, some might claim that there is no” emotions morphology” of 
humans en par with the real-life flesh and bone morphology of humans.
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and possibly even expanding its insights.
concerns about a morphology of mind notwithstanding, the above 
discussion and examples indicate that habits of mind may be and commonly 
are formed coincident with kinetic habits, and from the beginning in 
learning one’s body and learning to move oneself. The full-scale realities 
of habit are indeed psycho-physical in nature and develop in concert 
with experience.  They are at once cognitively, affectively, and kinetically 
dynamic: they flow forth with varying intensities, amplitudes, and 
perseverations in each of these dimensions of animate life and at the same 
time as a singular whole in the habit itself. That husserl writes often of 
the “intertwining” of body and soul is revealing in this respect, perhaps 
most decisively when he affirms that “the unity of man encompasses these 
two components not as two realities externally linked with one another 
but instead as most intimately interwoven and in a certain way mutually 
penetrating (as is in fact established)” (husserl 1989, p. 100). 
in sum, what comes to mind may be and not uncommonly is habitual in 
some degree, as the above examples indicate and as psychological renditions 
of associations might furthermore show. The idea that habits of mind exist, 
however, might pose conundrum.  Such habits seem both to affirm and to 
contradict the fact that thoughts simply arise. Aficionados of the brain might 
claim that the affirmation and contradiction attest to the hegemonic nature 
of the brain; that is, they might latch on to the conundrum as a validation of 
the monarchical status of the brain and its right to experiential ascriptions 
such as “if you see the back of a person’s head, the brain infers that there is a 
face on the front of it” (crick and Koch 1992: 153). The habit of inferring arises 
and the thought “a face on the front of it” arises because the brain infers 
and says as much. This rather comically eccentric not to say preposterously 
homuncular metaphysics is clearly at odds with experience2. however much 
thoughts may and do simply arise, we are able to concentrate attention on 
a text, on a report, on a paper we are writing, on a puzzle we are trying to 
solve, on a fugue or nocturne we are trying to learn, and so on. we are at 
the same time, however, something akin to passengers with respect to what 
turns up in the process of our concentrated attention—a wayward concern 
about an upcoming meeting, a recurring concern about how a sick child 
is doing, a resurging regret about not having done something earlier. yet 
2 State ments of neurobiolo gist Semir Zeki and neurologists antonio and hanna damasio 
engender a similarly quirky metaphysics: “an object's image varies with distance, yet the brain 
can ascertain its true size” (Zeki 1992: 69); “To obtain its knowledge of what is visible, the brain 
… must actively construct a visual world” (Zeki 1992: 69); “when stimulated from within the 
brain, these systems [neural systems in the left cerebral hemisphere that “represent phonemes, 
phoneme combinations and syntactic rules for combining words”] assemble word-forms and 
generate sentences to be spoken or written” (damasio and damasio 1992: 89).
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though thoughts outside our concentration may and do arise, we surely 
control “turning toward,” as husserl emphasizes, just as he emphasizes that 
we control our attention to something, that is, our interest (or disinterest) 
in something, and we of course control what we choose to do or not to 
do. we are indeed freely-motivated and freely-moving (e.g., husserl 2001, p. 
283). These dual facts of human life are obviously of pivotal importance 
to our understandings of habit. Supposing we are sufficiently attuned to 
our affective/tactile-kinesthetic bodies, we can, for example, choose to 
change our habit of turning only toward certain things and not others, or 
of finding interest in only certain things and not others, or of doing only 
certain things and not others. These dual facts of human life are of pivotal 
importance as well to understandings of habit and its relation to style. 
husserl deftly and succinctly captures the relation of habit to style when 
he writes, “every man has his character, we can say, his style of life in 
affection and action, with regard to the way he has of being motivated by 
such and such circumstances. and it is not that he merely had this up to 
now; the style is rather something permanent, at least relatively so in the 
various stages of life, and then, when it changes, it does so again, in general, 
in characteristic way such that, consequent upon these changes, a unitary 
style manifests itself once more” (1989, p. 283). That habits are breakable, so 
to speak, and that any particular habit can be replaced by a different habit 
means that one’s style of life is precisely changeable with respect to what 
husserl terms “affection and action.” husserl’s common meaning of affection 
is tethered to “allure” and motivations (husserl 2001, p. 196), that is, to 
‘turning toward’ and ‘interest’. he writes, for example, of receiving “some 
joyful tiding and liv[ing] in the joy,” pointing out that “within the joy, we 
are “intentionally” (with feeling intentions) turned toward the joy-object as 
such in the mode of affective ‘interest’” (husserl 1989, p. 14).
Such investigations and findings conflict with present-day 
phenomenological studies that pass over kinetic and affective realities, 
and this in part because they unwittingly pass over ontogenetic realities 
of human life, choosing instead a perspective that is in truth adultist.  
Gallagher and Zahavi, for example, affirm that “[T]he sense of agency is not 
reducible to awareness of bodily movement or to sensory feedback from 
bodily movement. consistent with the phenomenology of embodiment, 
in everyday engaged action afferent or sensory-feedback signals are 
attenuated, implying a recessive consciousness of our body.” They cite 
merleau-Ponty (1962) as a reference and conclude, “i do not attend to my 
bodily movements in most actions. i do not stare at my hands as i decide 
to use them; i do not look at my feet as i walk.” Their apparent unwitting 
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appeal to vision and neglect of kinesthesia is both telling and puzzling. why 
would one stare at his or her hands in deciding “to use them” any more than 
one would look as one’s feet as one walks unless there was a pathological 
condition of some kind3. in short, when phenomenologists write as 
knowledgeable adults without ever stopping to ask themselves how they 
came to be the knowledgeable adults they are--using their hands to grasp 
a cup or towel, walking along a trail or down the street--and in turn, offer 
fine-grained phenomenological descriptions of same, they pass over the 
need for a full-scale constructive phenomenology, a phenomenology that 
might indeed at times embrace a genetic phenomenology, the latter in the 
sense of determining how we come to the meanings and values we do.
a full-scale constructive phenomenology necessarily addresses the question 
of familiarity, in particular, the nature of that familiarity that undergirds 
habits having to do with using my hands, for example, and walking.  
how indeed is it that reaching for a glass or throwing a ball, or walking 
or skipping, or moving in all the myriad habitual ways we move in our 
everyday lives, run off as what famed neurologist aleksandr romanovich 
luria termed “kinesthetic melodies” (luria 1966, 1973)? how is it that these 
melodies, with all their variations with respect to particular situations 
and circumstance, become engrained in kinesthetic memory? how indeed-
-except on the basis of  familiar qualitative dynamic patterns, particularly 
inflected patterns of movement that run off in a way not dissimilar from 
the way that husserl describes internal time consciousness “running off”? 
movement, like time, is a “temporal object,” and temporal objects “appear” 
in a wholly different way from “appearing objects”: they are precisely 
“running-off phenomena” (husserl 1964, p. 48; see also Sheets-Johnstone 
2003, 2012, forthcoming 2014). Familiar qualitative dynamic patterns are 
just such phenomena.  we may thus ask how, other than as learned patterns 
of movement, patterns learned in infancy and early childhood, such 
familiar qualitative dynamic patterns come to be? as pointed out earlier, 
infants and young children learn their bodies and learn to move themselves 
in myriad ways in the course of growing. in effect, when present-day 
phenomenologists overlook ontogeny, they overlook the very ground of 
that adult knowledge that allows them to claim “a recessive consciousness 
of our body” and to state, “i do not attend to my bodily movements in most 
actions.” indeed, an adultist stance seems generally to allow a distanced stance 
with respect to the body: “The body tries to stay out of our way so that we can 
3 one might be inclined to think that gallagher and cole’s study of ian waterman, a person 
who “does not know, without visual perception, where his limbs are or what posture he 
maintains” (Gallagher 2005, p. 44), has unwittingly influenced phenomenological practice and in 
this instance compromised it.
ON THE ORIgIN, NATURE, AND gENESIS Of HABIT
maXine SheeTS-JohnSTone  university of Oregon
107
get on with our task” (gallagher and Zahavi 2012, p. 163)4.
a veritable phenomenological analysis of what is going on “in most actions” 
shows something quite different. it shows that, whether a matter of 
walking or eating or dressing ourselves or drying ourselves after a shower, 
or whether a matter of myriad other everyday “actions, the dexterity, 
the precision, the fluidity, and so on, that are necessary to the “action” 
running off are engrained in kinesthetic memory in the form of an ongoing 
qualitative dynamic that is spontaneously inflected and modulated 
according to circumstance, an ongoing qualitative dynamic that was 
learned and cultivated in earlier years and is now so dynamically familiar 
that it runs off by itself. in short, whatever the everyday adult actions, 
their dynamic familiarity is anchored in the tactile-kinesthetic body and 
thus in kinesthetic memory. Their formal reality is in part related quite 
precisely to husserl distinction between an appearing object and a running 
off object: staring at one’s hands in deciding to use them or looking at one’s 
feet in walking are not equivalent to everyday synergies of meaningful 
movement, synergies that were honed from infancy and early childhood on 
and that adult humans reap in the form of “getting on with our task.” it is 
indeed not that the body “tries to stay out of our way,” but that in learning 
our bodies and learning to move ourselves, we have amassed an incredibly 
varied and vast repertoire of i cans. To overlook ontogeny is thus to fail to 
ask oneself basic questions concerning one’s adult knowledge and in turn 
foil foundational elucidations of habit. it should be added that neither 
does merleau-Ponty asks himself ontogenetic questions, basically genetic 
phenomenology questions, nor does he, in his discussion of habit, provide 
answers to the question of how habits come to be formed. on the contrary, 
merleau-Ponty declares simply that habit is “knowledge in the hands” 
(1962, p. 144) even though in the previous sentence he declares that “habit is 
neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action” (ibid.).
gallagher and Zahavi’s reliance on merleau-Ponty is in fact disconcerting, 
and this because, again, quite to the contrary, movement “pure and simple” 
does not surface with phenomenological clarity and depth in merleau-
Ponty’s writings. without this surfacing, genuine phenomenological 
understandings of habit are kept at bay. in a long footnote, for example, 
in which he tries to explain how motion, “which acts as a background 
to every act of consciousness, comes to be constituted,” merleau-Ponty 
4 we might in fact ask whether it is “the body” that “tries to stay out of our way,” or “we” who 
try to keep the body out of our way, or what “our way” would be had we not learned our bodies 
and learned to move ourselves and in the process forged those myriad familiar dynamic patterns 
that inform our everyday lives and that run off so effectively without our having to monitor 
them.
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writes, “The consciousness of my gesture, if it is truly a state of undivided 
consciousness, is no longer consciousness of movement at all, but an 
incommunicable quality which can tell us nothing about movement” 
(merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 276). moreover his earlier appeal to “the bird which 
flies across my garden” (ibid., p. 275) actually confuses movement with 
objects in motion (for a phenomenological clarification of the distinction 
between movement and objects in motion, see Sheets-Johnstone 1979) and 
leads him simply to posit “[p]re-objective being.” in short, merleau-Ponty 
too passes over the qualitative dynamics inherent in kinesthetic experience, which 
indeed are “incommunicable” only if one disregards them. merleau-Ponty 
in fact dismisses kinesthesia outright when he affirms that “As a mass of 
tactile, labyrinthine and kinaesthetic data, the body has no more definite 
orientation than the other contents of experience” (merleau-Ponty 1962, pp. 
287-288) and when, in his attempt to fathom the complexities of movement 
in relation to learning, he simply states, “a movement is learned when the 
body has understood it” (ibid.,  [1945], p. 139). his statement is in fact an 
unacknowledged near quotation from henri Bergson who wrote almost 
fifty years earlier, “A movement is learned when the body has been made 
to understand it” (Bergson 1991 [1896], p. 112).  his continuing statement 
that a movement is learned when the body “has incorporated it into its 
‘world’,” and that “to move one’s body is to aim at things through it” is taken 
up explicitly by gallagher and Zahavi. They declare, “[w]e are normally 
prepared to describe our habitual or practised (sic) movements as actions. i 
would say that ‘i hit the ball’ or ‘i played one of Beethoven’s sonatas’, rather 
than ‘the arm (or fingers) changed position in space’. But in this case the 
movements are at some level conscious. They are teleological actions which 
contain a reference to the objects at which they aim (merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 
139)” (gallagher and Zahavi, p. 174). 
a description of our “habitual or practiced movements” does not of 
course have to be, or even “normally” is,  in the past tense any more than 
it has to be described “normally” in terms of action. Phenomenological 
descriptions hew fairly consistently to the present tense of the experience 
they are describing, taking into account its temporal flow and how the 
experience comes to be constituted. Furthermore, if “habitual or practiced 
movements” are to be elucidated phenomenologically, they warrant bona 
fide phenomenological descriptions that, rather than packaging them in 
actions, do justice to their particular and unique qualitative dynamics—
whether a matter of hitting a ball, hammering a nail, playing one of 
Beethoven’s sonatas, or playing liszt’s liebestraum no. 3. Further still, 
doing phenomenological justice to “habitual or practiced movements” 
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means realizing that movement is not a matter of body parts having “changed 
position in space.” By its very nature, movement is neither positional nor 
is it simply spatial. movement is a phenomenon in its own right, a spatio-
temporal-energic phenomenon that is clearly distinguishable in essential 
ways from objects in motion, which do change position in space. To do 
phenomenological justice to the phenomenon of movement requires 
opening one’s eyes not to positional awarenesses but to the dynamics of 
change (for a phenomenological analysis of movement, see Sheets-Johnstone 
1966/1979 and 1980; Sheets-Johnstone 1999a/expanded 2nd ed. 2011).
The underlying problem in all these purported phenomenological 
descriptions of movement is a basic ignorance of movement “pure and 
simple,” meaning that complex qualitatively dynamic phenomenon that 
is opaquely subsumed in various and sundry ways in action, behavior, and 
embodiment, and that is furthermore mistakenly described as an object 
in motion and thus relegated to what amounts to no more than positional 
information of one kind and another. habits, both general human ones 
and highly personal human ones, are not reducible to changes of position 
unless, of course, one is referring to an attempt to change one’s habit of 
slouch-sitting to erect-sitting, for example. even then, kinesthesia cannot 
be ignored: that pan-human sense modality is integral to the change, not 
only to felt changed tensions but to changes in body line, i.e., changes 
in the linear design of one’s body that, as experienced, are dependent in 
part on one’s imaginative consciousness (on this latter topic, see Sheets-
Johnstone 2011b). moreover kinesthesia can hardly be ignored since it, along 
with tactility, is the first sensory modality to develop neurologically in 
utero (windle 1971) and, barring accidents, is there for life. indeed it is an 
insuppressible sensory modality.  as well-revered and internationally-known 
neuroscientist marc Jeannerod concluded in the context of examining 
“conscious knowledge about one’s actions” and experimental research that 
might address the question of such knowledge, including experimental 
research dealing with pathologically afflicted individuals, “There are no 
reliable methods for suppressing kinesthetic information arising during the 
execution of a movement” (Jeannerod 2006, p. 56).
“information” terminology aside, especially in the context not of position 
or posture but of movement, Jeannerod’s declarative finding speaks reams 
about the foundational ongoing reality and significance of kinesthesia, 
reams that should certainly lead phenomenologists to take kinesthesia 
seriously and the challenge of elucidating  its insuppressible living dynamics 
of signal importance. Puzzlingly enough, gallagher bypasses this 
very foundational reality. when he writes (gallagher 2005, p. 83), “The 
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phenomenon of newborn imitation suggests that much earlier [before later 
forms of imitation and the “mirror stage”] there is a primary notion of self, 
what we might call a proprioceptive self—a sense of self that involves a 
sense of one’s motor possibilities, body postures, and body powers, rather 
than one’s visual features”—he clearly affirms that “a primary notion of 
self” is not a visual recognition of oneself. at the same time, however, he 
bypasses the foundational reality that is the tactile-kinesthetic body, its 
neurological formation, as noted above, encompassing the first sensory 
modalities to develop5. He bypasses as well findings such as those of infant 
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist daniel n. Stern whose studies led 
him to the description of a “core self” identifiable in terms of four “self-
invariants”: self-agency, self-coherence, self-affectivity, and self-history. as 
Stern states, “in order for the infant to have any formed sense of self, there 
must ultimately be some organization that is sensed as a reference point. 
The first such organization concerns the body: its coherence, its actions, its 
inner feeling states, and the memory of all these” (Stern 1985, p. 46; see also 
Sheets-Johnstone 1999c). Though not specified as such, these invariants all 
rest on the tactile-kinesthetic body (Sheets-Johnstone 1999b/expanded 2nd 
ed. 2011). The description of each dimension indeed validates the primacy 
of movement and the tactile-kinesthetic body. recognition of this body 
would obviate the need of gallagher or any other researcher to “suggest” 
anything. on the contrary, recognition of the tactile-kinesthetic body 
straightaway gives empirical grounds for affirming that the phenomenon of 
newborn imitation is rooted in a kinetic bodily logos attuned to movement 
(see, for example, Spitz 1983 on what husserl would term the “allure” of 
movement), and further, that as that body learns, it cultivates and forges 
an ever-expanding repertoire of i cans, that habits are engendered in that 
repertoire, and that a certain style--or “character” as husserl also terms 
5 Proprioception, as first described by Sir Charles Sherrington and as taken up by many 
present-day academics (e.g., Bermudez 2003, Thompson 2007, gallagher 2005, gallagher and 
cole 1998), is basically a postural rather than kinetic sense. indeed, Sir charles Sherrington’s 
original coinage of the term and his focal emphasis define proprioception as “the perception of 
where the limb is” (Sherrington 1953, p. 249).  Proprioception provides us postural awarenesses 
and, in addition, a sense of balance through vestibular mechanisms. gallagher and cole uphold 
Sherrington’s postural specification when they explicitly state, “Proprioceptive awareness is 
a felt experience of bodily position” (gallagher and cole 1998, p. 137). gallagher and Zahavi do 
likewise when they state, “although i do not have observational access to my body in action, i 
can have non-observational proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of my body in action. 
Proprioception is the innate and intrinsic position sense that i have with respect to my limbs 
and overall posture. it is the ‘sixth sense’ that allows me to know whether my legs are crossed, 
or not, without looking at them” (2012, p. 162). whatever the meaning of “non-observational . . . 
awareness of my body in action”--does “non-observational awareness” mean simply “knowing 
without looking”?--gallagher and Zahavi clearly bypass phenomenologically deepened 
understandings of the sense modality that is kinesthesia, which is to say the experience of 
movement and its qualitative dynamics.
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it--is born and being shaped in the process, a style that others readily 
recognize.
The lapses specified above indicate a call “to the things themselves.” In 
heeding the call, one is led back to husserl’s phenomenological insights. 
They are indeed an imperative beginning to bona fide understandings of 
habit, a beginning that might proceed from, but is certainly not limited to 
his conclusion that “each free act has its comet’s tail of nature” (husserl 
1989, p. 350). what husserl meant by this metaphor is that, by way of earlier 
experiences, “[t]he ego always lives in the medium of its ‘history’,” that 
“aftereffects” are present in “tendencies, sudden ideas, transformations 
or assimilations” (ibid.). This insight in particular leads most decisively 
to an appreciation of the significance of ontogenetic studies. Pathological 
case studies may enhance phenomenological understandings, but they are 
not essential in the way that phenomenologically-informed ontogenetical 
studies are essential: a constructive phenomenology is indeed essential to 
understandings of habit, just as it is essential to understandings of emotions 
and agency (on the latter topic, see e.g., Bruner 1990, Sheets-Johnstone 
1999c; on the former topic, see Sheets-Johnstone1999b, Johnstone 2012, 
2013). in fact, how “[t]he ego always lives in the medium of its ‘history’” 
is of sizeable import. husserl implicitly indicates just how central that 
history is when he brings together habit and style, and habit and the freely-
motivated, freely-moving subject. he states, “as subject of position-takings 
and of habitual convictions i have of course my style . . . i am dependent 
on my previous life and my former decisions . . . i depend on motives . . 
. i have a unique character . . . i behave according to that character in a 
regular way” (husserl 1989, p. 343). while he is clearly at pains to distinguish 
“who i am” as natural being from “who i am” as “position-taking ego,” he 
is clearly at just as sharp pains to show their relationship, in other words, 
the relationship of what he terms the freely-acting ego to “affect and 
action” (for a full discussion, see ibid., Supplement Xi, pp. 340-343). his 
emphasis on the relationship of a foundational basis in nature—a lower 
psychic level—to a position-taking Ego is succinctly put when he states that, 
“with each position-taking, there develop ‘tendencies’ to take up the same 
position under similar circumstances, etc.” (ibid., p. 293). The relationship is 
emphasized in different but related terms when, in describing “The spiritual 
ego and its underlying basis,” he points out that whatever is constituted 
naturally, i.e., in associations, tendencies, perseverations, and so on, 
permeates “all life of the spirit”: spirit “is permeated by the ‘blind’ operation 
of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining 
grounds for drives . . . all of which determine the subsequent course of 
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consciousness according to ‘blind’ rules. To these laws correspond habitual 
modes of behavior on the part of the subject, acquired peculiarities (e.g., the 
habit of drinking a glass of wine in the evening)” (ibid., p. 289). it is in this 
context, several pages later (ibid., pp. 291-292) that husserl writes of the 
background that is prior to all comportment and of what we find “in the obscure 
depths”: “a root soil.” in sum, habits, including habits of mind, particularly 
for husserl in the form of motivations, are a basic dimension of a freely-
moving subject, which is to say that the “medium of its history” is integral 
to the life of a subject.
Surely it is essential for phenomenologists to attempt a regressive 
inquiry, to take an ontogenetic perspective and carry out a constructive 
phenomenology. habits are a fundamental dimension of human life. indeed, 
we could not readily live without them. if everything were new at each turn, 
if all familiarity was erased and strangeness was ever-present, life as we 
know it would be impossible. A few final words about a dimension of habit 
make the point both incisively and decisively. That dimension has to do with 
style, specifically, our common dependence on style in our interchanges 
with others and our recognition of them as individuals to begin with.
Husserl affirms, “One can to a certain extent expect how a man will 
behave in a given case if one has correctly apperceived him in his person, 
in his style” (Husserl 1989, p. 283). He offers many examples of style—not 
only in the way in which an individual judges, wills, “and values things 
aesthetically,” but in the way “’sudden ideas’ or ‘inspirations’ surge up . . . 
in the way metaphors come to him and [the way in which] his involuntary 
phantasy reigns,” and even further, “in the way he perceives in perception 
. . . [and] “in the specific way his memory ‘operates’.” In short, Husserl 
affirms that style permeates to the core and does so on the basis of habit. 
what we notice in another person’s style are precisely just such aspects 
of another person’s comportment—the ways in which he or she typically 
relates to his or her surrounding world, thus not only the way in which a 
person “behaves,” i.e., his or her typical kinetic qualitative dynamics, but 
the things the person typically values, his or her typical lines of thought, 
what he or she typically notices, and so on. moreover husserl includes in 
a person’s style his or her “turning of attention,” a turning that, husserl 
states, “is also a ‘comportment’,” but is not a position-taking as are other 
aspects of the person’s style. yet here too, as husserl observes, “the subject 
displays his ‘peculiarity’, i.e., in what it is that rivets his attention and how 
it does so . . . [how] [o]ne subject jumps easily from object to object, from 
theme to theme; another one remains attached for a long time to the same 
object, etc.” (ibid., p. 291). in sum, husserl’s observations pertain to a social 
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world. we indeed seem to be more aware of the habits of others than of our 
own habits. we do so to a sizeable extent on the basis of the movement of 
others, what we in a packaging way term their “behavior,” but which we 
get a glimpse of in terms such as “jumping easily from object to object” in 
contrast to “remain[ing]attached for a long time to the same object.” The 
qualitative dynamics of another are perceived. They are integral dimensions 
of his or her style. we can thus anticipate what another will likely do given 
such and such a situation. There is a certain familiarity about the person 
that is simply there, evidenced in the dynamics of his or her comportment 
across our history with them, hence dynamics that we have experienced 
before and have now come to expect. it should be noted that we do not 
anticipate ourselves in the way we anticipate others. as indicated above, we 
are commonly less aware of our own qualitative dynamics than we are of 
the qualitative dynamics of others-- unless we have attuned ourselves to our 
own movement.
when we begin not with an adultist perspective and speculative entities 
to explain various phenomena, but with a veritable reconstructive or 
constructive phenomenology that allows one to “get back” to those 
nonlinguistic days in which we learned our bodies and learned to move 
ourselves and in the process formed nonlinguistic corporeal concepts in 
concert with synergies of meaningful movement, we approach veritable 
understandings of mind. We find that those synergies of meaningful 
movement are orchestrated not by an embodied mind but by a mindful body, 
alive to and cognizant to its surrounding world and developing fundamental 
abilities to move effectively and efficiently within it from infancy and in fact 
from in utero onward.
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in the following pages we shall discuss the notion of habit in sight of its role in the 
constitution of meaning. We make use of Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule following to 
show the crucial role played by habits in the establishment of verbal meanings. Then, 
we show how habits can be established according to the Peircian model of abduction. 
The generalizing power of abduction (and habit) is explained in terms of teleological 
motivation, whose roots we expose by means of husserl’s analyses on passive synthesis. 
finally, we draw the conclusion that the notion of habit may lead to a “non-naturalistic 
naturalization” of mind, that is, a “naturalization” opposed to both objectivistic and 
reductionist accounts of mind.
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The notion of “habit” is a philosophically crucial and often misunderstood 
notion. Usually “habits” are mentioned in two theoretical contexts: 
by mentioning (and often stigmatizing) the power of mere reiteration 
of experiences in the constitution of beliefs, and by questioning the 
transmission of social practices.
The first case is emblematically represented by Hume’s treatment of habits, 
which considers them a powerful force in the mind, while simultaneously 
depicting them as mere mechanisms, enforced by the contingent regularity 
of nature. This way of understanding habits grants them a central position, 
but at the same time makes of habits something essentially meaningless: an 
unanalyzable contingent fact of nature.
The second interpretation regards the notion of habit as akin to “custom” 
and makes use of it as an explanatory key for traditions and social practices. 
This acceptation is legitimate and interesting, however it disregards the 
essential discontinuity between habits and social practices. habits are 
personal: they may or may not have been inherited from social transmission, 
and they may or may not be intersubjectively shareable. Therefore habits 
are only a necessary precondition for social practices, but in order to become 
social practices a mechanism of transmission must be implemented, and 
this raises further questions that go beyond the nature of habit.
in the following pages we want to discuss the notion of habit in the light 
of its crucial role in the constitution of meaning. as we are going to show 
“habit” is the essential key to grasp and interpret the whole sphere of 
“learned contents” as such.
wittgenstein’s argument on the conditions for following a rule is among 
the most discussed pieces of philosophical literature, however its scope is 
not always clearly perceived. By focussing on rules wittgenstein actually 
examines the conditions for learning and standardizing any mental content 
that we may use with constancy over time. This means that what counts 
for rules does count for any learned meaning, inclusive of the most strict and 
formal ones, like the ones handled by mathematical thought.
wittgenstein noticed that, although ordinary language follows rules, we 
usually do not know either which rules we are using, or how to explain 
them. Furthermore, any explanation of the meaning of a sentence is 
finite and can never be exhaustive: if I do not understand “snow is white”, 
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somebody can try to explain each word occurring in the sentence, and at 
some point, if the explanation is still unsuccessful, the verbal dimension 
will be trespassed by coming to a level where i will be just prompted to have 
in the first person some experiences.
By resuming wittgenstein’s point, let us suppose that we are trying to teach 
a child to count by one (positive natural numbers). all that we ordinarily do 
(and can do) is: to provide the child with examples, to require her to produce 
samples of enumeration in her turn, and to correct her possible mistakes. 
at a certain point, the child seems to be consistently successful in her 
production, and the teacher concludes that the pupil has learned to count. 
however, after some days, we could imagine that the child is required 
for the first time to count beyond 200; surprisingly, she goes on uttering 
“202”, “204”, etc. Should we object that we did not teach her to do so, she 
might flawlessly reply that we never explicitly showed her that passage, 
and that she simply understood that this was the right way to proceed. in 
principle, this misunderstanding could be repeated endlessly, since we could 
never provide the pupil with an exhaustive exemplification of all possible 
applications of the rule. Indeed, each rule (each meaning) can have infinite 
instantiations, while examples and corrections can only be finite.
however, de facto we are often successful in teaching rules; therefore, 
there must be some reason why the possible derailment of the rule does not 
usually take place. in outline wittgenstein’s answer is that when you learn 
a rule, you do not produce an interpretation of what the teacher provides you 
with (examples and corrections) (wittgenstein 1958, § 201), but you simply 
reproduce the same act that you have been initially prompted to perform. 
This means that we follow the rule “blindly”, that is, we do not warrant the 
identity of the rule by a preliminary rational act: to follow the rule is not 
to choose among alternatives (wittgenstein 1958, § 219), nor to produce 
interpretive hypotheses, but primarily to persist in performing the same 
act.
But when we talk of the “same act”, we are already mentioning a kind 
of identity, though not a rationally ascertained one. where does this 
“sameness” come from, then? The sameness of the act, says wittgenstein, 
depends primarily on its habitual nature: rules are not something that 
we could follow only once in our life - says wittgenstein - they are habits 
(customs, institutions) (wittgenstein 1958, § 199). rule learning is possible 
insofar as rules are rooted in unreflective habits.
it is important to see that the identity of any rule is never ultimate and 
definitive: the paradoxical deviation in the ordinary rule of enumeration is 
in fact a simplified version of re-interpretations that actually do take place 
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over time. For instance, in the history of mathematics there was no pre-
settled determination about how to deal with the rule of subtraction when 
the minuend is greater than the subtrahend. when the question was posed, 
the rule of subtraction had to introduce an interpretative supplement, 
which turned out to be the introduction of negative numbers. in any case, 
each interpretive act must intervene on an operational core, learned by 
examples and corrections, which is what we call habit. Therefore habits (of 
some kind) are at the roots of all meanings (concepts, notions). habits are 
anything that can be learned in experience and replicated. habits must 
not be conceived of as overt physical movements: the interiorized verbal 
sequence of a nursery rhyme or the sensorimotor sequence of saccades in 
scanning a picture can be both habits. habits lie at the heart of meanings, 
where they enable the reiterated application of the same content to infinite 
experiences. This means that habits appear at the crucial crossroad where 
the empirical and the general (universal) meet.
habit, we are claiming, is what can turn the particularity of experience into 
the generality of meaning. This, to be clear, does not mean that meaning can 
be reduced to habit: the only point that is at stake here is the passage from 
particular experiences to the generality that is essential part of meaning. 
even with this limitation, this is a fairly bold claim, since the question of 
the passage from particular experiences, especially sensuous experiences, 
to the sphere of universals is among the most debated and controversial 
issues of the history of philosophy. in any case, we shall not try to provide 
a full-fledged answer to the question of the birth of meaning, but shall 
concentrate on the emergence of its replicable “content”, leaving aside 
the crucial point of the role played by language in shaping and conveying 
meaning.
The first thing to remark is that habits need no iteration of experience in 
order to be primarily established. although the traditional psychological 
interpretation of habit considers them to be borne by repetition, this is, 
strictly speaking, impossible. clearly repetition can take place as such only 
if the first experience already has a re-identifiable content, otherwise the very 
possibility of novel instantiations of the same could not be conceivable. This 
has nothing to do with the possible awareness of the relevant identity: even if 
we are completely unaware of the identity of an emerging content through 
experience, the enforcing role of repetition can take place only when an 
identity is already available. This means that each single experience must be 
already able to institute a habit, although repetition does affect the readiness 
and smoothness in performing the acts that characterize the relevant habit. 
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This point was acknowledged also by charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce, like 
wittgenstein, recognized that habits must lie at the core of meanings; this is 
what his famous pragmatic maxim conveys:
“consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings 
you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception 
of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.” (Peirce, cP 
5.422)
The pragmatic maxim gives expression to the observation that what we 
grasp in any propositional content is a knot of the implications that we 
would be disposed to draw from a belief in that content. Such implications 
are “practical” in the undemanding sense that they are “things to do” at 
some level (including the mere deployment of further signs). The relevant 
implications can be revived by us because they are habits. The propositional 
content “snow is white” entails in principle all the verbal explanations and 
the bodily acts that we are able to produce by grasping parts and whole 
of the judgment (inclusive of perceptual acts). de facto, according to the 
context of use only a subset of those implications will be drawn.
But, how can we understand the essential passage from experience to 
general content? Peirce shows a way to deal with this question through 
his notion of abduction. Abduction is the first step in the establishment of 
the meanings (rules) to be used in reasoning and deductions. according to 
Peirce all meanings (i.e., “conceptions”), which are endowed with universal 
content, are established through experience. But inductive experience is 
not the first step in the constitution of meanings. Events can be inductively 
confirmed, and frequencies of those events can be attributed, only insofar 
as a first experience generates something like a hypothesis (Peirce, cP 6.144-
6.145). This movement that generates hypotheses from primal experience is 
what he calls abduction: “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory 
hypotheses. it is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” 
(cP 5.172). abduction comprises “all the operations by which theories and 
conceptions are engendered” (cP 5.590).
In fact, how exactly abduction is to be understood is not thoroughly clarified 
in Peirce’s texts, its crucial role notwithstanding. abduction is not primarily 
the conscious formulation of a hypothesis, but is the origin of the contents 
with which conscious hypotheses can be built. when an experience is 
apprehended, it turns itself immediately into an expectation referring 
to a class of possible events: by making the acquaintance of an individual 
(say, “Kant”), i can immediately grasp a class of items kin of it (anything 
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“Kantian”). any experience (sensuous experience to begin with) immediately 
brings to light an instance which is capable of being re-instantiated; this 
instance already is a habit since it is a relatively stable disposition concerning 
what we can do. and, as we said, the relevant habit need not have any overt 
muscular-bodily manifestation: if a word steadily elicits a series of other 
words in my mind (as in a poem known by heart), this practical effect may not 
have any manifest behavioral expression, but it still is a habit.
We can try to improve our understanding of the first establishment of habit 
by looking at husserl’s analyses of the temporalization of experiences and of 
its connection with the idea of motivated possibilities. in husserlian language 
the passage from sensuous impressions to established meanings (noemata) 
may be articulated as follows.
Primal impressions (ur-impressionen), which are the most elementary level 
of sensuous experience, affect consciousness and produces a modification 
(Modifikation) of consciousness. This process of modification primarily 
appears as temporalization. Temporalization takes place in the form of an 
internal (essential) relation between so-called retentions and protentions.
retentions are the passive moment of sensuous consciousness, which 
apprehends our experiences as a train of events ordered by succession 
(hua X: 118): if we hear a melody, the tenth tone receives its musical 
meaning from the previous nine tones, inclusive of the specific duration 
of (possible) silent intervals; the antecedent tones (and intervals) bestow 
meaning to the present impression without being present and without 
being voluntarily presentified (recollected). Thus retentions originarily 
posit an order of succession. in fact, retentions must not be reduced to 
any psychophysiological model of memory, where succession would be 
supposedly generated out of a merely present state of affairs (mnestic 
trace, memory storage). indeed, you cannot describe any process where a 
succession would be “generated” without already implying that succession 
is entertained by a mind (consciousness). if one thinks that a present entity, 
for instance a magnetic track, can somehow “stand for” a succession, one 
should realize that this track has an order of succession only if it is “read” 
by somebody, who “keeps track” of the gradually receding elements of 
the track, in their specific order and “timing”. Otherwise you just have a 
piece of present matter without any reference to any temporal ordering. 
This means that you cannot “generate” succession without resorting to the 
kind of primal ordering activity that we recognize in living consciousness.1 
1  For a more detailed discussion of temporalization in phenomenology, we take the liberty to 
refer the reader to Zhok 2012: 216-225 and Zhok 2011: 247-251.
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Retentions are not, and cannot be, “facts”; they are modifications of 
consciousness that can be retrospectively discovered from their present 
offshoots.
retentions constitutively issue into protentions, whose motivated character is 
qualified by the retentional content (Hua XI: 337). Protentions are tacit plural 
expectations, based on retentional content. Protentions are not specific conscious 
expectations for two reasons: 1) because they do not imply any pre-figuration and 
2) because they are not bound to a single content. For instance, when i walk i 
may have no pre-figuration whatsoever, but if the ground collapses under my 
feet, my surprise and disappointment show that my walking body did have 
a tacit expectation concerning the solidity of the ground. and secondly, this 
expectation is only one in an indefinite plurality of similar tacit expectations. 
For instance, if during my unfortunate walk oxygen suddenly disappeared, i 
would learn the hard way that among my tacit expectations there was also the 
smoothness of breathing; and so on.
The essential point to grasp in this scheme is that retentions, being 
modifications of consciousness, are not sensuous particulars anymore: 
primal impressions can be said to be particulars, but retentions, which are 
prompted by primal impressions, already have a general content insofar as 
their “content” motivates protentions. motivation (“teleological impulse”) is the 
crucial generalizing power in consciousness. 
This passage could be also described as follows: sensuous experiences are 
particulars that primarily elicit “passive reactions” (retentional content), 
which are part of our general bodily sensorimotor reactivity; such reactions 
institute habits, since they can be re-activated in different moments as 
bearers of the same sense (function, télos). each time a sensuous impression 
is apprehended as percept, it implicitly dictates a range of motivated 
expectations (protentions) concerning its possible developments (husserl’s 
adumbrations, abschattungen). This horizon of embodied expectations is 
precisely the initial phase of what we are calling “habit”.
indeed, husserl himself describes habit (habitualität) in internal connection 
with the notion of Vermöglichkeit, which is a learned disposition that opens up 
a room of possibilities (hua XXXiii: 24-5; huamat Viii: 378-381). what Peirce 
conceives as abduction (primordial hypothesis) is described by husserl 
through the passage from sensuous affections to embodied dispositions 
(habits as Vermöglichkeiten). Such embodied dispositions initially appear 
as protentions, which primarily are perceptual expectations, rooted 
in sensorimotor (kinesthetic) activity. They are indeed something like 
“perceptual hypotheses”, that can be confirmed, corrected and replicated 
over time. Since perception is the first source of all learned meanings, this 
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scheme accounts for the basic establishment of those habits that provide the 
core content of meanings.
yet, the classical idea of habit, as it appears in humean accounts, seems 
rather at odds with our ordinary notion of meaning. Meanings are flexible, 
intelligible and, of course, “significant”, whereas habits are often conceived 
as dumb mechanisms. it is therefore important to carefully re-consider the 
nature of habits. In order to do so, the first thing that we have to do is to 
re-consider the nature of perceptual habits, that is, of the habits that are on 
display in our customary sensuous behavior.
let us take a trivial example of learned sensuous behavior: i am in the 
street and jump on my motorcycle; while beginning to move from the right 
sidewalk i see just in front of my tire a broken bottle; immediately i look to 
the left, to see if anybody is coming, before turning in order to avoid the 
bottle. now, this is a trivial case of behavior, guided by perception, where no 
reflective act has taken place. what is interesting to note is that this behavior 
has a clear logical structure, which can be easily translated into a structured 
reasoning. it is precisely as if i had said to myself: “i want to go, but if i go in 
this direction, i may damage my tire, then i shall change my trajectory, yet 
if i suddenly turn left, somebody could run into my vehicle, therefore i check 
that nobody is there.” This is a sample of what constantly happens in our 
usual sensuous behavior: in the wake of what we have practically learned, 
we perform tacit hypothetical reasonings and conditional inferences, 
using as occasional material for the inferences the current perceptual and 
behavioral contents. our practical competence (in riding the motorcycle, 
moving around in the street, detecting obstacles, etc.) has been acquired 
through experience and is available in the form of habits. But, contrary to 
what is often thought, the fact that habits can work “mindlessly”, does not 
imply at all that habits are “dumb mechanisms”.
First of all, habits are not mechanisms: they are sensitive to the 
environment and they keep their sense even when they have to take 
into account obstacles and delays. any habitual behavior is sensitive to 
current environmental changes and is altogether different from a kind of 
ballistic device, which, after being launched, would proceed unchanged 
till completion. Take some dull habit like walking or cleaning the floor 
with a broom. even if we have never truly envisaged the “ends” or 
“functions” involved in the current implementation of such habits, they 
unfold by appropriately reacting to different and changing contexts: we 
can meet irregularity in the ground or obstacles on the floor and we can 
(unreflectively) update our habitual behavior. In comparison with reflective 
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behavior, habitual behavior may appear “blind” because it is not concerned 
with foresight, and it may appear “mechanical” because it does not need 
reflective awareness. indeed, habits may be judged to be “short-sighted”, but 
in the short radius of the anticipations of perception (protentions) they are 
quite sensitive and far from blind.
Secondly, habits are not “dumb”: they have a teleological structure which can 
be made more and more complex and subtle. habits can be borne from the 
simplest sensorimotor reactions, but their “heuristic” and “explorative” 
character, which we saw as abduction, remains operative and generates 
continuous “ramifications”. Think of a learned skill like playing tennis. You 
begin by learning simple motor schemes in standardized situations, but 
through practice (which is no mere “repetition”), you acquire the ability to 
quickly adjust the performance to new situations and for different postures. 
when somebody knows how to play tennis, she has learned a complex habit 
that is unified by its teleological character (the aims of the game) and 
which involves a plurality of “knots”, from which contextually appropriate 
behavior flows. Habits, thus, far from being mechanisms, are living 
practices, where at each stage (“knot”) a plurality of alternative options are 
available. each “choice” at each “knot” has a logical form, without any logos 
(language) being involved. when playing we are continuously in situations 
which could be described by sequences of hypothetical and conditional 
inferences: “if the opponent does so, i should go there and prepare this stroke, 
but, look, she does so and so, then…, etc.” all this inferential process need 
no reflective act to be intelligently developed (and, in fact, if reflection 
intervenes, the behavioral outcome  often turns out to be suboptimal). 
habits are functional, teleological and plastic. The plasticity of habit is 
permitted, among other things, precisely by its teleological orientation, 
which makes possible that a plurality of courses be legitimate insofar as 
they converge in the same issue (or perform the same function).
The central position that we have here attributed to the notion of habit 
seems to move in the direction of a naturalization of meaning and mind. 
yet, this excludes the mainstream sense of “naturalization”. in the 
present account, consistent with wittgensteinian and Peircian analyzes, 
habits appear as the embodied basis of meaning. habits perform a sort of 
mediatory role between the particularity of sensuous experience and the 
generality of expectations, hypotheses and concepts. yet, we should be wary 
not to conceive of habits as “physiological dispositions”. The present account 
of the function of habit cannot be translated into any usual naturalistic 
description, because naturalism assumes an ontological priority of the 
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objects described by natural sciences, to which all other descriptions should 
be reduced. But the conceptual scope of the objectivistic categories of 
natural sciences is too limited to account for either “meaning” or “habit”.
More specifically, in the light of what we said above, the notion of “habit” 
turns out to be unintelligible without reference to “temporalization” and 
“teleology”, but neither notion can be translated into naturalistic terms. 
That is, neither “temporalization”, nor “teleology” can be expressed through 
objectivistic notions, i.e., through notions that regard as ontologically 
real only what is describable as spatiotemporal object. The essence of the 
customary idea of a naturalization of mind is the descriptive or causal 
reduction of first person phenomena to third person accounts in terms of 
spatiotemporal objects (events). This is no sensible option for the notion of 
habit because neither finality nor temporality (nor living corporeity, for 
that matter) can be reduced to accounts in terms of mere objects (events) in 
space and time.
habits primarily emerge from perceptual meaningful activity, not from causal 
chains of physical events, even if we can partially describe perceptual 
activity in terms of physical causes. The reiterability of habits, which is what 
makes them eligible for becoming part of shared meanings, depends on their 
teleological sense, which can be regarded as a “natural phenomenon” but 
most certainly is no “naturalistic fact”.
The generality of habits must be recognized at two levels. at the personal 
level, i can reactivate over time the same habit elicited by different sensuous 
particulars. at the interpersonal level, we can learn the same habit by 
different routes. For instance, me and you can both learn to ride a bike, and 
thus we can both access the knot of implications (meanings) included in 
“riding a bike” (traveling, training, sweating, but also the hardness of 
saddle, the danger of wet tracks, the muscular cramps, the wind in the 
eyes, the flat tires, etc.). All such blocks of practices inherent in the iterable 
notion “riding a bike” can be learned even if the specific biographical 
circumstances where we have learned to ride the bike are remarkably 
different. i may have fallen while learning and you may not, i may have 
learned by myself, and you under somebody’s guidance, etc. nevertheless, 
the identity of the practice can be preserved over time, and often shared. 
what precisely can or cannot be shared is discovered only after establishing 
a stable communication on such items, but the essential point here is that a 
stable operational core there is, and this is what allows the communication 
of meanings.
yet, the fact that habits are to some extent independent from sensuous 
particulars does not mean that they are extraneous either to bodily 
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constitution or to the exposure to specific kinds of experiences.
as to bodily constitution, habits are learned continuously and 
spontaneously whenever appropriately demanding conditions occur. even 
if there are in principle endless ways to perform an action developing 
from a to B, there is always for each bodily constitution an ideal “line of 
less resistance”, which is not represented by a physically unique course, 
but by a family of closely connected acts. when we walk, each step of ours 
has certainly some idiosyncratic particularity, but its typical unreflective 
identity is guaranteed by the fact that, under the same external conditions, 
there is a spontaneous way to unfold muscular contractions and balancing 
acts, so as to make the step most smooth and functional (“natural”). This 
line of less resistance is what leads to the establishment of a specific habit 
instead of another. if we want to alter the spontaneous development of an 
unfolding habit of ours, we must expose our behavior to special constraints, 
that lead to spontaneously learning a different habit. This is what happens 
in special trainings (sports), but is not different in principle from what 
happens, for instance, when we adjust our gate to a pain in the leg, by 
limping: in the presence of pain, the new limping gate is a new line of less 
resistance in our walking habit; and, after being learned, the limp can be 
freely simulated. The felt line of less resistance is generally sufficient to 
establish habits as monotonous and roughly self-identical.
Thus, our ability to establish some habits and not others is inescapably 
rooted in our bodily constitution; from this perspective, we can make sense 
of the famous wittgensteinian remark according to which “[i]f a lion could 
talk, we could not understand it” (wittgenstein 1958: 225). if, by hypothesis, 
the bodily constitution of a lion and its habits are taken to be radically 
different from ours, no shareable core of experiences available for verbal 
signification could be found.
But also the specific exposure to some classes of experiences is decisive in 
learning determinate habits. as michael Polanyi said, in order to become 
a good medical diagnostician (or a connoisseur of wines as well), a subject 
must be exposed to a plurality of appropriate experiential samples, under 
the guidance of experts that already possess the relevant discriminating 
abilities and that signal the aspects to which attention must be especially 
devoted (Polanyi 1969: 54). Polanyi recalls the learning process that 
gradually enabled him to read pulmonary radiographs: at the beginning, 
he says, the image looked to him like a blurred jumble, where he could 
hardly discern heart and ribs, while the radiologist’s comments sounded 
to him like a kind of bluff, a stageplay pretending to take those muddled 
blots as a precious informative source. only after a repeated commented 
andrea ZhoK università degli Studi di milano
ON THE TElEOlOgy Of MENTAl HABITS
128
vision of those images, weeks later, he began to make out a rich landscape of 
meaningful signs, signaling physiological variations, pathological changes, 
scars, infections, etc. (Polanyi 1969: 100-101). The increased perceptual 
ability was, of course, no matter of improved visual acuity, but of learning a 
habitual articulation of units and differences, emerging as a system of signs. 
incidentally Polanyi notices that although he dropped the medical career 
and the relevant studies, this ability to read radiographs never went lost.
if we take both sides of the relation that can generate habits, we can see 
in which sense we can, and in which we cannot, talk of a “naturalization” 
of habit (and mind). habits are neither physical facts nor reducible to 
physical facts. yet habits are inescapably bound to bodily constitution and 
to appropriate experiential exposure. in this sense, instead of talking of 
“naturalization” we may prefer to talk of an “ecological correlation” where 
bodily constitution and the available environment concur in articulating a 
world of “practical units”. we can apprehend, remember, re-instantiate and 
mean what we usually do, insofar as we have the bodily constitution we have 
and as we are exposed to a specific environment.
This does not imply, notice, that different body constitutions or different 
environments would necessarily dictate radically different habits (and 
meanings). This may or may not be the case. i may suppose that things look 
mysteriously different to the proverbial nagelian bat, or that they look just 
more limited than how they look to us, or even that they do not “look” at all 
to the bat. what we can know, and what we can guess, anyway makes just use 
of the set of habits that we can recognize in the first person and of their variations.
 There are chromatic phenomena to me, because i have eyes. does it mean 
that a gradual change of my eyes, becoming something radically different, 
would involve a gradual change in the sensuous phenomena at my disposal? 
altogether different colours? altogether different sensations? This 
development is quite unwarranted and our usual experience bears witness 
to a different development: when reaching certain phenomenal thresholds 
experiences simply lose their unity and intelligibility.
in other terms, the contents of my world may well be tightly dependent 
on my body and its habits, yet this does not exclude the subsistence of 
essential boundaries within which experiential units can only emerge. The 
kind of “ecological naturalization” that this perspective allows invites to 
reflect on the living correlation of our body and its environment (which 
may be historical and cultural). it is our living and operative position in the 
natural and historical environment that determines the space of habits and 
therefore the palette with which the world of meanings can be painted.
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The paper seeks to draw a preliminary map of the relations between the human body, 
habituation, and nature, in a lineage of questioning which should be referred to as 
aristotelian in the wider sense of the term. The trail begins from aristotle’s articulations 
of Hexis, and reaches Bergson’s definition of motoric habitude, through the two 
intermediary-stops of Thomas aquinas and félix ravaisson. in all of the four “stations” 
of the trail, one finds intricate relations between habituation and nature that include 
the role that the human body plays in the process of coming-near of the two and the 
approximation between them. habituation has a task to play in the bringing of a human-
body as close as possible to its own natural reality. yet by that process habituation 
effectively covers and wraps the body with a “second” nature, a supplementary nature 
including not only actions, operations, gestures and deeds but also things that participate 
in these. finally, based on this basic structure of habituation, all the four “stops” in the 
presented conceptual genre conceive of the task of habituation as carrying a moral tenor, 
which the article seeks to portray. 
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The concept of the human body is still a difficult theme to approach 
in a philosophical manner. during the second half of the 20th century, 
continental philosophy has persistently returned to inquire into the 
problem of the reality of the body. Philosophical reflections on the body 
produced by thinkers as merleau-Ponty, michel henry, michel Foucault, 
deleuze and guattari, giorgio agamben, and more recently catharine 
malabou, graham harman and ray Brassier exemplify the centrality of the 
body as a philosophical issue in continental philosophical debates. Still, 
Jean-luc nancy was able to remark in 2000 that “all thoughts of the ‘body 
proper’, laborious efforts at re-appropriating what we used to consider, 
impatiently, as ‘objectified’ or ‘reified,’ all such thoughts about the body 
proper are […] contorted: in the end, they only expel the thing we desired”1. 
a central challenge regarding the status of the body regards its intermediate 
position between a subject-actor and a passive object, being enacted and 
moved by a subject-actor. in other words: is the body a mechanical dispositive 
to be automatized as cleverly as possible, or is it rather an intimate layer 
of inner experience, escaping the rationalizing grip of the intellect and at 
the same moment  being distinguished from the physical matter of nature? 
That is, is the body an organic part of nature, or is it somehow distinguished 
from nature qualitatively, by the fact of possessing of or being possessed by a 
human subject2? The concept of habit, contracting into itself a long tradition 
of discussion that will be portrayed in outline below, makes one of the possible 
apertures to approach this complex, ambivalent reality of the body. habit 
merits this privileged position as its functioning, similarly to that of the body 
itself, takes place between activity and passivity and between actuality and 
potentiality. most importantly, it is the position of habit as a second nature, 
or as a naturalized capacity, that places habit in the vicinity of the body itself. 
one therefore is called to pay attention to the manner in which the body 
makes itself a site for the activity of thought by processes of habituation. 
when the body is approached via the habitual framework, one is able to think 
of the human body in a manner which we recommend viewing as inherently 
moral, which is to say belonging to the domain of the human mastery of one’s 
actions. 
1  nancy, 2008: 5.
2  on this see gontier, 2001. 
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we proceed now to the more reconstructive core of this essay, which 
will revolve around issues related to the rather popular maxim “habit is 
a second nature”. The philological origins of this expression are, in fact, 
quite complex3. we suggest examining central articulations of the relation 
between habit and nature at several central stations in the conceptual 
history of habit: aristotle, aquinas, ravaisson and Bergson. we’d refer to 
nature here in the general sense of an organized matter, composed of things, 
bodies and movements. As we shall see, the core Aristotelian definitions 
are pertinent to the scholastic and to the modern formulations of habit, 
including habit’s relation to nature and to the body, so that one can detect 
here what could be called a conceptual genre. The present restoration of the 
conceptual genre of habit is done by comparing the three central historical 
moments of its longue-durée: the ancient, the medieval and the late modern. 
This will provide an introductory orientation for the question, preparing 
the groundwork for a fuller examination4.  
in aristotle, corporeal habit (ἕξις, hexis) is an evident member of the family 
of habits. in the metaphysics5 aristotle refers to bodily health as a hexis which 
is responsible for the well-balanced maintenance of living-beings. yet the 
general structure of habit in aristotle, by itself, is somewhat ambiguous. 
a basic structural ambiguity to be found in the term “hexis” is that it is 
brought by aristotle as a central example for three important categories: 
relation (πρός τι, pros ti), Quality (ποιότης, poiotes) and Possession (ἔχειν, 
echein)6. hexis is therefore conceived by aristotle as exemplifying these three 
categories: relation, quality and possession, and it is not quite decided to 
which of the three it most essentially pertains. it should be underlined that 
hexis in itself is not a category, but rather a state of affairs participating in 
these three central categories. we further learn from the Categories that as a 
(first kind of) quality, hexis should be differentiated from διάθεσις (diathesis, 
disposition). Both hexis and diathesis are qualities belonging to a substantial 
reality (οὐσία, ousia), and any hexis is also primarily a diathesis. yet, in as 
much as disposition is fleeting and unstable, hexis is a disposition which “has 
been naturalized” (πεφυσιωμένη, phepusiomene) over a period of time7”. 
hexis is then established by a process of appropriation between an acting 
3  This known maxim is not to be found in Aristotle. In Augustine, one finds the expression 
“secunda natura” together with “consuetudino”, not with “habitus.” (de musica, lib. 6, 19). augustine 
himself points to cicero as the origin of this expression.  
4  i am thankful to the gerda henkel Foundation for the support of the present project as well 
as to the community of the Thomas institute for hosting my work. 
5  aristotle, 2003: 272-273 (1022b13).  
6  aristotle, 1962b: 46-47 (6b1), 62-63 (8b27), 106-107 (15b19). 
7  aristotle, 1962b: 64-65 (9a1-5).  
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subject and that which she possesses. This can also happen between living 
organisms and the things that pertain to them: in the metaphysics, aristotle 
writes that between he who has a garment and the garment which is being 
had, exists a hexis8. That is to say: hexis mediates between the “owner” and 
that which is “being-had”, or property. we will return to this point later. 
in the nicomachean ethics aristotle differentiates between habit, affect 
(πάθος, pathos) and potency (δύναμις, dunamis); and out of these three state 
of the soul, only habit serve as the foundation of virtue9. Both potencies 
and affects could be viewed as participating in the natural pace of things: 
Potency exists in the thing by the latter’s very nature and could not be 
eradicated, and affects are exterior movements causing a corresponding 
movement in the body, according to causal natural laws. hexis, in its 
turn, exists between the two former states of the soul: as a process of 
naturalization, hexis is the human capability to react properly or improperly 
to the affects10, that is to say to all that which changes the human-being 
from the outside. and when a habit is established, it behaves like a potency, 
that is to say like something belonging to human nature. From this we 
induce that hexis has a complicated relation to nature: hexis is a naturalizing 
process. it goes towards nature, working to achieve a situation which is 
nature-like. And even if ethical virtues belong first and foremost to the soul, 
φύςις (phusis, nature) has an integral part to play in them. 
in the ethical context, a distinction should be made between hexis and ἔθος 
(ethos), which are both translated occasionally as “habit”.  whereas hexis 
does not necessarily belong to the ethical domain, ethos refers exclusively 
to habits pertaining to the ethical domain which is arranged by the soul. 
moreover, if hexis signifies a state of possession in a general manner, then 
the meaning of ethos goes in the more specific direction of a “custom” 
or “character”11. yet every “habit” effectuates a process which is related 
to nature and affected by it. in memory and reminiscence, aristotle writes: 
“ὥσπερ γἀρ φύσις τό ἔθος”12, “character comes after nature”. Therefore, 
it is useful to differentiate between ethos as character, which belongs to the 
ethical domain of praxis, and hexis which should be regarded as belonging to 
a proto-practical domain: hexis is certainly capable of participating in ethico-
practical processes, but by itself and in its elementary form, hexis concerns 
the fundamental, general human ability to master and dispose of his own 
8  aristotle, 2003: 272-273 (1022b9).
9  aristotle, 1962a: 86-89 (1105b20-1106a14).   
10  nickl, 2001: 19-35.
11  on the difference between hexis, ethos and hutos in aristotle, see miller, 1974. 
12  aristotle, 1957: 304-305 (452a27) 
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actions and reactions to the affects, in regard to its potencies.   
even if rigorously intermingled with natural elements and movements, 
virtue is not a natural quality. Virtue is constituted neither from nature nor 
against nature13; virtue is rather determined, stabilized and naturalized 
through a process necessitating experience and time-lapse, establishing its 
own regulations. This structure necessitates a body and an area which is 
its exterior. it necessitates the sensitivity and responsiveness of the body 
to outside influences. Finally a habit in the ethical framework necessitates 
a process of commerce between the acting-subject and its surrounding, 
determining the manner in which the acting-subject is actualized in its 
affecting environment. 
a synthesis of the above mentioned aristotelian text-locations suggests that 
the aristotelian hexis is an active relation of possession, being stabilized 
between a living actor and something that she possesses. in the ethical 
framework, that which is possessed in hexis is a capacity to react to the 
affects, in a manner which serves first and foremost the form or the soul of 
the subject-actor.  
in its medieval scholastic version, habitus, which is the latin translation 
of the greek hexis, belongs first and foremost to the soul. Yet one has to 
emphasize that Thomas aquinas did not exclude physical habitus from the 
list of habits14. instead, aquinas accepted aristotle’s determination that 
both beauty and health are habits, but he specified that they are “as habits”, 
that is to say, closer to a disposition than to habit in the full sense of the 
word. The reason aquinas provides for this differentiation is that, whereas 
habits are taken as stable and difficult to change, the body, according 
to the scholastic understanding, is viewed as a non-permanent, fleeting 
reality, always susceptible to be changed and mutated. habitus of the body is 
therefore “as” a habit, in as much as habitus of the soul is properly a habit15. 
habitus in the proper sense of the word, according to aquinas, belongs 
exclusively to the moral domain and is, as in aristotle, the foundation of 
virtue. only habit that is directed to a form (rather than to an operation), 
that is to say, to the soul (or the reality) of the subject, could have its “seat” 
in the body and therefore have the body as its subject16. Therefore habitus 
of the body, in the Thomistic framework is directed to the actualization of 
the reality (the “form”) of the actor, rather than to a specific operation that 
13  aristotle, 1962a, 70-71 (1103a25).
14  aquinas, 1920: 797-799 (Quaest. 50 art. 1). 
15  ibid., reply to 2. 
16  aquinas, 1920: 798 (Quaest. 50, art 1, answer). 
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the actor performs. Finally, habitus could reside in the body in a secondary 
manner, when it participates in the general habit ordered and directed by the 
soul. Therefore in the scholastic framework bodily habits are acknowledged, 
though they are submerged in the habits of the soul and are subordinate to 
them. in a second step, as we are going to see, aquinas raises the possibility 
of including material things in the kingdom of habit.     
in the opening of the discussion of habitus in the Summa Theologiæ, and 
following aristotle in the Categories, aquinas differentiates between habitus 
as “relation” and habitus as “having”, and it is the latter that aquinas links 
with physical usage. aquinas returns to the examples of the garment 
and its wearer given by aristotle in the metaphysics. aquinas sharpens 
and radicalizes aristotle’s suggestion by saying that habits are situations 
involving things, i.e., those things that “we have about ourselves”17. Therefore 
here habitus is designed not only as a relation but also as including the 
material thing itself, having an actual relation with a body and being 
carried by a body. habits are, therefore, inter alia, also bodily accessories 
which are found in a relation to a body, adorning and covering it: 
“Thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is 
adorned or covered [ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum]: wherefore 
the Philosopher says (metaph. v, text. 25) that ‘a habit is said to be, as it 
were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had’; as is the 
case in those things which we have about ourselves [quae circa nos habemus]. 
and therefore these constitute a special genus of things [speciale genus 
rerum], which are comprised under the predicament of ‘habit’: of which the 
Philosopher says that ‘there is a habit between clothing and the man who is 
clothed’ [inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus 
medius]”.
To conclude this all-too-brief account, in the scholastic version, habitus of 
the body should be understood as a quasi-habitus closer to a disposition 
(because its subject could be easily changed), which is directed to the form 
of the subject, that is to say, to the actualization of the natural form of the 
actor. corporeal habitus maintains the ambiguous status of the aristotelian 
hexis: on the one hand, it is contingent and artificial, but on the other hand 
it adheres and conforms to the form of its actor and is integrated in the 
actor’s operations. hence, aquinas maintains both the elements and the 
ambiguity of the Aristotelian definitions: He maintains the dispersal of hexis 
between the various categories (relation, quality and having), as well as 
17  aquinas, 1920: 793 (Quaest. 49, art 1, answer). 
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the distinction between habits, potencies and affects. yet aquinas enlarges 
the aristotelian model by adding to it this “speciale genus rerum”, the habit 
understood as a “res”. one has indeed to remember that in the romance 
languages, “habit” also denotes simply a cloth, a garment, dress and custom, 
this genre of things that cover the body and serve as its “second skin”. in 
as much as aquinas distinguished between the possessive-material kind 
of habitus and the properly moral one, in the 19th century the two parts of 
habitus re-unite to create the modern “habitude” in this later formulation of 
habit, the bodily possession of habit is considered not only as an element but 
as a constitutive part of the moral domain. 
in 1802, maine de Biran has located the notion of habitude as the center of his 
treatment of the human psyche and its faculty of thought (pensée), to which 
corporeal reality itself, according to Biran, is immanent18. a treatment of the 
peculiar immanence of the body in Biran and of the place of habitude in its 
construction will require a separate study19. yet it is important to note that Biran 
differentiates between passive and active habitudes: those habits which are “forced” 
on the organism from its surrounding, and those which are initiated or developed 
by the conscious organism itself. This Biranian differentiation, as we shall see, will 
be elaborated by Bergson. 
ravaisson’s de l’habitude of 1838 condenses several traditions of discussion of 
habit, of which the prominent ones are the aristotelian and the Biranian20. The 
scholastic model, on the other hand, is not explicitly named as a direct source for 
ravaisson’s inquiry. nevertheless, ravaisson’s attitude towards habitude shares 
notable affinities with that of Aquinas, affinities regarding the spiritual, theological 
horizon and beginning of habits. ravaisson opens his inquiry with the quote from 
aristotle mentioned above, “character comes after nature”21. hence the relation 
between habitude and nature is posed as the leitmotif of the essay. The second 
quote from aristotle ravaisson brings at the opening pages of his essay 
is a known sentence from the opening of the second book of the ethics22 
in which aristotle maintains that inanimate things could not acquire a 
virtue: “for not even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times will 
it ever rise upward unless under the operation of force23”. The aristotelian 
ethical framework of ravaisson’s discussion is therefore evident, and one 
18  de Biran, 1953.
19  For such an examination see henry, 1965: 71-105. 
20  Janicaud, 1997: 15-35. 
21  ravaisson, 2008: 24-25.     
22  aristotle, 1962a : 70-71 (1103a20).  
23  aristotle, 1961: 246-247 (1220b4-5). 
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of the central conceptual operations of ravaisson’s essay is the synthesis 
between ethics and physics, a synthesis extending between will and nature, 
a synthesis that, according to ravaisson, makes the work that habitude has to 
accomplish.      
differently from the Thomistic version which proceeds from the 
presentation of habitus to the discussion of moral virtue, ravaisson 
begins his essay with an extensive discussion of the physical world and the 
manner in which habitude participates in its construction. The discussion 
begins by questioning the place of habit in nature, in spatiotemporal 
reality, in material things and in bodies. From an aristotelian point of 
view this method is acceptable as in fact this order of discussion searches 
to understand habitus’ foundation in natural disposition (diathesis), 
conforming with the discussion in the Categories that was mentioned 
above, stating that habit begins as a disposition. also in agreement with 
aristotle, ravaisson’s conclusion is that in the inorganic domain, which is 
immediate and homogenous (according to ravaisson), habitude as such does 
not exist24. Therefore, habitude does not belong essentially to nature. instead, 
habitude begins where human action begins, that is to say, where an ethical 
organization (in the aristotelian sense) is enabled. even if the habitual 
dynamics are not natural, ravaisson demonstrates that the depths of the 
habitual architectonics come infinitesimally close to nature in its pure 
physical reality. habitude acts like a membrane prolonging the movement 
between the moral and the natural domains.  
ravaisson’s habitude is an instrument of prolongation. Two levels of 
prolongation characterize the ravaissonian habitude. First, as we have seen, 
like in aristotle (and in aquinas), the work of habitude needs an enduring 
process of acquisition and contraction (these are ravaisson’s terms). 
Secondly, habitude necessitates the existence of an element of a domain 
which is exterior to the active organism. in other words, a primary condition 
for the formation of a habitude is a situation of heterogeneity existing between 
a thinking-active body and its natural surroundings25. This fundamental 
heterogeneity is the reason for the fact that habituation is a process 
demanding a time-span, a duration, in order to gradually (and never fully) 
bridge-up this abyss between the soul and exterior nature. in the inorganic 
world, where cause and effect are established and immediate as the rules of 
nature, there is neither a need nor a place for a process of habituation. This 
24  ravaisson, 2008: 28-29.  
25  on heterogeneity in ravaisson see montebello, 2003: 82, 89, 91. 
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lapse of time characteristic of human reality and its habitudes, as we shall 
shortly see was captured and underlined by henri Bergson. moreover, for 
Bergson, the domain of habitude extends, in principle, also to the inorganic 
world, that is to say, to matter itself26.  
   
For ravaisson, with the help of habitude, liberty and consciousness could 
re-unite with the natural tendency for repetition and rehearsal, which is 
spontaneous and unconscious (otherwise referred to in physical terms as 
“inertia”). in order to describe the architectonics of habitude, ravaisson 
introduces the model of a spiral, which has its deep roots in the very 
beginning of organic life, whereas its upper bounds dwell in the light of 
consciousness. “habit comes back down this spiral, teaching us of its origin 
and genesis”27. This “spiral” movement of habitude is established only in 
the domain of organized life; but organization of life, as in aristotle and in 
aquinas, is always a result of the morphologies of the soul, and therefore: 
“It is in consciousness alone that we can find the archetype of habit; it is 
only in consciousness that we can aspire not just to establish its apparent 
law but to learn its how and its why, to illuminate its generation and, finally 
to understand its cause”28. yet when arriving to the pure formal level of 
the organization by the soul, one is no longer in the domain of nature: “as 
soon as the spiral arrives at self-consciousness, it is no longer merely the 
form, the end or even the principle of organization: a world opens within 
it that increasingly separates and detaches itself from the life of the body, 
and in which the soul has its own life, its own destiny and its own end to 
accomplish”29. godly grace and the Spirit’s freedom are transcendent both 
to nature and to the habitual domain. and both godly grace and the Spirit’s 
freedom are, according to ravaisson’s understanding, the beginning and 
principle (arché) of habitude. The beginning of habitude is generated by a 
gesture of grace enacted upon human reality from its outside. on this issue, 
ravaisson is closer to aquinas than to aristotle. as we are going to see, for 
Bergson, who also strolled down the paths of the aristotelian formulations, 
habitude is generated by nature and from within nature, and, in a certain 
sense, habitude is nature itself.   
Bergson radicalized the affiliation of habitude30 with corporeal reality and to 
nature itself. In this, as Bergson clarified in his course notes of 1892-1893, he 
26  “a vrai dire, la matière est susceptible d’habitudes”, Bergson, 1992: 272. 
27  ravaisson, 2008: 76-77. 
28  ravaisson, 2008: 38-39. 
29  ravaisson, 2008: 66-67.
30  i am following the translation of mabelle l. andison in Bergson, 1946.
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followed what he called “the naturalist thinkers of habitude31”. yet, Bergson’s 
explorations of habitude refer explicitly as well to the aristotelian and the 
ravaissonian sources. dominique Janicaud, an eminent researcher of the 
relation between ravaisson and Bergson, has determined that Bergson’s 
reading of ravaisson on the subject of habitude is an “optical error”32 that 
fails to serve as a true reflection of Ravaisson’s model. Bergson’s reading of 
ravaisson is erroneous, according to Janicaud, as the former emphasized the 
mechanical nature of habitude and even reduced habitude to a mechanical 
activity, whereas as for ravaisson habitude has an extra-natural, spiritual 
and godly source. The approach taken in the present paper, though, 
neither over-emphases the idealistic character of ravaisson’s work nor 
over-materializes the mechanical character of habitude in Bergson. Both 
Spiritualist thinkers pursued what Pierre montebello called “a movement 
towards profundity” [le movement vers la profondeur]33. and for both ravaisson 
and Bergson, it is habitude which opens the door to the descent inwards, 
though by two different methods. 
Both versions of habitude, adhering to the Spiritualist decree34, reserve for it 
the privileged status of serving as a starting platform of philosophical inquiries. 
moreover Bergson returned to an issue which was addressed by de Biran 
but was not prominent in ravaisson’s model, which is the relation between 
habitude and memory35. much more than an optical error, this observation 
by Bergson in fact drew a reasonably poignant conclusion from ravaisson’s 
habitual spiral, and bounded ravaisson’s discussion more strongly with its 
Biranian, and therefore Spiritualist, roots.     
it is true though that for Bergson all habitudes are essentially motoric. in 
numerous places in his writings, the word “habitude” appears together with 
the word “motrice”, creating the expression of “motoric habitude”. habitude 
is therefore connected in Bergson’s thought to the movements of the 
organism. This is how Bergson presents ravaisson’s concept of habitude, in 
an honorary essay from 1904:
For motor habit [une habitude motrice], once contracted, is a 
mechanism, a series of movements which determine one another: it 
is that part of us which is inserted into nature and which coincides 
31  Bergson, 1992: 265-273. 
32  Janicaud, 1997: 50.
33  montebello, 2003: 97.
34  Janicaud, 1997: 126-161. 
35  Biran, 1953: 130-163.
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with nature; it is nature itself. now, our inner experience shows us in 
habit an activity which has passed, by imperceptible degrees, from 
consciousness to unconsciousness and from will to automatism. 
Should we not then imagine nature, in this form, as an obscured 
consciousness and a dormant will? habit thus gives us the living 
demonstration of this truth, that mechanism is not sufficient to itself: 
it is, so to speak, only the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity36.  
Bergson’s version of the concept of habitude is indeed different from that 
of ravaisson. For Bergson, habitude is immanent to the mechanical nature 
of practical life. motoric habitude, Bergson emphasizes, has its cause not 
so much in the spirit but rather in the utility of the organism. habitude 
guaranties that the same gesture would be ready to respond to future 
situations belonging to the same genre37. Thus, habitude engenders and 
installs in the body a motoric apparatus38, whose own effect, Bergson 
clarifies, is either to construe the automatic machinery in the organism, or 
to produce a need in the organism39. as in all conceptions of habit discussed 
in this essay thus far, so also for Bergson the acquisition (“contraction”) of 
a habitude is achieved through repetition and rehearsal. The rehearsal of 
gestures by habituation orders and organizes the activity of the organism.40 
moreover, for Bergson, this establishing and ordering of gestures is of a 
mnemonic kind41. every gesture which is performed by motoric habitudes 
realizes a virtual reservoir of movements, perceptions and memories, 
already performed by the organism as a reaction to a similar movement, 
cause, or image42. we note in passim that this still stands in agreement 
with the aristotelian determination of hexis as a capacity to react to the 
affections. 
Therefore, according to this Bergsonian understanding, from any rehearsed 
gesture of the body one could draw enormous amount of data regarding the 
history of the organism. The habitual spiral of ravaisson mentioned above, 
therefore, was brought by Bergson to a radical conceptual consequence, in 
Bergson’s view that the roots of habit lie not only deep in the body but also 
in the very past of the organism.  
36  Bergson, 1946: 275; Bergson, 2009: 267.
37  Bergson, 2012: 186. 
38  Bergson, 2012: 267.
39  Bergson, 1992: 266. 
40  Bergson, 2012: 88-89. 
41  Bergson, 1992: 270. 
42  Bergson, 2009: 182.  
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The decisive character making Bergson’s habitude a concept in its own right 
is its relation with memory. This aspect of the relation between habitude and 
memory is not to be found in the ravaissonian version, but is rather to be 
found earlier, in de Biran43. Bergson understood the core-activity of memory 
as operated by motoric habitudes. For Bergson, motoric habitudes are memory 
in its mechanic, automatic, un-reflective aspect, taking place in the body as 
well as in in the soul.
 
in the operation of habitudes, the actor constantly re-enacts, re-realizes 
its past deeds, willingly or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously. For 
Bergson, this not only includes a physical aspect but is the physical aspect 
of the organism. The body is a lump of conglomerated, better or worse 
organized habitudes, and the part of the soul directing mental or corporeal 
habitudes is already conceived as spatial in its very nature, and therefore 
belonging to material reality, not to  spirit’s domain. yet the memory of 
the body, constituted by the ensemble of the sensorial-motoric system that 
habitude has organized44, condenses the entire past of the organism into 
momentary actions, which can be transfigured into moments of intuition. 
Bergsonian intuition therefore should be considered as working along with 
and within the architecture of habitudes, rather than as a transgression 
beyond them altogether. Bergsonian intuition, understood literally, should 
be conceived as a grasping of the manner in which an intensive-compressed 
network of habits and memories are realized in a certain momentary act 
of a particular apprehension (of an idea, of an object etc.): “in concrete 
perception memory intervenes, and the subjectivity of sensible qualities 
is due precisely to the fact that our consciousness, which begins by being 
only memory, prolongs a plurality of moments into each other, contracting 
them into a single intuition45”. intuition, in this sense, is a configuration of 
habitudes. furthermore a pure intuition, the productive intuition that one finds 
in philosophy and art, is enacted as the un-making (défaire) of habitudes, in 
order to “recover contact with the real”46. Bergsonian intuition therefore 
is a two-layered mental act (literal and pure), and both layers involve the 
working with habitudes: At the literal level, intuition configures a reservoir 
of habitudes into a point of contact with reality; and at its pure level, 
intuition un-makes this virtual reservoir in order to restore something that 
was missed or contorted in the literal moment of apprehension. 
   
43  Biran, 1953: 117-145.
44  Bergson, 2012: 169. 
45  Bergson, 1911: 292; Bergson, 2012: 246.  
46  Bergson, 1911: 241; Bergson, 2012: 205. 
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Therefore we learn that habitude has the capacity to register knowledge of 
the history of the habituated organism in an orderly and extended manner, 
partes extra partes. This capacity of habitude has also its pedagogical aspect:
The memory of the lesson, which is remembered in the sense of learnt 
by heart, has all the marks of a habit. like a habit, it is acquired by the 
repetition of the same effort. Like a habit, it demands first a decomposition 
and then a re-composition of the whole action. lastly, like every habitual 
bodily exercise, it is stored up [emmagasiné] in a mechanism which is set 
in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed system of automatic 
movement which succeed each other in the same order and, together, take 
the same length of time47.
Therefore, learning by heart, appropriating a poem, a language, a style, 
being acquainted and truly familiar with some object, embodies the core 
structure of habitude.
habitude is acquired by the repetition of effort; but when effort is repeated 
automatically, it tends to diminish and to evaporate. yet repetition itself 
holds the capacity to de-compose a movement and to re-compose it again. 
and this, according to Bergson, is already a supplementary effort which 
keeps habitudes alert and intelligent48. Therefore habitual repetition holds 
the capacity to become innovative when it involves the de-composition of 
gestures, actions and deeds. without repetition and rehearsal one could 
neither begin nor continue to perform the task of understanding a poem. 
yet the habitual activity, for example like of literature reading or wine-
tasting, is being enhanced by attention and effort, thereby producing an 
ever-growing subtlety, that is to say, taste49.
The motoric gestures of the body, by their rehearsal, create a mechanical 
habitude and establish the movements that automatically follow certain 
perceptions. This is the basis of the survival of the organism in its adaptation 
to its milieu. This process registers the past of the organism in the figures of 
its habitudes50: “The body retains motor habits capable of acting the past over 
again [ jouer à nouveau le passé]; it can resume attitudes in which the past will 
insert itself; or, again, by the repetition of certain cerebral phenomena which 
have prolonged former perception, it can furnish to remembrance a point 
47  Bergson, 1911: 89-90; Bergson, 2012: 84.  
48  Bergson, 2012: 122.
49  Bergson, 1992: 244. 
50  Bergson, 2012: 89. 
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of attachment [point d’attache] with the actual, a means of recovering its lost 
influence upon present reality”51. 
in our view, then, Bergson’s reading of ravaisson’s habitude distinguished 
an important aspect of habitude which was latent in ravaisson’s account. 
moreover, we suggest that one should assign to habitude a decisive place in 
Bergson’s philosophy at large, a more important place indeed than the one 
which is usually admitted. Bergsonian habitude is not only a reservoir of 
the past of the organism; it also constitutes the primary subject-matter of 
philosophical inquiry.  
according to Bergson, habitudes of all kinds (material, mental and intellectual) 
divert our spirit from capturing reality, as they construe an architecture of 
assumed relations between situations and actions. yet the reversibility of 
habitudes, that is, the fact that they are not natural, but rather constituted and 
artificial (again in full conformity with the Aristotelian formulation), makes 
habitudes capable of being disintegrated, so that a momentary contact with 
reality would be enabled: “intelligence has contracted habits necessary for 
everyday living; these habits, transferred to the domain of speculation, bring 
us face to face with a reality, distorted or made over, or at any rate, arranged; 
but the arrangement does not force itself upon us irresistibly; it comes from 
ourselves; what we have done we can undo; and we enter then into direct 
contact with reality52”. habitudes are formed by the practical necessities of man 
and it is the task of metaphysics, according to Bergson, to begin its inquiries 
by dissipating and questioning those habitudes, the artificial obscurities that 
diverted mind’s connection with reality53. in other words, Bergson assigns to 
philosophy the task of (re-)beginning by a deconstruction of the synthetic 
reality, in which utility constructs motoric habit. This habitual reality should 
be referred to as a moral reality in the aristotelian sense of being occupied with 
the managing of human actions, gestures and deeds. any metaphysical inquiry 
should begin by a questioning of the habitual domain of human reality which is 
simultaneously moral and physical, beginning by examining the philosopher’s 
own mental-habits, decomposing them and recomposing them anew. returning 
to the aristotelian vocabulary, we’d say that Philosophy, according to Bergson, 
should begin with a naturalized reality, with the extended habit that has been 
established in somesubject who is under consideration. The inquiry then should 
proceed by dismantling, undressing, deconstructing, going down the spiral of 
habit and denaturalizing it in order to uncover its beginning, its arché, which is, in 
51  Bergson, 1911: 299; Bergson, 2012: 253. 
52  Bergson, 1946: 30-31; Bergson, 2009: 22.
53  Bergson, 2012: 9.  
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all versions that we have examined (aristotle, aquinas, ravaisson and Bergson), 
an affect arriving to the subject from an outside (nature, movement, godly 
grace, necessity, etc.). This kind of metaphysical questioning will neither be 
“materialist” nor “idealist”, but it would be at any rate an incorporated process 
of inquiry, in which thought would have to pierce through its own incorporated, 
inhabited habits, in order to achieve moments of contact with nature.   
could one think of the 19th century French chapter of dealing with habitude 
of the body as a response to the aristotelian and Thomistic challenges and 
ambiguities? in the Spiritualist version suggested by ravaisson and Bergson, 
habitude is not anymore a quality laid upon the surface of the organism: rather 
it is a reality installing the interior and the depth of the organism itself, up 
until the point of the lodge of the spirit, the latter remaining always free and 
self-constituting. habit in this version is seen more as prosthesis rather than 
as ornament, it is an ornament becoming prosthesis, being anchored in the 
organisms’ reality. 
The two most crucial questions arising out of this state of affairs are (a) what 
could be the conceptual consequences of the late 19th century mixture between 
habitude and corporeality to the understanding of spatiality and extension 
in general; and (b) returning to the aristotelian and Thomistic formulations, 
locating hexis and habitus between an actor and the habits that wrap it, one 
should ask what could be the consequences of ravaisson’s and Bergson’s 
elaborations of habitude not only for the actor-subject, but rather for the cloth 
itself, that is to say for the accessories accompanying the bodily actor. in the last 
couple of decades, within the framework of what is known as the Speculative-
realist turn, one finds a tendency to talk about an “object oriented ontology”, 
aiming to put in the center of philosophy not the human subject but rather the 
things and instruments surrounding it.54 here, on the other hand is suggested 
an equally realist manner of approaching the accessories and the habits of the 
human body as naturalizing instruments, while nevertheless maintaining 
the primacy of the subject: habits participate in the subject, they generate and 
re-generate it, covering the actor and simultaneously endowing the actor with 
profundity. The subject, embracing both the human actor and its habits, must 
be conceived as a moral, acting reality55, in which the rehearsal, realization 
and actualization of past actions literally produce the body, consisting of 
accessories, covers, containers, and the locks that hold all these together. 
Denaturalizing habits meaning finding the keys to unlock these various 
habitual cases, yet not doing away with habit altogether.
54  harman, 2010: 93-104. 
55  Badiou, 1982. 
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Paul ricoeur claims in freedom and nature that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply 
challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking 
about. habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, 
perceiving and so on. it has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that 
provides a form to our world relations. 
But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? in ordinary discourse, habits are often thought 
of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal and social identities. But they 
tend also to be thought of as actions in which the free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as 
automatic responses conditioned over time which are triggered by the environment such that we 
act ‘before we know what we are doing’.
In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the relationship between 
habitual action, reason and knowledge. i will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition 
in asking the question whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or 
whether they involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to 
expression as subject. in doing so, i will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative view of habit 
that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings of the matter before, (2) looking 
to phenomenological insights that offer a more positive view by integrating the notion of habit 
with discussions of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness. here, i will refer to the work 
of merleau-Ponty and ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. 
my claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in establishing the 
centrality of habit for identity formation, as husserl and merleau-Ponty do, but that they entail a 
unique form of knowing or exercise of reason which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative. 
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”To acquire a habit does not mean to repeat and consolidate but to invent, 
to progress.” 
Paul ricoeur
Paul ricoeur claims in freedom and nature that delimiting the domain of habit is 
deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is 
that we are asking about (ricœur, 1966, p. 280). habit, he says, is not like acting, 
sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and so on. it 
has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that provides a 
form to our world relations. 
But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? in ordinary discourse, habits 
are often thought of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal 
and social identities. But they tend also to be thought of as actions in which the 
free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as automatic responses conditioned 
over time which are triggered by the environment such that we act ‘before we 
know what we are doing’.
In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the 
relationship between habitual action, reason and knowledge. This will not be 
comprehensive and seeks only to temper a certain one-sidedness in discussions of 
habit. i will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition in asking the question 
whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or whether they 
involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to 
expression as subject. in doing so, i will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative 
view of habit that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings 
of the matter before, (2) looking to phenomenological insights that offer a more 
positive view by integrating the notion of habit with discussions of embodiment 
and hermeneutic consciousness. here, i will refer to the work of merleau-Ponty 
and ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. 
my claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in 
establishing the centrality of habit for identity formation, as husserl and merleau-
Ponty do, but that they entail a unique form of knowing or exercise of reason 
which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative. But first to the more negative 
appraisal.
in the Concept of mind, gilbert ryle makes explicit mention of habits but only to 
dismiss them as irrelevant to intelligent acting. ryle is concerned with offering 
an account of “knowing how” which is essentially distinct and irreducible to 
propositional “knowing that” inasmuch as it is enacted rather than enunciated. 
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But he is clear that “knowing how” is not to be identified in any way with the 
notion of habit. habits, along with explicit propositions, in fact, make up the two 
poles in whose tension the notion of dispositions is held. For ryle, the disposition 
is an engaged, mindful and dynamic way of knowing which is made manifest as 
responsive to the demands of a situation. This responsiveness requires revision 
of the classical cartesian account of knowledge because the intelligence involved 
in responsive dispositions does not involve something that we know but is rather 
an enacted intelligence. Still, such enacted knowing how is not to be identified with 
habituality.
while ryle is often described as a thinker with strong behaviorist sympathies, 
his account of dispositions must rather be understood as an explicit attempt 
to distance himself from behaviorism inasmuch as he thinks of dispositions as 
incorporated ways of knowing the world which are not automatic. on the other 
hand, behaviorist claims seem to very much determine the way he thinks about 
habits. To act from habit, he says, is “to act automatically and without mind to 
what one is doing” (ryle, 2000, p. 42). Following a famous cue from aristotle, 
ryle describes habits as ‘second natures’ but goes on to say that these second 
natures consist of drill and the rote learning of basic skills or facts which can 
be reproduced or recited without significant use of intelligence. When a child 
learns to recite the multiplication tables, she does so in a way that lacks any 
meaningful mental engagement. She merely repeats the words in the way a 
parrot might. So while dispositions involve a non-propositional application 
of intelligence that is dynamic, adaptive and progressive, habits are blind and 
thoughtless and are incorporated into actions as reflexes. He claims that while 
“drill dispenses with intelligence, training develops it” (ryle, 2000, p. 42). a habit, 
then, is a stock response, lacking in dynamism, which is always the same, and 
which issues forth in answer to a specific stimulus. A habit might, of course, 
appear to be intelligent (the multiplication tables are the manifestation of an 
intelligence) while a disposition might appear to be a reflex (as when the chess 
player makes a spontaneous move without appearing to deliberate) but we must 
not let ourselves be deceived. what separates the habit from the disposition is (a) 
the extent to which the agent appropriates the knowledge as her knowledge and, 
(b) the capacity to engage with the world on the basis of this knowledge in a way 
that is innovative. acting from habit denotes, for ryle, a type of performance that 
is static because its meaning in wider contexts of significance remains largely 
opaque for us. as such, habitual action cannot be considered to manifest knowing 
in any genuine sense.
This view of habit is typical of the way it has come to be thought by philosophers 
and in ordinary discourse. even one of the great thinkers of the formation of 
subjectivity in habituality, heidegger, tends to present habit in a largely negative 
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light.  Take, for example, the social expression of habit in heidegger’s discussion 
of dasein’s public everydayness (heidegger, 1962, p. 213). ordinary everydayness is 
presented, by heidegger, as incorporating and reproducing ways of being, talking 
and thinking about the world, oneself and others which are intelligible in a sense 
but which cannot be considered to manifest genuine knowing. For ryle, learning 
the multiplication tables also contained a certain intelligibility in the sense that 
the tables themselves are the product of intelligent organizations. when i repeat 
them, however, i am not doing so intelligently but spontaneously and without 
thought. likewise, for heidegger, the idle talk (gerede) of the ‘they’ (das man) is 
not lacking in intelligibility and he even concedes that it is a way of disclosing 
the world. and yet the dasein which discloses in such talk does so in a mode of 
“groundless floating” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 221) which “not only releases one from 
the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of 
intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer” (heidegger, 1962, p. 213). 
habitual ways of being and acting, as such, distract, uproot and alienate dasein 
from Being-in-the-world by dissolving individual dasein into an inauthentic 
self-forgetfulness or an amorphous ‘they’ that is everyone and no-one. This 
contrasts with authentic self-appropriation which is made possible on the basis 
of radically disclosive experiences that reveal the singularity of dasein, not apart 
from the world but in the network of world and other relations.1 So for both ryle 
and heidegger, the problem is not so much that habitualities lack intelligence but 
that the intelligence is not genuinely expressive of the habitual agent. whether 
this lack is the lack of enacted rational agency (ryle) or of an authentic self-
relation (heidegger), the point is that they involve ways of being, thinking and 
acting which are incorporated in me but which are not really mine. heidegger is 
concerned here with habitual ways of making sense which are, to be sure, much 
more complex than what ryle has in mind with the concept of habit but what both 
discussions have in common is the presentation of incorporated ways of acting 
as lacking in understanding or dynamism, as stock and as falling away from a 
genuinely intelligent engagement with oneself and the world.
what these accounts have in common is a commitment to the idea that authentic 
world engagement must revolve around an immediate kind of self-transparency. 
The problem with habits is that they inhibit transparency through the 
incorporation of ways of being and acting that are, from the start, thoughtless or 
1  There are other places in heidegger’s text which could fruitfully be discussed with regard to our 
theme. not least of which is his analysis of the primordiality of dasein’s practical engagement with the world. 
As is well known, Heidegger provides detailed analysis of the way in which the world is first and foremost 
encountered as a network of significances which are ready-to-hand (zuhanden). These are eminently relevant 
because of the fact that it argues for a world relation that is shot through with habituality. For heidegger, 
habit is essential to any understanding of human Being-in-the-world. however, my claim here is simply the 
minimal one that the overriding concern for authenticity in Being and Time results in a clear ambivalence 
regarding habits in that they are viewed as both essential and problematic.
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which have become so.
But must habit be so understood? i want now to turn to certain texts of 
merleau-Ponty and ricoeur who challenge this view by claiming that habits 
are, in fact, crucial to the constitution of the individual as individual and to 
her constitution as knower of the world.2
Their claims will turn out to hang on the importance of embodiment and 
hermeneutic consciousness for our understanding of what subjectivity 
is. The idea is that subjectivity does not simply stand in opposition to 
objectivity but naturalizes or objectifies itself through its Being-in-the-
world. This is important for the concept of habit because it enables us to 
think the objectification process, which partly determines habit acquisition, 
not as a loss of genuine engagement with the world as subject but as a crucial 
moment of this coming to expression. at the same time, they are aware that 
this objectification can reify and become automatism. They simply reject 
the claim that such degeneration of habit should be identified with habit 
simplicter (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145).
as is well known, merleau-Ponty makes embodiment fundamental to any 
genuine understanding of the meaning of subjectivity, a commitment which 
entails thinking of the habitual body not as a ‘falling away’ of consciousness 
but a crucial moment in its coming to presence.  as such, the formation 
of habit is considered to be important to the way in which consciousness 
spiritualizes the world and is naturalized by it such that it becomes important 
to the constitution of authentic Being-in-the-world. habit acquisition is a 
crucial moment in the dialectic between spirit and nature which, in turn, 
is of crucial importance for the singularization of the subject as knower. as 
such, habits are intensely individualizing and cannot be considered to stand 
for a flight away from myself. In many ways, Merleau-Ponty’s habits are close 
enough to ryle’s dispositions even though their import encompasses both 
considerations of epistemology and also the constitution of personhood and 
identity.
But is it just a question of terminology that separates ryle and merleau-Ponty? 
2  merleau-Ponty is not alone in his positive evaluation of habit and habituality. as dermot 
moran has recently pointed out, husserl’s writings are replete with detailed and comprehensive 
analyses of habits and their crucial role in the constitution of human life at corporeal, social 
and cultural levels (moran, 2011, p. 61). These analyses are so important for husserl’s account 
of rational personhood that they make the various cartesian caricatures of the founder of 
phenomenology untenable (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 82). i will not be discussing husserl in the present 
context for two reasons. The first is that his coverage of habituality is simply too comprehensive 
to be done justice to here. The second reason is that our theme is especially about knowing and 
while this is not alien to husserl’s discussions of habit, he tends mainly to prioritize the role of 
habit in the constitution of the person. 
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is the latter is simply calling habit what the former called disposition? it might 
appear so given that merleau-Ponty also discusses thoughtless, automatic 
actions which he distinguishes from habits such that it might seem that his 
habits are identical Ryle’s dispositions. And yet, the significance of the explicit 
connection between habituality and embodiment should not be overlooked 
here. in making this connection, merleau-Ponty appears to incorporate a 
naturalistic perspective into his account of knowing in the sense that there 
is a respiration between the emergence out of and the sinking into nature in 
the embodied subject’s business of knowing the world. For ryle, by contrast, 
the concept of disposition was explicitly intended to protect the concept of 
intelligence against its degeneration into natural being through habit. 
For merleau-Ponty, corporeal habits are about “the reworking and renewal 
of the corporeal schema” (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 143) and have to do with 
the way the body knows the world and is transformed by it (merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 143f.). in a similar vein, ricoeur says that habit, “is a new structuring 
in which the meaning of elements changes radically” (ricœur, 1966, pp. 
287-288). Speaking at the level of bodily habit, he follows merleau-Ponty in 
thinking of habit as the adaptation of the body to the meaning of the world, 
the incorporation of that meaning and a new gestalting of the environment 
through bodily engagement. again, we see the complex dialectic, which is 
better described as an interweaving of body and environment, or the body’s 
institution in the text of the world.
This understanding of the meaning of bodily habits is therefore explicitly 
intended to challenge the way that we think about consciousness and mind. it 
prompts us to rethink what we understand by the notion of ‘understanding’ 
(merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 146)  precisely because the body knows the world, in 
habit, in a way that is adaptive and dynamic without being self-consciously 
deliberative (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145). as he did throughout his career, 
merleau-Ponty is here trying to think together that which has traditionally 
been thought apart; namely consciousness and nature (merleau-Ponty, 
1983, p. 2). as such, he insists that we err in our attempt to makes sense of 
the constitution of meaning if we do not approach the problem in terms of 
a deep interwovenness of body and mind.3 while ryle might be inclined to 
agree with parts of Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning here, the former reflects little 
on the explicit meaning of embodiment for knowing how such that the role 
3  it was no doubt for this reason that merelau-Ponty’s later writings show a distrust of even 
the concept of constitution which he (somewhat unfairly to husserl) thinks of as a one-way street 
of ‘meaning giving’ Sinngebung. as an alternative, he uses the notion of institution which seems 
to capture what was essential to husserlian constitution while simultaneously acknowledging 
the way in which the conscious subject is given over to itself in and by nature. See, for example, 
his lectures on instituion and Passivity (merleau-Ponty, 2010)
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of embodiment remains somewhat under-communicated.4 it is possible that 
the largely unthought role of the body accounts for ryle’s wariness of the 
notion of habit and his dismissal of settled dispositions as thoughtless. For 
merleau-Ponty, habits, especially as corporeal, are crucial to the reception 
and generation of meaning. he claims that “the body has understood and the 
habit has been acquired when the body allows itself to be penetrated by a new 
signification, when it has assimilated a new meaningful core.” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 148) 
in other words, to be an ego is to be an habitual ego, an ego of capacities. 
This does not mean that the habitual ego is an entirely predictable ego 
that mindlessly repeats patterns of thought and action without invention. 
Quite the contrary. habits constitute us as having a certain style and are 
the horizon of our capacity to know the world and to personalize this 
knowing. But this is a moving, dynamic horizon. habits are not mechanisms 
but tendencies or dispositions within which imagination, creativity and 
spontaneity come to expression. 
habit as a capacity for discovery is, as such, utterly belied when it is described 
in terms of automatism (ricœur, 1966, p. 284). habits can degenerate into 
automatism but they are not predominantly this. This point was clearly at 
stake in merleau-Ponty’s famous and oft cited example of the football player’s 
perception of the playing area:
For the player in action the football field is not an ‘object’, that is, the ideal 
term which can give rise to a multiplicity of perspectival views and remain 
equivalent under its apparent transformations. it is pervaded with lines 
of force (the ‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the penalty area) and 
articulated in sectors (for example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries) 
which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action 
as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but 
present as the immanent term of his practical intentions. (merleau-Ponty, 
1983, p. 168)
This example is usually cited in order to demonstrate the claim that the 
environment is not primarily encountered as a system of objects, shapes 
and figures which are to be understood before being engaged.5 This is an 
important point to be sure. what is often overlooked, however, are the 
implications of this example for the way we think about thinking and 
4  This in spite of the fact that ryle often uses examples of embodied dispositions that would 
seem to be perfectly compatible with merleau-Pontyian accounts. he would, however, certainly 
have been skeptical to the claim that the body can be said to “know more than we do about the 
world” (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 248)
5  This kind of interpretation is typical of dreyfus’ reading of merleau-Ponty and is also 
consistent with environmental accounts of mind found in writers such as James gibson (gibson, 
1979) and Jacob von Uexküll (von Uexküll, 2010).
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knowing. hubert dreyfus, for example, has given birth to a certain orthodox 
reading of merleau-Ponty on this point that maintains that because the 
football player is not thinking propositionally about the football pitch or 
about his body’s movement in it, that he is not present to himself as thinking 
at all (dreyfus, 2007, p. 356). This goes too far and betrays the point that 
Merleau-Ponty is trying to make. When the football player engages the field 
as lines of force, he is specifically engaged in a practical species of thinking 
that engages the field as a field of possible actions. The game has rules which 
mean that the lines and spaces have a certain meaning within that context. 
however, these demarcations do not impel action but invite it and they invite 
it by opening for a range of possible engagements. The football player’s habit 
gives rise to a “probing”, as ricoeur puts it (ricœur, 1966, p. 290), which co-
creates the meaning of the space in the dialectic of transforming and being 
transformed. it is therefore not so much that action is ‘drawn out’ of the 
agent, but that the agent meets a field of possible action which can be engaged 
imaginatively only because he is thinking.
it is possible that dreyfus means this too but his focus in these discussions has 
always tended to be in the wrong place.6 he follows merleau-Ponty in arguing 
correctly that “movement is not thought about movement” (merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 139) but would do well to note ricoeur’s insistence that while i do not 
think the movement, i make knowing use of it such that “we need not say 
that in habit consciousness is abolished but only that reflexive knowing and 
willing are” (ricœur, 1966, p. 286). in other words, the creative, spontaneous 
nature of world engagement in habit is one that justifies thinking of habit as 
comprising a kind of mindful, practical imagination. The fact that this is not 
thinking under the species of conceptual, propositional thinking does not 
mean that it is not thinking at all.7 That the football player does not think 
about the rectangularity of the football pitch or the bio-mechancics of his 
own movement as he plays is true but focusing only on this question leaves 
the meat of the account of habit untouched.  it tells us what habitual action 
is not (explicit thinking) but not what it is. while there is more that could be 
said here, it suffices to say that Merleau-Ponty considers habits to be crucial 
to the individuation of consciousness and to the life of discovery. habits are 
not automatisms that hinder genuine understanding. They denote, rather, 
the way in which my life is constituted in experience through my own actions 
6  on this, see my critique of dreyfus’ reading of merleau-Ponty (mcguirk, 2013).
7  Precisely this point of the status of practical coping vis-à-vis the conceptual was discussed 
in great detail in the 2007 debate between hubert dreyfus (dreyfus, 2007a, 2007b) and John 
mcdowell (J. mcdowell, 2007; John mcdowell, 2007). my point here goes in another direction 
inasmuch as i am claiming that habitual action is neither a conceptual form of knowing 
(mcdowell) nor an opaque form of coping (dreyfus).
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and the actions of others and the world upon me. The dialectic is what gives 
the ego to itself as this individual even while we must always remain wary of 
sedimentations that will dissolve individuality. The traces that the past (both 
personal and historical), others and nature leave upon us do not close the 
future as a future of sameness but enable our capacity to meet the future as a 
new field of possibilities. 
But habit is not just a feature of our bodily being-in-the-world. it is also 
crucially determinative of the socially engaged subject, as we have seen 
already with heidegger. while this dimension of habit is rarely broached by 
merleau-Ponty, it is central in ricoeur’s treatment of the matter in freedom 
and nature. 
ricoeur takes his cue here from merleau-Ponty, but also from Felix 
ravaisson, whose little book On habit (ravaisson, 2008), with its 
modernization of the aristotelian notion of habit as ‘second nature’, is 
frequently cited. To be sure, Ravaisson’s reflections on the relationship 
between freedom and nature are interpreted through the lens of 
merleau-Ponty but in a way that allows ricoeur to draw certain unspoken 
conclusions out of the work of the latter. That merleau-Ponty himself 
did not take the discussion in these directions is no critique since it is 
beyond the ambit of what he is trying to do in Phenomenology of Perception. 
That is, while merleau-Ponty’s exploration considers the dialectic between 
naturalized consciousness and spiritualized nature in order to challenge basic 
assumptions about epistemology, anthropology and ontology, ricoeur brings 
these to bear in a more comprehensive evaluation of habit as such. Thus, his 
approach is thoroughly phenomenological and merleau-Pontyian8 while it 
tries to match the sweep of ravaisson’s discussion. in other words, ricoeur’s 
discussion is anchored in a more comprehensive discourse about being-in-the-
world in which he presents a non-heideggerian response to a heideggerian 
problem, at least as far as the question of habit goes.
in this text, ricoeur claims that the way habits shape perception and 
physical competences is analogous to the way in which fore-knowledge 
both opens new fields of possibilities and comes to expression in new and 
surprising ways. For ricoeur:
what i know intellectually is present to me in the same way as the bodily 
skills i have. what i learn, what is understood in an original act of thought, 
is constantly being left behind as an act and becomes a sort of body of my 
8  ricoeur never cites merleau-Ponty in freedom and nature, although he once claimed 
that his debt to merleau-Ponty was enormous and that the latter had shaped his thought in 
immeasurable ways. he said of merleau-Ponty’s thought, that: “il est passé dans mon sang et dans 
mes veins” (ricoeur, 1983). i am indebted to Bengt Kristensson Uggla for this reference.
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thought: thus knowledge becomes integrated with the realm of capabilities 
which i use without articulating them anew (ricœur, 1966, p. 294).
in this way, he extends the scope of the merleau-Pontyian discussion in a 
way that would challenge not only ryle, but also heidegger, inasmuch as it 
suggests another way of appraising habitual ways of thinking and acting. 
crucial to this alternative picture is the idea that habituality is adaptive. 
“There is a wisdom of habit,” ricoeur says, “which psychology does not 
encounter as long as it restricts itself to stereotyped forms of conduct” 
(ricœur, 1966, p. 290).
What is learned – at first explicitly – becomes incorporated into the agent’s 
range of possibilities. For ricoeur, this is important as a way of describing 
the nature of our knowing relation with the world. The habit comprises, 
on the one hand, a kind of cognitive short-cut in the sense that what was 
first appropriated or learned explicitly need not be rehearsed every time it 
is called upon.9 But it gradually transforms our encounter with the world 
and generates capacities that make possible a new ease of engaging and 
knowing.  
This claim is explicitly rooted in his understanding of the nature of 
subjectivity and the meaning of the first-person perspective as it is used 
in phenomenological research. In one of the finest presentations of the 
paradox of this perspective, ricoeur explains habituation as a slipping away 
from itself of the subject where the incorporation of the business of thinking 
makes it partially opaque at the level of explicit consciousness and opens for 
the spontaneity of the subject to be a surprise to itself. he says that:
The strange presence within me of my intellectual experience…laid down by 
the activity of thought itself…seems to objectify thought completely. and yet 
the paradox which seems ruinous for a philosophy of the subject receives full 
significance only for it, for what is presented as an enigma is my self becoming 
a nature by virtue of time; an “it thinks” is present in the “i think” (ricœur, 
1966, p. 294)
This was very much the point in merleau-Ponty’s example of the football 
player’s engagement with the field of play in the sense that at stake was a 
decentring of the thinking agent in a way that is yet not self-forgetful or 
alienating. a version of this point is also found in ravaisson, who claims 
that,
in descending gradually from the clearest regions of consciousness, habit 
carries with it light from those regions into the depths and dark night of 
nature. habit is an acquired nature, a second nature that has its ultimate 
9  ravaisson addresses the same point when he notes that the effort of consciousness is 
effaced over time (ravaisson, 2008, p. 59)
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ground in primitive nature, but which alone explains the latter to the 
understanding. It is, finally, a natured nature, the product and successive 
revelation of naturing nature (ravaisson, 2008, p. 59).
leaving aside the somewhat unfortunate language of the ‘dark night’ of 
‘primitive nature’, the point to note concerns an othering of consciousness 
into nature in which self-presence becomes partially opaque. i become a 
mystery to myself because of the forces – both natural and cultural – which 
shape me as well as the way in which my own experience – corporeal and 
intellectual – becomes embodied such that they come to expression in ways 
that are not always entirely transparent for me. in this sense, the insights 
about the nature of constitution which were offered by merleau-Ponty’s 
account of embodied subjectivity are carried over into other forms of the 
contextual embeddedness of the subject.
This insight would be determinative for ricoeur’s later hermeneutic work 
too, of course, in that it pre-figures the thought, central for hermeneutics, 
that the constitution of the subject comprises both an origination in the 
time before the subject and also a slipping away in the time of the subject 
(ricœur, 1984, 1992).10 But these opacities of the self to itself are crucially not 
consigned to either the domain of the sub-personal or the inauthentic. They 
are instead considered forms of self-othering that operate within the realm 
of the humanizing of the self as singular knower.
ricoeur’s (and raviasson’s) positive appraisals of the trajectory of mind in 
habit are important though for validating forms of knowing which lack 
thorough transparency. and in saying this, the point is not that habitual 
action is blind but rather that it operates out of a ground which may have 
receded from view. rather than making the habitual action blind, the claim 
is that the ground that has been formed by habit is the basis for seeing, 
comprehending and acting. For merleau-Ponty, ricoeur and ravaisson, the 
point is that this humanizing process takes place in a way that is embodied 
and embedded even to the extent that singularity is constituted in a tension 
between full transparency and blind opacity regarding the sources of 
meaningful action.
The difference between this view of habit and that of ryle (or heidegger) 
hangs, then, on the connection of habit to the phenomenology of the body 
and to hermeneutics (for ricoeur it is both). For neither merleau-Ponty nor 
ricoeur deny that habit involves a certain opacity of the self to itself. They 
are clear that habitual action involves an aspect of the self slipping out of 
10  ricoeur is, throughout his writings interested in the interplay between the involuntary and 
the voluntary, whether this concern the possibility of novelty in action, as in the fourth study 
of Oneself as another (ricœur, 1992, pp. 88-112) or in language, as in the third study in The rule of 
metaphor (ricœur, 2003, pp. 74-116).
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view for itself. whether as embodied or historical subject, our being-in-
the-world comprises habitualities of mental, social, cultural and physical 
action, whose originally transparent connection with the will have receded. 
however, rather than considering such habituality and its attendant opacity 
as an affront to genuine personhood or to the meaning of human knowing, 
they suggest that our knowing and being are crucially expressed through 
these forms.
nowhere is this clearer than in ricoeur’s treatment of the problem 
of automatism that was so crucial to ryle’s and heidegger’s negative 
appraisals of habit. in his discussion of the dialectic between “spontaneity 
and automatism in habit”, ricoeur is able to fully confront the rylean/
heideggerian prejudice on the basis of merleau-Pontyian insights in a way 
that merleau-Ponty himself did not do. as noted earlier, this is largely 
because Phenomenology of Perception is essentially a discussion of perception 
and mind that incorporates considerations of habit while ricoeur’s 
text is a more fully developed phenomenology of habit that builds upon 
considerations of perception and mind.  
when ricoeur takes up the point, he is able to give ryle and heidegger their 
due by acknowledging the phenomena they point to while simultaneously 
challenging their interpretation of the meaning of these. Thus, he offers 
a more nuanced account of habit which is neither wholly positive nor 
negative. For ricoeur, habit is always in danger of slipping into automatism. 
whether on the basis of aging or a lack of attention, habits can become 
predominantly expressions of association, repetition and fixation. There is 
a tendency towards inertia that is inescapable in human life, which tempts 
us to “resign our freedom under the inauthentic form of custom, of the 
‘they’, of the ‘only natural’, of the already seen and already done” (ricœur, 
1966, p. 301). This coheres with ordinary intuitions about habit and both 
ryle and heidegger are right to capture this aspect of the matter. however, 
Ricoeur insists that while “ossification is a threat inscribed in habit, [it is] 
not its normal destiny” (ricœur, 1966, p. 302). To act habitually is not to 
act automatically, programmatically or ‘without thinking’. This is, rather, 
a disintegration of habit into the associative such that “the mechanical 
represents a triumph of automatism over the will” (ricœur, 1966, p. 304). 
ordinarily, though, habitualities are incorporated skills and knowledge that 
enable us to engage dynamically with the world in ways that are seemingly 
effortless. This goes from basic operations such as reaching for a doorknob 
to comforting an upset student. These actions can become automatisms if 
we fail to attend to what we are doing and will cause us to err. as ricoeur 
PHENOMENOlOgICAl CONSIDERATIONS Of HABIT
JameS mcgUirK  university of nordland
3
Habit as 
the Tension 
Between 
Spontaneity 
and 
Automatism
159
notes, mistakes only occur on the condition that we lose focus on the task 
at hand, while “a will attentive to the task is stronger than any association” 
(ricœur, 1966, p. 305). Thus understood, “the mechanical which seems 
to invade certain consciousness to the very roots is never completely 
independent of a definite desertion of consciousness” (ricœur, 1966, p. 306).
The complexity of habit is such that it can fall into unconscious action 
or give us over to sedimented ways of responding that barely engage 
with the situation in which we find ourselves. But his point is that this is 
fundamentally a degeneration of the habitual and not its essence. Following 
merleau-Ponty, ricoeur thinks of habit as “the useful naturalization of 
consciousness” (ricœur, 1966, p. 307), and the ‘descent’ of freedom into 
nature. This complex interweaving is the site of human being-in-the-world. 
We exist in the tension that can tend towards an excessive form of reflection 
that seeks to make us entirely self-transparent and a sleep of reason that 
allows consciousness to become ossified and objectified but both of these are 
here understood as distortions of the authentically habitual.
The importance of ricoeur’s account here is that he manages to develop 
merleau-Pontyian insights into the nature of habit which take seriously our 
ordinary intuitions about habit – as expounded in the discussions of ryle 
and heidegger – but which place these intuitions in a more comprehensive 
framework which is derived from the most systematic analysis of habit to be 
found in the phenomenological tradition.11
11  i would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments which have 
made this a better paper.
PHENOMENOlOgICAl CONSIDERATIONS Of HABIT
JameS mcgUirK  university of nordland
160
REFERENCES
Bourdieu, P. (2000), Pascalian meditations, Polity Press, oxford, 2000, pp. 256;
dreyfus, h. l. (2007a), “The return of the myth of the mental”, inquiry, 50 (4), 
pp. 352-365;
dreyfus, h. l. (2007b), “response to mcdowell”,  inquiry, 50 (4), pp. 371-377;
gibson, J. J. (1979), The ecological approach to visual perception, houghton 
Mifflin, Boston, 1979, pp. 332;
heidegger, m. (1962), Being and time, Basil Blackwell, oxford, 1962, pp. 589;
mcdowell, J. (2007a), “what myth?”, inquiry, 50 (4), pp. 338-351;
mcdowell, J. (2007b), “response to dreyfus”,  inquiry, 50 (4), pp. 366-370; 
mcguirk, J. n. (2013), “dreyfus, merleau-Ponty and the phenomenology of 
practical intelligence”, Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift, 48 (03-04), pp. 289-303;
merleau-Ponty, m. (1983), The structure of behavior, duquesne University Press, 
Pittsburgh, 1983, pp. 255;
merleau-Ponty, m. (2010), institution and passivity: course notes from the Collège 
de france (1954-1955), northwestern University Press, evanston, ill., 2010, pp. 
276;
merleau-Ponty, m. (2012), Phenomenology of perception, routledge, london, 
2012, pp. 606;
moran, d. (2011), “edmund husserl’s Phenomenology of habituality and 
habitus”,  Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42(1), pp. 53-77;
ravaisson, F. (2008), Of habit, continuum, london, 2008, pp. 139;
ricœur, P. (1966), freedom and nature: the voluntary and the involuntary, 
northwestern University Press, evanston, ill., 1966, pp. 498;
ricœur, P. (1984), Time and narrative vol 1, University of chicago Press, 
chicago, 1984, pp. 274;
ricœur, P. (1992), Oneself as another, University of chicago Press, chicago, 
1992, pp.363;
ricœur, P. (2003), The rule of metaphor: the creation of meaning in language, 
routledge, london, 2003, pp. 454;
ricoeur, P. (1983), “Un philosophe au-dessus de tout soupcon. Un entretien 
avec Paul ricoeur”, le nouvel Observateur (03.11.1983);
ryle, g. (2000), The concept of mind, Penguin Books, london, 2000, pp. 348;
von Uexküll, J. (2010), a foray into the Worlds of animals and humans, University 
of minnesota Press, minneapolis, 2010, pp. 272.
PHENOMENOlOgICAl CONSIDERATIONS Of HABIT
JameS mcgUirK  university of nordland
abstract
keywords
extended mind, merleau-Ponty, habit, body-schema , skilled action, embodied cognition  
richard charleS STrong  
Villanova university
charlie.strong@gmail.com
This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the non-
trivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action.  This is attempted by bringing 
merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account 
of the extended mind.  What the author hopes to show is that the incorporation of new 
habits into one’s body schema can make a meaningful difference for extended cognition 
as it regards behavioral competence, systemic performance, endorsement of external 
components, and typical invocation of external components.  habitualization of one’s 
body to environment and things in the environment is perhaps not a central part of the 
cognitive system - nor is it always necessary - but habit can and does make a meaningful 
difference in how well a coupled cognitive system might function and therefore ought to 
be taken into account.  moreover, habit highlights the extent to which enhanced cognitive 
performance relies on the body and its organs in conjunction with mind and thing. 
The essay proceeds by introducing Clark and Chalmers’ version of the extended mind 
hypothesis from before turning to merleau-Ponty’s notion of the acquisition of habit qua 
modifications of the body-schema in conjunction with the extended mind.
HABIt And tHe extended mInd: flesHIng 
oUt tHe extended mInd tHeoRy wItH 
meRleAU-PontIAn PHenomenology
162
This essay takes as its object the extended mind theory as expressed 
in clark and chalmers essay “The extended mind” in conjunction with 
merleau-Ponty’s account of the functioning of habit from the Phenomenology 
of Perception.1  The thesis i want to put forward is that merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account of habit (which leans heavily on his notion of the 
body schema) provides a non-intellectualist, temporally sensitive, and more 
fully embodied account with which to flesh out Clark and Chalmers basic 
extended framework; this augmentation can enable us to better account 
not only for otto and his notebook or Tetris mavens, but also applies to 
the wider domain of extended cognition which may be present in cases of 
language, tool use, and socially distributed cognition. More specifically, 
merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the workings of habit can provide a more 
robust account regarding the fulfillment of key conditions for extended 
cognition such as increased or equal behavioral competence, endorsement, 
and typical invocation.   The acquisition of habit in the service of epistemic 
action may not itself be properly cognitive but, as i hope to show, it does 
make a significant difference overall cognative performance.2  moreover, 
merleau-Ponty’s account of habit begins, so to speak from motor functioning 
and builds up to “higher level” operations thus foregrounding the important 
role of the body as the starting point or anchor of many cognitive process.  
we are not born cyborgs, we become them  – and we do so in part through 
the subtle, often imperceptible, workings of habit.
a problem, as i see it, with clark and chalmers “The extended mind” is that 
they fail to provide an full account of how a coupled system comes to be as 
well as the role of mastery over external elements in coupled systems and 
how performance might differ based on the acquisition of habits.3  
1  This is not the first attempt to bring phenomenology and the extended cognition together.  
other important works dealing with the intersections between phenomenology and the 
extended mind include richard menary’s Cognitive integration: mind and Cognition unbounded (2007), 
michael wheeler’s Reconfiguring The Cognitive World: The Next Step (2006), robert wilson’s Boundaries 
of the mind: The individual in the fragile Sciences – Cognition(2004), and mark rowland’s The new 
Science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied Phenomenology(2010).  
2  Following Kirsh and maglio, clark and chalmers take epistemic actions to be those actions 
that alter the world to “aid or augment cognitive processes.” Pragmatic actions, by contrast, alter 
the world because some physical change is desired for its own sake (1998).
3  This is a problem with the extended mind.  one could say the problem of the extended mind 
surrounds the challenges to the hypothesis advanced most notably by adams and aizawa. adams 
and aizawa claim that clark and chalmers, among others, commit a coupling-constitution 
fallacy whereby things outside the biological mind may be causally related to the mind (i.e., as 
inputs) but it would be a fallacy to claim that external elements are constitutive of mind (2001).  
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additionally, it seems that if certain cognitive processes are not taking place 
entirely within the limit of the skull or skin then a skilled body is playing 
at least some role – to a greater or lesser degree - in said processes.  clark 
and chalmers advocate an active externalism and yet if one wants to make 
sense of how a here-and-now coupled system not merely works, but works 
well such that behavioral competence is equal to or is markedly higher 
than standard cases of skull-contained biological cognition, then bodily 
conditions and processes need to be fleshed out in order to tell the whole 
story, so to speak.  a possible solution, as i see it, to this problematically 
quasi-cartesian omission would be to recuperate merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
habit – which begins in motoricty and perception and extends to “higher 
level” behavior and instrument use - to provide a temporally sensitive 
ontogeny and non-intellectualist foundation to the extended mind theory 
and instances of extended mind. 4  
if the extended mind is as a pervasive phenomenon as clark and chalmers 
seem to imply, and if it concerns questions not only of cognition and 
mind but also of self, identity, morality, and ethicality, then a merleau-
Pontian account of habit as the mortar between the intracranial mind, 
consciousness, the body, language, other people, and things in the world 
with which coupled systems might obtain could be a helpful orientation for 
future research.  More specifically, it may provide an orientation that places 
more emphasis on the role of the skilled body in certain epistemic actions.
i will begin with a sketch of key elements from the “The extended 
mind” essay paying special attention to the criteria for coupled systems 
constitutive of extended cognition such as behavioral competence.  i will 
then turn my attention to merleu-Ponty’s theory of habit from Part one of 
The Phenomenology of Perception in order to highlight how that theory can and 
should be used to improve upon the work of clark and chalmers. 
clark and chalmers distinguish their own project from similar 
externalization hypotheses from the 70s by claiming that those earlier 
forays into a sort of extended mind or meaning hypotheses only considered 
passive extension whereas they believe that their contribution takes the 
hypothesis a step further towards active extended cognition (Burge, 1979; 
Putnam 1975). This active externalism is opposed to other earlier stripes 
of externalism, which for the sake of simplicity, can be considered passive, 
distal, and diachronic or historical. The active/passive dichotomy lends 
4  To my mind, the other key thinkers on the subject habit in the late 19th and 20th century worth 
seriously revisiting are marcel Proust, william James, John dewy, Pierre Bourdieu, edmund husserl, 
Felix ravaisson, Paul ricoeur, gilbert ryle, and Samuel Butler. 
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intelligibility the specific way in which “The Extended Mind” essay differs 
from earlier projects.  clark and chalmers are concerned with epistemic 
actions involving some elements outside of the head.  These external 
elements matter not at some prior point in time but hic et nunc.  if epistemic 
actions sometimes involve extra metabolic elements then the epistemic 
credit should be  spread among those external elements as well. 
clark and chalmers insist that their active externalism is, in some instances 
and for certain durations, not a description of a mere aid to cognition.  
rather the claim is that extra-metabolic elements can be partially 
constitutive of certain cognitive processes. in their own words, “in these 
cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way 
interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system 
in its own right” (1998). These systems may be, and often are, temporary, but 
for that reason the external components are no less partially constitutive 
of cognition. again, to be clear, the hypothesis of extended cognition does 
not put forth the idea that mind extends into things and environment all 
the time or that it must do so by necessity.  rather the claim is that there are 
some instances in which mind does extend out into the world in ways such 
that those cognitive processes cannot be fully accounted for by limiting the 
object of one’s investigation to what goes on in one’s head. moreover, if one 
only looked at the skin-bound human mind, or even more concretely at only 
the brain, then the argument is that one would obtain only a partial, and 
therefore possibly misleading picture of some types of cognition. with this 
in mind let’s now turn to more concrete examples of extended cognition.    
clark and chalmers give us three Tetris driven problem-solving examples 
in order to first highlight the unjustified assumption that the skull is 
the boundary and limit of all cognition.  In the first case we are asked to 
imagine a sort of ersatz Tetris in which a user will not be able to rotate the 
blocks on the screen but must rotate them mentally in order to determine 
if they will fit in to various sockets.  The second case is more or less a 
straightforward Tetris in which the blocks can be rotated on the screen 
by using a rotation button to help determine the fit of blocks with sockets.  
The third case is a sort of cyborg mash-up of the first two:  Imagine one 
has a neural computer implant that can perform the rotation that would 
happen on the screen from the second example but now it is happening 
inside the head or one can opt for the old-fashioned mental rotation from 
the first example.  In other words, the in the third case both possible types 
of rotation – outsourced and mental - occur in the head and yet the neural 
implant option is on par with the traditional externalized rotation-button 
example from the second case.  comparing these three examples is meant to 
HABIT AND THE ExTENDED MIND
richard charleS STrong Villanova university
165
highlight the similarities in all three cases and the inadequacy of the skin 
or skull as a boundary for cognition when faced with the third option.5  This 
is a declaration of what douglas robinson has referred to as a border-war 
(2013).  let us look now more closely at the paradigmatic example clark and 
chalmers hazard in favor of their position; otto and his notebook.
arguably, the core of the “extended mind” essay is a thought experiment 
involving two people who find themselves in New York City and want to go 
to the moma. Their names are otto and inga. inga has normally functioning 
declarative memory and needs no external tools recall that moma is on 
53rd Street. otto suffers from alzheimer’s disease and so rather than being 
able to use biological memory he uses a notebook for all sorts of things he 
would like to be able to recall. in this thought experiment, otto’s notebook 
contains, among other things, the address of moma. Thus otto can use 
the notebook in lieu of biological memory with no problems or decrease 
in behavioral competence. otto’s use of the notebook in this example 
illustrates a plausible case of a coupled cognitive system as discussed above. 
clark and chalmers also give us an additional list of criteria that must all be 
met in order for something to count as extended qua cognition in the case of 
otto’s notebook. They write:
1. That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked.
2. That any information thus retrieved be more or less 
automatically endorsed. […] it should be deemed about as 
trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory
3. That information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required.
4. That the information in the notebook has been consciously 
endorsed at some point in the past and indeed is there as a 
consequence of this endorsement (1998).
The “resource” in the case of otto is his notebook but surely a smartphone 
or other high-tech tool could do the job as well or better. moreover, the 
resource needs to be trusted.  True a notebook or smartphone could be 
tampered with or mistrusted but biological memory is no less immune to 
gaslighting or doubt.  Accessibility when needed is also not sufficiently 
5  Based on research by david Kirsh and Paul maglio (1994), the conclusion was drawn that the 
rotation of these shapes was used not just to position the blocks but also and often to determine 
their fit within the sockets.  The rotation of blocks was thus perhaps an epistemic and not merely 
pragmatic action.  Moreover, this determination of blocks fitting into sockets was achieved far 
more quickly when one could rotate the block on the screen as in the second case then when had 
to carry out the same rotation in one’s head.
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different in cases of biological as opposed to external memory resources.  
The naked brain is subject to sleep, intoxication, and emotional overload 
just as much as the notebook is susceptible to worldly inaccessibility.  clark 
and chalmers back away from the force or necessity of the fourth condition 
because it may suggest that a history is partly constitutive of belief and 
because endorsement might not always need to be conscious. 
what clark and chalmers argue is that the process of memory retrieval in 
the case of otto highlights the parity principle in favor of the hypothesis of 
extended cognition. The parity principle states that 
if, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world 
is (for that time) part of the cognitive process (1998).
in other words, if something external to the body or brain functions in 
the same way as something internal then it is in a strong sense part of the 
cognitive process for as long as that process takes place. when is otto’s mind 
extended into the notebook? only for the brief period of time that he is 
coupled with it in the act of retrieving the address of moma. in investigating 
the myriad types of human cognition (an incredibly broad and contentious 
term) we would do well, clark and chalmers tell us, to operative with what is 
called a “veil of metabolic ignorance (2011).” 
Using this veil of metabolic ignorance one would not make proper sense of 
the process of otto’s recall by limiting the scope of one’s analysis to otto’s 
biological memory and indeed the notebook would seem to be constitutive 
element of a couple cognitive system. coupled systems, of which otto 
coupled with his notebook is one example, have a number of conditions 
that need to be met in order for the extended element to be considered 
constitutive of a cognitive process or system. clark and chalmers identify 
the following four features:
1. all the components in the system play an active causal role. 
2. They jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way that 
cognition usually does.
3. if we remove the external component, the system’s behavioral 
competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain.
4. This sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive 
process, whether or not it is wholly in the head (1998). 
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These general conditions are clearly tailored for cases such as otto’s whereby 
parity of internal and external components is key.  of central importance is the 
condition that if the external component is removed then behavioral competence 
will drop.  a drop in behavioral competence stemming from the removal of the 
external component of a cognitive system can be seen in the Kirsh and maglio’s 
study of the performance of determining a block fitting a socket in Tetris (1994).  
if the competent performance of a cognitive behavior or action is needed for 
parity then perhaps an additional explanation in needed to explain behavioral 
competence with an extended component over time, which is to say with the 
addition of habitual knowledge of how to use a given external component without 
having to deliberate how - not just use it – but to use it well.   
moreover, it may be that complementarity is just as important as parity in terms 
of performance, competence, and governing of behavior.  There are many people 
with Alzheimer’s or similar conditions who might require or greatly benefit from 
cognitive scaffolds that replace some biological component that has failed then.  
however, cases of extended cognition in which the biological has not failed but 
rather can be improved upon with some external help may be equally worth 
investigating
in clark’s solo effort, Supersizing the mind, he moves beyond just parity to examine 
complementarity. in that work, it seems that it is probably the case that in taking 
seriously the hypothesis of the extended mind we should still maintain the parity 
principle, but that it is equally promising to think beyond the parity and instead 
look at cases of complementarity. in other words, the equally fruitful, interesting, 
and perhaps more pervasive cases of extended mind will not be processes that 
mirror “skin-bag” memory, as in the case of otto’s notebook.  rather attention 
should also be paid to those cases which, as clark writes, show the ways in which 
“it is the brain’s great plasticity and thirst for cheap, outsourced labor that drives 
the distributed engines of sociotechnological adaptation and change (2011).” he 
states further that the forward-going agenda of his project is
[…] to understand the larger systemic webs that, spun around the common 
core shared with so many other animals, help to give human cognition its 
distinctive power, character, and charm. (ibid.)
with both parity and complementarity in mind one can perhaps see that if there 
is this perhaps pervasive systemic web spun around the sine qua non that is the 
biological mind then making sense of the kind of behavioral competence or 
improvement, typical invocation, and endorsement may in some cases require 
the acquisition of habitual knowledge of the use of external components in an 
extended cognitive system.   let us now turn to merleau-Ponty in order further 
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the possible role of habit in cases of extended cognition.
habit, chez merleau-Ponty, is a broad notion that functions as an umbrella 
term denoting the practices by which quasi-stable dispositions, capacities 
and fields of meaning emerge in a number of analytically distinct yet 
conceptually blended regimes running from “higher level” operations 
of consciousness and non-conscious discursive practices through “lower 
level” functions likes perception and motricity. habit is the process which 
denotes the production of second natures (quasi-stable dispositions, 
capacities, and affordances), and frameworks (or fields) of meaning and 
action both epistemic and pragmatic. in many of these cases habit can only 
be understood if we extend the scope of the analysis beyond the skin of the 
organism.  indeed, habit functions at the fundamental antepredicative, 
preobjective, prepersonal, and nonreflective level of familiarity with the 
world.6 This does not mean that habit for merleau-Ponty is not squarely 
bodily and biological but it is the case that starting from what is given 
to us by nature, our body and organs, habits can and do emerge which 
incorporate ‘external’ interments (2012[1945]). habit, for merleau-Ponty, 
should not be understood as mere mechanism or under the guise of 
Skinnarian behaviorism because, at the very least, his explanations exceed 
observable behavior. habit concerns the body and begins with the body for 
merleau-Ponty, to be sure, but a clear picture of habit cannot be sketched 
via embodiment alone; body, mind, environment, language, and artifacts 
need to be given consideration in the constellation of habit.  moreover, 
distinctions or oppositions such as mind and body are shown to be the 
result of leaning too far towards opposing poles of false dilemmas, or 
rather real dilemmas that can be deflated by pursuing a middle path: lived 
phenomenology.  merleau-Ponty’s analysis attempts to avoid the Scylla of 
something like pure mind and the charybdis of brute body by starting from 
phenomenal lived experience; an intentionally ambiguous middle ground 
that is neither the objective or actual body nor the free floating Cartesian 
cogito.7  To be sure, the skin is not the outer limit of habit.   
merleau-Ponty will often use the word “l’habitude” but, as mentioned, its 
6  on the distinction between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ or one could say ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ or ‘self ’ and ‘world’, merleau-Ponty writes: “inside and outside are wholly inseparable.  
The world is wholly inside and i am wholly outside myself (2012[1945]).”
7  merleau-Ponty’s work almost always attempts to show that seemingly intractable binary 
oppositions such as mind and body, subject and object, self and world, idealism and materialism, 
etc., can be deflated and shown to be a mistake of emphasis or orientation. It varies by case, but 
it often he proceeds by showing the interdependence of the two terms, the actual truth to each 
term, and the mistake of privileging one above the other or falling too far on one side or the 
other of such an opposition which is usually a result of starting from the “antepredicative unity 
of life and our world” (2012[1945]).  
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sense will vary. habit seems to be an ‘operative concept’ which is employed 
but neither simply defined nor consistently used.8 in this essay i will 
focus my attention to merleau-Ponty’s remarks on habit in relation to the 
body schema.  habit is also aligned with or crucially related to language, 
concepts, discursive thought processes, sedimentation and operative 
intentionality (2012[1945]).  however, it is in his discussion of habit and 
the body schema that merleau-Ponty deals explicitly with extending one’s 
capacities by incorporating external instruments into ones repertoire 
of possible actions and therefore a fruitful way to bring merleau-Ponty’s 
account of habit to flesh out behavioral competence as it might concern 
the extended mind.  This essay thus takes a narrow perspective on what is 
admittedly a larger role of habit in the work of merleau-Ponty.9 
There are many who have worked on variations of this issue before, 
albeit with different aims in mind and not always conjunction with the 
extended mind theory. namely, Sean gallager in his work on the difference 
between the body schema and the body image (1986;2005). ed casey, in a 
number of excellent essays, has worked extensively on habit and the body 
schema (1984;1987). what is more, dermont moran has an essay in which 
he lucidly undertakes the difficult task of disambiguating the notion of 
habit in the work of edmund husserl (with reference to merleau-Ponty; 
although he draws a conservative conclusion regarding the importance 
and scope of habit for merleau-Ponty)(2011). additionally, martina reuter 
has done excellent work on Merleau-Ponty’s conception of pre-reflective 
intentionality, a notion that i see as a key part of the larger picture of the 
role habit as constitutive element of selves, groups, things, worlds, as well as 
the relation between those categories, critically understood (1999). 
The body schema is the notion that merleau-Ponty perhaps most closely 
aligns with habit. The body schema is the pre-conceptual, pre-personal, 
non-explicit, non-representational command of the body’s current and 
futurally open location, organization, situation, and capacities in relation to 
itself, to things, to language, and to world. it is founded in motricity. 
although the body scheme begins in basic biological motricity, a more 
developed body schema can and does run the gamut of actions and 
8  i take this notion of ‘operative concept’ from eugen Fink via dermot moran. Fink used the 
notion of “operative concept” to describe husserl’s account of habit. habit - being somewhat 
unwieldy - suffers a similar fate in the work of merleau-Ponty. 
9  It is difficult to isolate terms or concepts that Merleau-Ponty uses without some distortion 
because of the how closely any given term or concept is thoroughly integrated with almost all 
the others.  a fuller picture of merleau-Ponty’s notion of habit would have to take into account 
the relation of habit in and to his notions of the intentional arc, operative intentionality, bodily 
intentionally, sedimentation, language, freedom, space, time, the cogito, and style.  Such an 
account is simply beyond the scope of this essay. 
HABIT AND THE ExTENDED MIND
richard charleS STrong Villanova university
170
capacities from basic bodily skills and tacit savior-faire that blend into and 
are indissociable from faculties such as perception.10 The acquisition of 
habits modifies ones body schema allowing one to perform highly developed 
cultural-technological practices that incorporate external components 
such as playing an instrument, driving a car, or blind person using a 
cane to navigate through space.11  The acquisition of habits begins with 
testing or trying-out, not usually nor necessarily with prior deliberation, 
representation, and objectification.12  The body schema is not a static 
relation between self and world, it undergoes change and this change is 
produced by the acquisition of habits.13 
when the acquisition of a habit incorporates an instrument into one’s 
repertoire of actions by modifying and augmenting the body schema, it 
becomes the case that, according to merleau-Ponty, the cognitive load of 
performing that action – in terms of attention, consciousness, deliberation, 
and representation - is lightened.   The well-know example of the blind 
persons cane can be illustrative here.  he writes, 
But habit does not consist in interpreting the pressure of the cane on 
the hand like signs of certain positions of the cane, and then these 
positions as signs of an external object –for habit relieves us of this very 
task (2012[1945]).
This example - which so clearly shows that perception and motricty can be 
nontrivially co-constituted by a non-biological external thing – also shows 
that once a habit is fully incorporated into ones body schema, conscious 
interpretation is no longer needed and presumably competence or command 
of the external component has been mastered.14 
i want to highlight two more important aspects of habit acquisition and 
10  merleau-Ponty writes, “in fact, every habit is simultaneously motor and perceptual because 
it resides, as we have said, between explicit perception and actual movement, in that fundamental 
function that simultaneously delimits our field of vision and our field of action (2012[1945]).”
11  on the incorporation of external components into one’s body schema via habit, merleau-
Ponty writes: “To habituate oneself to a hat, an automobile, or a cane is to take up residence in 
them, or inversely to make then participate within the volumosity of one’s own body.  habit 
expresses the power we have of dilating our being in the world or of altering our existence 
though incorporating new instruments (2012[1945]).”
12  To acquire the habit of using a cane to navigate space merleau-Ponty states that “if i want to 
become habituated to a cane, i try it out, i touch some objects and, after some time, i have it “in 
hand”:  i see which objects are “within reach” or out of reach of my cane (2012[1945]).”  
13  The acquisition of habits is the acquisition, moreover, of a type of knowledge.  merleau-Ponty writes, 
“This is what i express by saying that i perceive with my body or with my senses, my body and my senses 
being precisely this habitual knowledge of the world, this implicit or sedimented science (2012[1945]).” 
14    on the extension of the perception of the world through the cane, merleau-Ponty writes 
“when the cane becomes a familiar instrument, the world of tactile objects expands, it no longer 
begins at the skin of the hand, but at the tip of the cane (2012[1945]).”
HABIT AND THE ExTENDED MIND
richard charleS STrong Villanova university
171
mastery of certain behaviors.  First, habits are transparent. once a habit 
is incorporated into the body schema then that habit is not conspicuous, 
these habits are something we live, act epistemically, and act pragmatically 
through. moreover, according to mearleau-Ponty, the actions we have 
habitually mastered, if known at all, can only be know after the fact, known 
in breakdown, in the removal or misplacement of instruments in cases of 
extension, or they can be know in reflection subsequent to mastery.  Second, 
habits exhibit temporal and functional dynamism for merleau-Ponty.  habits 
are a sort of knowing familiarity, not a pure and self-same mechanistic 
response.15   What exactly I mean by this is that we find as a general rule 
that habits are not something one acquires once and for all and that 
even those which appear quasi-stable are themselves undergoing change 
by reinforcement or slight and unnoticed modification upon each fresh 
application. This similar to the way that current psychological research 
shows that episodic memory is not held in storage in the brain and then 
called up the way that things might be stored in a warehouse and then easily 
accessed when needed, rather episodic memories born anew and modified 
with each recollection. 
with merleau-Ponty’s account of the acquisition and mature function of a 
habit in mind, especially in cases where the habit modifies the body schema 
in ways that go beyond the limits of the skin such as in the use of familiar 
instruments in a mode that is highly skilled, transparent to consciousness, 
dynamic, prepersonal, preobjective, nonrepresentational, and effortless 
it may be possible to use this theory to underpin and flesh out Clark and 
chalmers theory of extended cognition. 
an instrument or tool of epistemic action, bracketing cyberpunk neural 
implants for the moment, is by necessity beyond the limits of the skin or 
head.  Therefore the use of such an instrument will, by varying degrees, rely 
in some way on motricty and perception in order to be used.16  To not merely 
use such a tool or instrument, but to use it well, that is to say with mastery 
15  merleau-Ponty explains this familiar by recourse to an example of an organist playing on 
an unfamiliar organ.  an experienced organist, having a body schema that has mastery over the 
playing of organs, can modify and adjust their body schema to a new organ in the course of a few 
minutes of practice.  memory of the objective location of pedals, etc., or predicative knowledge of 
the new organ’s unique layout prove to be inadequate and misleading explanations of this sort of 
plasticity for merleau-Ponty (2012[1945]). 
16  The habitual command of ones hands in arranging tiles in a game of Scrabble or similar 
search and recognition actions will be presumably easier to habitually acquire and will be 
acquired at a much younger age than the more complicated and specialized tasks, for example 
those that Hutchens identifies in Cognition in the Wild (1995).  we often assume that, for example, 
the skillful motor-perceptual use of a smartphone or computer is automatically intuitive when 
it fact is only appears to be intuitive if we already have a habitual command of touchscreen 
graphical user interfaces.  This example will not hold for longer very long, however, think of the 
use of computers by older individuals that did not grow up as ‘digital-natives,’ so to speak.
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or a high level of behavioral competence that exceeds the novice or first 
time user.  it is likely the case that in such instances the habit of using such 
an instrument has been incorporated into the body schema of the subject 
in question.  The habit is not thereby constitutive of cognition but it makes 
a difference concerning performance and competence.   moreover, if such a 
habit is acquired then it is likely the case that in performing certain types 
of epistemic actions, the reliable instrument will be typically invoked as 
well and endorsed (in the past or present) in a non-explicit, non-deliberative 
manner.   The importance of the role of habit will depend on specific type of 
epistemic action in question, therefore let us now look at some examples.
recall the Tetris examples from clark and chalmers.  in the case which 
allows for an individual to rotate the blocks on the screen in front of 
them thereby allowing the individual to outperform the epistemic action 
of fit determination over and above instances mere metal rotation, the 
individual in question is using a video game controller to rotate the blocks 
in conjunction with perceiving rotating block on the screen.  it is likely 
that given time, an individual would acquire the habitual command of 
this motor-perceptual skill in a modest modification of said individual’s 
body schema.  once a habitual command of this skill was acquired then 
presumably the behavioral competence and performance of that individual 
at this task would increase.  Thus the acquired habit in question would not 
be part of the cognitive coupled system rather it would subtend that system 
and would do so in a way that makes a difference in the efficacy and overall 
performance of that process.  indeed performance would increase as the 
habit becomes more fully integrated into the individual’s body schema.  
The case of Otto’s notebook presents some difficulties for my thesis is so 
far as it is unclear if otto’s alzheimer’s makes it unable for him to develop 
new habits understood as modifications and enrichments of the body 
schema.  assuming otto can acquire new habits then it is likely the case that 
his command of his notebook as an external cognitive resource would be 
improved with and motor-perceptual familiarity which is the acquisition 
of a habit via the incorporation of that habit in the body schema.  even for 
those of us that do not have any cognitive impartments, familiarity with the 
motor perceptual demands of an external memory resource (a phone book, 
an encyclopedia, a map, a smartphone, a laptop computer) and unknowingly 
responding to those demands with the acquisition of the needed habit would 
presumably improve speed and performance of epistemic actions over time. 
what i have hoped to have shown is that in the acquisition of habits, as 
accounted for by merleau-Ponty, it is the case that the motor-perceptual 
modification of the body schema can make a meaningful difference 
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for extended cognition as it regards behavioral competence, systemic 
performance, endorsement of external components, and typical invocation 
of external components.  habit is perhaps not a part of the cognitive 
system, but habit makes a difference in how well such coupled cognitive 
system might function.  moreover, habit highlights the extent to which 
this enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs in 
conjunction with mind and thing.  habit makes a difference for extended 
cognition and Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habit helps to flesh out or show the 
role of embodiment, more specifically the body schema, in this regard.
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in this paper i discuss the concept of habit from a sociological point of view. my aim, in 
part, is to consider the ways in which sociologists and social philosophers could use and 
have used ‘habit’ in their analyses and explanations. in particular the concept of habit 
can contribute to our understanding and explanation of the behavioural regularities 
involved in social structure. in addition, however, i am interested in the limitations of the 
concept of habit, within a sociological context, when compared against other concepts 
which are used to do similar work. in particular i contrast the concept of habit with the 
concepts of ‘rule’ and ‘convention’, drawing out the strengths that it has relative to those 
competing concepts but also identifying important aspects of behavioural regularity 
which they bring to light and which habit ignores. in the conclusion to the paper i 
consider ways in which these various concepts might overlap and might be used in 
conjuction with one another.
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in this paper i approach ‘habit’ as a sociologist. i am interested in the 
way that both ‘habit’ and the related concept of ‘habitus’ (see below) are 
used, particularly in the context of ‘theories of practice’ and even more 
particularly in those theories of practice which build upon the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1992), to explain the regular and enduring patterns of 
social interaction (that is, the social practices) that form a central element 
of ‘social structure’1. habit is a crucial concept for these purposes, in my 
view, but it is a limited concept which only captures one element of what is 
involved in these regular and enduring patterns. my aim here is to identify 
and explore some of these limitations, delimiting more precisely the role 
habit that plays in the reproduction of social life whilst also considering 
the elements of that process that it doesn’t capture. i do this by contrasting 
‘habit’ with two concepts which are sometimes used to do the same analytic 
work as it but which have fallen out of favour as ‘habit’ has risen to the fore 
in sociological thought: rule and convention. i will argue that they do not, in 
fact, do the same work; that each draws out a distinct aspect of the regular 
and enduring patterns of interactivity that interest sociologists and that 
sociologists would do well to attend to these differences and to the range of 
concepts necessary to adequately grasp them. we need the concepts of rule 
and convention as well as the concept of habit if we are to fully understand 
and enjoy the capability to analyse the enduring patterns of interaction 
which (partly) constitute social structures. From the point of view of 
specific focus of this special edition, namely, habit, I hope that this offers 
a useful interrogation of its sociological meaning and scope. i begin with a 
brief account the concept’s somewhat chequered history within sociology 
and of the role accorded it in explaining social structure.
in sociology, as in other academic discourses, the concept of habit has 
undergone various reappraisals and changes of meaning across time (camic 
1986). early sociologists used the concept, positively, to denote acquired 
dispositions of a fairly broad nature, perceiving it to be entirely compatible 
with their understanding of human action as purposive and intelligent. 
in the early twentieth century, however, partly as an effect of the rise 
1 other key elements of social structure are patterns of connection between the participants 
in particular ‘social worlds’ and the distribution of resources between them.
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of behaviourist psychology and physiology, with their mechanistic and 
reductive explanations of human action, sociologists began to think of 
habits as largely involuntary behavioural ticks; inconsequential, devoid of 
meaning and for these reasons sociologically uninteresting (ibid.). elements 
of the old concept of habit were maintained in such concepts as custom, 
tradition and even perhaps culture but ‘habit’ itself was dropped from the 
lexicon. more recently, however, habit has made a comeback. The work 
of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1992), in particular, has put the concept of 
‘habitus’ at the heart of contemporary sociological thought, and that in turn 
has prompted a return, in some quarters, to ‘habit’ itself.
i have discussed the (lack of) difference between ‘habit’ and ‘habitus’ 
elsewhere (crossley 2013). it very much depends, i have suggested, whose 
concept of habit and whose concept of habitus one refers to. For every 
theorist, such as Bourdieu or marcel mauss (1979), who develops a concept 
of habitus, distinguishing it from ‘mere habit’, there is another, such as 
maurice merleau-Ponty (1962) or John dewey (1988), who has sought to 
rescue ‘habit’ itself from a reductive behaviourist understanding, refusing 
to relegate it to the domain of simple, insignificant and mechanical 
behaviours. restoring something of its original meaning, they locate habit 
within behaviour which is meaningful, intelligent, rational and sometimes 
strategic. in addition, they discuss collective habits, formed and diffusing 
within social networks whose members they serve to mark out as distinct 
social groups: e.g. social classes, nations and ethnic groups.
Furthermore, they identify the sociological importance of habit as a 
mechanism which anchors socially and historically variable forms of 
conduct, physically, lending the society or social world to which they belong 
durability and a relatively stable structure. Society persists on a day-by-day 
basis, they suggest, because its forms have become habitually engrained 
within the behavioural repertoires of its members. william James captures 
this in a widely cited passage, adding the important further observation that 
habit contributes to social reproduction because it entails desensitisation 
to inequalities and hardships which, were they to be experienced with full 
force, rising to the forefront of consciousness, might provoke discontent and 
uprising:
Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent. it alone is what keeps us all within the bounds 
of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious 
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uprisings of the poor. it along prevents the hardest and most repulsive 
walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. 
It keeps the fisherman ... at sea .... It dooms us all to fight out the battle 
of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice ... it is too late 
to begin again. it keeps different social strata from mixing. (James 
1892, 143)
James anticipates many of the key elements of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus 
in this passage, not least the sense that habits are formed in particular 
social worlds, whose structure they subsequently reproduce. actors adapt 
their behaviour to fit the social worlds in which they find themselves. This 
gives rise to habits which both attach the actor to that world and contribute 
to its reproduction; shaping the actor’s behaviour in a way which then 
shapes the world in question. To quote Bourdieu himself, habitus are:
... durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations 
that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu 1992, p.53)
Pragmatists (dewey in particular) and phenomenologists (merleau-Ponty 
in particular but also husserl (1973, 1990)) make a crucial contribution to 
this renewed focus upon ‘habit’, opening up and exploring the nature of 
habit to a far greater extent than Bourdieu. They ground the concept by 
illuminating and exploring its place in everyday activity and experience. 
They challenge its behaviourist framing both with detailed critiques 
which reveal the inadequacy of behaviourist theory to explain even its 
own experimental findings (Merleau-Ponty 1965, Dewey 1896) and also 
through careful phenomenological analyses of familiar habits which refute 
any notion of mechanical repetition and show rather how habit enables 
skilled improvisation and how it can be transposed to novel situations. 
Furthermore, they understand habits as open to revision in the context 
of an engagement between the organism and its environment, and they 
expand the scope of the concept beyond simple motor functions to the 
realms of perception and reflective thought, simultaneously exploring how 
these realms are intertwined (crossley 2001, 2013).
Finally, connecting with the key sociological theme identified at the outset 
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of this paper, they explore the key link between habit, history (and thus 
temporality) and identity (both individual and social). habit, they argue, lends 
continuity to our lives, making me the same person tomorrow as i was today 
and allowing projects begun at one point in time to be completed at another. as 
such it contributes to our freedom and capacity for choice. choice is meaningful 
because it achieves traction and anchorage in my life through force of habit. at 
the collective level, this same mechanism ensures the continuity of history and 
the distinctiveness of particular periods within it. The human organisms who 
populate different historical periods do not differ greatly qua organisms but 
their habits do and this makes a huge difference. 
note that habit facilitates both conservation and change in this account or 
rather the conservation that is integral to change. habit preserves aspects of 
the past within the present, facilitating actions which build upon that past 
in pursuit of a future. it is because of habit that our activities, individual and 
collective, never emerge ex nihilo. as James emphases in the above-cited 
passage, we cannot ‘begin again’. The present must always build upon the past as 
preserved within habit and the clock is never, can never be turned back.
it will be apparent that i deem habit or habitus (i will use ‘habit’ to refer to 
both hereafter) a crucial mechanism in the reproduction of the social world. as 
noted in the introduction to this paper, however, it is, like any scientific concept, 
selective, drawing certain aspects of the empirical world into the foreground of 
our attention, at the expense of others which may also be important. we must 
reflect upon these others too if we are to achieve a satisfactory account. 
one particular concern that i have with habit is that it locates ‘social 
structure’ entirely within the individual failing to engage with the 
intersubjective and more broadly relational nature of the social world qua 
social. habits are individual dispositions and even collective habits are 
mere aggregations of individual habits. They can and i believe that they 
usually do take shape within the context of social interaction but this 
social dimension is not captured within the concept of habit itself, which, 
as noted, tracks it back into the individual. This individualised element 
is important and i will defend it. however, it is not the whole story. Social 
worlds are networks of interacting and interdependent actors, both human 
and corporate2 (crossley 2011). The structure of these networks is a further 
2 By ‘corporate actors’ I mean such as organizations as firms, trade unions and governments, 
which involve mechanisms of collective decision making and means of implementing their 
decisions.
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element of social structure, and the behavioural regularities focused upon 
in this paper are not only anchored by means of habit but also by relational 
means, within these networks. 
in what follows i will tease this out by contrasting the concept of habit 
with the concepts of ‘rule’ and ‘convention’ respectively. in contrast to 
habit, both ‘rule’ and ‘convention’ imply interconnection and a discussion 
of them allows me to demonstrate why connection is important. i will 
not be arguing against ‘habit’, however. where habit, rule and convention 
are discussed together theorists typically argue for one over the others. 
Bourdieu (1990) famously argues for habitus over rule, for example, and 
Peter Winch (1958) argues in favour of rule over habit. I briefly review 
both arguments, identifying merit in them but the either/or framing is 
problematic and unnecessary in my view because each concept identifies 
a different and important mechanism at play within regular patterns of 
behaviour. Furthermore, though the three mechanisms are often found 
together each is sometimes found in the absence of the other, and they 
can conflict, such that we must distinguish between them in our analytic 
toolbox. i begin by considering winch’s critique of ‘habit’.
winch draws a comparison between habits and rules in his path-breaking 
study, The idea of a Social Science. having argued for the importance of rules, 
drawing upon wittgenstein (1953), he observes that much of the work which 
he assigns to ‘rules’ in his account is assigned to ‘habit’ in the work of his 
contemporary, michael oakeshott (1991, 1999). winch accepts a broader and 
richer account of habit than was typical at his time of writing and is not, 
therefore, entirely dismissive of oakeshott. however, he does not believe 
that ‘habit’ can play the role which he attributes to rules:
oakeshott appears to think that the dividing line between behaviour 
which is habitual and that which is rule-governed depends on whether 
or not a rule is consciously applied. in opposition to this i want to say 
that the test of whether a man’s [sic] actions are the application of 
a rule is not whether he can formulate it but whether it makes sense 
to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things ... 
where that makes sense then it must also make sense to say that he 
is applying a criterion in what he does even though he does not and 
perhaps cannot formulate that criterion. (winch 1958, p.58, emphasis 
in original)
Habit and Rule
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His first objection, outlined above, is that social practice has a normative 
aspect which is captured by ‘rule’ but not ‘habit’. Social behaviour can be 
and often is judged right and wrong, either in a moral or a technical sense, 
by those involved. ‘rule’ entails this normative element, ‘habit’ does not 
and ‘rule’, therefore, is the preferable concept. his second objection is that 
the regularities of interaction that these normative judgements refer to and 
which i have previously referred to in this paper are not mere repetitions of 
a set behavioural pattern, as ‘habit’, on his interpretation of that concept, 
would imply, but rather appear regular in virtue of their adherence to an 
underlying principle, as the concept of ‘rule’ would suggest. Following a 
rule does not always mean acting in an identical fashion across time and 
different social contexts, he observes. it entails understanding the rule, and 
understanding, as wittgenstein famously claims, entails the capacity to ‘go 
on’, extending and/or applying a rule beyond the limited range of examples 
involved in one’s leaning of it. like the individual who is able to continue a 
number series further than they have heard it recited, continuing ‘12, 15, 18 
..’ after hearing ‘3, 6, 9 ...’, social actors act in accordance with rules which 
they have learned and understood without exactly replicating forms of 
conduct which they have seen others perform in the past. Their interactivity 
manifests understanding of a rule rather than habitual repetition.
curiously, Bourdieu uses a very similar observation to winch to argue 
against the concept of rules and in favour of habit. For him ‘rule’ implies 
rigidity of conduct whilst habit or at least habitus implies a flexible 
disposition and ‘feel for the game’ which allows the actor to spontaneously 
improvise in unfamilar situations. The strategic action of the footballer, who 
is constantly innovating and improvising in response to the state of play is 
an example of habitus for Bourdieu. Furthermore, most of the revisionist 
accounts of habit that i referred to above equate habit with understanding 
and knowledge, bringing ‘habit’ much closer to ‘rule’ than winch’s account 
suggests. merleau-Ponty, for example, views habits as forms of embodied 
understanding and know-how:
we said earlier that it is the body which understands in the acquisition 
of habit. This way of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is 
subsuming a sense datum under an idea, and if the body is an object. 
But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us to revise our 
notion of ‘understand’ and our notion of the body. To understand 
is to experience harmony between what we aim at and what is 
THE CONCEPT Of HABIT AND THE REgUlARITIES Of SOCIAl STRUCTURE  
nicK croSSley university of manchester
184
given, between intention and the performance – and the body is our 
anchorage in the world. (1962, 144)
habit is embodied know-how for merleau-Ponty, which allows the actor to 
spontaneously adapt to unfolding situations in a manner intelligently and 
rationally adapted to those situations, given the actor’s goals.
it follows from this, contra winch, that the same habit may give rise to 
a variety of behavioural responses, across different situations, unified 
only by their manifestation of the same basic understanding. in winch’s 
defence, however, we might argue that understanding is always necessarily 
understanding-of something or other and we would therefore have to ask 
what is understood in habit? The answer will vary according to the habit 
in question. however, if that habit is amongst those which are constitutive 
of social structure then it seems inevitable that what it will grasp is a 
rule of some sort. indeed the concept of understanding seems logically to 
entail ‘rules’, in winch’s wittgensteinian sense, because it must entail the 
possibility of misunderstanding or not understanding and therefore right 
and wrong ways of going on. Furthermore, we might ask whether Bourdieu’s 
‘feel for the game’ does not necessarily entail constitutive ‘rules’ of the 
game. what does an actor have a feel for when they have a feel for the game 
if not rules which define the objectives and constraints of the game?
equally importantly, winch’s insistence that ‘rule’ implies that there is a 
right and a wrong way of doing things does identity an important element of 
social structure that is not captured by the concept of habit. Social practices 
are not only regular and enduring. They have a normative character such 
that those involved sometimes correct both themselves and others, drawing 
a distinction between right and wrong ways of going on. ‘rules’ captures 
this but ‘habit’ has no such normative implication. habits might be good or 
bad but only in relation to a rule or standard which is extraneous to them. 
The point here is not to deny that rule-following is sometimes habitual. it is 
and this doubtless contributes to the survival of particular rules. The point, 
rather, is that there is an important normative aspect to social structure 
which ‘habit’ does not capture. i return to this. Presently, however, i will 
continue the critique of habit.
Though winch is careful to allow that social actors may not be able to 
formulate the rules they understand and orient to, breaches of rules in 
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social circumstances are likely to be noticed by those who understand the 
rule and may occasion reflective attempts at correction. Likewise for the 
individual actor who confronts a situation where application of the rule is 
not straightforward:
...questions of interpretation and consistency, that is, matters for reflection, 
are bound to arise for anyone who has to deal with a situation foreign to 
his previous experience. (winch 1958, 64, emphasis in original) 
Most rules are not subject to reflection for much of the time, on Winch’s 
understanding, but in the context of a rapidly changing social world any 
rule might be elevated into conscious reflection. In this respect Winch 
balances the attention to pre-reflective activities often afforded in 
accounts of habit with a focus upon the  role of reflective intelligence and 
understanding. our patterns of interaction are not completely habitual. 
Periodically they come into question and what we reflect upon in such 
circumstances –i.e. how to go on- bears upon the principle underlying our 
action; that is to say, rules.
Building upon winch i would add that rules are also important because, 
at least as defined by Wittgenstein (1953), they are irreducibly social. They 
exist not within but between individuals, within a social network. They 
rest upon ‘agreement in forms of life’ and therefore presuppose at least two 
actors who ‘agree’ upon them (often more, of course). habits, by contrast, 
even where shared and therefore collective, are properties of individuals. 
even collective habits are only aggregations of individual habits. a collective 
habit is an individual habit that happens to be shared, and habits can be 
strictly individual (at least in theory). By contrast a rule exists only in the 
context of social relations between multiple individuals. rules are relational 
and, as such, they permit us to explore the genuinely social nature of social 
life.
Furthermore, where rules are supported by sanctions this too adds a 
relational dimension to structure. actor a acts as she does, following a 
rule, because actor B will punish her if she does not. This situation may be 
reciprocal. a and B may each be in a position to sanction one another for 
rule violation. in some cases, however, only one of the two may have the 
means to sanction the other, a position which arguably allows her also to 
impose the rule to which the other must adhere. in this case we would deem 
the power balance within the relation between a and B to be assymetrical. 
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whatever the precise details, however, the key point is that relations matter 
and that relations are not captured by ‘habit’.
The various advantages of the concept of rule do not amount to an argument 
for using it instead of the concept of habit, however. on this point i disagree 
with winch. Just as ‘rule’ captures certain aspects of regular patterns 
of social interaction missed by ‘habit’ so to ‘habit’ captures aspects that 
are neglected by ‘rule’. not only is it perfectly meaningful to refer to 
habits which are individual and therefore not rule-following, it is equally 
meaningful to distinguish between instances of rule following which are 
habitual and instances which are not. Though it does not occur to winch 
that rule following may sometimes be habitual, for example, we have seen 
that he distinguishes between situations where rule following involves 
reflection and situations where it does not. Furthermore, where rule 
following is habitual there will always have been a time at which it was not; 
that is, a time at which some degree of conscious effort was required to 
follow the rule.
The concept of rules captures the pattern adhered to by actors in particular 
situations and the normative aspect involved but it does not explain why 
actors adhere to rules. There may be many such explanations, from the 
desire to do the right thing through to fear of punishment for doing the 
wrong thing, but these all presuppose that rule following is a reflective 
activity; that an act of decision and a degree of conscious effort is involved. 
habit adds a further possibility. it alerts us to the way in which certain 
patterns or principles of conduct, that is to say, certain rules, are conserved 
within the pre-reflective ‘structures of behaviour’ which underpin our 
reflective life such that they become, from the point of view of the actor, 
automatic. habit is a mechanism which explains some (but not all) instances 
of rule following. 
as ‘rule’ and ‘habit’ each do a different job in explaining and rendering 
social practices intelligible i would suggest that we do not consider their 
respective merits in either/or terms but rather look to keep both in our 
analytic toolbox. in the conclusion to this paper i return to this suggestion. 
Before i do, however, i want to introduce a third concept into the discussion: 
convention.
Like ‘habit’ and ‘rule’, ‘convention’ is defined in a variety of ways both 
within and outside of social science. We find an interesting use, however, 
Convention
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in the philosophical work of david lewis (1969) and the sociological work 
of howard Becker (1982), who draws (selectively) upon lewis. conventions, 
for lewis are solutions to ‘coordination problems’ and involve mutual 
expectations between actors as to how each will interact in a given 
situation. in many circumstances in social life social actors need to 
coordinate their activity, lewis observes. Various possibilities for acting are 
open to them, any of which would equally well serve their purposes, as long 
as the others involved make a complementary choice. Thus, in the UK, we 
drive on the left side of the road. we could drive on the right, as is common 
elsewhere, but as long as we all drive on the same side it doesn’t matter. 
where a particular option is settled upon, lewis argues, we may speak of 
convention. a convention is a course of action, integral to the solution of a 
coordination problem, which all (or at least most) relevant actors within a 
given population orient to.
lewis’ concept of convention is important because, like ‘rule’, it draws 
out a relational aspect to social structure which is not entailed in ‘habit’ 
(even collective habit) and which habit arguably ignores; namely, that 
social activity requires coordination and thus ‘agreement’3 between those 
involved. Social activity is inter-activity, interaction, and its regularities 
cannot therefore be grasped entirely by reference to a concept (habit) which 
captures the manner in which forms of conduct are conserved within the 
action repertoires of discrete individuals. Just as the concept of habit does 
not entail that action might be right or wrong, as suggested by rule, neither 
does it address the issue of coordination and the intersubjective agreement 
this involves. ‘conventions’ are ways in which we act together rather than, 
as in the case of habit, individual instantiations of action which may or may 
not be found across multiple individuals.
Furthermore, like rules, conventions necessarily exist between people, in 
interaction. a convention only exists when at least two people ‘agree’, often 
tacitly and in practice, about how each will act in certain situations.
in some instances conventions will involve a normative element and thus 
have a rule-like nature. however, this is not necessarily so. There are two 
types of counter-example. Firstly, some conventions lack a normative element 
because their arbitrariness is recognised and/or deviation does not cause huge 
3 This is not to say that parties to a convention actually come to a reflective consensus but 
rather than they act in complementary ways. To paraphrase wittgenstein, they agree, not 
(necessarily) in opinions but in forms of life.
Conventions 
and Rules
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coordination problems. Parties to a convention recognise that other ways of 
behaving in a situation would be entirely appropriate, only sticking to what 
they do because agreement between their respective ways of behaving is useful 
to them. Friends who regularly meet at a particular table in a café may be said 
to have established a convention, for example, which eases the coordination 
of lunchtime meetings between them but this is unlikely to be regarded as 
normatively binding. If the first to arrive at the café fancies sitting somewhere 
else for a change the second will not deem this wrong (either morally or 
technically), unless it proves particularly disruptive or inconvenient. Similarly, 
if somebody else is sat at their seat when they arrive they might regard this as 
an inconvenience but not as a breach of a rule. 
Secondly, challenges to convention are sometimes viewed positively, 
especially in aesthetic domains. The musicologist leonard meyer (1956), for 
example, argues that the pleasure generated by music stems in large part 
from the composer and/or performer playing with and bending conventions 
and thereby teasing the audience. The audience expect a passage that has 
begun like ‘this’ to finish like ‘that’, for example, because that is how such 
sequences conventionally run. Knowing this, however, the performer 
deviates from the convention, generating tension within their audience 
which they will later release either by diverting to another convention 
or establishing a non-conventional pattern which they audience can at 
least recognise as a pattern and which might become a new convention. 
‘Convention’ is defined here much as Lewis defines it. It involves shared 
expectation. The audience expect certain things of the performer/composer 
and the performer/composer expects that they expect it. Furthermore, 
these expectations facilitate coordination and communication between 
the two parties. The aesthetic effect is only achieved to the extent that 
the audience, following convention, react in the way that the composer/
performer expects. however, meyer’s composer/performer plays with and 
deviates from convention herself, and though this may sometimes be met 
with negative sanctions it can also be an occasion for praise and positive 
sanctions. Though the concepts of convention and rule sometimes overlap, 
therefore, this is not always so and we have good reason to keep both, 
distinguishing between them, in our analytical toolbox. in what follows i 
will show that the same is true for ‘habit’ and ‘convention’.
as with ‘rules’, the advantages that the concept of convention affords us do not 
merit our choosing it over ‘habit’ because ‘convention’ does not do the work of 
‘habit’ any more than ‘habit’ does the work of ‘convention’. conventions can 
be habitual but not always. To give an example which covers both rules and 
Habit and 
Convention
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conventions: when i drive in the UK i follow the convention and the rule of 
driving on the left hand side of the road, and i do so by force of habit. it does 
not occur to me to do otherwise. i get in the car and pull onto the left-hand 
side of the road. if an occasion were to arise in which another road user drove 
on the right i would be shocked, evidencing a taken for granted (i.e. habitual) 
expectation about the behaviour of others, as is proper to convention, and i 
would no doubt feel a sense of moral outrage, evidencing the normative weight 
(and thus rule-like nature) of this convention, but in most cases in the UK 
everybody drives on the left, by force of habit, and insofar as we notice at all it 
feels natural to do so. when in France, by contrast, i drive on the right hand side 
of the road. This does not come naturally to me. it is not a habit. indeed it goes 
against my habitual inclination. i know what i ought to do, have expectations 
about how others will drive and have expectations about how they will expect 
me to drive but this largely arises in my reflective consciousness and I find that I 
have to remind myself what to do, especially when approaching challenges such 
as those presented by a roundabout. driving on the right feels strange, at least 
at first, until I get used to it (habituate to it) and begin to form a habit of driving 
on the right. 
it might be argued that such driving conventions/rules only work because they 
are habitual for the vast majority of drivers. This is no doubt true but the fact 
that we can follow such conventions/rules even when they are not habitual 
indicates that ‘habit’ adds something to our analysis that neither ‘convention’ 
nor ‘rule’ in themselves entail, just as they each make a unique contribution, 
covered neither by the other nor by habit. 
The work that ‘habit’ performs in relation to ‘convention’, to reiterate what i 
said with respect to habit and rules, is to lend them stability and durability by 
anchoring them within the individual, beneath the level of reflective decision, 
where their instigation and execution would always potentially be open to 
question. habits may be called into question, of course, and may become subject 
to conscious attempts at cultivation and/or destruction. however, habitual 
action, for the most part, is action which is triggered and executed without the 
intervention of reflective thought. 
removing structures of behaviour from the realm of choice and conscious 
deliberation increases their regularity and durability by rendering them 
‘automatic’. all things being equal an actor will behave in a habitual manner 
within a familiar situation. The selection and filtering which reflective 
deliberation affords is bypassed. in addition, habituation lowers the costs 
of action, in terms of effort, generating a degree of inertia. it is much 
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easier to act as we habitually act than to devise new ways of acting, and 
even where we consider alternatives, therefore, we may still revert to habit 
unless changes in our situation have significantly reduced their use value. 
in a further twist, moreover, habits have the effect of naturalising certain 
behaviours. in part this is a matter of putting them outside of the realm 
of discourse. if we do not need to think about doing them then we may not 
even notice that we do them and will certainly be less inclined to think 
about or question them if we do. even if we do question them, however, the 
fact that they come so easily to us will often incline us to suppose that they 
are ‘natural’ ways of acting.
Defined in this way ‘habit’ potentially conflicts with ‘convention’ as 
Lewis understands it. A defining feature of convention, for Lewis, is our 
awareness that we could act otherwise. Patterns of interaction which are 
believed to be ‘natural’ and perhaps even those executed without reflective 
awareness would not qualify fully as conventions from this point of view. 
Lewis offers no good reason for this particular aspect of his definition of 
convention, however, and i believe that it has counter-intuitive implications. 
a convention might cease to be a convention over time, for example, as 
social actors forget about its arbitrariness and it becomes taken for granted. 
conversely a behaviour which is taken-for-granted will only become a 
convention when its taken-for-grantedness is challenged. more strangely 
still, the same behaviour might be a convention for some of the people 
who engage in it (those aware of alternatives) but not for others (those who 
deem it natural). it is certainly true that, as analysts, we will not recognise 
a convention as such unless we are aware that other arrangements are 
possible but the requirement that lay actors share that awareness is 
unnecessary. actors need not be aware that an arrangement is conventional 
in order for it to be conventional.
Habit, convention and rule are not, as Bourdieu’s and Winch’s reflections 
on habit and rule each seem to suggest, alternative ways of conceptualising 
the same thing. rather, each concept picks out a different aspect of social 
practice. ‘Rule’ identifies a normative aspect: actors act in a way which their 
peers deem correct and/or believe that they ought to act. Furthermore, 
it identifies an underlying principle or criteria which actors understand 
and apply in their activity. ‘Convention’ identifies the way in which 
particular ways of acting resolve coordination problems and involve mutual 
expectations about the behaviour of self and other. ‘Habit’ identifies the 
anchoring of understanding and expectations in the pre-reflective life of the 
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embodied agent.
each of these aspects is important and in many cases each will be 
simultaneously in play, as my UK driving example suggests. however, i hope 
i have also shown that any one may be absent in a particular situation. This 
is why we need to distinguish the three. we may elaborate upon this by way 
of a Venn diagram.
The diagram presents seven possibilities for the possible interplay of 
habit, convention and rule. Any specific instance of regular and enduring 
behaviour will fit into one of these seven possibilities. We may use the 
diagram as an analytic tool for considering the specific interplay of these 
factors involved in concrete cases of regular/enduring behaviour.
The reflections offered in this paper only begin to scratch at the surface. A 
proper understanding of social practice requires further and much more 
nuanced differentiation of the various mechanisms in play within it. This 
includes those focused upon here, those gestured towards (e.g. sanctions 
and balances of power) but no doubt many more besides. i hope that i have 
at least made a start here, however.
convention rule
habit
Figure 1.1: habit, rule and convention
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abstract
how is social creativity linked to habitual dispositions?
This paper critiques Bourdieu’s answer to this question, which is related to his theory 
of habitus, against the background of its phenomenological evidences. his concept of 
habitual dispositions seems to be linked both to an internalisation of the performativity 
of habits as a form of Kantian schematism (in husserlian terms: ‘noetization’), and to 
a static concept of the social environment, which is never analysed in its own dynamic 
structural relation to the life of the bearer of habits.
Through the genetic-phenomenological distinction between habits as noetic dispositions 
and types as noematic schemes, the paper seeks to show that the social environment 
cannot be presupposed as a given field of social objectivities and norms that are stabilized 
by internalized habitual dispositions, but should instead be seen as an enactively framed 
habitat. When we further distinguish between passive and active habitualities, their 
intertwining comes to the fore, showing how in taking a position in relation to its own 
cultural environment the subject finds in the hiatus between disposition and the disposed 
leeway for a relative framework of spontaneity and personal cultivation, a space allowing 
for individual and, ultimately, social creativity that is absent from Bourdieu’s account. 
*Translated by Jacob martin rump (emory university)
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connected from the outset both to habits and routine, at once the support and 
the vehicle of this myriad of actions undertaken by the human being in a kind 
of reckless spontaneity, habitus seems to be the antagonist of social creativity, 
of the deliberate emergence of new configurations and new opportunities. 
it is in this sense, that, for Bourdieu, habitus is a system of dispositions, “the 
principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism sees in social 
practices without being able to found it in reason, at the same time as regulated 
changes and revolutions”1. habitus, as the generative scheme of practices 
adapted to objective circumstances of social context, “generates dispositions 
objectively compatible with these circumstances and in a way pre-adapted to 
their demands. The most improbable practices are therefore excluded without 
examination as unthinkable, by a kind of immediate submission to order 
that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is 
anyway denied and to will the inevitable”2. habit so conceived seems capable 
of supporting only the reproduction of acquired conditionalities, incorporated 
into a second nature which retains nonetheless the virtue of making its 
requirements “reasonable”3 in the eyes of common sense: the behavior which it 
befits each to adopt, according to her condition (i.e. her social position). Habitus 
would thus be reduced to the modus operandi of a modus vivendi.
one can grant that habits and routines obviously structure a great number 
of our banal and everyday activities. if it were only a matter of producing yet 
another theory of social reproduction, no one could find any fault in this. 
But Bourdieu puts at the heart of a theory of action a principle that accounts 
more for that which is likely for the action than that which is possible for it, 
something worse than having linked the likely and the possible, such that one is 
the exact correlate of the other. it is this that leaves us puzzled4.
To understand the issue, we must remember that the challenge for Bourdieu 
consists in being able to give an account, on the one hand, of the regularity 
of social configurations and lifestyles without reverting to a soulless 
mechanism, and on the other, to do justice to a certain creativity in social 
interactions without reference to a subjective power whose rationality 
1  Bourdieu (2000), p. 277, and Bourdieu (2012a), pp. 91-92 [Bourdieu (1990), p. 54].
2  Bourdieu (2012a), p. 90 [Bourdieu (1990), p. 54, translation modified].
3  cf. Bourdieu (2012a), p. 93 and note 15 on p. 104 [Bourdieu (1990), 55f and note 10 to p. 62].
4  See on this subject haber (2004).
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would be able to escape from the reproduction of social structures. and indeed, 
neither the referring of social change solely to the movements of the structures 
of society, nor the artful disappearance of the weight of the structure 
and conditionings in current social interactions will allow us to meet the 
requirements of a theory of collective action. But the determining of habitus as 
an operative passivity, as a disposition endowed with a plasticity of adjustment 
by analogy, by which it schematically cuts out all objective context in order to 
extract the recognized elements necessary for its own reiteration and its own 
strengthening, was destined to fail to account for elements of social creativity5.
From a purely epistemological point of view, it is because:
The habitus fulfills a function which another philosophy confines to a 
transcendental consciousness: it is a socialized body, a structured body, 
a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or 
of a particular sector of that world—a field—and which structures the 
perception of that world as well as action in that world6.
that Bourdieu’s project cannot effect a final synthesis between the objectivism 
of structuralism and the subjectivism of interactionism. indeed, habitus 
as a structured body, makes the disposition out to be a milieu immediately 
comprehended and included [compris] in the worldly context, a milieu which 
is only transcended through the analogical transfer of the schemes of a 
previous situation to a relatively new one. in its blind spontaneity, habitus 
suffers from a lack of distance or difference from itself, and perpetuates itself 
only according to its pre-disposition, purely and simply, without social and 
contextual evolution, and in principle always slowly and imperceptibly.
To formulate the critique in husserl’s terms, the incorporation of habitus 
is overcompensated by is predominant use of the Kantian transcendental 
schematism of the imagination, that is to say by a noétization of the 
operative mode of habitual disposition. The habitus is structured as body, 
and structured-structuring as schema, which is why, in spite of its agility 
and flexibility, it ballasts everything present with the “disproportionate 
weight” of the past7. But this is not all: because its schematizing anticipation is 
presented in presented in a context of conditions favorable to its own renewal, 
habit is blind to those possible other conditions which contain the situation, 
and which could themselves initiate a new given.
5  Bourdieu (2000), pp. 261-263. 
6  Bourdieu (2012b), p.155 [Bourdieu (1998), p. 81, translation modified].
7  Bourdieu, (2012a), p. 90. [Bourdieu (1990), p. 54].
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This brief detour through Bourdieu’s concept of habitus allows us to bring out 
more deeply the conditions of possibility and, in return, of impossibility, of a 
theory of habit capable of supporting social creativity without relying on an 
all-powerful subjectivity whose specter causes the sociologist to flee.
we propose in this essay to draw the outlines of such a theory by taking 
up and extending husserl’s theory of habituality. This will involve 
demonstrating: 
1) The practical and ethical reworking of the correlational a priori to show 
that to habitus as subjective disposition there always responds a typical8 
dis-position of the world which constitutes its objective correlate. man is not 
habituated only to a world which he finds already structured by innumerable 
rules; he is not acquainted exclusively with a space composed of ways of doing 
and being. The world is also given to him as a space he has to in-habit [habiter], 
that is to say, to which he must give an inhabitable [habitable] form, typical of 
his way of living [manière de l’habiter]. This inter-implication of habituality and 
the typical is at the basis of the dynamism of meaning [sens9] and action.
2) one thus cannot understand the operativity of this “inhabiting” 
exclusively through the habituality which is passive, embodied, and which 
disposes us constantly to the familiarity of the world so that we do not have 
to begin again every morning like unfortunate Pénélopes; carnal links that 
unite us with the world, spatio-temporal structures, relations of similarity 
and dissimilarity, etc., extending all the way to the social relations that 
underlie everyday life. To grasp this operativity, one must also study the 
active habituality through which we conform, our lives, and the world of 
life—our life, our world—as the space that we wish to in-habit according to 
a certain style through those material correlates we have created to make it 
inhabitable: tools, works of art and institutions.
3) This is why, for husserl, active habituality and passive habituality 
maintain relations of intertwining and implication and not of opposition 
or antagonism: the passive does not constitute an opacity or a heaviness 
that would have to be overcome in a resounding effort of self-transparency 
necessary for becoming truly self. instead, active habituality, that is to 
say deliberate habituality, rests upon and plays from this fundamental 
8  [“Typical”, “typification”, etc. are used throughout in the sense of Husserl’s “theory of 
types”. –Trans.]
9  [The French sens, like the German Sinn, corresponds to English’s sense and meaning. It 
is translated both ways in this essay in accordance with idiomatic English usage, but this 
double-connotation should be kept in mind for both words throughout. –Trans.] 
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disposition to iteration in order to establish a personal or intersubjective 
style of life and, correlatively, to create concrete material devices for the 
reiteration of position-takings, that is, institutions.
4) The constitution of material devices of reiteration constitutes the 
terminal point of husserlian ethics. That is why we turn to the Sartre of 
Search for a method [Questions de méthode] and the Critique of dialectical reason 
for support to develop, in conclusion, a brief analysis of the institution as 
material device for the incorporation of ends.
The correlational a priori is a foundational thesis of husserl’s 
phenomenology, at first glance quite simple or seemingly obvious: all 
consciousness is consciousness of something which that consciousness is 
not. The immediate consequence of this is that without something it would 
be the consciousness of, consciousness is not, and vice-versa: without a 
consciousness that is aware of it, the something is not, i.e. it has no meaning.
Static phenomenology—which interrogates neither the genesis of the stream 
of consciousness nor its potential generativity in order to confine itself to 
the constitution of sense in the present—could consider the correlational a 
priori to be a simple correspondence, an eidetically necessary correlation 
both for the determination of consciousness and for that of its “correlate,” 
the objective phenomenon. with the development of genetic phenomenology 
in the 1920s, especially in the Passive Synthesis lectures [analysen zur passiven 
Synthesis], this correspondence which was inclined toward the noetization 
of the intentional field is literally invalidated. Husserl shows that the 
correlation does not express a characteristic of the essence of consciousness, 
which could be taken up a priori by examining the formal structures of the 
pure ego as the center of operation, but instead manifests a relationship 
of consciousness to the world that requires the analysis of subjective 
experience insofar as it is in-formed [einbilden], formed from the inside by 
that which is not it, and more rigorously, which is not from it: alterity.
From a formal standpoint, the correlational a priori instead defines a 
relationship of consciousness to the world through reciprocal implication. 
in its dynamism, the liveliness of sense is enhanced by the event of 
experience that consciousness undergoes [ce dont la conscience fait l’épreuve]. 
The “self-production” of the life of consciousness—”self” because this 
production is not the result of an external impact or stimulus that arouses 
the consciousness from its drowsiness in order that it make sense—is 
immediately affected by its production itself, by its being toward alterity.
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 The original position-taking of life as life involved in alterity, the inter-
implication of life and the world, consists of nothing other than that 
urdoxa given to us under the repeated evidence of an everyday occurrence, 
the knowing of the constant conjunction of human life and the lifeworld 
[lebenswelt] in which it lives. one of the tasks addressed to genetic 
phenomenology is precisely to reveal the eidetic lawfulness that underlies 
and deepens the phenomenological investigation of the constitution of 
meaning in the direction of its genesis.
To do this, husserl makes use of the double reduction, initiated in the 
lecture course fundamental Problems of Phenomenology10 through which 
the phenomenological field is expanded to non-present [inactuel] lived 
experiences of consciousness and opens sup to the indefinite horizon 
of past and future by breaking the artificial restriction that prevailed 
in static phenomenology. The double reduction in this way frees “the 
endless temporal stream of life”11 of consciousness taken in its ongoing 
development and allows for reflection on non-present lived experiences in 
the background of consciousness, since they are not given absolutely as is 
the case with present lived experiences, but nonetheless implicated in any 
current lived experience as sedimented in it. This allows for a major shift 
in phenomenological reflection, which in turning away from the present 
actuality of the act of consciousness, accesses the transcendental field of 
lived experiences, a field which is made up not only of lived experiences but 
also of things, the world, as the intentional correlate of these experiences. 
In this way phenomenological reflection can now avail itself of an 
intentional field that allows for the description of both the directedness 
of consciousness and the object that it aims at as its correlate, so that 
within this field, the directedness of consciousness and object to which it is 
directed are presented as equal and simultaneous.
This co-location in the temporal stream of the life of consciousness proves 
to be fundamental: from the noetic point of view, it allows us to account for 
the structuring of the intentional field and its unification while from the 
noematic point of view it allows us to account for the role of alterity in the 
structuring of this field, that is to say, to explain the immanent operativity 
of alterity in intentionality.
The opening of the intentional field thus presents a double implication: 
the implication of alterity in intentionality and the implication of non-
present lived experiences in present lived experiences. in the temporal 
genesis of the stream, these refer respectively to transversal intentionality 
10  husserl (1973b), pp. 177f.
11  husserl (1959), p. 152.
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(relating to  the temporal object) and to longitudinal intentionality 
(relating to the phases of the stream)12,13. if, however, the correlational 
a priori manifests the inter-implication of the life of consciousness and 
its world in the order of genesis, in return, in the order of becoming, it is 
the co-genesis, that is to say, the common becoming of subjectivity (and 
subjectivities) and of the world that phenomenology brings to light. it is 
demonstrated through the original correlation of these two vectors of 
sedimentation, that is to say of intentional implication, which are noetic 
habituality on the one hand, and the noematic type on the other14. it is 
through the correlation of these two vectors that to the “becoming me in 
the unity of history”15, to the individuation of transcendental subjectivity 
soon rethought under the leibnizian concept of the monad, there always 
corresponds on the noematic plane a typical configuration of the world, 
understood beginning in ideas ii as the “secondary individuation of the 
opposite” 16. The correlation thereby founds, in the immanence of the 
genesis, and according to a lawfulness that we will present in detail, this 
immediate familiarity with a world that presents itself from the outset 
with its typical shape, as our habitat. But a habitat that, if it is at the origin 
of the dynamism of meaning as something already there, is also at its end: 
the world is not only a given, it is also a task and a responsibility. and the 
sense that it reveals, good, fair or cruel, democratic or authoritarian, is 
revelatory also of us.
The correlation of habituality and type is part of a geneticization of 
phenomenology that will change husserl’s original project and lead him to 
develop a concrete universal ontology that requires taking up the concept 
of the monad. By this concept, husserl understands, as leibniz before him, 
the power that possesses the principle of its absolute individuation and the 
principle of its temporal/contingent individuation. it allows him to 
resolve the tension between the identity-permanence of the pure ego—
12  For detailed and precise analyses of these fundamental points, only briefly sketeched here, 
see Kokoszka (2004). 
13  This is the reason why genetic phenomenology cannot content itself with the notion of 
time as the necessary form of all genesis, but must equally do justice to the fact that temporality 
founds itself in a “continual, passive, and completely universal genesis.” husserl (1973a), p. 114 
[husserl (1999), p. 81].
14  Husserl outlined the operativity of this habituality/type correlation following a specific 
genetic sequence: a) genesis of passivity, b) the participation of the me and relationships 
between activity and passivity, c) active genesis, d) formation of monadic individuality, e) 
genetic relationships between individuated monads, f) possibility of undertaking the absolute 
consideration of the world, a “metaphysics.” husserl (2001), pp. 342-343 [husserl (2001), p. 631].
15  husserl (1973c), p. 36.
16  husserl (1971), p.301. [husserl (1989), p. 315].
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substrate of habituality—and the contingency of the self17, the substrate 
of habits in which phenomenology remained imprisoned, preventing it 
from accomplishing the becoming-self of the ego, and, correlatively, the 
becoming-my-world of the world. Although it is a configuring power, 
both genetic and generative, habituality is nothing like the mysterious 
faculty that a suspect metaphysics would attach to a no less contentious 
transcendental subjectivity. it simply consists in the disposition of the pure 
ego (as center of the functioning of acts) to the iteration of its acts which 
are sedimented and grounded in habit. These habits constitute the having 
[habe] of a self, its reservoir of experiences. Between the ability to iterate 
that governs the fusion of acts in habits, and the acts founded in habits, lies 
the entire gap that separates the disposition from that which is disposed. 
This gap opens an internal distance, absent in Bourdieu, that the me is able 
to mobilize to create itself in the unity of a “personal” style, idealiter, in that 
which husserl calls vocation.  
But before addressing this point, we should briefly sketch the basic features 
of passive habituality and its role in passive genesis. This is based primarily 
on association, of which Husserl distinguishes two forms. The first is 
association as a principle of the formation of a unity, of the configuration 
of different moments, whether simultaneous or successive, within the same 
phase of presence. it is accomplished by means of a reciprocal associative 
awakening, through which the data are synthesized, homogenized, and 
fused remotely on the basis of contiguity, similarity and contrast. as 
the passive engine of “universal unification of the life of an ego” and 
correlatively of the unity of the field of consciousness18, the associative 
awakening puts in play a persistence of interest, a “consequence” in which 
both the life of consciousness and its worldly field are unified. “[T]he life of 
consciousness here, like everywhere, is subordinate to the grand principle 
of iteration,” says husserl19.  iteration or habituality, at the most originary 
passive level, is neither a pure repetition of the initial position-taking nor a 
purely causal attainment: if the interest persists, if the consequence governs 
the synthesis of data without there being a voluntary and determined 
orientation of consciousness, it is only that the associative awakening is 
made dynamic, on the noematic side, by the “resonance” of data that echo 
each other, recall each other, infringe upon each other, attract or repel each 
17  [The interpretation of Husserl presented here relies on a distinction between the 
transcendantal ego as “Funktionzentrum”, pure activity  quapassive structure conceived 
as bare substrate and the “me” as the active ego quaperson or self.  The former has been 
translated by “ego” and the latter as “the me,” “the self,” etc. throughout. –Trans.] 
18  husserl (1966), pp. 405-406 [husserl (2001), p. 505].
19  husserl (1966), p. 409 [husserl (2001), p. 510].
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other to form unities of the similar and the dissimilar.
The second form of association appears in husserl as the principle of the 
apperception of objects in cases where they already have a determined 
meaning. it is built up through the apperceptive awakening of previous 
experiences and through the resultant analogical recollection. at the heart 
of longitudinal intentionality, apperception is essential to the thought of a 
stream of becoming in which the becoming is not an anarchic surfacing of 
data, but a regulated relationship: “The stream of consciousness is a stream of 
a constant genesis; it is not a mere series, but a development, a process of becoming 
according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete apperceptions of 
different typicalities (among them,  all the apperceptions that give rise to the 
universal apperception of a world) grow out of primordial apperceptions or out 
of apperceptive intentions of a primitive kind” 20. There is therefore a double 
consequence to the work, horizontal and longitudinal, through which the 
correlative individuation of the subjective life and the world occurs. if 
the life of consciousness is originally an awakening, a life directed toward 
the “encounter,” this awakening is never a pure repeated spontaneity to 
which only a worldly chaos could respond on the noematic plane. on the 
contrary, it is a life that is configured in undergoing the event of experience 
[en s’éprouvant via ce dont elle fait l’épreuve] and which configures in return by 
means of the typical eidetic forms “human being”, “world”, “body”21.
Typification thus constitutes a major process of the pre-predicative sphere 
since it is only through it that the world is given in a coherence where 
everything that happens is anticipated according to the mode of familiarity. 
The correlational a priori thus translates, in the very individuation of 
the life of consciousness, as the correlation between typical generality 
(noematic) and habituality, such that the production of the coherence of 
experience is rooted in the unceasing reiterated interaction of a life that 
habitualizes interests and motivations and applies itself to the inhabiting of 
a mode that constantly presents it with a familiar sense-type. 
however, in reinforcing the consequence of the life of consciousness and the 
familiar coherence of the world, do we not risk falling into a cohesion at this 
point so smooth or perfect that no incoherence can break through its sense, 
can provoke surprise or refusal, interest or aversion: a world constantly 
adapted for those who inhabit it, who in return would only have to let it live? 
what place remains then for the will, for freedom, for life-projects? if worldly 
coherence is linked to the usual consequence of the monad, this consequence 
is always imperfect, partly due to unnoticed or unrepeated resonances, partly 
20  husserl (1966), p. 339 [husserl (2001), p. 628].
21  husserl (1966), p. 341 [husserl (2001), p. 629f].
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because of the opacity of interests and motivations that are recombined over 
time. But that which radically prevents the world from being exclusively 
“my world” in a perfect match between my consequence and its coherence, 
is precisely that it is not only mine. The world of experience as it is given to 
me is already piled with sediments and objective deposits of which i am not 
the author. other subjectivities deposit them, according to their interests 
and to their most original motivations; the fruits of a coherence that is not 
mine alone. it is thus literally the concrete encountering of the other in 
empathy that returns subjectivity to itself not as a life directed toward the 
“encounter” in its native innocence, but as a power-to-be, an “i can” which 
has to deliberate for itself in order to be achieved. in other words, to preserve 
and develop its consequence and the coherence of “its” world, subjectivity 
must reiterate its position-taking in the world according to its values  and 
convictions, this time decisively and voluntarily. Since convictions and 
values  are not held in an apperceptive unity passively formed by association, 
subjectivity must unify these values  and beliefs, arrange and order them in 
a higher unity, that of the personal self, by which it can achieve its selfhood 
and be reconciled with itself. Because being “me” is not only letting the self 
be, submitting to encountered norms, to structures that govern the being of 
the group, in short surrendering the self and the world of common purposes 
to the exteriority of the norm 22. To be me is to be faithful to my-self, to claim 
to be a self in the integrity of personal values  and convictions, in the unifying 
unity of a life that gives a form which husserl conceives, idealiter, as vocation. 
Vocation indeed consists in the unification of life according to a direction, a 
meaning, a purpose that corresponds for each of us to the anticipation of a 
possible style of existence in which it fulfills its “meaning of life”23, its “will to 
be a self”24 which remains stable and persists when affected [dans les épreuves] 
without losing its meaning or its hold, and retains its form. This possibility of 
living in the development of a typical and personal style of existence depends 
upon the ego’s ability to reiterate its position-takings, to habitualize its effort, 
its tension towards an objective or an end25. active habituality, plays, so to 
speak, on the disposition to fuse effort into habit, so that the choice that the 
me makes for itself  persists without its having to constantly revalidate all 
of its motives, equipping itself with a base for flourishing and progressing 
22  cf. on this subject the critique of “faulen Vernunft” in husserl (1973c) p. 231. if Bourdieu 
feared an all-powerful transcendental subjectivity in the manner of Sartre’s “for-itself”, we must 
also do justice to that which husserl and Sartre themselves feared: the laziness of the reason that 
complies with the ordo ordinatus and steps down from being ordo ordinans; the subsumption to the 
given order exactly as it is.
23  husserl (1976), Beilage XXiV.
24  husserl (1976), Beilage X.
25  cf. husserl (1966), p. 360 [husserl (2001), pp. 443-444].
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in what it is and what it aims for. This possibility is obviously not without 
setbacks or complications: condition of creating and maintaining a form of 
life that modalizes and unfolds according to that which it encounters and 
undergoes [éprouve], habituality can also serve to support rigidities or opaque 
automations. To be free, to draw its own destiny, to equip itself with a sense 
of life, flourishing and achieving it in any situation, is a task that falls to a 
constant willing, not to sporadic good action.
The world in its familiar typicality of meaning is configured by sediments 
of meaning, social structures, arrangements of signification deposited there 
by past generations and by contemporaries. if it is on the basis of this initial 
configuration that the self chooses for itself, the form for which it decides 
already no longer depends completely on it alone because of its dependence 
on other selves. From the outset, every self undergoes in experience [fait 
l’épreuve] the passive inter-implication of monads: common meaning 
comes precisely from the original interweaving of these subjective lives. 
however, these subjectivities can decide to voluntarily and actively form 
the community they are always already forming passively, can choose to 
inter-implicate their position-takings to configure the world, to give it the 
manifest form of the “to us” in an ars vivendi wherein being and values are 
reconciled. here is the radical responsibility that results from the project of 
a universal ontology of the lifeworld: the making constant of our world, the 
concrete holding place of our values. husserl situates the operativity of this 
configuration in the voluntary inter-implication of monads, which inter-
orient their actions, embody and synthesize their purposes to constitute 
“personalities of higher order”, that is to say community institutions such 
as associations, parties, the university, the state. as material devices, such 
institutions are tasked with the incorporation, maintenance, conveyance 
and sedimentation of purposes ordered according to the values  that govern 
those who invest them with their projects. Personalities of a higher order 
are thus only legitimately institutionalized provided that they concretely 
use the material devices of the embodiment and iteration of the purposes 
of a community of action, i.e., of a community that takes its destiny in hand 
and concretizes its values  in the world.
Just as at the personal level, habitual sedimentation runs the risk of 
rigidifying material structures, the particular perversion of which 
Sartre would demonstrate in The Search for a method: the empowerment of 
institutions with respect to purposes pursued by the social body as a whole. 
in this frequent imperfection, institutions become incapable of allowing 
themselves to invest in the logics of the actions of the members of a society, 
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incapable of letting themselves incorporate the goals of individuals. So 
empowered, these collective units then appear to pursue, uncontrollably, 
goals and purposes without authors and without leaders. The degeneration 
of social vehicles for the realization of ends in material devices of social 
reproduction is such—and this is the radical perversion—that one almost 
forgets that they were not instituted all and only to reinforce social 
domination, but also to achieve goals, to transform the real, to concretize an art of 
life. The emergence of new collective units (associations, ngos, committees 
for literacy, etc.) thus must overcome the shortcomings of older devices 
until they in turn fall into disuse or disinheritance, in a constant struggle 
not of being against value, but of letting-be against the achievement of a 
worthwhile world26.
26  Sartre (1960), p. 226.
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in this article i take a phenomenological approach to clarify the concept of habit and 
advance the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality.  This approach 
clarifies what may be referred to as Aristotle’s understanding of the reciprocal nature 
of virtue in regard to the virtuous agent.  reading virtue, then, as a kind of disposition 
which determines the value system in which an agent participates, a phenomenological 
understanding of the intersubjective ground of social reality emerges.  This advances 
the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality with a more robust 
understanding of normativity.
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rather than follow Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) and examine habit as 
constrained by historical and sociological conditions (cf. Bourdieu, 1977), 
this article examines the habitual grounds of lived experience, through a 
phenomenological analysis, toward drawing conclusions regarding persons 
and social reality.  This will not be the first phenomenological analysis 
of social reality.  The perhaps two most prominent examples are alfred 
Schutz’s The Phenomenology of the Social World and James ostrow’s Social 
Sensitivity: a study of habit and experience.  however, this article differs from 
the above examples by incorporating the notion of a reciprocal nature 
between habits and values.  Though this notion may be seen in aristotle’s 
nicomachean ethics, its exploration through phenomenological analysis can 
advance the discussion of the relation between habit and social reality.
For example, ostrow was concerned to provide a phenomenological 
disclosure of an intersubjective ground to social reality.  Stated as a 
question: how is an individual’s lived experience constituted such that the 
meaning of experience is determined in relation to a social reality?  ostrow’s 
“intersubjective ground” here points to an understanding of individuals 
as themselves socially constituted.  Beyond the awareness, however, of an 
intersubjective ground as a condition for the possibility of each individual 
subject experiencing itself as a subject, questions remain concerning the 
normativity of social reality.
in other words, though two persons, as individuals in a social encounter, 
may have access to a reflective awareness of each other as subjects by way 
an intersubjective ground, questions regarding the normativity of social 
reality pertain to how the social meaning of a situation is determined.  Such 
questions are complex.  on the one hand, the very fact that social meaning 
is social indicates that the meanings determined must extend beyond any 
one individual subject.  on the other hand, the freedom of each individual in 
a social encounter extends to the determination of meaning.  notice, this is 
the case even within the context of the suggestion that all meaning is social. 
one person may determine the meaning of a social transaction differently 
from another, though both determine the meaning of the transaction as a 
social transaction. 
 what is at stake, then, in this article may be referred to as the problem of 
the intersubjective ground of normative social reality.  Just as an account 
of social reality would not be complete without taking normativity into 
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consideration, normativity, it seems, can neither be simply reduced to an 
intersubjective ground nor to individual freedom. interestingly, normativity 
does not reduce to an intersubjective ground because of individual 
freedom, and normativity does not reduce to individual freedom because 
of the intersubjective ground of meaning.  hence, this article addresses 
the individual freedom pole of the problem by examining the role of 
habit in social transactions at the level of persons, and it addresses the 
intersubjective ground of meaning pole of the problem by examining the 
role of values in determining social reality.
This article provides a robust account of the intersubjective ground of 
normative social reality through a phenomenology of the reciprocal nature 
of habits and values.  it may be considered robust in that it provides an 
account of normativity through an understanding of the habitual grounds 
of lived experience, rather than attempt to reduce normativity to either 
personal creation or some non-personal intersubjective ground (e.g. 
language or a vague notion of empathy).  moreover, this approach differs 
from those which, despite the existential, social, and historical constraints 
which may be associated with “roles”, advance a version of “social role 
embodiment” to account for the intersubjective ground of normative social 
reality.  hence, this article provides a habit-centered reading of social 
reality, and given its approach to uncovering the relation between habit and 
values, this article affirms the value of phenomenology.
Taking aristotle’s understanding of the virtuous person as a point of 
departure, it is possible to see social reality as habit-centered.  in his 
nicomachean ethics Aristotle identifies virtue with practice.  That is to say, a 
person becomes virtuous by repeatedly performing virtuous acts.  This not 
only indicates habit as the ground of virtuous activity but also points to the 
role of habit in determining social reality.
of all that may be meant by the term “habit”, what i mean here, following 
aristotle, is a disposition or tendency resulting from the development 
of human capacities.  The idea is simply that in order to perform actions 
humans must actualize the capacities involved in the performance of such 
actions, and through the process of repeated actualization a kind of fluency 
develops.  This fluency may be characterized in contrast to earlier moments 
in the process of its development by noting that the fluency entails a kind of 
“momentum.”  That is to say, in contrast to earlier less developed moments, 
a tendency to perform actions related to the now developed capacities has 
emerged.  on the one hand, this tendency makes the performance of actions 
more efficient, since it allows for relevant actions to be performed with 
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less intervention by the (now practiced) agent performing the action.  on 
the other hand, this tendency ensures that actions related to developed 
capacities are more likely to be performed than actions related to un-
developed capacities.  
This seems to be precisely aristotle’s understanding of habit and the 
tendency to perform virtuous actions.  according to aristotle,
This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we 
do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and 
by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being 
habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly 
(aristotle, 2009: 103b14-18).
notice, “our transactions” with others are not merely the result of our 
virtues.  rather, since virtue is grounded in habit, social transactions 
contribute to the reality of social life by influencing future transactions.  On 
the one hand, this points to a reading of aristotle’s practical philosophy as 
more habit-centered than decision or logic-centered.  on the other hand, 
this leads us to ask the question: is social reality somehow grounded in the 
habits of the society’s individuals?  
as habit-centered, aristotle emphasizes that deciding to be brave does not, 
of course, make one brave.  Similarly, realizing that to be brave would be the 
logically correct way to handle some social transaction does not, of course, 
make one brave.  Though these may be straightforward conclusions, when 
social commentators overlook such realities they misrepresent the human 
and personal realities of the situation.  as this article will show, because 
the habits influencing social reality reside at the level of the (first-person) 
individual, phenomenology is the appropriate method for showing these 
human and personal realities in social situations.
To answer the question, then, yes.  Social reality is somehow grounded 
in the habits of the society’s individuals.  yet, without providing a 
phenomenological analysis of how habits relate to social reality, it may be 
difficult to see why habit is more important than other logical alternatives 
such as advertising or the collective adoption of social goals.  This is not 
to say that advertising or the collective adoption of goals is not influential 
to social reality; rather, this is to say phenomenologically, and along 
with aristotle, that individual personal habits are more primordial than 
advertising or the collective decision to pursue a goal. 
hence, what needs to be examined phenomenologically is the relationship 
between persons and values.  Phenomenological analysis will show the 
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primordial nature of habit in relation to values by revealing that values are 
not simply aspects of the natural environment to be chosen from like apples 
at the market.  rather, it is as if habit conditions the horizon of experience.  
what this means is that though the meaning of a social situation may be 
determined in many possible ways, the tendencies of the habit-grounded-
dispositions of the participants in the situation limit the set of logically 
possible meanings.  aristotle illustrates this insight in the nicomachean 
ethics by convincingly arguing that persons may be understood in terms 
of different character types, and these character types indicate a relation 
between lived experience and the meaning of a social transaction.  That 
is to say, the possible meanings to be determined in a social transaction 
are limited precisely by the dispositions constituting the lived experience 
specific to each character type.  A phenomenological analysis of the 
dispositional nature of the lived experience of persons in relation to values, 
then, will properly situate values in relation to habit.  
an excellent example of a phenomenological analysis of persons in relation 
to values may be seen in the work of dietrich von hildebrand (1889-1977).  
So, though the following analysis may not be unique regarding values, 
it may be unique in regard to my connecting values with habit and my 
phenomenological characterization of the results.  on the one hand, the 
reciprocal nature of habits and values was already seen by aristotle, and 
arguably perhaps Plato (cf. Plato, 1997).  on the other hand, von hildebrand’s 
phenomenological approach to understanding value allows for the more 
mysterious aspects of this reciprocal nature to emerge.  Therefore, this 
article builds on a combination of insights found in the work of aristotle and 
von hildebrand toward phenomenologically illuminating the primordial 
ground of habit in relation to social reality, specifically from the perspective 
of the person in relation to values.
Performing a social transaction in accordance with a value or set of values, 
as aristotle taught, strengthens the habit of performing future transactions 
similarly.  Further, the practical freedom of an agent situated in social 
transactions seems to suggest the habitual reinforcement of multiple, 
and even conflicting, values to hang in the balance.  In other words, an 
understanding of habitual momentum does not exclude personal choice 
in social transactions.  yet, if it is possible for the agent to determine the 
meaning, i.e. identity, of a social situation differently depending on the 
values involved, then how exactly are values involved in social situations?
Phenomenological analysis responds to this question in a twofold way.  
First, this question calls for a discussion of disclosure.  Second, it calls for 
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a discussion of the relation between evidence determining states of affairs 
and an agent’s situating of a social transaction.  disclosure points to the 
determination of experiential truth.  That is to say, the lived experience 
of a situation can be taken as disclosing the truth of what is present to 
the experiencing agent.  This is different from the truth that relates to 
logical operations.  Briefly put, logical truth should stand regardless of 
the content of the experience an agent may have.  however, truth in terms 
of phenomenological disclosure depends on the content of the agent’s 
experience.  
if i take myself to be in the presence of a horse, then the question may be 
asked as to whether the essence of horse is intuitively fulfilled.  In other 
words, i can imagine a horse because i have an understanding of what a 
horse is essentially.  however, to say that my lived experience discloses a 
horse to me, if true, means that i have experiential content related to the 
immediate environment that fills in the essence in question (in this case a 
horse) such that a horse is experientially present to me.  This is often called 
“intuitive fulfillment” by phenomenologists since it is my intuitions of the 
environment that count as evidence for or against the essence with which i 
understand myself to be presented (cf. husserl, 1983: §138).
now, social transactions are more complicated than the question of whether 
there is a horse in front of you or not.  yet, the phenomenological process 
through which the identity of the social transaction is disclosed to an 
agent will essentially function in the same way.  Since an agent’s action in 
a social situation is inextricably tied to the agent’s lived experience, prior 
to and including its understanding of the identity of the social situation it 
is experiencing, social transactions are complex in that they include the 
consideration of multiple disclosures.  in phenomenological terminology, 
each of the multiple disclosures may be thought of as parts contributing 
to the identification of a whole meaning, and thus the agent’s disclosure of 
this whole meaning is called the present “state of affairs” (cf. husserl, 1973: 
§17).  Social transactions depend on an agent’s disclosure of a state of affairs, 
since intuitive fulfillment of mere parts of a situation are insufficient.
Notice, intuitive fulfillment of mere parts of a situation would mean merely 
disclosing the meaning of the parts without determining the meaning of 
the relations among the parts.  insofar as social transactions depend on 
understanding the meaning of the state of affairs as a social transaction, 
then social transactions are complex in that they necessarily include the 
consideration of multiple disclosures.  now, though much could be said 
regarding the phenomenological understanding of states of affairs, for 
the purposes of this article i will discuss the relation between intuitive 
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fulfillment and habit and the relation between values and essences in 
determining the meaning of social reality. 
Because, for example, the identity of a social situation depends in part on 
how the participants tend to act socially and are disposed to act socially, 
some of the intuitive fulfillment of a social situation may be described as 
“carried into” the situation by the very presence of the particular agent(s) 
in question (cf. Scalambrino, 2013a).  This, of course, points generally to 
habit as contributing to the intuitive fulfillment that discloses the identity 
of a situation.  That is to say, the habits of individuals in a social situation 
contribute to determining the meaning of the social situation.  yet, just 
as the truth of disclosure depends on the actual intuitive fulfillment, the 
possible lived experience of a situation is constrained as to the various kinds 
of states of affairs it can be.  These constraints regarding kinds point to the 
presence of essence.
For example, at the moment an agent is experiencing freezing weather on 
the north Pole, it is not possible for that agent, at that time, to have the 
lived experience of a beach exemplary of the essence of an italian island.  
The agent may have an essentially italian island in mind; however, the 
intuitive fulfillment will not provide evidence for the lived experience of 
such an essence.  This constraint works in the other direction, so to speak, 
as well.  That is, though an agent may have intuitive fulfillment potentially 
providing evidence for the lived experience of some essence, if the agent 
is not capable of grasping the essence, then the agent will not live the 
experience of that essence.  Though perhaps an agent in a social situation 
could be taught to understand the situation in a way essentially different 
from the way(s) it currently understands it, missed opportunities and follies 
of youth provide ample examples of agents not understanding the state of 
affairs in which they were situated.
hence, the essential ways states of affairs may be intuitively fulfilled point to a 
multiplicity of ways a social situation may be lived, i.e. a multiplicity of ways 
lived experience may disclose the truth of a situation.  This is the result of a 
phenomenological analysis of meaning determination in social transactions, 
and it may be taken as a point of departure from which to consider the 
reciprocal nature of habits and values.
in the same way that the framework of this result shows how intuitive 
fulfillment can allow for the determination of different states of affairs 
from out of an intuitively constrained set of essences, so too this framework 
reveals the way in which values contribute to the lived experience of a social 
situation.  consider the following from von hildebrand,
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it is plainly nonsensical to say of acts of charity or justice that in 
speaking of their value we only refer to such a point of view of 
motivation; for evidently [emphasis added] the value discloses itself as a 
property of these acts (hildebrand, 1953: 79). 
Beyond thinking of values as motivations, phenomenological analysis 
reveals values as essentially related to the acts in which a social transaction 
is identified as charitable or just.  In other words, just as it is the case that 
if an agent is to reinforce its habitual relation to a specific kind of lived 
experience, then it must be able to disclose a state of affairs so as to live that 
kind of experience, so too if an agent is to reinforce its habitual relation to 
acting in accordance with a value or set of values, then it must be able to 
determine the meaning of a state of affairs in light of such values.  
The distinction may be subtle; however, there is a difference between being 
motivated by values and having the kind of disposition that allows one to 
determine the meaning of a situation in terms of some value or set of values. 
in fact, von hildebrand himself points to “the disposition to recognize 
something superior to one’s arbitrary pleasure and will [emphasis added]” 
(hildebrand, 1969: 10).  here, then, is the reciprocal nature of habits and values. 
recall, as noted above, though the meaning of a social situation may be 
determined in many possible ways, the tendencies of the habit-grounded-
dispositions of the participants in the situation limit the set of logically 
possible meanings.  now we see that this limiting of the set of logically 
possible meanings involves, beyond habit, the essential values accessible to 
the person with which to determine the meaning of a situation.  hence, to 
act in accordance with values, as essential properties of acts, an individual’s 
habit-ground must condition the horizon of the experience in such a way 
that a person experiences the state of affairs as one in which the set of 
possible actions to be performed essentially involves such values.  
Though aristotelian virtues and social values may not be isomorphic, values 
may still be understood as grounded in habit regarding individuals.  recall, 
also from the above section on aristotle, values too may be understood has 
habit-centered.  For example, deciding to be charitable and being charitable 
are different, and this is the case even when sound logic calls for a 
charitable act.  hence, just as the habitual reinforcement of a disposition to 
disclose a state of affairs influences future disclosures, acting in accordance 
with some value or value system reciprocally affects the agent so as to 
influence the future disclosure of situations as calling for such value-laden 
acts.  
lastly, notice that though the habitual determination of meaning in terms 
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of values influences the agent’s present and future acts, like essences values 
are intuitively fulfilled in determining the meaning of states of affairs; 
they are not part of the intuitions related to the environment with which 
the fulfilling is accomplished.  This insight provides an entry into the more 
mysterious aspects of the reciprocal nature of habit and values.  First, we 
should ask: what is a value?  Second, we may come to understand why von 
hildebrand characterizes values as “spiritual”, and how the presence of 
values may involve “grace.”
we often characterize something as having value, and we may mean this in 
multiple ways.  For example, we may declare a beverage to be valuable, and 
notice it may be valuable in multiple ways.  it may be valuable due to the 
pleasure it provides us in consuming it, or it may be valuable as a charitable 
gift to someone.  as von hildebrand maintains, we may understand value 
as subjectively contingent or as transcendently absolute.  a person may 
be motivated to act, then, in regard to a value, so long as the person is able 
to determine the meaning of a situation as one in which the value applies.  
in determining a state of affairs a person is then able to respond to the 
presence of values, and von hildebrand refers to this as a value-response (cf. 
hildebrand, 2009: 206; cf. hildebrand, 1973: 47).
 on the one hand, values are essential properties of acts (cf. hildebrand, 
1953: 79).  This was noted and discussed above.  on the other hand, values 
transcend that of which they are essential properties.  For example, it may 
be a non-essential property of some coffee mug that it is blue.  yet, the 
property of being blue transcends the coffee mug insofar as there are other 
objects which participate in the property of being blue.  however, there 
is a difference which is quite important here between values as essential 
properties and qualities, such as being blue, as accidental properties, 
and this difference relates to the possibility of self-transcendence in von 
hildebrand.  That is to say, by responding to absolute values as essential a 
person is able to transcend a tendency to respond to subjective and relative 
values as accidental.  Finally, this understanding of the difference between 
absolute and relative values and absolute and relative value-responses 
allows us to ask: in determining the meaning of a social transaction, 
how does an absolute value become present as a value to potentially be 
intuitively fulfilled?
interestingly, this question would be at home in Book ii of aristotle’s 
nicomachean ethics where he wonders how “moral virtue” is acquired.  on the 
one hand, aristotle and von hildebrand are in clear agreement regarding 
the reality of a transcendent pleasure experienced by persons being 
virtuous, and this is intimately related to von hildebrand’s discussion of 
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self-transcendence.  on the other hand, though there is, of course, value in 
teaching children to consider what von hildebrand calls “absolute values” in 
social transactions, aristotle’s ethics reminds us that as “a condition of the 
possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other 
conditions count not for a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions 
which result from often doing just and temperate acts” (aristotle, 2009: 
1105b1-5).  hence, we may now arrive at an answer to the above question 
by contextualizing values in von hildebrand’s terms of “spirituality” and 
“grace.”  That the presence of absolute values grants the person to whom 
they are present the possibility of self-transcendence through a kind 
of absolute participation, the mysterious nature of their origin may be 
characterized as a gift, and this points to “grace” (hildebrand, 1953: 18; 
cf. Scalambrino, 2014).  Finally, recognizing this grace as perfecting the 
nature of a person toward dwelling in a self-transcendent communion with 
absolute values, speaks to the “spiritual” nature of the values and persons 
(cf. hildebrand, 1953: 167; cf. Scalambrino, 2013b).
now that habit as the primordial ground, from the perspective of the person 
in relation to values, has been established, the question of how to identify 
the relation between the agent and habit needs to be addressed.  addressing 
this relation phenomenologically interestingly hearkens back to a Scholastic 
notion of the difference between real and conceptual distinction.  in 
perhaps more contemporary language this may be seen as the difference 
between a real and an abstract distinction.  For example, though two 
properties of a thing may not be distinct in reality, they may be distinct 
when taken in the abstract.  in other words, the circularity of a real ball is 
not really distinct from the presence of the ball in question.  however, taken 
abstractly circularity may be contemplated as distinct from experience of 
the ball.
The question under consideration, then, is how to understand the 
distinction between habit and the lived experience of the person.  Just as the 
notion of person may be thought to unify the two terms which are here 
abstractly distinct, i.e. habit and lived experience, understanding habit 
and lived experience as not really distinct provides more depth to the 
understanding of a person in a social transaction and to the understanding 
of the reciprocal nature of habit and value.  This concern, then, to illustrate 
that habit and lived experience are not really distinct is quite similar to a 
concern held by martin heidegger (1889-1976) in relation to the results of 
phenomenological analysis.  For example, in his history of the Concept of Time 
heidegger was concerned “to show that intentionality is a structure of lived 
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experience as such and not a coordination relative to other realities, [i.e.] 
something added to the experiences taken as psychic states” (heidegger, 
1985: 29).  
The similarity between heidegger’s concern and ours may help guard 
against mistakenly considering habit as really distinct from the person 
having a lived experience of social reality.  as his above quote suggests, 
heidegger is aware that a phenomenological analysis provides access to 
aspects of lived experience as if those aspect were separate in reality.  
however, beyond the abstract awareness of separate aspects of lived 
experience such as essences, intuitive fulfillment, habits and value-
responses, from the perspective of the social reality of a person in a social 
transaction, such aspects are not really distinct.   in other words, to 
consider habit as really distinct from the person having a lived experience 
of social reality is to confuse abstract and real distinction.  This is to say 
that the primordial ground of habit influencing the values with which the 
person determines how to identify the state of affairs and act in a social 
situation precisely is the person in the situation.  Further, the reinforcement 
of the habit of the person is the reinforcement of the presence of the values 
enacted in the very construction of social reality.
Since an awareness of the difference between real and abstract distinctions 
will help clarify the concluding parts of this paper, briefly consider one 
more example from the history of philosophy.  recall one of the telltale 
signs of the virtuous person in aristotle’s nicomachean ethics is the absence 
of the awareness which accompanies the lived experience of the ethically-
incontinent person.  This is because the virtuous person is in the habit 
of being virtuous.  how then may we understand such a function of habit 
in which potential meaning determinations of a social situation are 
kept absent from the virtuous person’s awareness?  insofar as we may 
characterize what is absent to the virtuous person as the tendency to 
indulge in relative values of self-satisfaction, the function of habit in the 
virtuous person may be seen as contributing to what von hildebrand called 
“self-transcendence.”
a brief consideration of henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) characterization of habit 
memory, then, may provide further clarification regarding the real function 
of habit in self-transcendence.  according to Bergson, the uniqueness of 
habit memory, i.e. its primordial nature, is such that “it no longer represents 
our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not 
because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful 
effect into the present moment” (Bergson, 1929: 93).  here, Bergson may be 
seen invoking a distinction between a kind of declarative memory, which 
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preserves bygone images, and a kind of procedural memory, which may 
be said to “act” insofar as there is not a real distinction between it and its 
agent.  Put negatively, the habit memory of the virtuous person “acts” in 
such a way that potential meaning determinations remain absent from 
the person’s horizon of experience.  Put positively, the habit memory 
of the virtuous person “acts” in such a way as to maintain a relation to 
absolute values as essential for determining the meaning of social reality.  
in this way, the reciprocal nature of habit and values conditions self-
transcendence.  it is as if the agent’s presence in a situation unfolds from its 
habit-ground (cf. Scalambrino, 2012a).  hence, it is by way of analysis that 
the agent and its habitual way of being seem distinct; yet, in terms of the 
person in the social situation, the agent is not really distinct from its habit. 
with the above phenomenological analysis of an agent in a social 
situation, the relation between habit and value in determining an agent’s 
lived experience of the state of affairs of a social transaction has been 
accomplished.  it is now possible to examine how a logic-centered reading 
of normative social reality diminishes the actual role of habit in relation 
to social reality (cf. Scalambrino 2012b).  The difference between a logic-
centered and habit-centered reading of normative social reality will 
hinge on different understandings of the universality and necessity of the 
determined meaning of a social situation.  normativity here, of course, 
refers to the manner of determining the identity of a situation such that the 
situation would be acknowledged necessarily and universally as such.   
robert Brandom has provided what may be seen as a logic-centered reading 
of normativity.  consider Brandom’s characterization from his reason in 
Philosophy: animating ideas,
the synthesis of a rational self or subject: what is responsible for 
the [normative] commitments … has a rational unity in that the 
commitments it comprises are treated as reasons for and against 
other commitments, as normatively obliging one to acknowledge some 
further commitments and prohibiting acknowledgement of others 
[Brandom’s emphases] (Brandom, 2009: 14). 
To begin, notice that Brandom’s emphasis on the agent in a social 
situation as rational is not exclusive to either the logic or habit centered 
understanding.  For example, the virtuous agent for aristotle is rational 
(aristotle, 2009: 1103a1-10).  Further, an agent may be rational and still 
have a primordial habit ground.  next, that a situation has a rational unity 
Logic-Centered 
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with commitments influencing future actions and future commitments, 
again, is not exclusive to a logic-centered understanding.  The example here 
being that two different individuals can understand the same situation 
differently, and yet both may have commitments extending into the future 
which rationally relate to the determined meaning of the present social 
situation.  For example, this may describe exactly what happens when the 
vicious and the virtuous do business with one another.
at this point, then, we might ask just how the logic-centered and habit-
centered differ.  The difference is that the logic-centered understanding 
takes the identity of the situation to be universal and necessary for all 
possible participants insofar as a set of possible ways to identify the 
situation can be listed along with the manner in which each extends 
through its commitments into the future.  This extending into the future, 
then, from a logic-centered understanding suggests the presence of a kind 
of essential map of social norms.  lastly, this map of social norms is taken 
to be a map of social reality.  The assumption being that no rational agent 
would be able to see the situation differently than some way that appears on 
this map, since this map outlines all the rationally possible ways situations 
may be identified.  Historically changing social norms may then be seen as 
merely affirming different configurations of this map.
Now, it should not be surprising to find that a logic-centered understanding 
seems logically valid.  however, phenomenological analysis brings us to a 
different understanding of the necessity and universality of a situation’s 
identity.  in fact, the following quote from edmund husserl (1859-1938) 
seems to speak directly to this different understanding.
necessity as an objective predicate of truth (which is then called a 
necessary truth) is tantamount to the law-governed validity of the 
state of affairs in question.  [however, a] natural equivocation leads us 
to call every general truth that itself utters a law a necessary truth. 
… it would have been better to call it the explanatory ground of a law, 
from which a class of necessary truths follows (husserl, 2001: 146).
Further, Husserl clarifies that the “equivocation consists in the fact that 
we call laws which are the source of necessity necessary” (husserl, 1996: 
220; quoted in mulligan, 2004: 397).  in other words, the goal is not to try to 
understand how a rational agent might determine the identity of a situation 
differently from any of the possible rational determinations available.  The 
goal is to see the rational necessity as crystallizing around the identity of 
a situation determined in the lived experience of an agent.  in this way, 
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different agents, determining the identity of a situation differently, may 
both be seen as rational and with rational obligations relating to the identity 
of the situation as they determined it.
To see the identity of the situation from the logic-centered understanding 
as a rational determination by a rational agent makes the situation seem as 
though every social agent as rational should have access to the normative 
map of social reality.  however, as the habit-centered understanding 
emphasizes, agents in social situations are not identifying the state of affairs 
by choosing from a series of rational possibilities (like choosing apples at 
the market), rather the habit ground of each agent brings a disposition to 
determine states of affairs essentially in accordance with various values.  
That there is a “law-governed validity of the state of affairs in question”, 
according to husserl, points to a rational agent’s ability to understand the 
necessary commitments and obligations extending into the future from the 
current social situation without necessitating that the situation was to be 
identified as it was.  Hence, phenomenological analysis reveals the extension 
into the future of commitments and obligations to be, though rationally 
constellated, dependent upon the habit ground of the agent.
notice that the conclusion drawn in the above section is not foreign to 
Aristotle’s understanding of the influence of an agent’s dispositions in its 
understanding of a social transaction.  That is to say, a state of affairs may 
be determined differently by different agents, and the difference depends 
on the values carried into the lived experiences by habit with which the 
state of affairs, and thereby the meaning, of a situation is determined 
(cf. aristotle, 2009: 1109b).  From the perspective of a phenomenological 
analysis the points to synthesize, then, include the habit-centered 
understanding of social norms and the primordial habit ground of the agent 
as merely abstractly distinct from its lived experience.  Out of this synthesis 
a phenomenological understanding of the intersubjective ground of social reality 
emerges.
 The question affirmatively answered at the beginning of this article asked: 
is social reality somehow grounded in the habits of the society’s individuals? 
The above phenomenological analysis provided support for the affirmative 
response by revealing a more robust understanding of normativity, arguing 
for a habit-centered understanding over a logic-centered understanding.  
in this way, social reality emerges not from the rational individuals of a 
society relating to the rational commitments and obligations of their social 
transactions.  rather, social reality emerges from an intersubjective ground 
to be understood as constituted by the habits of each individual in the 
How Habits 
Make Social 
Reality Present
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society.  The habits, as indicated above, are to be thought in their unity with 
lived experience as indicating the very persons of the society in question.
The persons of a society, then, constitute the normativity of their society by 
the values their habits sustain.  This habit-centered account of normativity 
is more robust than the logic-centered.  For example, the indication of the 
logic-centered account that normativity entails rational obligations and 
commitments does not account for the presence of, or difference between, 
absolute and relative values in the determination of social reality.  hence, 
following the habit-centered account we may speak of a phenomenologically 
revealed intersubjective habit ground sustaining a society’s norms such that 
the lived experiences of the persons in the society may be seen as making 
social reality present.  This “making present” is to be understood in terms of 
phenomenological disclosure as stated above.  
To be clear, nothing in this article should be understood as denying an 
agent’s ability to make rational choices.  moreover, that action is grounded 
in habit does not mean that there is a passive dimension to action.  This 
points back to husserl’s concern, noted above, to not “call laws which are the 
source of necessity necessary.”  in other words, through phenomenological 
analysis we gain access to the conditions for the possibility of experience, 
and insofar as rational action involves rational consideration of the content 
of experience to which action is related, then the elements examined 
through phenomenological analysis are of a prior ontological order from the 
elements considered in performing a rational action.  
what i mean by “prior ontological order” is that phenomenological analysis 
regards an understanding of what is necessary to have an experience 
in which rational action may take place.  For example, one person may 
rationally deliberate whether to charge another person interest on 
something borrowed.  To charge interest may be rationalized, and there 
need not be anything passive about the actions which subsequently entail 
obligations, etc.  however, in regard to the conditions for the possibility of 
an experience as a social transaction, a person cannot rationally deliberate 
whether to charge another person interest unless charging interest is a 
practice of which the person is aware.  yet, this need not be characterized 
in terms of being ignorant or having knowledge.  in the language of von 
hildebrand, it is as if in the latter situation the value of charging interest 
does not condition the horizon of meaning for the person.  hence, the 
person is neither tempted to nor can have a value-response to a value which 
is absent from the horizon essentially informing the determination of a 
social transaction’s meaning (cf. aristotle, 2009: Bk Vii, esp. 1146b17-21). 
rather, a more robust understanding of normativity and rational choice may 
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be seen in a way similar to aristotle’s discussion of the role of habit in regard 
to the virtuous person.  That is to say, understanding that an agent’s habit 
ground is more primordial than the rational structure crystallizing around 
each determined state of affairs, provides a more robust understanding 
of the state of affairs within which a person conducts a social transaction.  
Showing your citizens the logic of how they are rationally obligated and 
committed to a set of actions is less likely to change social reality than 
would a change to the habits of those citizens.
This article provides a phenomenological analysis of social reality.  after 
phenomenologically examining the reciprocal nature of habits and 
values at work in the disclosure of states of affairs, this article provided a 
habit-centered reading of social reality.  The habit-centered reading was 
contrasted with a logic-centered reading to emphasize the manner in which 
the former provides a more robust understanding of normativity.  The 
article culminated, then, by showing how the reciprocal play of habits and 
values determines social reality in the lived experiences of societal persons.  
hence, this article moved from a phenomenology of the reciprocal nature 
of habits and values to an understanding of the intersubjective ground of 
normative social reality.
Conclusion
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i argue that husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to 
understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. i claim 
that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among 
others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental 
active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional 
desiderata. first, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and 
social individual development. Second, it should be able to underlie the vast diversity 
of human beings within and across communities. as possible candidates, i contrast 
position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the 
one hand, and customary habits, on the other. i argue that position-taking represents 
the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. a subject’s 
position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which 
evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. 
i conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is 
deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to 
passivity.
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This paper argues that husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, 
specifically as developed in ideas ii, is adequate to understand the 
idea of second nature as an issue of a philosophical anthropology1. 
inter- and intra-cultural diversity among individuals and groups, as 
well as transhistorical variation in human activities, institutions, 
accomplishments, and even personal characteristics (all of which we take 
to be telling of who we are), give us reasons to think that our nature goes 
beyond our species-common biological nature. it seems then that what 
we are is not limited to our biological, first nature. But what goes beyond 
first nature is not, as i will show, separate from it: they both make up our 
second nature. how to think more concretely about this unity/duality? 
i argue that what we are is manifest in a particular way in the diversity 
and complexity of human activities. in thinking about second nature, 
my interest will be to try to get some clarity about the level in which it 
is possible to locate the union of both a biologically and a non-biological 
aspect at work in the historically-situated everyday life of human beings, 
who are social in nature, and to articulate that connection.
in everyday life the subject’s acts are not isolated peaks2. actions belong 
together in two senses: they express a certain internal consistency in their 
motivations and they issue from the same subject. Thus, second nature 
is looked for in that which connects the sequences of motivations that 
underlie a person’s doings. This connection i identify as dispositional. 
Position-taking or Stellungnahme, i hold, is the right dispositional concept 
to articulate  the notion of second nature. 
1 husserl’s works are referenced according to the husserliana edition, save for experience and 
Judgment. non-enclosed numbers correspond to the english translation cited; page numbers of 
the german edition are given within angle brackets, where available.
2 i use the terms “subject” and “person” synonymously. They refer to the actual being that 
is essentially embodied and historical and has an intersubjective dimension. i use sometimes 
“living subject” for emphasis. my referent is not the pure or transcendental ego (save as a 
stratum in the multilayered constitution of the subject). 
my commitment to such a conception of the subject, among other things, puts me apart from 
a number of Husserl commentators that insist that Husserl accounts first and foremost for a 
transcendental consciousness as the essence of subjectivity. it also distinguishes my account 
from recent influential investigations, such as Crowell’s recent book (2013), who argues that while 
husserl may have seen the necessity to account for a richer subject, in the manner above described, 
his theoretical commitments rendered him unable to accomplish such project. To put it in crowell’s 
terms, the type of normativity that is manifest in the pragmatically-embedded life of the subject is 
beyond the reach of husserl’s phenomenology. i oppose such reading. This paper can be seen as an 
argument for the presence of such type of normativity in the husserl.   
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it conveys the idea that in everyday life a subject does not simply face 
pre-given things in a pre-given way. rather, she orients herself in relation 
to things, people, states of affairs, etc. This orienting herself is broad 
in its operation as it ranges from basic levels (e.g. sensory acquaintance 
with things) all the way up to complex activities, and is always and 
preeminently active. Since it has been the explicit aim of this special 
issue—habits: Second nature and Social reality—to invite accounts of habit, my 
paper has the intention of offering a counterpart to positions positively 
centered on that concept. 
in §1 i argue that since the concept of motivation is at the core of the 
phenomenological and ontological priority of active subjectivity that 
husserl endorses in ideas ii, and motivations can be understood as 
dispositions, the issue of second nature can be framed in terms of the 
appropriate dispositional concept. i then offer a list of desiderata for the 
right dispositional concept, and define and locate two groups of habit-
like concepts in relation to those desiderata. in §2 i offer an account of 
Stellungnahme. in doing so, i offer arguments for the primacy of active 
subjectivity, and for the connections Stellungnahme-motivation and, issuing 
from it, Stellungnahme-identity. in §3 i clarify my stance on position-taking 
and passivity arguing that position-taking has phenomenological and 
epistemological priority over passivity. i do not identify position-taking 
with the whole sphere of activity and i do not discount that there are passive 
bases, both innate and acquired, that are essential to position-taking.
husserl conceives the living subject in its everyday concreteness as the 
subject that acts, judges, perceives, makes decisions, desires, etc. on this 
view, the subject is constituted by a series of layers or strata. her actions are 
motivated, that is, they are animated by influences of different sorts: needs 
of pragmatic engagements with things or people, value considerations, and 
also biological drives and instincts, and psychic rigid habits that we have 
acquired.
our second nature is manifest in our active life, but it is rooted in the 
biological and in the habitual (hua 4, 267, <255>). in speaking of the 
underlying basis of the subject, husserl says that “in a certain sense 
there is, in the obscure depths, a root soil” (hua 4, 291–292, <279>)3. The 
metaphor points to a hidden ground that is difficult to investigate not only 
because it is beyond the reach of our awareness, but also because it is deep 
and its elements are buried. despite this obscurity, it is essential to the 
3 “es ist gewissermaßen ein wurzelboden da in dunklen Tiefen” (hua 4, <279>). See also 
Supplement Xii to hua 4.
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account i offer to see everyday actions as grounded in such multilayered 
substrate. although i address second nature through an active concept, 
the partly passive, underlying sphere must be kept in sight, so that my 
account is sensitive to the complexity of the subject matter and proves to 
be compatible with and answerable to the ground on which it is rooted. 
husserl’s theory of constitution provides a way to investigate the issue of 
second nature, for it looks for the structure of lived experiences through 
an inquiry into the constitution of the experiencing subject. Before i get 
there, i would like to propose some criteria to guide the inquiry.  
at the core of the active subject are complexes of dispositions, product of 
physiological and biological dependencies, and of earlier experiences (hua 
4, 143, <136>), and this is why the question of second nature should framed 
as an investigation into the most adequate dispositional concept. The 
right dispositional concept should satisfy two groups of desiderata. First, 
there is an ontogenetic aspect: the right dispositional structure should 
be able to change alongside biological, personal, and social individual 
development. a second group relates to variations between different 
subjects: the right dispositional structure should be plastic enough so as 
to adapt to biological differences between human beings, including those 
of subjects with disabilities, and to underlie cultural and intersubjective 
variations of humans, such as languages and modes of relating to the 
world affectively, cognitively, or in value terms. 
husserl’s mid-to-late philosophy accords an increasing importance to 
passive structures and processes, habit being their chief representative, 
so it is just natural to consider them in the present discussion. The idea 
of habit is, in quite general terms, the idea that some aspects of our 
experiential engagement with the world become habitual and ground our 
experiential life in general. while i agree that the domain of passivity does 
play a central role in our experiential life, i do not think that it is the right 
concept to be at the center of a philosophical anthropology. let me explore 
two habit-like formations. 
on one extreme we have hard, biologically-based instincts and habitus, 
that is, sedimented (sometimes thickly sedimented) cognitive or 
affective opinions (hua 4, 267, <255>). habitus refers to a type of knowledge 
constituting a horizon of “familiarity and precognizance” that, by means 
of a certain anticipation, underlies the objects’ coming to be experienced 
as they actually are experienced (experience and Judgment, 121-123). in 
other words, habitus is “a residue of past life that informs the current 
perceptions, thought and actions of the ego” (Biceaga 2010, 68; see also hua 
4, 118, <111>). in the process of the explicative thematization of an object, 
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for instance, this sedimented knowledge is responsible for assigning (or 
awakening) a sense to different aspects of the object as it is given in time 
(experience and Judgment, 112–124). The origin of habitus is the repetition 
of similar instances that fixes a sense and makes it become latent in 
cognitive and belief expectation (hua 11, 238–241, <188–191>).
instinct and habitus are passive even when they play a role in activities. 
instincts and bodily-based habitualities (e.g. being raised as right-
handed even if one ‘is’ left-handed) are closer to pure passivity (Biceaga 
2010, 68). But even more complex cases of habitus—say habitus at play in 
recognizing a social dynamic—are passive because the person, without 
much resistance, ‘accepts’ what is suggested by habitus. The fact that 
we can ‘fight’ or ‘overcome’ some of these ‘suggestions’ (perhaps not the 
instinctual ones), and on occasion intendedly yield to them, only shows 
that it is possible to more actively relate to them, not that they are not 
passive. 
on other extreme we have customary habits: having a coffee in the 
morning, crossing one’s arms, putting too much salt in food, etc. although 
habits are evidence of our second nature in that, for instance, they are 
not instinctual and can vary from culture to culture and from person to 
person, they are too concrete and specific, and for that reason are not the 
type of concept we are after. it should be possible, though, to account for 
them through the right concept. 
it does not seem then that either instincts and habitus, or customary 
habits are the concepts that can successfully articulate the idea of second. 
even when closely woven into action, “the ego’s participation […] is usually 
minimal and removed from introspective reach” (Biceaga 2010, 69). 
methodologically these passive formations can help delimit the 
dispositional concept i am after. we can think that the right dispositional 
concept should be in between these two extremes: the passive formations 
that underlie our acquaintance with objects (instincts and habitus), 
and specific repetitive behaviors (habits) that, while a form of activity, 
are more like end-products or peaks of action, in which the subject 
yields to fixed ways of doing things. As to habits, in addition to minimal 
participation and lack of introspection, they are not productive in the 
sense a structure of subjectivity would be and are all-too-specific to be 
the concepts we are looking for: habits do not underlie the wide variety of 
activities of which they themselves are but instances. 
in the next section i will offer an account of position-taking as the most 
adequate dispositional concept to understand the second nature of 
persons.
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The notion of position-taking conveys the idea that in everyday life 
a subject does not simply face pre-given things in a pre-given way 
and executes pre-delineated actions upon them. Rather, she first and 
foremost orients herself in relation to things, others, states of affairs, 
etc. The general orientation that precedes and gives rise to the situation, 
and guides the moments of explicit action is a taking of position. 
Position-taking sets the tone, as it were, for the essentially interpretive 
acquaintance between subject and things, on which the very definition 
or thematization of those things depends, and it maintains or changes 
that tone in ensuing comportments. in this sense, it has a broad range of 
action. The concept of position-taking is also broad in that it applies to 
different domains of acquaintance with things (sensory, perceptually, 
logically, affectively, inferentially, etc.). 
Say i am walking in the street and there is a car parked near me. i may 
notice the car or not. i may only notice the presence of a big object without 
thematizing it as a car. if i notice it, i may notice it in many ways: noticing 
its color or not, noticing where it is exactly parked, etc. my way of noticing 
it or not somehow depends on what i am doing: perhaps i am rushing to 
get somewhere and my surroundings are not something i have an interest 
in, except for the purposes of efficiency. My level of awareness of the car is 
also related to my pragmatic engagement with it: if i barely notice the bulk 
i may be able to avoid it (and vice versa too), and my noticing it without 
awareness of model or color may be enough for a more involved pragmatic 
relation, such as intently standing behind it while another car goes by. 
in all these cases, i take a position, even if only derivatively, in respect to 
the car. Thus, when i am in the vicinity of a car, it is not the case that i 
always encounter a car as such, with its many characteristics, and that my 
perceptions, actions and reactions about it can be defined objectively. This 
simplified scenario is the type of situation I have in mind.  
in inquiring about second nature, the explanandum is the second nature 
of the whole person, of “the subject of actual life” (hua 4, Supplement Xiii, 
382-383, <372-373>). According to Husserl’s theory of constitution, chiefly as 
developed in ideas ii, the person is constituted by multiple levels. These levels 
are different ego-formations, ranging (in broad strokes) from a bodily level, to 
the theoretical-transcendental pure ego, to the empirical, intersubjective ego 
of everyday life. let me illustrate by focusing on two levels. 
The aesthetic body is a system that pairs sensory occurrences with 
subjective occurrences in the body, and in an important sense determines 
“what it is that, as world, stands over and against the subject” (hua 4, 
70–80, <65–75>). This corporeal self [ichleib] has the particularity of being a 
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center of reference in relation to which perceptual happenings take place: 
perceived things are above, to the left, they are disgusting or agreeable, 
actable upon or not, etc. (hua 4, 61, <56>; hua 16, 1997, 124, <148>). 
another stratum is that of the “pure ego”, achieved by self-reflection in 
abstraction from the body (hua 4, 103, <97>). The pure ego is the abstract 
intentional unity in which the same I-feeling is attached to the same flow 
of consciousness and that is common to all intentional acts. 
These abstract formations are at work in the pragmatic involvement of 
subjects in the world. These strata do not ‘act’ isolatedly or modularily: the 
workings of the simpler, more basic strata are constitutive of the activities 
of ‘higher’, more comprehensive levels (hua 4 hua 4, 70–71, 269, 292–293 
<66, 257, 280>). let us take the case of perception as an illustration of 
different levels at work in the actual life of a subject. 
Take, for instance, the müller-lyer (so-called) illusion (Fig.1). To this day, the 
müller-lyer lines are taken by most as evidence of a universal characteristic 
featuring both the representational character of perception and its modular 
character (one can’t see the lines of equal length despite knowing they are 
so). as some social psychologists have shown, however, there is nothing 
universal or necessary about the perception of the drawing. Some people, the 
San foragers of the Kalahari, do not see the illusion. Further, the differences 
in perceived length between the two lines varies across populations (henrich, 
heine, and norenzayan 2010, 62). according to the authors of this study, it may 
be that the exposure to “‘carpentered corners’ of modern environments may 
favor certain optical calibrations and visual habits that create and perpetuate 
this illusion” (2010, 62). Whether it is specifically the exposure to carpentered 
corners or other complex social influences, what is crucial here is that this 
case illustrates husserl’s claim that the bodily dimension does not act in 
isolation but is influenced by intersubjective and pragmatic constraints. The 
perceptual element is not simply about what sensations follow what sensory 
worldly occurrences. it is about ways of encountering, taking in, and relating 
to worldly occurrences: it is a taking of position. 
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husserl does not claim that the perceptual is the bodily dimension alone, 
but that the perceptual is partly constituted by the sensory, bodily level. 
nor does husserl claim, that the sensory or bodily is only biological 
or physiological. The workings of the body are active in meaningful 
perception, but personal and intersubjective strata also shape a person’s 
sensitivity or even a person’s way of ‘using’ the senses. i am now in the 
position to offer a fuller articulation of position-taking.
The subject is active, and being active means taking position vis-à-vis 
things, objects, goals, etc. (hua 4, 226-238, <215–226>). For husserl, the 
genuine sense of subjectivity belongs to the ego that acts upon things, 
makes decisions about her life, perceives objects—that one who attends, 
compares, is attracted or repulsed, etc. (hua 4, 224-225, <213>; hua 11, 16-19, 
<362-364>). The subject that relates to things in the world is not a universal, 
abstract subject, but rather a being that is individualized in her own 
constitution as “a person among persons” (hua 4, Suppl. Xiii, 382, <372>).  
The person is, for these reasons, not conceived of as a substance in which 
properties or capacities inhere, but rather as an active being in which a 
complex underlying basis is in action and is made manifest in the way things 
are dealt with, as well as in the things that are dealt with. in exercising 
faculties and habits the subject takes position and determines relational 
stances regarding things (hua 4, 265, <253>). 
This position-taking of the person is the pragmatic thematization of a relation 
of the subject with aspects of the world (hua 4, 119–120, <112–113>). This 
means that position-taking, as a relational structure of subjectivity, does 
not only refer to individual, isolated position-takings. There is a broader 
connection between position-takings and the subject, and the key is the 
notion of motivation: “my thesis, my position-taking, my deciding from 
motives […] is something i have a stake in” (hua 4, 119, <122>)4. 
The causality of motivation is central for husserl because the subjective 
relation with the surrounding world is not a causal relation, governed 
by causal, physical conditionalities, but one governed by the nexus of 
motivations, that is, by the type of animating power that guides the 
meaningful, pragmatic relation with things that intentional beings like us 
have.  husserl refers to motivation also as the “lawfulness of the life of the 
spirit” (hua 4, 231, <220>). To say that lawfulness belongs to motivation 
means that there exists a certain agreement of motives, a type of consistency. 
we can see this consistency, for instance, in the character of a person. 
if, as i have said, the subject is an ongoing taking of position animated by 
4  “meine Thesis, meine Stellungnahme, mein auf die motive hin mich-entscheiden […] ist 
meine Sache” (hua 4 1989, <122>).  
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consistent motives, the identity of the subject is to be found precisely in the 
consistency evinced in her position-takings and comportments. in husserl’s 
terms, it is part of the idea of a subject that the subject is the same in all her 
position-takings, and that in all her position-takings the subject is the same: 
“as long as i am the one i am, then the position-taking cannot but ‘persist’, 
and i cannot but persist in it” (hua 4, 118–119, <111–112>). 
in this case, to say that the identity of the subject is to be found in her 
consistent position-takings and ensuing comportments means that such 
position-takings are expression of herself (Flynn 2009, 67). The whole 
person, as a psychophysical unit that exists over time, expresses herself 
in the bodily, active, ongoing engagement with things in the world. The 
subject is, as a subject, nothing else than her position-takings and ensuing 
comportments. We may say that we find in a person a style of being, a mode 
of acting, a host of tendencies and preferences. we should rather say that 
it is in those things—in her position-takings—where we find the person5. 
This is not to say, though, that in a changing stream of consciousness 
and lived experiences, the subject is ever fully defined. Husserl says that 
“the subject develops by living” (hua 4, 264, <252>), which means that it 
is more precise to speak of an ongoing, interactive correlation between 
subject and activities, such that the subject determines those activities 
and is at the same time influenced and further shaped by those activities 
themselves (see hua 4, Supplements Vii, X).
it follows also from this framework that the identity of a subject is not 
strictly an individual issue. insofar as position-taking features ways 
of relating towards things, others, and events, and those ways come 
oftentimes from others (e.g. upbringing and cultural ways of doing things), 
Stellungnahme is partly intersubjectively constituted. Personal character 
and style are then partly constituted by others, and in this sense husserl 
says that “this influence determines personal development, whether or 
not the person himself subsequently realizes it, remembers it, or is capable
5  husserl’s two main conceptions of expression and the shift from one to the other, from the 
investigations to ideas ii, are explored in detail by Flynn (2009). on the early conception, modeled 
after the linguistic sign, expression operates with two separate things, one of which expresses 
the other, the expressed being the essential one. in contrast, the view husserl endorses in ideas 
ii talks about an intimation between a subjective aspect and a bodily manifestation, that is, so 
‘close’ a connection that it is not the case that interiority is expressed in exteriority, but that 
the “interiority” coexists with “exteriority” (68). The body does not simply indicate subjective 
states because, first, the body itself is not just materiality—it is not Körper but leib, living body—, 
and second, because the body itself in its being animated—or the subjective aspects being 
embodied—constitutes a type of unity that only exists in that intimation, which is in this case the 
human being herself as a particular type of reality (67). The extension i propose of the treatment 
Flynn offers of exteriority and body is that they are properly nowhere to be ‘seen’ or intuited but 
in position-takings and ensuing comportments.
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 of determining the degree of the influence and its character” (hua 4, 281, <268>)6. 
in the following section i will offer a few closing remarks nuancing the 
relation between position-taking and passivity.
my argument for Stellungnahme rests on the consideration that the person 
is essentially active: it is “the [personal] ego that in any sense is “active” 
and takes a position” (hua 4, 225, <213>). on that basis i argue that the 
active position-taking has priority over passivity, and that this priority is 
phenomenological and epistemological. Passivity, embodied in instinct, 
habitus and habit, is necessary for subjectivity to take place, but is 
subservient to position-takings7. 
husserl examines the relation between passive and active aspects in the 
analyses and says that despite the central role of passivity, consciousness 
of objects is “genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts” (hua 11, 274, <3>, 
emphases mine). Position-taking is phenomenologically prior to passivity 
because it pertains to first-person experience, where meaning is located; 
whereas other underlying strata, subpersonal or unconscious, are not 
meaningful in the first-person sense. Epistemologically, position-taking is 
prior to passivity because first-person experience is the proper source of 
knowledge and is also known first and more directly; whereas underlying 
strata are only known indirectly (some only transcendentally) as they reveal 
themselves in first-person experience. 
 Position-taking cannot exist without the passive sphere. The subject that 
acts—that perceives, grasps, remembers, values, etc.—possesses, as it were, 
a passive ground that makes it possible, in the most fundamental sense, 
6  My proposal is broadly compatible with scientific accounts of the origins of human 
cognition such as Tomasello’s (2009). on his view, human cognition is the product of a 
historical and ontogenetical development of cognitive skills on the basis of a set of phylogenetic 
characteristics (2009, 10–12).
7  my account of position-takings is not an account of the sphere of activity. There is a good 
reason: there are specific activities that are passive in the relevant sense, which is a certain 
deciding freely according to motives. when trying to suggest a relativization and softening of 
the relation activity/passivity, Biceaga argues, for instance, that receptivity is a type of “activity 
in passivity” which defies the opposition between “passive receptivity as the ego’s undergoing 
of something and judicative activity as the ego’s doing something in response to its being passively 
affected from without” (2010, xix, emphasis in the original). Thoroughly habitual doings are 
actions in the obvious sense that the body moves, but they are entirely passive in that the free 
ego, as it were, hardly intervenes and the action is beyond introspection and even perhaps beyond 
awareness. 
on the other hand, position-taking is not a simple voluntaristic account of actions. in the course, 
for instance, of a time-extended pragmatic endeavor in which one interacts with several objects 
for the sake of the whole, like cooking a meal, position-taking refers more to the whole, and the 
way specific interactions are part of that whole orientation—consistency of motivations—rather 
than to each individual engagement with an object. This is why the issue of wanting to do each 
individual action is relatively unimportant, and why ‘activity’ in the traditional conception of 
‘what is done’ is entirely flat-footed, even inadequate, for the present purposes. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the whole pragmatic engagement is active. 
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for objects to be objects for consciousness. in a way, the passive sphere is 
active in the being active of the subject, and this also shows that “activity 
and passivity are inseparable and mutually dependent” (Biceaga 2010, 
2010, xix). 
addressing this complex relation, husserl writes:
[The fullness of the person is] the ego as human, the ‘i take a 
position’, the i think, i value, i act, i complete works, etc. Then there 
also belongs to me a basis of lived experiences and a basis of nature 
(“my nature”) which is manifest in the play of lived experiences. 
This nature is the lower psychic layer, but it extends even into the 
sphere of position taking: the position-taking ego is dependent on 
its substratum insofar as i, in order to be motivated in my position 
taking, must have precisely the motivating lived experiences, 
which stand in an associative nexus and under rules of associative 
dispositions. (hua 4, 293, <280>)
I would like to finish by going back to the botanic metaphor I invoked 
at the beginning of §1, in which husserl referred to the lower levels on 
which position-taking depends as the obscure depths of roots. There lie 
the underlying bases, biological and habitual, of the life of the person. i 
would like to suggest now that the metaphor is not a mere illustration but 
a genuine way of understanding the complexity of human beings in the 
constitutional sense. The power of the metaphor has been felt by more 
than one philosopher. Buber spoke of the spirit as nature’s blossom. in his 
gay Science, nietzsche says “like trees we grow – it’s hard to understand, 
like all life! – not in one place, but everywhere; not in one direction, but 
upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; our energy 
drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once” (2001, §371, 236). nietzsche’s 
metaphor supplements husserl’s reference to a deep root soil. The relation 
between roots and trunk and branches is not only one of groundedness, but 
also one of productive development. Trunk and branches also exert pressure 
downwards and drive the roots to new developments, and those new root-
configurations becomes renewed ground for even the highest of leafs.
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husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in 
order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception 
despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don’t have 
any imaginative or symbolic representation of all their unseen properties. The article 
shows that this conception of empty intention is a misconception and that the emptiness 
that is constitutive for the givenness of whole things in perception is due not to empty 
intentions but to intentional habitualities, especially to habitual beliefs. These beliefs 
make up the empty horizons through which we have consciousness of whole things and 
of the world as a whole. This solution is offered by husserl in the framework of his genetic 
phenomenology. referring to some of husserl’s genetic pronouncements, the article 
investigates the constitutive role of two forms of habitual beliefs: beliefs which stem from 
one’s own experiences and insights and beliefs that stem from other’s experiences or 
insights and are taken over in good faith. Special attention is paid to this second form of 
habitual beliefs for the constitution of the world; it is argued that the world-horizon is 
basically made up of habitual beliefs of this second form. 
*This essay is an enlarged and improved version of a lecture delivered under a similar title at the “husserl-arbeitstage” 
in Cologne in 2011. elizabeth a. Behnke has translated the german original, which is forthcoming in the Polish journal 
fenomenologia 12 (2014) under the title “episodische und nicht-episodische intentionalität. Zur konstitutiven funktion 
der epistemischen habitualitäten des Wissens und glaubens bei edmund husserl.”
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Proceeding from the descriptive analysis of acts (i.e., of 
intentional lived experiences of which we are prereflectively 
aware) and oriented toward act-intentionality as the prototype 
of any intentionality whatever, husserl described, within the 
framework of static phenomenology, certain act-moments 
that are indeed intentional, but are not act-moments of which 
we are prereflectively aware; under the headings of “empty 
intention” and “meaning (or intending) more” he assimilates 
the intentionality of these act-moments to the intentionality 
of acts and describes them as pertaining to the phenomena 
of consciousness. i would like to show that assimilating these 
moments under those headings is inadequate and that broadening 
the notions of “meaning” and “intention” to include something 
that is not itself a phenomenon of consciousness, that is not an 
act-like meaning or intending, is misleading and superfluous: it 
is misleading because it leads the reflective glance in the wrong 
direction, and it is superfluous because with familiar habitualities 
of knowledge and belief we have forms of intentionality that 
cannot be addressed as forms of act-intentionality, yet play the 
very same role in the constitution of things and of the world that 
husserl ascribed to empty intention and meaning-more. what 
husserl was trying to describe “statically,” using the resources 
of a broadened vocabulary of “consciousness,” as something that 
is act-like and is thus a type of conscious performance turns out 
“genetically” to be a performance of non-conscious habitualities 
whose intentionality is to be characterized as non-episodic 
intentionality, in contrast to the episodic intentionality of acts.1 
Using the example of thing-constitution, i will show in the first 
part of the present essay that a distinction must be made between 
episodic and non-episodic intentionality, and that something 
like thing-perception is only possible through their functioning 
1  what i am calling “episodic intentionality” in this essay corresponds quite precisely to the 
form of intentionality that Uwe meixner called “classical intentionality” or “Brentano-husserlian 
intentionality” and highlighted as “the core form of intentionality” in contrast to functionalistic 
and representationalist conceptions of intentionality—see Uwe Meixner (2006), as well as 
meixner (2014), especially chapter iii, “on intending,” pp. 247–360. This form of intentionality 
determines the thematic and methodic framework of Brentano’s descriptive psychology of “psychic 
phenomena” and of husserl’s earlier phenomenology of intentional lived experiences.
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together.2 in the second, considerably shorter part of this essay, 
i will show that what holds good for the constitution of things in 
perception holds good all the more and to an even greater extent 
for the intentional constitution of the world. like the intentional 
constitution of things, the intentional constitution of the world 
remains incomprehensible without taking into account the 
constitutive function of the epistemic habitualities of knowledge 
and belief: it is essentially due to the intentional horizon-forming 
performance of these habitualities that we have existing things 
and an existing world given through empty inner and outer 
horizons.
1.1 The Original Visual Concept of Horizon and the Phenomenological 
Concept of Horizon
when we visually perceive such things as houses or tables, we 
always perceive the whole thing, even though we always only 
“genuinely” see sides of things. we don’t merely perceive the front 
side that is intuitively presented to us; instead, we perceive the 
whole thing: what we refer to perceptually is the thing as a whole, 
appearing from the front side. it is just this reference to the whole 
thing that is expressed in everyday language when, for example, 
we are looking at the house in front of us and say, “This house has 
been empty for years.” The thing intended to in the perception is 
the entire physical thing as such standing there before us in person 
[leibhaftig], even if it is always seen from a particular angle and 
thus always appears only “one-sidedly.” This is precisely what is 
peculiar to thing-perception, and is what distinguishes it from 
both pictorial presentations and descriptions in which a thing 
existing contemporaneously elsewhere is presentified—namely, 
in thing-perception, the thing itself is not only given as present 
now, but also as being there in person.3 yet all that is “genuinely” 
perceived at any given time—perceived in the narrow sense of 
what is immediately present purely visually—is the side of the 
visually appearing thing that is currently facing us, the side we 
2  what will be shown in what follows about acts of thing-perception holds good mutatis 
mutandis for any act whatever. All analyses of specific types of acts remain incomplete if 
habitualities and their constitutive function are not taken into consideration.
3  The latter is the case when, e.g., i am standing in front of the eiffel Tower in Paris and am 
looking at this landmark itself; if i am looking at a photograph of it or reading a description of it 
in a travel guide, it is not given in person, but is merely pictorially or symbolically presentified. 
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could reproduce with the aid of photography or film. In order to 
make the fact that the perceived thing is given in person as a whole 
comprehensible in light of the fact that the seen thing necessarily 
appears from one side, husserl introduces the phenomenological 
concept of horizon, or more precisely, of inner horizon. 
husserl’s phenomenological concept of horizon can be explained 
as follows by taking an analysis of the original visual concept of the 
horizon as a point of departure. a horizon in the original visual 
sense is a limited sphere of view, relative to the standpoint of 
the beholder, within which things appear; it moves along with 
the beholder, and because it shifts in this way it has a movable 
boundary line that points (in more or less determinate fashion) 
toward what is potentially visible beyond the boundary line of the 
sphere of view. (For instance, at sea the horizon line is a movable 
boundary line of the sphere of view that points toward further, 
unlimited stretches of open ocean, or else toward sea bounded by 
shore, and our expectations of the one or the other can be more or 
less determinate, depending on how much we currently know about 
our nautical position.) Since a horizon or sphere of view is always 
only a sphere of view relative to a current standpoint, any talk of 
horizons is subjective from the start, always also implicitly including 
the subject in any given case, along with this subject’s movable 
standpoint. and it is this relativity to the subject that makes 
the concept of horizon a concept suitable for phenomenological 
descriptions, since in such descriptions the appearing (more 
generally: what one is conscious of) is always thematized in its 
relation to the subjectivity for whom something appears (more 
generally: for whom something is consciously given).
husserl’s specifically phenomenological concept of horizon does 
include the components of subject-relativity, delimitedness, and 
movability (components drawn from the original visual concept 
of the horizon), but these components receive another, non-visual 
sense: the components of the visual horizon become components 
of a horizon of acceptance [geltungshorizont]. The subject-relative, 
delimited, and movable field of view of the visible becomes a 
movable sphere (a sphere that is therefore open, even though 
delimited) of what currently holds good [gilt] for the subject, 
and in a double way. on the one hand, it includes acceptances 
[geltendes] that are currently actually holding good within the 
current lived experiences of intentional consciousness; on the 
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other hand, it includes acceptances that habitually hold good 
(or better, are in co-acceptance [mit-geltung]), especially with 
regard to fixed convictions in which what holds good for us with 
the sense “existing” or “real” remains in abiding acceptance, 
comprising, in its totality, what is suggested in the expression 
“background knowledge.” This specifically phenomenological 
concept of horizon—which is indispensable for what follows—
can be seen in a manuscript that husserl wrote around 1933 
or 1934. here what he has in view is the horizon-phenomenon, 
“world holding good for me [mir geltende Welt]),” and he uses 
the perceptual field and the visual concept of the horizon as 
the point of departure from which to determine the genuinely 
phenomenological concept of horizon:
The world holding good for me extends beyond the perceptual 
field; it has its non-perceptual horizon; [what i have] apart 
from the latter [is] the perceptual field in its oriented mode of 
givenness within which all the objects simultaneously perceived 
in it (the perceptually coexisting objects) have their modes of 
adumbration as near and far and <within which> a sphere of the 
outermost still-perceivable distance can be distinguished. This 
[concept of horizon] [...] in the stratum of visual perception [...] is 
even the original concept of “horizon.” of course, the latter word is 
used ambiguously. It also refers to the entire visual field—to the 
totality of that which lies within the sphere of the horizon. in 
phenomenology, [however,] we use the word to designate that which 
holds good beyond the perceptual field, and then further for all similar 
cases (fields of memory, etc.). (hua XXXiX, p. 333f.)4    
This characterization of the horizon as what holds good beyond 
the perceptual field (and similar fields of what is intentionally 
meant) makes it clear that horizon in the specifically 
phenomenological sense is not something like a background 
that we are unthematically aware of co-appearing along with 
the object that we are currently thematically aware of, i.e., the 
perceptually appearing object standing in the foreground. To 
equate the “horizon” of consciousness with its “background” 
4  Below i will show how the horizon-concept in this passage compares with another 
horizon-concept husserl uses elsewhere (horizon as the “induction that essentially belongs to 
each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself”—see the second passage from 
experience and Judgment cited in section 1.2 below).
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is to confuse the much more impoverished static concept of 
the background (which has its original place in the distinction 
between a salient visual form in the foreground and a visually co-
appearing background) with husserl’s richer, dynamic horizon-
concept, whose main characteristic is that what horizonally holds 
good—or better, what is co-accepted—does not and must not appear: 
it can neither co-appear on the perceptually appearing object as 
a determination of it, nor can it appear within the perceptually 
co-appearing background. what is decisive is that what lies in 
the horizon and belongs to it as a component is merely co-accepted 
[gilt mit] in what appears, and as co-accepted, determines the sense 
with which the appearing appears. and within this total sphere 
of what holds good for me at any given moment, what currently 
thematically holds good for me—e.g., the thing holding good for 
me as currently actually perceived and as determined in such and 
such a way—is merely a small (albeit central) sector of a whole 
consisting of everything i have in acceptance in a given living 
present, including everything that “exists” (in the broadest sense) 
“for me” at all, part of which i am thematically aware of and part 
of which is unthematic or entirely out of awareness.
husserl gives the following answer to the question of how a real 
thing is constituted for us in perception as there in person as a 
whole, how the sense “real thing” is built up in perception: it is 
by way of an inner horizon, i.e., through the intentions that form 
this horizon and that intend beyond what is “genuinely” perceived. 
in experience and Judgment (a work edited by ludwig landgrebe 
and published posthumously in 1939), husserl characterizes the 
concept of inner horizon with reference to a concept of horizon 
that is essentially different from the one discussed above:
each real item arising in experience as something new stands 
within the world-horizon and thus has its inner horizon. it is 
known in thematic perception by continually being presented 
as itself there, while at the same time being explicated in its 
individual features, its “what”-moments, during the stretch of 
experiencing [...]. For their part, these features too are known as 
presenting themselves, but precisely with the sense of features 
through which the real item is displayed as what it is. [...] 
everything that shows itself in this way, and is already implicitly 
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there even before the explication of what is perceived, essentially 
holds good as that which is genuinely perceived of the real item in 
this perception. [The real item] itself is more than what currently 
comes to actual cognizance or has already come to cognizance: it 
has the sense that its “inner horizon” constantly imparts to it; the seen 
side is only a side to the extent that it [reading “es,” not “sie”] has 
unseen sides that are anticipated in a way that determines the 
sense. (husserl 1976, §8, pp. 30f./35; emphasis altered)5
husserl explains the general guiding concept of horizon as 
follows:
“horizon” thereby means the induction that essentially belongs to 
each experience and is inseparable from each experience itself. 
[...] This originary “induction” or anticipation turns out to be [...] 
a mode of “intentionality”—precisely the mode that anticipatorily 
intends beyond a core of givenness [...]. (husserl 1976, §8, p. 28/32f.]; 
cf. hua XXXiX, p. 137)6
Both the characterization given here of the inner horizon as 
concerning the possibility of explicating the thing’s being-thus7 
and the general characterization of the horizon-concept that this 
5  Passages from husserl (1976) quoted in the present essay have been newly translated, but for the 
convenience of the reader, page references will also be provided to the published english translation, 
husserl (1973).  drummond (1990) emphasizes the sense-bestowing function of the horizon in many 
places, e.g., p. 213: “The horizon, then, by virtue of the noematic senses it correlates with the present 
noematic sense, contributes to the concrete sense the object has for us [...]”; cf. p. 226. drummond’s 
thesis of the primacy of the act-horizon such that “references from noema to noema [...] are possible 
only because the acts of which these noemata are the correlates are intentionally united” (p. 216) 
rests, in my opinion, on a construction; what can be brought to light descriptively is rather the 
contrary: noemata intentionally unified as horizons. At best one can only speak of act-horizons with 
reference to the extremely narrow compass of the horizons comprising the temporal “window” of the 
living present, i.e., horizons in which an act is constituted in retention and protention. The horizons 
lying beyond this are horizons of habitualities, or rather, horizons of habitually accepted noematic 
contents that are “sense-determining” for the currently explicit noematic sense.
6  here it must be left open to what extent landgrebe’s edited text for the introduction 
to husserl (1976), and especially the text most relevant for the present essay (§8), actually 
corresponds to husserl’s intentions. This can only be settled by having the original version of 
all of the husserl manuscripts landgrebe used in composing the introduction at one’s disposal 
in order to be able to judge whether landgrebe’s arrangement and combination of portions of 
text drawn from these manuscripts is in fact justified. A helpful synopsis of manuscripts used for 
most of the main text of this work is provided in lohmar (1996). Unfortunately, no such synopsis 
is available for the introduction. meanwhile, however, we can point to the publication of at least 
two of husserl’s original texts from 1934, portions of which landgrebe incorporated into the 
introduction (see hua XXXiX, Beilage Viii, Text nr. 15); these permit us to read the passages he 
drew upon in their original context.
7  “hence the inner horizons concern concrete objects in their substrate-structure; they are 
the horizons of what is to be explicated, of the being-thus” (hua XXXiX, p. 104).
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entails have weaknesses. 
one weakness lies in falsely equating the horizonal “intending 
beyond” with an “anticipating,” i.e., with the anticipation of 
something temporally subsequent. That to equate these is false 
follows from a fact that can be brought to light in reflection, 
namely, that determinations (qualities or parts) that are ascribed 
to the thing, through the “intending-beyond” perception, 
as belonging to the thing right now are not anticipated, i.e., 
anticipated as something future, but are appresented, i.e., posited 
as something co-present. as co-present thing-determinations, 
the horizonally intended determinations are present, just as the 
entire thing intended is (as well as what is currently “genuinely” 
perceived of it). at best, what could be anticipated is its future 
givenness in future acts of “genuine” perception. The horizon-
intentionality characteristic of inner horizons, an intentionality 
that posits co-present thing-determinations as co-present 
“implicitly,” is accordingly not anticipating, but appresenting.
a second weakness of the above characterizations of the concepts 
of horizon and inner horizon arises because what is appresented 
or posited as co-present are not sides or views of the thing relative 
to the subject, but objective thing-determinations such as, for 
instance, the shape and color of the facade of a house i am seeing 
from the back side, or of its inside, which is hidden from me at 
the moment. These objective thing-determinations, which would 
become visible if i were to enter the house or go around to the 
front side, are the thing-determinations that are co-intended, 
and co-posited as present, in horizonal intending-beyond. The 
formula for the constitution of things by means of inner horizons 
accordingly reads: presentation through appresentation.8 This 
solution of the problem of the in-person givenness of perceptual 
things as a whole can also be found in husserl. in a text from 
the 1930s with the title “appresentation and presentation with 
respect to individual things and with respect to the whole world,” 
8  cf. the following related formulation found in hua XXXiX, Text nr. 15: “now perception 
as perception of the thing, of this thing, is perception through apperception, through horizonal 
co-acceptance [horizontmitgeltung] as determining the ontic sense. This co-acceptance is 
‘indeterminately general.’ itself-appearing is appearing as determined. what is anticipated in an 
‘indeterminate’ manner, in a vague, equivocal, ‘general’ way, is what would appear in a possible 
[vermöglich] continuation of the perception, in a synthetic itself-appearing and as something 
that itself appears” (p. 141, emphasis added). [The last two sentences of the german original: 
“Sich selbst zeigen ist sich bestimmt zeigen. antizipiert ist in ‘unbestimmter’ weise, in vager, 
vieldeutiger, ‘allgemeiner’ weise: sich in vermöglicher Fortführung der wahrnehmung selbst 
Zeigendes in einem synthetischen Sich-selbst-Zeigen und <sich> selbst Zeigenden.”]
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he writes: “each perception of something transcendent can only 
present its transcendent object by means of appresentation” 
(hua XXXiX, p. 142). and since husserl also characterizes the 
appresenting inner horizon that is functioning constitutively here 
as a so-called empty horizon, he can say in the same text: “insofar 
as [...] [empty horizons] are essential for thing-perception, and 
insofar as a thing can only be present in person at all through their 
help, they make present [sind sie gegenwärtigend] rather than merely 
presentifying [vergegenwärtigend]” (hua XXXiX, p. 142).  
what exactly are these empty horizons? and how is the horizon-
intentionality that forms them and functions in them to be 
characterized? husserl speaks of empty intentions as having 
the function of appresenting. But what are these appresenting 
empty intentions? are they merely acts of a particular type? are 
they latent acts co-performed alongside other acts? or are they 
moments of acts, non-selfsufficient parts of acts that themselves 
have nothing act-like about them? in what does the peculiar 
constitutive performance of empty horizons consist, and how can 
we make this performance comprehensible?
within the empty intentions forming the horizons of thing-
perceptions, something would be emptily intended insofar as 
what is “horizonally” intended, and is thereby co-accepted in the 
objective sense (e.g., the inside of a house i’m familiar with and am 
perceiving from the outside), is not presentified intuitively. as a rule, 
no matter what side i am seeing the house from, no phantasy or 
memory images of its interior hover before me. husserl emphasizes 
the non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-intended when he writes 
of thing-experience as follows: 
its experiencing intending has an open horizon of possible experiences 
of the same thing in which whatever is not yet genuinely given would 
come to genuine givenness. They are not experiences that actually 
hover before me in advance as intuitively presentified, or even as 
particular individual experiences of any sort. it is nevertheless a 
horizon of consciousness, a mode <of> implicitly intending beyond 
what is genuinely experienced. This is a “vague,” “non-intuitive” mode 
such that the sense intended in this intending-beyond is brought 
to demonstrative display in specific actual or possible [vermöglich]  
experiences, whether they are able to be freely <generated> or 
occur on their own; this [demonstrative display] is accompanied by 
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the evidence that [these experiences] were encompassed in the 
indeterminate generality [of that horizon of consciousness] in a 
peculiar way, i.e., vaguely, non-intuitively, indistinctly, yet co-
intended. (hua XXXiX, p. 112)
in the Cartesian meditations, husserl characterizes what is 
implicitly horizonally co-intended beyond what is genuinely 
experienced as “what is included and only non-intuitively co-
intended in the sense of the cogitatum” (hua i, §20, p. 85).9 
The non-intuitiveness of what is horizonally co-intended and 
included in the sense of the cogitatum—a non-intuitiveness that 
Husserl emphasized—is also not offset by a symbolic reference, a 
symbolic intending-beyond, through linguistic or non-linguistic 
signs establishing a symbolic relation to what is not “genuinely” 
perceived of the thing (e.g., the inside of a house seen from the 
outside), since both of these types of signs are usually lacking 
in my perceptual consciousness. and in any case, no sort of 
symbolic consciousness of what is not genuinely perceived of 
the thing can be descriptively brought to light in reflection on 
normal prelinguistic thing-perception. But if the appresenting 
empty intentions consist neither in intuitive nor in symbolic 
presentifications of what is co-present, how is their performance 
to be understood, namely, the performance of appresenting 
something as determinate as, e.g., the familiar interior of a 
familiar house and not appresenting something completely 
indeterminate instead? For if all that was appresented was 
something completely indeterminate, with only the “genuinely” 
seen side of the house determined, then there would be no 
perception of a house as a concrete physical thing, and certainly 
no perception of it as a familiar individual material thing with a 
familiar interior. 
The difficulties in understanding husserl’s talk of the doubly 
empty horizon-intentions (i.e., empty both with regard to the 
intuitive and with regard to the symbolic) can be resolved if 
one recognizes that husserl’s conception of inner horizons as 
formed by empty intentions remains trapped in the vocabulary of 
“consciousness” and accordingly replaces this construction with 
the husserlian conception of acceptance-horizon [geltungshorizont] 
9  Passages from hua i quoted in the present essay generally follow the published english 
translation, which includes the hua i page numbers in the margin.
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introduced  above—and indeed, with a conception of an 
acceptance-horizon that is the correlate of knowledge and belief, 
hence the correlate of habitualities, and not of a particular sort 
of act or act-like act-moments called “empty intentions.” By 
habitualities husserl understands “abiding ego-properties” or 
“habitual determining properties” (hua i, §32, 101) that have 
been passively or actively acquired; to a certain extent, these have 
an intentional character, since they have intentional “contents” 
(such as convictions and willed decisions in particular), and 
to a certain extent they have a non-intentional character (e.g., 
a person’s typical way of walking or of behaving in conflicts). 
what is important in our context are habitualities that have an 
intentional character, and above all those one could call epistemic 
habitualities.10 
as husserl recognized by the beginning of the 1920s at the latest 
but probably already realized during the preceding decade,11 
only part of the sphere of intentionality consists of acts or 
intentional lived experiences; another part consists of intentional 
habitualities of various kinds whose intentionality differs from 
that of so-called acts. as will be shown below, acts too always 
10  The epistemic habitualities (including knowledge and belief) comprise only one part 
of the multifarious sphere of habitual intentionality; habitualities of willing and valuing in 
particular also belong to this sphere and co-contribute in their own way to the constitution of 
the concretely experienced lifeworld. in a text from 1926 on decision as a habituality of willing, 
husserl says (hua XXXiV, pp. 105f.): “a decision i make to go on a journey in eight days is not 
solely a momentary lived experience, [...] but my decision to go on this journey at that date. 
The decision to take a course of treatment every day for a year is a general decision, and in its 
generality it is ‘valid’ [“gültig”] for a year through all the individual activities i carry out, always 
recurring in being re-awakened as the same decision for me, the same person who is now acting 
in accordance with what I willed. For a year. Likewise, however, there are also infinite decisions 
in a true and literal sense. These include any decision for a vocation, a willed resolve that 
signifies an abiding general attitude of willing for the rest of one’s life [...]”
11  That husserl already had habitualities in view under the title of “psychic dispositions” in the 
years following 1910 can be seen from the following remark from ideas i (hua iii/1, §85, p. 195/206): 
“Belonging together with [the tendency toward a ‘psychology without a psyche’] is the fact that 
under the heading of the psychic—especially of the currently actual psychic in contrast to the 
corresponding ‘psychic dispositions’—one preferably thinks of lived experiences in the unity of the 
empirically posited stream of lived experiences.”  For the sake of consistency of terminology, passages 
from hua iii/1 quoted in the present essay will depart in some respects from the published english 
translation, whose page numbers will also be provided. That husserl paid attention to habitualities 
(and especially to intentional habitualities) could be due to the influence of Adolf Reinach; according 
to Wolfgang Künne (1986, p. 175), Reinach was “the first phenomenologist to draw a clear line between 
a lived experience such as judging and a state such as being convinced,” doing so in an essay that 
appeared in 1911 (Reinach 1911). Whether or not this historical claim is true may be able to be clarified 
on the basis of husserl’s nachlass. But it seems less probable when one considers that Brentano (1874) 
already speaks of “unconscious habitus and dispositions” or “habitual dispositions”, even though he 
excludes them from the sphere of the eo ipso conscious “psychic phenomena” (Book 1, ch. iii, §6; Book 
2, ch. ii, §2). This would have to have been husserl’s initial literary source for his distinction between 
intentional lived experiences and habitualities.
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have components of habitual intentionality, and would hardly 
be possible without them. if we limit talk of intentions to acts of 
consciousness, i.e., to intentional lived experiences, while taking 
appresenting empty horizons as horizons of acceptance, and indeed, 
as horizons of what is habitually known and believed, then there is no 
difficulty in understanding the emptiness or non-intuitiveness of 
what is horizonally co-accepted as the non-intuitiveness of what 
is merely co-known and co-believed. nor is it difficult to understand 
how what is known and believed contributes to the unitary 
objective sense of any perceived thing characterized by in-person 
givenness, standing there for consciousness as a physical thing 
as a whole and not merely one side of it. Thus when we look, for 
example, at the door of an individual closet familiar to us—e.g., 
our own clothes closet—we know how what is inside it looks, or if 
we see an individual yet typical clothes closet we are not familiar 
with, we apprehend it as “a” clothes closet and know in general 
what such a thing typically looks like inside.12 
Both types of knowledge—knowledge of an individual, which concerns 
a specific clothes closet familiar to us, and the general (and usually 
rather rough) typical knowledge of any clothes closet whatever—
have their sense-determining “efficacy” when we are perceiving 
clothes closets. But both types of knowledge play their role as 
knowledge, and knowledge is not an act: it is not an ephemeral 
episode within the stream of consciousness, but something 
habitual. Thus knowledge is something abiding in contrast to 
the flowing lived experiences, and as something belonging to 
the i, it is transcendent to the stream of consciousness, just as 
the stream’s i is transcendent to the stream and is the same i at 
various temporal locations within the stream.13 what is habitually 
12  what holds good here for the example of a perceived clothes closet also holds good for any 
perceived thing whatsoever: “each thing as a currently perceived thing in ontic acceptance 
[daseinsgeltung] is ‘apperceived typically’ in terms of its species and genus, and for their part 
the species and genus enter into the ont<ic> horizon as types that only now receive their 
‘determined’ particularization as what is proper to an ‘individual’” (hua XXXiX, pp. 140f.). when 
an unknown individual is apprehended according to its type, it receives a certain concomitant 
character of familiarity: “Even when the object is initially seized upon and is at first purely and 
simply contemplated, it does already have its horizons, which are co-awakened right away—first 
of all, an inner horizon [...]. The object stands there with a character of familiarity from the 
very beginning; it is apprehended as an object of a certain type that is already known in some 
way, even if in vague generality. Seeing the object awakens protentional expectations regarding 
its being-thus, its as yet unseen back side, etc.—regarding whatever individual properties that 
examining it in more detail would yield” (husserl 1976, §22, p. 114/104f.). 
13  John locke already had the distinction between episodic and non-episodic forms of 
knowledge in view with his distinction between actual knowledge and habitual knowledge—see an 
essay Concerning human understanding, Book 4, ch. i, §§8 and 9.
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known by a subject, which is sometimes termed “background 
knowledge,”14 is not a matter of conscious awareness, and is not a 
part of the actual or manifest content of consciousness in the 
pregnant sense. yet it determines this content in a peculiar fashion 
insofar as it essentially co-determines its core—the objective 
sense of the currently appearing object. The actual content of 
consciousness (e.g., “my clothes closet, appearing to me right 
now in such and such a way”) is indeed essentially co-determined 
by knowledge, but this co-determining knowledge is something 
habitual belonging to the I, and as such is not an actual, fleeting 
content of consciousness. Thus in the case of actual, episodic thing-
perception, the content of consciousness is empty with respect 
to the components of knowledge that are implicitly functioning 
constitutively without our being consciously aware of them either 
intuitively or symbolically. however, this emptiness is really no 
surprise; instead, it is a natural and a necessary consequence of 
the habitual and non-episodic nature of knowledge. as a content co-
determined by knowledge and therefore by something habitual, the 
intentional content of consciousness is accordingly characterized 
by an “emptiness” that Husserl conceived in terms of a specific sort 
of intentions proper to it—namely, empty intentions functioning in 
the inner horizon.  if in explaining the emptiness of inner horizons 
we resort not to empty intentions but instead to the habituality of 
knowledge and its contribution to the constitution of perceptual 
things, we can dispense with the descriptively inadequate 
construction of “empty intentions” in the sense of acts performed 
alongside other acts.   
what has been said here about husserl’s concept of empty 
intention also holds good for husserl’s terms “co-intending” 
[mitmeinung] and “meaning-more” [mehrmeinung]; when these 
terms refer to acts of co-intending and meaning-more, they 
14  Smith (2007) speaks of a “background of tacit understanding,” or for short, of the “relevant 
background” of a situation (p. 208). however, he neither brings out the habitual knowledge and belief 
that this background consists of, nor sees that what is most essentially constituted in these epistemic 
habitualities is what Husserl calls “horizon,” and more specifically “acceptance-horizon”; for Smith (p. 
287), what the “horizon of an act of consciousness” means is “the range of possibilities for the intended object 
that are left open by the act’s noematic sense together with relevant background ideas that are implicit 
or presupposed in the core sense.” Smith already defended this position in the important work he co-
authored with ronald mcintyre, (Smith and mcintyre 1982). in John r. Searle’s conception of intentionality, 
the background of habitual intentionality plays an important role under the title of a “network.” This 
is a holistic network of non-conscious “intentional states” such as convictions, wishes, hopes, etc., and 
according to Searle, it is these, along with a non-conscious background of abilities or “know-how” as well 
as general pre-intentional assumptions—all of which he terms “background” for short—that first make 
individual conscious states (and acts) possible as such. See Searle (1983), pp. 19–21, 65–71, and ch. V. 
EPISODIC AND NON-EPISODIC INTENTIONAlITy
rochUS Sowa rWTh aachen university 
251
are just other expressions for the concept of empty horizon-
intention, and are used in the Cartesian meditations to characterize 
the constitutive function of horizon-intentionality. all 
they basically do is to broaden concepts like “meaning” and 
“intention”—concepts belonging to the vocabulary concerned 
with consciousness (a vocabulary that arose from the analysis 
of acts)—without truly grasping and adequately characterizing 
the phenomena of habitual intentionality that such terms 
address, phenomena that are indeed already in view in a certain 
way when such terms as co-intending and meaning-more are 
used. in the Cartesian meditations husserl is still talking about a 
particular type of meaning and intending when he speaks in §20 
of “meaning more” and “intending-beyond-itself” in articulating 
the “fundamental [insight]” that “as a consciousness, every cogito 
is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of its meant [meinung 
seines gemeinten], but that, at any moment, this something meant 
[dieses Vermeinte] is more—something meant with something 
more—than what is meant at that moment ‘explicitly’” (Hua I, p. 
84). husserl explicitly characterizes this general state of affairs 
as a state of affairs in accordance with an eidetic law: “This 
intending-beyond-itself, which is implicit in any consciousness, must 
be considered an essential moment of it” (hua i, p. 84). 
The hidden “noetic multiplicities of consciousness and 
their synthetic unity, by virtue of which alone [...] we have 
one intentional object, and [in each case] this definite 
one, continuously meant—have it, so to speak, before us as 
[determined] thus and so” (hua i, p. 84), which husserl calls 
“hidden constitutive performances” here (hua i, p. 84) and 
are what he has in view under the title of “meaning more” 
[mehrmeinung], are not, however, phenomena of episodic act-
intentionality, as the reference to “noetic multiplicities of 
consciousness” suggests. instead, they are actually phenomena 
of non-episodic horizon-intentionality: they are neither acts 
nor act-like co-meanings or co-intendings, but intentional 
habitualities. These habitualities are beliefs [meinungen] that one 
has; as such, they function appresentationally in intentional acts 
of thing-perception and make an essential contribution to the 
perceptual constitution of things as wholes, since what is going 
on in thing-perception is a global positing of the thing as a whole 
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without secretly “co-intending” any qualities, pieces, or moments 
that are not directly visible. in any case, such “co-intending” 
in the sense of hidden acts or act-like intentions cannot be 
descriptively brought to light. it is otherwise with the habitual 
co-intendings that count as knowledge [Wissen]; in any given case 
they are in implicit co-acceptance [mitgeltung] within the global 
thing-acceptance [dinggeltung], and thus determine the objective 
sense of the currently intended thing. The sense-constitutive 
co-accepting of the knowledge both of general types and of 
individuals does indeed depend upon an actual performance of 
an act of thing-perception in order to enter into a constitutive 
function co-determining the sense at all. But this co-accepting is 
not itself an act-like co-intending implied in the act of perception: 
on closer inspection, the alleged horizonal co-intending of what 
does not “genuinely” appear is a horizonal having in co-acceptance 
[in-mitgeltung-haben], and as i have attempted to show, a having in 
co-acceptance in the mode of habitual knowledge, which is a form 
of non-episodic intentionality.
despite the fact that husserl’s talk of empty intentions, meaning 
more, and co-intentions remains trapped in the vocabulary 
of a static phenomenology of consciousness, he did have the 
habitual, constitutively functioning horizon-intentionality of 
acquired knowledge in view throughout, and thereby the sphere 
of non-episodic intentionality per se (to be sure, without making 
it fruitful for the “official” theory of horizon in the Cartesian 
meditations, for which horizons are “predelineated possibilities”15). 
This can be seen in numerous nachlass manuscripts from the 
15  See hua i, §19, p. 82: “The horizons are ‘predelineated’ possibilities. we say also: we can 
ask any horizon what ‘lies in it,’ we can explicate or unfold it, and ‘uncover’ the potentialities of 
conscious life at a particular time. Precisely thereby we uncover the objective sense meant implicitly 
in the actual cogito, though never with more than a certain degree of foreshadowing. [...] The 
predelineation [of the potentialities of conscious life] itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; 
yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure.” It is this completely insufficient 
and even misleading characterization of the horizon that Smith and McIntyre appeal to when—
contrary to the position I defend, and contrary to numerous statements in Husserl—they do 
not take up the currently co-accepted “background beliefs” into the horizon itself, and merely 
allow the horizon to “predelineate”: “These beliefs play an essential role in the predelineation 
of an act’s horizon; they (or their Sinne) ‘motivate’ the possibilities making up the horizon by 
prescribing what would and would not count, for the subject, as further ‘determination’ of the 
object as it is given in the present act” (Smith and mcintyre 1982, pp. 249f.). That for husserl the 
horizon constitutive for the objective sense is not only a horizon of predelineated potentialities 
but essentially consists of the intentional contents of background beliefs is shown in, for 
instance, the following statement from experience and Judgment: “The object [...] is given for 
consciousness [ist bewusst] along with the horizon (albeit an empty horizon) of acquired knowledge” 
(husserl 1976, §25, p. 138/122f.).
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1920s and 1930s. But even in published works of this period such 
as Cartesian meditations and experience and Judgment, there are clear 
indications of the constitutive role of epistemic habitualities, 
and in particular of the constitutive role of the habituality of 
knowledge. in experience and Judgment he writes, for instance, 
as follows with regard to the knowledge of types that functions 
constitutively in the experience of things: 
a cognitive performance concerned with individual objects of 
experience is never carried out as if the latter were initially 
pregiven as substrates that were still entirely indeterminate. For us 
the world is always already a world in which cognition has already 
done its work in the most various ways: it is undoubtedly the case 
that there is no experience (in the sense of a first, unmodified 
thing-experience) that seizes upon this thing for the first time, 
taking cognizance of it, without already “knowing” more of it than 
what is thereby cognitively grasped. whatever any experience 
may experience in the genuine sense whereby something comes 
into view as “it, itself,” each experience necessarily has eo ipso 
a knowledge and co-knowledge with respect to this very thing—
namely, of something proper to it that has not yet come into view. 
This foreknowledge  is contentually indeterminate or incompletely 
determined, but never completely empty, and if it were not co-
accepted [wenn es nicht mitgelten würde], the experience would not 
be an experience of this one thing at all. (husserl 1976, §8, pp. 
26f./31f.; see also hua XXXiX, p. 126)
and with reference to the “habitual possession” (husserl 1976, §67, p. 
331/275; §68, p. 340/282; §79, p. 380/313) of object-determinations 
acquired through explication and constitutive for the objective 
sense, he writes:
[The object] has taken on forms of sense that were originally 
constituted in acts of explication, forms of sense [that are now 
taken on as] habitual knowledge. [...] The object [...] is [henceforth] 
given for consciousness along with the horizon (albeit an empty 
horizon) of acquired knowledge: the sediment of the active 
sense-bestowing in which [the object] previously received a 
determination is now a component part of the apprehension-sense 
of the perception [...]. (husserl 1976, §25, pp. 137f./122f.)
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in the Cartesian meditations, husserl relates the object-constitutive 
habitualities of the i both to constituted objects and to the 
constituted surrounding world:
This, my activity of positing and explicating being, sets up a 
habituality of my ego, by virtue of which the object, as having its 
manifold determinations, is mine abidingly. Such abiding acquisitions 
make up my surrounding world, so far as i am acquainted with it at 
the time, with its horizons of objects with which I am unacquainted—
that is: objects yet to be acquired but already anticipated with this 
formal object-structure. (hua i, §33, p. 102)16
although husserl did not take the intentional phenomenon of 
habitual knowledge (and its contribution to the constitution of 
things and of the world) sufficiently into account at the level of 
static phenomenology, and although this phenomenon is more 
concealed than revealed in his theory of empty intentions, at 
the level of genetic phenomenology he did clearly establish the 
constitutive contribution of the habitual and incorporate it 
into his theory of empty horizons.17 as i would like to show in 
what follows, what holds good for the habituality of knowledge 
in the constitution of objective sense similarly holds good 
for the habituality of belief: as a mode of habitually taking-
for-true, belief essentially contributes to the constitution 
of things and of the world, and must accordingly receive 
appropriate consideration in a transcendental-phenomenological 
description of intersubjective thing- and world-constitution. in 
phenomenology, as far as i know, hardly any attempts have been 
made so far to approach this issue.
Before i discuss the constitutive function of belief, i would like 
to offer some overdue explication of the concepts of “knowledge” 
and “belief”—concepts I have used up until now in their vague, 
everyday language signification, trusting that they would be 
generally understood.
16  one has the impression that in the Cartesian meditations, constitutive analyses from static 
phenomenology are presented immediately alongside constitutive analyses from genetic 
phenomenology.
17  Taking husserl’s later work as a point of departure, alfred Schutz investigated the role of 
knowledge (and especially our knowledge of types) in our lifeworldly experiencing, acting, and 
knowing; penetrating analyses are to be found in a work written between 1947 and 1951 (Schutz 1970).
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i am not using the expression “knowledge” in the sense of the 
standard analysis of propositional knowledge (“knowledge is 
justified true belief ”), a sense that edmund gettier has placed in 
question.18 The standard analysis can serve as an explication of 
one of the everyday language concepts of knowledge; however, 
i am using the expression “knowledge” in another sense of the 
word, likewise occurring in everyday language and arising from 
a contrast between knowledge and belief (in a non-religious sense 
to be discussed shortly). in what follows, “knowledge” will mean 
holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for obtaining, 
on the basis of one’s own evidence, i.e., on the basis of one’s own 
experiences or one’s own insights, be these insights empirical or a 
priori. (This concept of knowledge corresponds, by the way, with 
the etymology of the german “wissen,” to know, as “having seen”; 
the same holds true for the greek “eidenai.”) in contrast, “belief” 
will mean holding a statement for true, or a state of affairs for 
obtaining, on the basis of trusting the knowledge of someone else one 
trusts.19 
i take my guiding concepts of belief and knowledge from Josef 
Pieper’s philosophical treatise On Belief.20 There Pieper, following 
Thomas of aquinas, explicates “belief ” as a three-placed 
predicate: “Believing always means: believing someone about 
something. The one who believes in the strict sense of the word 
accepts a state of affairs as actually obtaining on the basis of 
the testimony of someone else [...]” (Pieper 1962, p. 31).21 in this 
characterization of the concept Pieper emphasizes the following 
two interconnected elements: “on the one hand, agreeing with 
a [judgment about a] state of affairs, taking it for true; on the 
other hand, agreeing with a person, trusting [this person]” (p. 31), 
since “the basis [...] upon which one believes ‘something’ is that 
one believes ‘someone’” (p. 32). The following remarks by Pieper 
are also illuminating and fruitful for the problem of thing- and 
18  gettier (1963). See also, e.g., grundmann (2008), pp. 86–109.
19  a further concept of knowledge in everyday language encompasses both of the concepts 
of knowledge and belief just explicated: “knowing that p” means “being informed that p.” This 
more general (and more contentually impoverished) concept of knowledge leaves open what 
source the “information” comes from and cannot be used for my purposes, since what i am 
concerned with is precisely what the source of being informed is.
20  Pieper (1962) was reprinted in Pieper (1997). Page references in the present essay are to the 
german edition (Pieper 1962).
21  For the purposes of the present essay, the other current determination of belief as “taking 
[something] as true on a basis that is indeed objectively insufficient, but subjectively sufficient” (Kant 
1968, p. 67) is also unusable as an explication of the word “belief.”
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world-constitution in the epistemic habitualities of knowledge 
and belief: “To believe means: to participate in the knowledge of 
someone who knows” (p. 49). Since such participation is a type of 
grasping reality, then someone who believes someone else who 
knows “is able to grasp more reality” (p. 52) than is possible when 
one relies only upon what one has experienced oneself or knows 
only on the basis of one’s own insights—and apart from cases of 
pathological mistrust, we do not normally rely solely upon our 
own experiences and insights in everyday life. instead, ever since 
early childhood we participate to an ever larger extent and in 
many different ways in a knowledge that we have not acquired for 
ourselves and that we ourselves do not genuinely possess.22
it is further essential for belief in the sense thematized here 
that the one who believes is subjectively certain of what he or she 
believes (cf. Pieper 1962, p. 60). This too is relevant for our problem 
of constitution, since whoever believes someone about something 
is relying upon the truth of what has been said, taking it “at face 
value.” For such a person, things are the way the believed, trusted 
other says they are. Thus for the one who believes, a state of affairs the 
other presents as obtaining does indeed obtain. in this respect belief 
has the same epistemic effect as knowledge: it makes reality 
accessible, and for the believing subject, it constitutes what exists 
in the pregnant sense, i.e., objects and states of affairs that are 
intersubjectively demonstrable as existing.23 it should therefore 
now be clear that belief in the sense of “taking objects as existing 
and states of affairs as obtaining” on the basis of the testimony of 
others has a crucial object- and world-constituting function, since 
apart from the relatively small compass of taking-for-true in the 
mode of knowledge (in the sense explicated above, i.e., taking-for-
true on the basis of one’s own experience and insight), it is above 
all taking-for-true in the mode of belief that has objects that 
22  here we may point to the epistemological problem of knowledge on the basis of the 
testimony of others, a problem that has been intensively discussed among analytically oriented 
epistemologists ever since coady (1992); cf. laskey and Sosa (2006).
23  In the case of knowledge and belief as specific forms of having-in-acceptance, it must be 
noted that with husserl, “holding good” or “acceptance” (geltung) is not the same as “validity” 
(gültigkeit). everything valid is indeed accepted as holding good, but not everything accepted 
as holding good has the status of validity. in this sense, as husserl says in an as yet unpublished 
manuscript, “To hold good is not yet to be valid in the pregnant sense. [...] Validity, truth [...] is 
a child of critique” (“geltend ist aber noch nicht im prägnanten Sinn gültig. [...] die gültigkeit, 
die Wahrheit [...] ist ein Kind der Kritik”—Ms. B I 10/56). in the present translation, “gültig” is 
translated as “valid”; the terms “gelten” and “geltung” are always rendered using some version of 
the locutions “holding good” and “acceptance.”
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exist and states of affairs that obtain as intentionally correlated 
with it, and that has a world holding good as existing as its total 
intentional correlate.
That belief has a thing- and world-constitutive function is 
familiar to everyone from everyday life. if we learn from people 
we believe that our neighbor is incurably ill with cancer, then 
on our next encounter we will see this neighbor with different 
eyes; the sense in which this person immediately appears to us 
in perception has become different. hence what we have here is 
belief, in the sense just explicated, in its constitutive function of 
determining the objective sense. it is similar in more primitive 
cases of “enrichment of meaning” and “continuing development of 
meaning” (hua Vi, p. 161/158). what husserl describes in the 
following quotation, although without using the word “belief ” 
(he speaks instead of “co-judging, as it were”), is a simple case 
of constitution through belief, a case in which the appresentation 
of a thing-quality is accomplished through taking over and 
believing something communicated and through the subsequent 
involuntary habitualization of what is thus taken over:
if someone says to me that the back side of the thing is red, then i 
apply the predicate “red” to it, co-judging, as it were; [...] then what 
the thing attains for me is both the closer determination of the 
back side as red and the conceptual content of this determination, 
although not on the basis of my own experience determining the 
thing. (hua XXXiX, p. 425)
The thing holds good for me henceforth—up until a possible 
correction of my conviction compels me to new knowledge—as a 
thing whose back side is red. my belief, my habitual taking what 
is said by another as true, thus determines the inner horizon of 
the thing, and thereby implicitly determines the total sense of the 
thing in the mode of a habitual intentionality.
Using the vocabulary of ideas i, husserl could characterize the 
habitual intentionalities of knowledge and belief as noeses, and 
indeed, as habitual noeses.24 as habitual noeses, the noeses of 
knowledge and belief are non-episodic noeses. But in contrast 
24  husserl introduced the concept of noesis as the concept correlative to that of noema 
in ideas i (1913), but it seems that all he thematized there were noeses that as performances 
of intentional sense-bestowing had the character of currently lived (or livable) intendings, 
intendings we are explicitly conscious of (hua iii/1, cf. §§85, pp. 87f.).
EPISODIC AND NON-EPISODIC INTENTIONAlITy
rochUS Sowa rWTh aachen university 
258
to episodic noeses (e.g., judgments performed in speech acts 
of assertion or perceptual observations of processes), i have no 
consciousness of the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. it 
is even a criterion of habitual noeses that we can legitimately 
ascribe them to someone asleep or unconscious, whereas we 
cannot ascribe episodic noeses to a sleeping or unconscious 
person. Thus, for example, i can legitimately claim that a sleeping 
person knows that Paris is the capital of France or that 2 × 2 = 
4, just as i can legitimately claim that this person knows how 
to swim or to play the piano. when someone knows or believes 
this or that, this person is not prereflectively aware of this 
knowledge or belief (along with the known or believed-in state 
of affairs); the person has no lived experience of this knowledge 
or belief: to use the language of Brentano, it is not the content of 
an accompanying “inner consciousness.”25 what characterizes 
acts (intentional lived experiences)—namely, that they are lived, 
that we are preref lectively aware of them as such—does not apply 
to the habitualities of knowledge and belief. when i know that 
Paris is the capital of France or that 2 × 2 = 4, i do not have a lived 
experience of knowing these states of affairs. in contrast, when i 
am watching a bird sitting in a tree, i am immediately conscious 
of perceiving something; when i add 143 and 922 “in my head,” i 
am immediately aware that i am doing so. when i carry out such 
episodic noeses, someone can ask me, “what are you doing right 
now?” or “what were you doing a moment ago?” (using the word 
“doing” in the broadest sense), and i can provide the answer on 
the basis of my prereflective awareness of the acts carried out, 
saying, for instance, “right now i am watching the bird in that 
tree over there” or “i just added 143 and 922 ‘in my head.’” it is 
similar for the episodic psychic states that i am aware of (feelings, 
moods), states about which someone can ask me, “how are you 
feeling right now?” But this kind of question cannot be posed in 
principle about habitual noeses.
25  cf. Brentano’s exposition in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Brentano 1874), Book 
2, ch. ii, iii. given the sharp distinction Brentano draws between inner perception and inner 
observation (Book 1, §2), the only thing Brentano can mean by “inner perception” or “inner 
consciousness” is what has more recently been termed prereflective self-awareness. Gallagher 
and Zahavi allege that when Brentano speaks of inner consciousness, he means something 
other than “prereflectively, my experience is not itself an object for me” or “I do not occupy 
the position of an observer, spectator, or in(tro)spector who attends to this experience”—see 
gallagher and Zahavi (2008), p. 53; however, this interpretation has no foundation in the text of 
the abovementioned two chapters on inner consciousness in Brentano’s main work. 
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That it belongs to the essence of habitual noeses of knowledge and 
belief that they are not present for lived experience or preref lective 
awareness does not alter their status as intentional, for they are 
both characterized by the same feature that acts or intentional 
lived experiences also exhibit: namely, by mineness [ Jemeinigkeit] 
and by having an intentional objectivity (an object in the narrower 
sense or a state of affairs), a theme, something that they are 
“about” (in discussions of intentionality in english-speaking 
philosophy of mind, this latter specific quality of intentionality 
has tentatively been termed “aboutness”). The habitualities of 
knowledge and belief are distinguished by mineness insofar as 
they have an intentional subject, i.e., the subject who knows or 
believes something. 
They are distinguished by so-called “aboutness” or 
“directedness”26 toward an intentional objectivity insofar as they 
are related to an objectivity (an object in the narrower sense or 
a state of affairs)—one that as an intentional objectivity has the 
distinguishing feature that nothing real has to correspond to it: 
the object purely and simply as intended need not exist, the state 
of affairs purely and simply as intended need not obtain.27 we can 
nevertheless thematize the intended objectivity as such (i.e., 
the currently intended objectivity as intended), analyzing and 
describing the manner in which it is intended without paying 
the slightest attention to the question of the reality of what has 
been purely and simply intended. if we use the term “noema” 
to designate not only what is intended as such in the case of 
episodic noeses but also what is intentionally meant as such in a 
non-episodic manner in knowledge and belief (i.e., the habitually 
26  The metaphorical talk of “being directed” toward something (an objectivity in the broadest 
sense) is only good for a first, rough characterization of intentionality, and proves inadequate 
for numerous types of episodic intentionality. however, we cannot use the metaphor for the 
epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief either, as if a subject were “directed” toward 
known or believed-in objectivities (states of affairs); here the metaphor of “aboutness” is more 
appropriate. in these and in all other cases of intentional relatedness toward something, both 
locutions (“directedness” and “aboutness”) point to the formal quality whereby intentional 
relations are asymmetrical relations: something (and indeed, always a “subject”) is related to 
something (an “object”) in a certain way, not the other way around.
27  as husserl says in §90 of ideas i, “every intentional lived experience [...] has its ‘intentional object,’ 
i.e., its objective sense. [...] The situation defining [this] sense for us [is] the circumstance [...] that the 
non-existence (or the conviction of non-existence) of the objectivated or thought of object pure and 
simple pertaining to the objectivation in question (and therefore to any particular intentional lived 
experience whatever) cannot rob any objectivation of its ‘being objectivated’ as such” (hua iii/1, pp. 
206f./217f.).
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accepted as such), then with knowledge and belief we have noeses 
that do indeed have an intended objectivity (a habitually intended 
state of affairs as such), but as habitual noeses do not have the 
character of being carried out in prereflective awareness.
in light of such non-conscious noeses, husserl’s concept of noesis 
becomes problematic; the question arises whether we need the concept 
of noesis at all—indeed, whether it has any descriptive contents at all. 
either the habitualities of knowledge and belief are noeses, or they 
are not. In the first case, if they are noeses, then it is not essential for 
noeses to be lived experiences of which we are prereflectively aware, 
so “noesis” becomes equivalent to “having a noema”—e.g., the noesis of 
being convinced is nothing other than having a conviction, and visual 
perceiving is nothing but having a visual perceptual appearance. But 
in the second case, if they are not noeses, then there is no universal 
“correlation” of noesis and noema characterizing the entire field of 
intentionality in general, and the correlation must accordingly be 
limited to the sphere of intentional lived experiences. with the former 
case, we are close to dispensing with the concept of noesis entirely and 
characterizing the multiform field of intentionality purely noematically, 
i.e., limiting all descriptive analyses of acts and habitualities to 
analyses of noemata.28 in the latter case, we have the by no means 
trivial task of descriptively exhibiting the actuality of noeses in the 
sphere of intentional lived experiences and giving the concept of 
noesis a precise signification. If one wants to retain both the concept 
of noesis and the so-called noetic-noematic correlation as a universal 
correlation—which is what I would like to advocate—then one must 
allow non-conscious habitual noeses on the one hand while showing 
on the other hand how episodic and non-episodic (habitual) noeses can 
be descriptively brought to light. This would call for attaining greater 
determinateness and a definitive content not only for the concept 
of the noesis, but also for the notoriously controversial notion of the 
noema.
i am conscious of a judgment or a perception i actually carry out, 
and such consciousness is “inner perception” in Brentano’s sense, 
i.e., I am prereflectively aware of performing such an act, and in 
28  hans-Ulrich hoche has been advocating dispensing with the noema ever since publishing 
his handlung, Bewusstsein und leib (hoche 1973). he is particularly convincing in his latest book 
(hoche 2007), especially in his extensive essay on “consciousness” (pp. 129–95), which from a 
methodological point of view provides a successful synthesis of the methods of phenomenology 
and of linguistic analysis. 
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each case i can in principle provide descriptions of it through 
subsequent reflection founded on retention or recollection. As 
shown above, however, it is completely different in the case of 
the habitual noeses of knowledge and belief. among these (and 
certainly not the least of these) we find knowledge of our own 
current “circumstances” (in the broadest sense), especially the 
knowledge of where i am in space and time right now. at the 
moment, for instance, i know that while i am composing this 
text I am in my office at the philosophical institute in Aachen. 
But i am not explicitly conscious of this knowledge, in contrast, 
for example, to the numerous acts of thinking and writing i am 
performing while I’m working on this section of the essay—I am 
prereflectively aware of the latter acts as I carry them out, and thus 
I can recall them and thematize them in acts of reflection. To this 
(non-conscious) knowledge of one’s own current circumstances 
there also belongs the knowledge of social circumstances and 
relationships. Thus i know, e.g., that i am at a party when i am 
discussing a philosophical problem with another guest at the party, 
or that i am talking to my superior when i am making a request 
to the head of the institute, and this sort of knowledge of my 
circumstances is also characterized by non-episodic intentionality.  
i am indeed not conscious of my habitual noeses (along with their 
noemata), but they are nevertheless undoubtedly “there” and 
determine the sense of the currently appearing objectivity (more 
generally: the objectivity i am currently conscious of). But there 
is more to it than that. These non-conscious noeses also effectively 
determine my action: they are at work (and their efficacy can be 
descriptively brought to light) in all cases of action in which 
the actor automatically takes habitually accepted contents (of 
knowledge or belief) into account. and apart from the “actions” 
of newborns, this is true for all actions. even when the actor is 
giving no thought whatever to these contents (and thus is not 
“conscious” of them in the narrower sense of being explicitly aware 
of them), they are mentally, as it were, “in view” [“in Sicht”] insofar 
as the actor is taking them into consideration in “circumspective” 
[“umsichtig”] action.29 Thus, for example, we are habitually keeping 
29  what heidegger describes in §§22 and 23 of Sein und Zeit (heidegger 1927) as the familiar 
spatial surrounding world “circumspectively” [umsichtig] articulated into “places” and “regions” 
is a phenomenon that cannot be made comprehensible without turning to the habitual 
intentionality of knowledge and belief. in a genetic perspective, all forms of familiarity and 
acquaintance turn out to be manifestations of habitual intentionality.
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in mind that we are at a museum when we speak in muted tones 
and refrain from munching on the sandwiches we’ve brought along 
or lighting up a cigarette. we know, or as we can also loosely say, 
we are “aware” that we are in a museum, and we act accordingly 
without bringing the fact that we are in the museum to explicit 
awareness (whether continually or discretely).
what holds good both for praxis in the usual sense and for the 
situated knowledge relevant to the action concerned also holds 
good for perception, which husserl called a “primal praxis” 
[urpraxis] underlying all other practice.30 when we are perceiving 
a house, for example, whatever we know about an individual 
house familiar to us or about houses in general is also habitually 
mentally “in view,” and this knowledge has its effect in the 
primal praxis of perception, co-determining the individually and 
typically determined sense that the perceived objectivity has for 
us as well as co-determining the way we behave toward it. This 
is what lends an individually or merely typically familiar thing 
(we know this specific house or this type of house31) its character 
of “familiarity” [“Bekanntheitscharakter”]. But what is known 
(gewusst) about a house in this manner (and thereby functions in 
determining the sense of what we are perceiving) has nothing to 
do with anything explicitly conscious (bewusst). it is not a manifest 
content of consciousness—all we are explicitly conscious of here 
is the perceptually intended house as a whole, even though it 
does have a certain implicit character of individual or typical 
familiarity. and the moment that determines the perceived house 
as “familiar” is the moment in which the habitual noesis of the 
relevant knowledge “exerts its efficacy.”
insofar as knowledge and belief are horizon-intentionalities that 
essentially co-participate in the constitution of any (individually 
or typically) familiar perceptual thing we encounter, they are a 
phenomenon of habitual intentionality for which we could coin 
the german term “gewusstsein” (literally, being-known), following 
the model of the german word “Bewusstsein” (consciousness—
30  See hua XXXiX, Beilage XXVi, pp. 382–84.
31  here and elsewhere in the present essay i am disregarding the everyday language 
distinction between two german verbs meaning “to know,” “kennen” and “wissen.” we say that 
we know objects (especially persons and places) in the sense that we “recognize” them (kennen), 
but not that we know them in the sense of possessing knowledge about them (wissen). however, i 
am taking the concept of knowledge (Wissen) in a broad sense that also includes recognizing and 
being familiar with objects. (note that the english version of this essay also makes no distinction 
between being explicitly “conscious” of something and being explicitly “aware” of it.) 
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literally, being-conscious). how could this be expressed in 
english? we might turn to the neologism “knownness,” but not 
as a predicate that merely expresses the status of something 
known irrespective of the way in which it is known. instead, what 
“knownness” points to here is first of all a specific manner of 
being-known that is not a matter of our being explicitly conscious 
of something. in addition, however, our concept of “knownness” 
refers to something that is not only already known, but comes 
into play by implicitly “informing” our lived experience in a 
currently given case, exerting its efficacy by contributing to 
the constitution of the sense of the situation or object itself. 
Thus in the present essay, the term “knownness”—a term that 
can play a useful role in the theory of constitution and that 
will be understood in a broad sense including implicitly being-
believed-in—designates the habituality of taking states of affairs 
as obtaining, and doing so in the modes of knowledge and belief 
in such a way that what is known or believed in is relevant to the 
situation of the action and/or sense-determining, here and now, for 
what one is currently explicitly and thematically aware of through an 
intentional lived experience. 
hence it is this actual, living, sense- and action-determining 
reference to what we are currently thematically conscious of 
in any given case that distinguishes the contents of “knownness” 
from sheer contents of knowledge. Knowledge can also be 
“dead,” completely irrelevant for the current situation and 
the objectivities given for consciousness (and most of our 
individual stock of knowledge is irrelevant for the currently 
actual situation!); in contrast, the contents of knownness are, 
in accordance with our concept of knownness, distinguished 
by being situationally relevant and by their immediate sense-
reference to what is currently thematic for consciousness. But if, 
along with husserl, we understand the expression “consciousness” 
in the narrowest sense, contents of knownness are not contents 
of consciousness, even if they contribute to (and in this sense 
co-comprise) the sense of the objectivity or action that we are 
explicitly aware of. when i am admiring the closet door i am 
looking at, I already “know” that it leads to something “inside”—I 
don’t have any sense that what I am looking at is a dummy door—
yet i am not “conscious of ” this interior: it is not the object of 
an intentional lived experience (and although i “know” that i 
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could explore what is inside the closet in new acts, i only “know” 
this because, and to the extent to which, i “know” that it has an 
“inside” in the first place). in the narrowest sense of the words 
“conscious” and “consciousness,” contents of knownness are “non-
conscious.” Thus with regard to these contents we find ourselves 
in the epistemic state that husserl terms “non-consciousness,” 
since “what is ‘conscious’ in the narrowest sense means [...] what 
i am occupied with, what pertains to the unity of the being-
occupied-with—and this itself once again has a central mode, 
<that> of having consciousness of, being conscious of, in the 
narrowest sense of all, [referring to] what lies in the center, the 
original point of [our] being-occupied-with-[something]” (hua 
Xlii, p. 38). Thus contents of knownness are non-conscious in 
both the narrow and the narrowest sense of the word “conscious.” 
however, they are also non-conscious in the broader sense of 
“conscious” in which this term is applied to the perceptual field 
that i always have as an awake i, a field that includes everything 
that is merely affectively present and “ready” to be perceived.32 
compared with these three significations of “conscious,” then, 
habitual contents of knownness are non-conscious, whether 
they arise from one’s own experiences and insights or rest 
on the testimony of others. as indicated above, however, in a 
certain manner they are nevertheless “there” as contents co-
accepted in the contents of consciousness pertaining to the 
current thing-perception—they “too” are “there” [“mit da”] as 
contents co-determining the currently actual objective sense. The 
intentional consciousness currently intending its thematic object 
is “saturated” and “permeated,” as it were, with knownness, and 
would hardly be thinkable in its current concrete intentionality 
without this knownness. Suppose, for instance, that we attempted 
to remove all contents of knownness—everything having to do 
with what is individually or typically known or believed—from 
the perceptual consciousness we have when looking at our 
wristwatch, stripping away the individual and typical character of 
familiarity pertaining to “my watch,” “any watch whatever,” “any 
cultural thing whatever,” “any thing whatever”; such a denuded 
perception would not even deserve the name “thing-perception.” 
husserl therefore says the following about the contentually 
more or less determinate (but never empty) constitutively co-
32  cf. hua Xlii, p. 55.
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functioning individual and typical “knowledge and co-knowledge” 
of a thing: “if it were not co-accepted, then the experience would 
not be an experience of this one thing at all” (husserl 1976, §8, p. 
27/32; emphasis added).
Such thought experiments attempting to omit something known 
or believed can help to determine whether or not something is 
currently co-accepted—whether something belongs to a specific 
actual content of consciousness as a relevant “knownness,” or 
whether it is situationally irrelevant knowledge that remains 
“dead” at the moment. lived experiences of disappointment have 
a similar function. if, for example, i am putting on the shirt i had 
laid out to wear on my trip and discover, to my annoyance, that 
there is a button missing, this demonstrates after the fact that 
when i was getting my travel clothes ready, i had “presumed” 
that all of the buttons were there—thus that a state of affairs 
did indeed “obtain”—without ever having explicitly intended 
this state of affairs or having become thematically aware of it. 
however, the habitual presumption that has been situationally 
“activated” as relevant here in the form of “taking this state of 
affairs as obtaining” is nothing other than “knownness” in the 
sense discussed, and the state of affairs held to obtain is nothing 
other than its knownness-content. 
Up to this point, i have attempted to show that the perceptual 
consciousness of things mingles episodic and non-episodic 
intentionality, and that such habitualities as knowledge and belief 
play an important—and indeed necessary—constitutive role in such 
consciousness. in what follows, i would like to provide a sketch of 
the role these epistemic habitualities play in the constitution of the 
world of realities as a whole, suggesting how they are co-effective in 
“bringing the world’s being and being-thus to constant acceptance 
for me” (“für mich Sein und Sosein der welt zu beständiger geltung 
zu bringen”—Ms. B I 14/37b). This broader problem of constitution 
can be put into words in the following question: what makes it 
possible for us to be “conscious” of a world as a whole in every moment 
of our waking life while we are intentionally occupied with this and 
that, so that we are therefore “conscious” of our waking life as a 
living-in-the-world? here too, husserl’s answer makes good use of 
the concept of horizon in the form of the outer horizon and of the 
world-horizon as the outermost outer horizon.
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a text from 1933 offers the following illuminating 
characterizations of the concept of horizon in general and of the 
concepts of both inner horizon and outer horizon, with the latter 
lying halfway, as it were, to the concept of world-horizon:
The horizonality—the non-conscious milieu surrounding what we 
are currently specifically aware of, or the horizon of latent, non-
conscious, and yet co-accepted sense pertaining to the patent, 
intuitively fulfilled sense, and indeed, as co-determining <the> 
sense of the patent objectivity—is, however, a double horizonality. 
on the one hand, it concerns the substrate-structure of the 
intuitively presented real item insofar as the latter [...] has its 
[inner] horizon of explication; [...] <on the other hand>, the concrete 
objects stand within outer horizons, within their intuitive fields, 
which in their ontic sense themselves have [...] sense-determinations 
“from the outside.” (hua XXXiX, pp. 102–104)
what husserl here calls “horizon” is the sense-determining, co-
accepted “non-conscious milieu surrounding what we are currently 
specifically aware of,” and this corresponds to what has previously 
been said about the habitual horizon-intentionalities of knowledge 
and belief, whose knowledge- and belief-contents are non-conscious, 
but—as co-accepted contents—are nevertheless sense-determining 
for the conscious or patent objective sense. in the passage just quoted, 
Husserl characterizes the outer horizon as the field of intuitive 
but unthematic objects surrounding the object that is currently 
thematically intuitive. whenever we are related to an object of this 
field through an act of perception, we are automatically and “passively” 
(non-actionally) co-related to this co-appearing field. Beyond this 
passively co-appearing perceptual field given in horizonal awareness 
we find an enveloping field of which we are not conscious, yet toward 
which we are always “intending beyond” (as husserl terms it in his 
vocabulary of consciousness). But such intending-beyond toward 
what is no longer perceived is a habitual intending-beyond in the 
form of knowledge and belief. and as a habitual, universal horizon-
intention, it ultimately reaches beyond all currently intuitive fields to 
the world constantly co-accepted as the total unity of realities. as the 
quotation above puts it, each intuitive individual thing receives “sense-
determinations ‘from the outside,’” i.e., from the habitually known and 
believed-in world. in addition, however, the currently co-conscious, 
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indeterminately delimited perceptual field as a whole receives the 
sense of being something from the world or a sector of the world. Speaking 
of being “conscious” or “aware” of something in a loose sense of these 
expressions, Husserl writes as follows about this sense—a sense that all 
appearing things (as well as qualities of and relations between things) 
have, as appearing, in common: “[we are] conscious of all of [...] the real 
items we are currently aware of as real objects (qualities, relations, etc.) 
from the world, as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon” 
(husserl 1976, §8, p. 29/33). husserl characterizes this peculiar sense-
determination quite similarly in another text in which (once again using 
his extended vocabulary of consciousness) he says of the “total world-
field” (“totale[n] Weltfeld”) that it “is in acceptance for consciousness by 
virtue of an indeterminately general co-intending that constantly gives 
the sector as such the sense of [being a] sector” (“bewusstseinsmäßig 
in geltung ist, vermöge einer unbestimmt allgemeinen mitmeinung, 
die ständig dem ausschnitt als solchem den Sinn eines ausschnittes 
gibt”—Ms. E III 11/2a). This sense of being a sector, of “being something 
from the world”—this sense with which everything real appears to us, 
a sense that lends anything and everything, even the most fleeting 
and private stirrings of our souls, the sense of worldliness—is, however, 
not a phenomenon of consciousness. instead, as an effect of horizon-
intentionality, and as a phenomenon of habitual knowledge and belief, 
it is a phenomenon of knownness in the sense explicated above. at every 
moment of our waking lives we know of the world as the totality of 
spatiotemporal realities constantly encompassing us, and we know this 
in the form of a habitual “indeterminately general co-intending.” But 
this means that in all experience of real items, we also have an implicit 
knowledge of each appearing real item, each appearing plurality of real 
items, and each field of real items within which something real appears 
as salient as being sectors of the world.33 when husserl says that the 
“world [...] [is] pregiven as holding good horizonally” (“welt [...] vorgegeben 
[ist] als horizonthaft geltende”—ms. a Vii 12/81a, emphasis added), he is 
using neutral terminology to characterize this universal descriptive 
state of affairs. The use of the locution “holding good horizonally” 
offers the possibility of doing descriptive justice both to the sectoriality 
33  This implicit knowledge of “the world” can take very different forms and varies not only from 
culture to culture, but within a person’s lifespan, as well as within the history of smaller and larger 
human communities. The world comes to awareness [bewusst] or is known [gewusst] differently for 
humans with a mythical image of the world and humans whose worldview is shaped by modern 
science. The different knowledge of (and belief about) the world co-determines in each case what 
the world currently holds good as and how it is co-accepted in experience and action.
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already mentioned and to the fact that “any experience of something 
belonging to the world [is] at the same time [implicitly] an experience 
(although an unthematic one) of the world as a totality” (“jede 
erfahrung von weltlichem, obschon unthematisch, [implizit] zugleich 
totale Welterfahrung [ist]”—Ms. A VII 12/79b), thus avoiding the vague 
and awkward talk of “co-intending” or “co-consciousness,” as well as 
the ambiguous sense in which the noun “co-intending” (mitmeinung) can 
refer either to the noetic side (mitmeinen as the act of co-intending) or to 
the noematic side (mitgemeinte as its co-intended correlate). 
Because the “noetic” or subjective “correlate” of ongoing and enduring 
ontic acceptance [Seinsgeltung] is not a current episodic intending or 
having-in-consciousness but a habitual having-in-acceptance, and 
because knowledge and belief are both fundamental epistemic modes of 
having-in-acceptance, the subjective “correlate” of the sense-formation 
holding good for me as “existing world” is a knowing or believing. 
as habitual horizon-intentionalities, knowledge and belief are the 
“passive” (non-actional), non-episodic subjective performances thanks 
to which we have a world at all, and indeed, have it as the “existing 
total unity of realities existing in themselves” (hua XXXiX, p. 83) 
that is necessarily co-accepted with ontic certainty in the experience 
of real items.34 But as the habitually known or believed-in universal 
unity of sense and acceptance, the world of realities—a world that 
we are not explicitly aware of in experiencing individual mundane 
realities—is still not something that we are somehow “co-aware” of, 
not something “co-intended” in act-like fashion as is the case with, 
say, the co-perceived background co-appearing with a seen thing. The 
language of “knowledge” and “belief” is suitable for the phenomenon of 
habitually having-in-acceptance, and allows us to call the phenomenon 
we are actually dealing with (i.e., the epistemic phenomenon of habitual 
intentionality) by its true name without tempting us to overextend the 
vocabulary of “intending” or to reach for such ambiguous expressions 
as “co-intending” or “meaning more.” with the help of the terms 
“knowledge” and “belief,” then, we can give unequivocal expression to 
the intentional performances that make the world present to us at every 
moment of our waking life as the totality of realities that are habitually 
held in constant ontic acceptance—and that constantly make us, 
ourselves habitually present to ourselves as beings existing in the world 
34  The being of the world is certain because “as the totality of individual entities standing 
in co-acceptance starting from any [particular] individual entity, the total horizon cannot 
be modalized. The type of ontic certainty [Seinsgewissheit] of the world that is founded in 
the modalizable certainty pertaining to individual [entities] is the apodictic basis for all 
modalizations, etc.” (hua XXXiX, p. 128). 
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at every moment of our waking life.35 These intentional performances 
consist precisely in the “appresenting” performances of knowledge and belief, 
which as habitualities are necessarily non-conscious, but which as sense-
determining intentional performances lend all spatiotemporal realities—
and thereby us, ourselves—the sense of being mundane, of being something 
in the world. in a manuscript from the 1930s, husserl expresses this state 
of affairs as follows: 
whatever i may be thematically occupied with, it is known to me 
as something existing in the world. with anything and everything, 
i have ontic certainty of the world. i have this a priori with every 
single experience, with every single perceptual field, with every 
single theme, with everything, as a horizon of continual, permanent 
certainty running through shifting themes. (hua XXXiX, p. 73)36
The permanence of a world holding good as existing for an i is the 
“correlate” of the permanence of the habitualities that this i has 
developed or acquired, since the i at the center of the countless 
performances of intentional life is a concrete subject for whom the 
world “constantly” exists—and is such a subject only as a “substrate of 
habitualities” rather than as “an empty pole of identity” (hua i, §32, pp. 
35  here it can merely be mentioned that by being known in empty horizons as the universe of 
what is present and co-present, the world is also known as a world with a world-past and a world-
future. husserl emphasizes the role of empty intentions in the constitution of the world as a temporal 
formation in a manuscript from 1932: “as soon as we are directed toward things we speak of what 
exists in their surroundings but is not seen. Thus in its infinity, in its indeterminate determinability, 
the surrounding world is given at any moment as the surrounding world relative to our own lived 
body, and is given originaliter. as [it is] for the present, so [is it] also similar for <the> future through 
the accompanying expectations and for <the> past through the empty retentions. what is constituted 
through all of these forms of empty intentions is thus not only the delimited unitary thing or a 
‘genuinely’ perceived part of the surrounding world, but the entire world in an indeterminate spatial 
present stretching into the past and into an indeterminate future” (hua XXXiX, p. 143).
36  It may be remarked in passing that this state of affairs—i.e., the fact that the world I experience 
at every waking moment as “a world holding good for me as existing” is a formation of habitual 
knowledge, belief, and knownness—determines the methodical sense of the phenomenological epochē: 
i cannot refrain from knowledge of the world and of entities in the world, i cannot abandon this 
conviction, because all i can refrain from is the performance of acts; however, convictions such as 
knowledge and belief are not acts, but something habitual. as husserl says in numerous places, all i 
can refrain from is making use of my world-knowledge and world-belief, for “having a conviction and 
making use of this conviction within a sphere of judgment, letting an ontic ground be given through 
the conviction, are two different things” (hua mat iV, p. 74).  it lies within our freedom to make no 
use of our convictions; we can decide to make no use of them, and as phenomenologists, we can 
maintain this decision in our descriptive work, thus refraining from all prescientific and scientific 
judgments that explicitly or implicitly posit the existence of the world or of items in the world. 
Through this refraining (epochē) we reduce the sphere of possible judgments to the sphere of possible 
phenomenological judgments, i.e., to the sphere of possible judgments about pure phenomena—
phenomena purified of naive positing of entities: “phenomena of being” [“Seinsphänomene”], phenomena 
in which entities still appear, but only as entities holding good for me (us) as existing. 
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100f.). what holds good for individual objects constituted as existing 
also holds good for the world constituted as existing as a whole: 
the “abiding existence and being-thus [is] a correlate of the 
habitualit[ies]  constituted in the ego-pole [itself] by virtue of 
[its] position-taking[s]” (hua i, §33, p. 102). it is by virtue of such 
position-takings and of countless acquired and “firmly developed” 
habitualities that “a nature [...], a cultural world, a [human] world 
with [its] social forms, and so forth” exists for an i (hua i, §37, pp. 
109f.). husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological principle “that 
nothing exists for me otherwise than by virtue of the actual and 
potential performance of my own consciousness”37 is accordingly to be 
supplemented by adding, “or by virtue of the intentional performance 
of non-conscious habitualities,” since habitualities essentially belong 
to the performances of the “effective intentionality” thanks to which 
entities—and finally, the world as a whole—exist for me at all. 
as the constitution of an objective world existing through and for 
a concrete subject endowed with habitualities, world-constitution 
necessarily has an intersubjective dimension: the objective world, 
which has the sense, “world for everyone,” rests upon communication 
and tradition, and thereby upon taking over and “believing” the 
knowledge of others. nature in particular (in the sense of what holds 
good for us as objective nature) is an intersubjective unity of sense and 
acceptance whose subjective correlate is empirical knowledge that 
is intersubjectively confirmed and accepted as valid [gültig], i.e., 
knowledge procured by natural science—more concretely, knowledge 
that natural scientists convey to us and that we “believe” and take 
over for our own stock of knowledge.38 The world holding good for 
37  hua XVii, §94, p. 241/234. husserl expresses the same principle in two further places in 
the same section: “no being nor being-thus for me, whether as actuality or as possibility, but as 
accepted by me [mir geltend]” (hua XVii, p. 241/234); “whatever i encounter as an existing object is 
something that [...] has received its whole being-sense for me from my effective intentionality; not 
a shadow of that sense remains excluded from my effective intentionality” (hua XVii, p. 241/234).
38  as early as 1917 husserl already mentions the role that “believing in” knowledge taken over 
from others plays in the intersubjective constitution of the world; writing in “Phänomenologie und 
erkenntnistheorie” (a paper never published during his lifetime), he says: “[...] to a great extent (although 
not always), i do not content myself with merely empathizing with [other persons]; rather, i ‘take 
over’ their experiences, their judgments, their theories—i.e., I do not merely ascribe these to others as 
opinions and convictions these others hold, but simultaneously award them the value of being accepted 
by me. Along with my experience via empathy—my experience that the other is experiencing thus and 
such—I carry out a ‘co-experience,’ participating in their positing even where I am not simultaneously 
experiencing the same objectivities that i have ascribed to them as actual experiential givens. it is the 
same when i believe in and take up any descriptive statements that others make about something i myself 
have not seen. Thus to a great extent it is through this kind of co-positing that i adopt and am informed by 
many of the position-takings i have experienced via empathy, especially with regard to others’ judgments 
and conclusions about the world, with regard to their world-knowledge of any type” (hua XXV, p. 180).
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each individual is accordingly not merely a sense-formation whose 
subjective correlate is each individual’s own knowledge, but is also, 
and above all, a sense-formation that is the correlate of belief in 
the sense of accepting the truth of something communicated by 
others. The world intersubjectively valid [gültig] as existing (be it 
a prescientific lifeworld or a world objectively determined by the 
natural and cultural sciences) rests above all upon the knowledge of 
others, a knowledge we take over from others whose truth we trust—
especially, in our modern world based on epistemic division of labor, 
from those who are experts in their field and as such have reliable 
knowledge about this or that aspect of the world. as laypersons 
(which we all are with regard to nearly all scientific disciplines, and 
most of us are with respect to all of them), we trust these experts 
and their corroborated procedures for attaining secure, dependable, 
intersubjectively definitive knowledge. in this way our knowledge of 
the world is broadened through belief. Thus when on the basis of such 
belief we habitually take a state of affairs as obtaining, this is an 
essential, or even the most essential, noetic-noematic component 
in the constitution of the objective world holding good for us as 
objective. For in such believing—which is not unlike the blind faith 
of the celebrated/notorious charcoal burner39—we do indeed believe 
in science (unless we are extremely skeptical of it), and we let science 
tell us what the world is and what “holds it together at the heart [im 
innersten zusammenhält].”40  
39  Josef Pieper writes as follows concerning certain insulting language that luther let loose upon 
the world (and concerning the thereby unjustly disparaged matter in question): “The ‘implicit faith’ 
[das ‘unausdrücklich einbeschließende glauben’] (termed fides implicita by the Scholastics) is something 
recognized and practiced everywhere else. To be sure, in theology the concept of fides implicita has 
become controversial”; referring to martin luther’s 1533 text Warnungsschrift an die zu frankfurt am 
main, sich vor Zwinglischer lehre zu hüten, Pieper continues, “there is only a short step from the concept 
of implicit faith to luther’s derogatory term, ‘blind faith’ [Köhlerglaube, literally: the charcoal burner’s 
faith]. Thus when the charcoal burner [Köhler] on the bridge to Prague responded to a doctor of 
divinity who asked him what he believed by saying that he believed what the church believes, it seems 
to me that this much-maligned man’s answer is not at all something ridiculous and despicable, but 
rather something exceptionally wise, apt, and accurate—and as already mentioned, it is something 
taken as perfectly natural everywhere else. in my opinion, if i were to be asked about the structure 
of the universe or of matter, i would respond by referring to modern physics: i may only have a vague 
knowledge of its results, but (in a way that may be difficult to define precisely) I nevertheless truly 
participate in these results because i am allying myself with men like Planck, Bohr, de Broglie, and 
heisenberg” (Pieper 1962, pp. 101f.).
40  Johann wolfgang von goethe, faust i, verse 382f.: “dass ich erkenne, was die welt im 
innersten zusammenhält.”
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